Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

Status
Not open for further replies.

StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
The last comment on lateral recruiting to sustain a large enough pool of qualified submariners is surprising.

I would be very interested in fellow posters response to this?

Regards,

Massive
Anecdotal, attend any Australian submariner event, you will find a significant number of ex-RN personnel. Identifiable by the wacky Dolphin with scales (RN), most have matching sets of RN and RAN dolphins.

With the RN going Nuclear, and Australia moving its sub base to WA, I no doubt expect many less RN sailors in the force than previously. I would imagine Canada has similar problems.

Beasley regrets not building 8, which would be much more sustainable number.

I don't see Darwin as a magical solution to the sub problems. Its tropical, its shallow waters, Darwin as a location won't attract more sailors(locally or internationally) to the service, all other navy assets are located in FBE or FBW (which would be ideal to train with for ASW). Its really really far from places like Hawaii or Adelaide.

Meanwhile the HMAS Platypus site sits vacant, apparently unable to be used for anything. Still in remediation (for 10 years!). Costing tax payers as much as when it was an active sub base.

Platypus Remediation Project | Harbour Trust
 

old faithful

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
GF, Ive read before where you mention that A.I. P didnt really offer the RAN much in the way of operational benefit, in fact I think you mentioned that we had a few sets, tested them with Collins, and now they sit around in a shed somewhere, like a paperweight.
The talk atm of Soryu class for RAN. Do you think they would be customised to RAN, s needs a fair bit, even to the point of losing AIP capability to extend the range?
 
Last edited:

hauritz

Well-Known Member
From today's Australian ...

Cookies must be enabled. | The Australian

Here are the pertinent bits for those without a subscription ...
The Australian said:
BUILDING a new fleet of submarines in Australia would be too risky and too expensive, the Abbott government has concluded.

Instead, the government is considering buying “off-the-shelf” options from Japan and Germany, with Japan’s Soryu- class boat the frontrunner.

As well as the risk and cost of building the submarines on home soil, such a project would require big infrastructure spending, whereas Japan has an established production line.

Defence sources have told The Australian it would cost between $50 billion and $80bn to design and build the submarines in Australia. This compares with previous estimates that the submarines were likely to cost between $36bn and $40bn to build.

It is understood that if the deal goes ahead as many as 12 Japanese submarines could be bought for about $25bn.

The German company TKMS offered to build 12 subs for $20bn.

Sources said the previous government’s view that the submarines could be designed and built in time to replace the Collins-Class vessels was “wildly optimistic”.

The Australian has been told the close relationship between Mr Abbott and his counterpart Shinzo Abe was a key to the deal, overcoming bureaucratic opposition in Tokyo and Canberra.


The Japanese submarine would use the US combat system in the nuclear-powered Virginia- Class attack submarines, which is *already fitted to the Collins-Class submarines.
 

Raven22

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Meanwhile the HMAS Platypus site sits vacant, apparently unable to be used for anything. Still in remediation (for 10 years!). Costing tax payers as much as when it was an active sub base.

Platypus Remediation Project | Harbour Trust
HMAS Platypus is about a 100m from my girlfriend's new apartment, and where I'll be living next year. You can see it from the balcony. No active sub base please, that would ruin the view.

Realistically though, HMAS Platypus is far too small to be of any real use as an active base for submarines.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
GF, Ive read before where you mention that A.I. P didnt really offer the RAN much in the way of operational benefit, in fact I think you mentioned that we had a few sets, tested them with Collins, and now they sit around in a shed somewhere, like a paperweight.
The talk atm of Soryu class for RAN. Do you think they would be customised to RAN, s needs a fair bit, even to the point of losing AIP capability to extend the range?
It could be interesting to see what changing the baseline in such a major way does to cost and schedule of a Japanese build, I'm sure political indecision and reluctance to pay for changes upfront but wanting them incorporated latter would have a very similar effect on a Japanese shipyard to what it had on ASC. A pain in the a$$ (PITA) customer can very effectively screw cost and schedule.

The alternative of course is we take a minimal change Soryu and pay the price down the track in operational capability, sustainment, additional forward basing costs and accordingly crew retention. Easy cheap (OTS) answers rarely turn out to be easy or cheap, just look at the AWD, Sea Sprite, Tiger, MRH-90, MU90, Armidales, Sirius, double hulling Success to name a few. All looked like great ideas upfront, cheaper than the ADF preferred options, good for short term budgeting but not good value for money in the long run. When you are talking about capabilities that are expected to last for twenty or thirty years, or even only fifteen you need to look at the big picture, sustainment, upgrades, obsolescence, replacement and disposal, there is a whole life cycle that defence is getting a handle on but unfortunately is beyond the comprehension of the political class.

Mind you a submarine base in Darwin could be very lucrative for me with my resume. As a tax payer though I am just not convinced it would be a good move and would rather the RAN had a purpose designed platform, built and maintained by the most experienced and capable submarine builder and designer in the southern hemisphere with 30-40% of the budgeted costs returning to the local economy.
 

