The Royal Navy Discussions and Updates

[H-D]

We still have a substantial ability to globally project our power, but we have no built in redundancy, which makes us a one shot navy. When assembling another task force, we will be at the mercy of fate or lady luck - if one ship is rendered inoperable, either because of enemy action or mechanical failure, there will be no prospect of a replacement ship. I can't help thinking what will be going through the minds of our military planners when the send forth a task force, knowing the risks, and facing the prospect of defeat and national humiliation just for the sake of a few bumbling politicians who are trying to save a penny.

Sorry. Rant's over.

 

[Padfoot]

Nine of our escorts were sunk or damaged. The official count of escorts sent up to the surrender is 23, consisting of eight destroyers & 15 frigates, i.e. more than we have now.

The Advanced Group had eight escorts: five destroyers & three frigates. They were the first to sail.
That was followed by the Carrier Battle Group, amphibs & transports with four frigates.
That's 12 escorts by the time the ground troops set sail.

The remaining 11 escorts were distributed from Ascension southwards by the time the amphibious group caught up with the carrier group off the islands.

So no, we didn't send just five escorts.

Hi Swerve,

I understand how many escorts were sent, I appreciate that.

I said in my comment: "The Type 21, the backbone of the navy, shouldn't have ever been put in harms ways."

My whole point is that the older frigates/ships were out of their depth and and not much better than target practise for the Argentine air force. I'm arguing that their numbers were largely irrelevant. Am I wrong in saying that they took a pounding? I'm interpreting that the 'five' were vital to the success of the operation. Even with the 'five' we had the situation where either Broadsword or Brilliant had to protect the Type 42( the fleet area air-defence ships) because they had no defence at short range or low flying aircraft, i.e. every single engagement they were involved in.

For the whole duration of the war there was an Argentine submarine in Falkland waters, totally undiscovered by the RN, it took several pot shots at British warships. It's only due to the fact that the officers and crew didn't know what they were doing that it wasn't successful.

My point , ultimately, is that a force of 3 Type 45 destroyers and 6 Type 23/26, with a QE carrier, a SSN with deep strike capability, a proper amphibious force is far preferable to what came before. I guess it harks on the 'we couldn't do another Falklands' debate. Sure, I understand the numbers argument, the two places at once point - though I argue that a Type 45 shouldn't ever be off chasing drug runners and Somali pirates. I get that.

Not saying I am right, just putting it out there for debate. I'm not convinced by the trauma of decline, whiny, forelock tugging, navy smaller than Belgium, Jellicoe had 80 destroyers - we have six standpoint that the UK media regularly puts forward. I think it's far more complex than that.

 

[Padfoot]

We still have a substantial ability to globally project our power, but we have no built in redundancy, which makes us a one shot navy. When assembling another task force, we will be at the mercy of fate or lady luck - if one ship is rendered inoperable, either because of enemy action or mechanical failure, there will be no prospect of a replacement ship. I can't help thinking what will be going through the minds of our military planners when the send forth a task force, knowing the risks, and facing the prospect of defeat and national humiliation just for the sake of a few bumbling politicians who are trying to save a penny.

Sorry. Rant's over.

Better to have 14 fleet area air-defence ships that are incapable of doing their job, that burn and sink when hit by a missile that doesn't even explode. Isn't it better to have quality over quantity, especially when the money really is tight?

We could have 50 escorts for the same money we are spending, could we not? Would that really be better, a green water navy as opposed to a proper blue water navy. Like I said, comparison of force totals can only be useful if each era built precisely the same ships and weaponry for the same objective. What do we want our navy to do?

I'll shut up now.

 

[ASSAIL]

Hindsight is a wonderful thing. I finished my PWO exchange in the RN in 1979 and there was no such hand wringing about the capabilities of Sea Dart and T42's then.
The same language used to describe the T45's AAW capability now; world beating, best in the world, was used to describe them (T42) in the late 1970's.
Nothing like a fair dinkum stoush to bring us all back to reality.

Simple truth, capability is fine but multiple units of capability is better if aspirations of expeditionary power remain for the RN.

 

[Padfoot]

Hindsight is a wonderful thing. I finished my PWO exchange in the RN in 1979 and there was no such hand wringing about the capabilities of Sea Dart and T42's then.
The same language used to describe the T45's AAW capability now; world beating, best in the world, was used to describe them (T42) in the late 1970's.
Nothing like a fair dinkum stoush to bring us all back to reality.

Simple truth, capability is fine but multiple units of capability is better if aspirations of expeditionary power remain for the RN.

Admiral Woodward was the first CO of HMS Sheffield, he took on its first sea-trials. In his book he is absolutely scathing. Not a good word to say about it.

But yeah, if it's a 'like for like' replacement then my point is dead in the water. No pun intended.

 

[CB90]

Rob that would not be hard a 42 was capable of engaging two targets at any one time as sea dart was a semi active homing weapon, utilising the 909 radar of which they had two. As for tracking targets a 42 would have had a track block allocated in the hundreds, whereas a. 42 with adimp would have an internal system block of 999, then a two hundred odd track block.
The batch one auto track was not very good and even later versions still had to be manually managed.
I believe with Sampson and S1805 the tracking and processing power are far greater than a feranti fm1600 computer, as well as the combined radars 1022,996 or even more archaic 965/ 992q or r.
Never mind multiple engagements with birds in the air.

So I'm not challenging that a T45 can engage and track more than 10 targets at once, it all comes back to six T45 replacing 12 T 42.

The issue really isn't how many targets you can track/engage. There's a pretty sexy sounding number for AEGIS/SPY that often gets thrown around for how many targets it can simultaneously track as well. But unless you're willing to go fully automatic, human interaction and evaluation will be the limiting factor in just how fast you can really engage. And going full auto is risky not just from a ROE perspective, but in how rapidly your magazine may be depleted.

Reality is that there are some things where numbers count.
Being the "good guys" ROE often dictates that you may not get to shoot first. With surprise as a factor, the chances of taking a sucker punch in the early days of a conflict should be a real concern...either that or you drastically reduce the element of risk (and therefore utility) of the assets you do have.
Modern ships don't take hits well. Even if a ship doesn't sink, odds are it'll be combat ineffective until it makes a shipyard and gets fixed up. Even a patch-up job worked 24/7 will probably take a few weeks to get done right.
The trick is to figure out just how much is enough in the balancing of quantity and quality. I can't say where that magic balance would be, but it's definitely something to think about. It's the age old numbers/presence/sea control vs concentration of firepower argument. For 90+% of peacetime ops, numbers matters more. Take the gloves off and go to war and quality becomes more important...unless you're willing to eat significant losses. Gets rehashed in CVN numbers/design debates all the time.

 

[swerve]

I'm not convinced by the trauma of decline, whiny, forelock tugging, navy smaller than Belgium, Jellicoe had 80 destroyers - we have six standpoint that the UK media regularly puts forward. I think it's far more complex than that.

Well, since Jellicoe's destroyers were about 1000 tons each, & had completely different weapons, other capabilities, & roles from the ships called (wrongly, IMO - the name doesn't fit) destroyers nowadays, I must agree with you on that.

I also agree that Type 45s shouldn't be off chasing drug smugglers & the like, except as training.

But even if we count only the ships with Sea Dart & Sea Wolf as effective escorts (which assumes that their only role was AAW), then we sent more than five. Yes, there were only five at the start, but we sent another four or maybe five, which arrived a few days after the landings.

Andromeda had Sea Wolf, & maybe Penelope (she'd been the trials ship, & AFAIK still had it), & we sent three more Sea Dart ships.

I know they weren't all around the islands at once, but some of 'em were escorting transports & supply ships that were within strike range of Argentina, but out of range of the Sea Harriers.