JohnT

New Member
Defence sources have told The Australian it would cost between $50 billion and $80bn to design and build the submarines in Australia. This compares with previous estimates that the submarines were likely to cost between $36bn and $40bn to build.
I've never understood why the cost estimates for building the Collins class replacement in Australia are so high. At $5-7B per boat that would make them several times more expensive than larger, nuclear powered subs like the Astute and Barracuda class.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
To be honest I do not have the foggiest where these cost estimates come from or how they are done. I would not be surprised if there is more than a little cherry picking involved to justify decisions that have already been made just not announced.
 

ASSAIL

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Mind you a submarine base in Darwin could be very lucrative for me with my resume. As a tax payer though I am just not convinced it would be a good move and would rather the RAN had a purpose designed platform, built and maintained by the most experienced and capable submarine builder and designer in the southern hemisphere with 30-40% of the budgeted costs returning to the local economy.
Darwin would be a total disaster as a sub base. Its approaches are shallow and easily mined, to the north are narrow straits, to the east is Torres Strait and deep Indian Ocean water lies 1000nm to the West. Only a lunatic would base them there.
 

Punta74

Member
Assuming an announcement is made in the next few months as most of the media are stating, is the general consensus that the first order would follow ?

2 years to build – probably further 2 years to become operational, so we at earliest we are now looking at 2019. I’m sure the aim would be to have 2-3 in service prior to the first of the Collins being decommissioned.
 

Massive

Well-Known Member
On numbers, if the planned fleet is reduced to 10 it would be interesting to see what the planned available capability would be. Peter Briggs writing for ASPI again:

...twelve submarines is the minimum force size to enable Australia to sustain one deployed at long range in a demanding but practical cycle, provide one operational submarine available for other tasking and have some capacity for ASW training or other contingencies. The deployment mix is one for the strategic judgment of the Government of the day and will depend on the circumstances they face. As a minimum, for a sustainable manpower base we should have at least nine submarines.


Source: How many submarines? (part 2) | The Strategist

Regards,

Massive
 

Joe Black

Active Member
Thinking out loud, wouldn't we be able to "have the cake and eat it too", as in, getting the Japanese to built 2 to 3 complete boats, while train ASC to build the rest. I am also thinking that since the Japanese will be finishing building the Soryu in just a few years, the next cycle to replace the Oyashios are likely to be a new class, no? In that case, is it wise to build all 10 boats of Soryu, or should we look at doing the cycle build like Japan? Why not retain some Collins, swap out the drive trains with that of Soryu's, when we finish the 6th boat, we can move to a new "son-of-Soryu" class boat and start a new cycle?

To me, this is likely to be a win-win situation whereby 1/2 the fleet is built in Japan, half in ASC with tech transfer. ASC get to maintain the subs with in-depth knowledge. And the potential for cost blowout is minimum (at the worst case, only 3 out of 6 boats will be affect - but God forbid).
 

Massive

Well-Known Member
...we can move to a new "son-of-Soryu" class boat and start a new cycle?
Or alternatively move to a continuous build in Australia - build a flight of 4 boats every 8 years for a fleet of 12 with a service life of 24 years.

You could start with Japanese built boats for the first flight.

Regards,

Massive
 

wheelz

New Member
I have just done a wikipedia search on the Japanese Soryu class boats and noticed they are not capable of firing TLAM.. . My understanding was the TLAM was very a must have capability for any boat that replaces the existing Collins class :confused:
 

jack412

Active Member
Or alternatively move to a continuous build in Australia - build a flight of 4 boats every 8 years for a fleet of 12 with a service life of 24 years.

You could start with Japanese built boats for the first flight.

Regards,

Massive
That's too sensible, all our boat/ship building is kneejerk feast and famine. We should of had a plan in place to replace the Collins, before the first one hit the water.
 

Joe Black

Active Member
I have just done a wikipedia search on the Japanese Soryu class boats and noticed they are not capable of firing TLAM.. . My understanding was the TLAM was very a must have capability for any boat that replaces the existing Collins class :confused:
I wonder if the requirement for TLAM would morph into NSM/JSM instead. Make more sense to have NSM/JSM than TLAM. Each TLAM is US$1+Mil per shot if I remember correctly.
 

hauritz

Well-Known Member
It seems to me that there are a lot of mods that would be needed for the Soryu to match Australia's requirements. Range and combat system will need to be addressed at the very least. It seems a bit unfair for the Australian bidders since they were bidding on a speculative design that met RAN requirements while the Japanese seem to have put forward a bid based on an off the shelf model.

It is like the Japanese were asked put in a quote on a stock standard family sedan while ASC was preparing a bid based on a luxury saloon.

The Germans put in a bid of around $20 billion which included building in Australia. When you look at how smoothly the ANZAC build went compared to the Collins and AWD projects it is probably worth giving some more thought to the German proposal.

German designed submarines have been built in Korea, Greece and Turkey. Not always successfully I will grant you ... but given their experience it is certainly worth considering.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Darwin would be a total disaster as a sub base. Its approaches are shallow and easily mined, to the north are narrow straits, to the east is Torres Strait and deep Indian Ocean water lies 1000nm to the West. Only a lunatic would base them there.
Agreed. ASC did look at a forward repair base to provide support for deployed submarines as required but it was ruled out by senior management. The idea would have been to have a warehouse and technical support personnel in Darwin to save time getting to the boats if something broke and to provide better support when they came in.