 

[the concerned]

What are the chances of the UK ever going to war as a stand alone country pretty slim. Even a re-run had of the falklands is not going to happen even if Argentina tripped up on a mountain of gold . The way I see it is if you a carrier task force consisting of 1cv, 2destroyers,4frigates,and a ssn that would mean the uk could have enough to replace each ship as required. What I would like to know is when we get new patrol ships what would be wrong with permantly basing them out of say the US and leaving them to conduct drug operations there rather than trapsing ships across the atlantic every time.

 

[153jam]

When assembling another task force, we will be at the mercy of fate or lady luck - if one ship is rendered inoperable, either because of enemy action or mechanical failure, there will be no prospect of a replacement ship.

Is that entirely accurate? I assume if we did send another task force we would only be able to send roughly a third of the fleet due to maintenance, available personnel etc (correct me if I'm wrong on that). Surely we could pull vessels out of maintenance or other global deployments to make up for the loss? Of course I don't believe we could sustain losses like in 82, but surely we are not a complete "one shot navy"?

 

[H-D]

153jam, it's not that easy to 'pull vessels out of maintenance' if the repair or refit is a major one. That is assuming of course that we have a vessel to pull out of maintenance in the first place! If the current government has it's way, in a few short months we will not have any replacement vessel for HMS Ocean at all.

IHS Jane's posted an article today that Ocean's scheduled refit is running behind schedule and she may not be able to participate in Cougar 14. Apparently HMS Illustrious is being prepared as a replacement;

"UK Armed Forces Minister Mark Francois declined to give details of the maintenance period for Illustrious or the ship's participation in 'Cougar 14', telling Parliament on 8 July: "I am withholding details of the future programme for HMS Illustrious as disclosure would, or would be likely to, prejudice the capability, effectiveness, or security of the armed forces. However, as first announced on 15 December 2010, HMS Illustrious will retire from service this year.” (HMS Ocean refit running behind schedule. Tim Ripley, London - IHS Jane's Navy International
10 July 2014)

The government has the mind set that it made a decision in 2010 to castrate Her Majesty's Armed Forces, and they're going to stick to that plan come hell or high water. It is fortuitous that the government hasn't had their way with HMS Illustrious yet. It is also fortuitous that we are only talking about 'Cougar 14' and not a military confrontation.

 

[ASSAIL]

Is that entirely accurate? I assume if we did send another task force we would only be able to send roughly a third of the fleet due to maintenance, available personnel etc (correct me if I'm wrong on that). Surely we could pull vessels out of maintenance or other global deployments to make up for the loss? Of course I don't believe we could sustain losses like in 82, but surely we are not a complete "one shot navy"?

In 1982 the RN had 17 destroyers, 38 frigates and 26 subs. There were 70,000 personnel on establishment

And today? Surely that answers your question. With 19 escorts and only 13 RFA's it would be almost impossible to mount simultaneous TG's of any magnitude.
Yes the RN is still a formidable navy but world wide combat on several oceans is long gone.

It's the bitter truth: We couldn't send a task force to the Falklands today | Mail Online

 

[H-D]

Oh, we've lost more ships in less time than this before We've lost ships in greater numbers than our entire surface fleet..

The Knott review (which we were spared from in part, thanks to a shooting war springing up) would have been much deeper.

OMG! I forgot about that review. The government of the day were going to sell HMS Ilustrious to Australia! In retrospect, perhaps the Argentines should have waited a few months longer and prepared better. The task would have been so much more difficult for the Royal Navy with fewer ships and reduced capability.

 

[RobWilliams]

The reason they didn't wait was fear of the idea that the build up would be spotted and nuclear submarines would head at high speed into the South Atlantic and wreck havoc in their landing ships.

As to the whole Falklands debate, there is one system which changes the game entirely - TLAM. Hitting Argentinian airbases could be done with - relative - impunity, hitting command centres, magazines, workshops, hangars, this definitely causes problems for their Air Force.