There are a number of repairs and configuration changes carried out on boats while in Darwin harbour over the years, having a facility there just would have made it cheaper and easier than sailing the boat back to Stirling / Henderson, or temporarily sending people without the necessary support to Darwin. Before I move up here a couple of senior engineering managers and I were joking about setting up an ASC Far North so I wouldn't have to leave the company.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
It seems to me that there are a lot of mods that would be needed for the Soryu to match Australia's requirements. Range and combat system will need to be addressed at the very least. It seems a bit unfair for the Australian bidders since they were bidding on a speculative design that met RAN requirements while the Japanese seem to have put forward a bid based on an off the shelf model.

It is like the Japanese were asked put in a quote on a stock standard family sedan while ASC was preparing a bid based on a luxury saloon.

The Germans put in a bid of around $20 billion which included building in Australia. When you look at how smoothly the ANZAC build went compared to the Collins and AWD projects it is probably worth giving some more thought to the German proposal.

German designed submarines have been built in Korea, Greece and Turkey. Not always successfully I will grant you ... but given their experience it is certainly worth considering.
The big difference with the ANZAC build was it was the first time since the early 1960s that an experienced competent yard went straight into a new build having just completed another project. It is (pardon the pun) the valleys of death that is killing our ship (and submarine) building capability more than anything else.

With the exception of the ANZAC build, which followed the Australian Frigate Project (HMAS Melbourne and Newcastle) every local build for the RAN has been either the first build from a greenfield site or after a long break in building (valley of death). The ANZAC project was also an extended build of ten hulls from a single yard as opposed to the traditional procurement pattern of ordering ships of the same design from multiple yards.

Basically we did it right once and then having seen this to be an efficient, competitive and cost effective way to acquire ships for the RAN decided never to do it again, reinvented the wheel and stuffed it up. It would actually have been quite easy to follow the ANZAC build out of Williamstown immediately with a class of air defence frigates or AWDs instead of upgrading the FFGs and subsequently the ANZACs.

The German Type 123 Brandenburg class frigates for example were contemporaries (slightly earlier build actually) of the ANZACs. They were similar enough to, but larger and more modern than the MEKO 200 design to have fit seamlessly into Williamstown. Being larger than the ANZACs they could have quite easily been upgraded into air defence ships using a variation of the USN NTU upgrade combat system developed for their non AEGIS cruisers and destroyers and also used by South Korea in their KDX II destroyers. This would have provided a perfectly good enough solution with more hulls equipped with near AEGIS level of capability.

A continuous build of six to eight ships with a two year gap from the last ANZAC to the first new FFG then a two year gap to the second ship and one ship a year after that would have seen the ships delivered in 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and possibly 2015 and 2016 as well. They could have actually been built in two batches of three or four with the second batch upgraded to incorporate CEAFAR radars with a two ear gap between batches, stretching the program out by a year to 2015 or 2017.

Add a two year gap to 2017 for six ships or 2019 for eight ships and the first of the ANZACs would be 21 or 23 years old, not antiques but old enough to consider replacement rather than upgrade and young and capable enough to sell to another navy as a going concern. The ANZAC replacement build of two batches of four would carry on through to 2027 or 2029 when the first of the new FFGs would be around twenty years old and could start to be replaced.

Alternatively a class of ten to twelve corvettes or OPVs could be added to the build cycle between the new FFGs and ANZAC replacements which would stretch service life of the frigates to 30 years which would then require a mid life update at about fifteen years to keep them viable.

This doesn't need the Type 123 class to work as the Type 124 Sachsen class AWD, the Spanish F-100 and the Dutch De Zeven Provinciën class were all available, proven, in service, designs before the final ANZAC commissioned and could have, with a little foresight followed on without a valley of death. They would have been more expensive than the Type 123 option but being built earlier and at Williamstown they would have been cheaper than the actual AWD project which would have easily permitted a fourth hull to have been afforded or possibly even a fifth and sixth. Again remembering these option would have removed the need to upgrade either the Adelaides or ANZACs saving $2 billion or so.

There we have it a sensible, affordable continuous build, based on the ANZAC industrial model that successfully delivered ten ships within budget and ahead of schedule. The remaining ships, such as the LHDs, LPD, AORs, LCH(R)s could then either be ordered overseas or build consecutively ant another yard, say FORGACS while ASC, especially with the support of a revitalised ship building sector providing trained, experienced and competent trades and professionals could start on their own perpetual build of new submarines with 18 months between boats in each batch and two or three years between batches.

Ah what could have been.
 

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
I wonder if the requirement for TLAM would morph into NSM/JSM instead. Make more sense to have NSM/JSM than TLAM...
Not if you want to attack land targets which is the point of TLAM and the point of ADF's interest in acquiring TLAM to enhance it's long range strike capability...

:confused:
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Top