Heck maybe even Storm Shadow + F35B could handle it too.

We could form a task group which could do some damage sure, but there are some big holes which need to be plugged. Mostly escort hull numbers.

 

[StobieWan]

OMG! I forgot about that review. The government of the day were going to sell HMS Ilustrious to Australia! In retrospect, perhaps the Argentines should have waited a few months longer and prepared better. The task would have been so much more difficult for the Royal Navy with fewer ships and reduced capability.

Indeed- some of the ships that sailed had been tied up awaiting disposal and had been picked over for parts. Frantic phone calls with "put that sodding blow torch DOWN and step *away* from the ship ensued. A lot of the amphib fleet would have been gone, the list stretches away.

We had more ships available to pull back into service as well - if the war had dragged on to another season, there were a number of ships that could have been recommissioned (with considerable expense and effort)

 

[harryriedl]

Admiral Woodward was the first CO of HMS Sheffield, he took on its first sea-trials. In his book he is absolutely scathing. Not a good word to say about it.

But yeah, if it's a 'like for like' replacement then my point is dead in the water. No pun intended.

This being my focus for my masters dissertation.(The procurement of the Type 45 and Nelson Battleships) They were on the whole rather unsatisfied hence the Type 43-44 program started in the early 80s and the eagerness to be part of the NATO replacement programs in the 90s.

The builds of the 70s were extremely difficult hence the series of unsatisfactory designs, such as T21, the problematic early batches of T22 and T42's for reasons I'm not entirely sure the builds of the 70s seem so much more problematic compared with both before and after(I am inclined to blame the state of mailase at the time)

Sea Dart was good for what it was intended high alt targets and in many ways at the time some aspects were rather advanced at the time but the T42 were never particularly well liked. The batch 1 in particular were a sad old vessels with their poor sea keeping under a rather poor procurement system at the time which equated ship length with cost.

It bares repeating as it seems to be regularly forgotten is the appalling state of the Argentina armed forces and the fact that their has been a general degradation world wide of both capability and numbers(baring Asia Pacific).

 

[StobieWan]

In 1982 the RN had 17 destroyers, 38 frigates and 26 subs. There were 70,000 personnel on establishment

And today? Surely that answers your question. With 19 escorts and only 13 RFA's it would be almost impossible to mount simultaneous TG's of any magnitude.
Yes the RN is still a formidable navy but world wide combat on several oceans is long gone.

It's the bitter truth: We couldn't send a task force to the Falklands today | Mail Online

In contrast, last year, I believe the Argentine Navy had something like 260 sailing days - between their entire force! One solitary capital ship in the RN spent more days out in the water than the entire Argentine navy..dearie me..

We could actually put a task force of some sort together and retake the islands, it'd just be a lot different and you'd have a bit more tap dancing to do in logistics.

If you were really getting Tom Clancy, get the Navy down there, throw a defensive bubble around a space, lay down a very rapidly constructed runway and then break out the surface to air batteries, you've got your air head, the rest comes down by air. White knuckle stuff but doable..

Three T45's could hold off (and probably shoot down) the entire air force, particularly with the bag draggers in play with ASAC giving over the horizon cover. The Argentine airforce in contrast hasn't flown any of their mirages in 9 years, they have no credit line internationally to buy more stuff and the average British infantry now looks like a cross between a terminator and Robocop when it comes to basic kit, firepower and body armour.

It'd be different but short of another south american country pitching in, Argentina hasn't got a look in in holding the Islands, even assuming they managed to take them vs the very strong defences at Mt Pleasant.

I'd like to see the Tiffies down there armed with air to surface kit to back that up but generally, the assumptions have been that if we prevent the Argentinians investing the islands, we have succeeded.

 

[RobWilliams]

Trouble with Falklands talk is we compare our force then to our force now when perhaps a more pertinent comparison would be the relative parity between the opposing forces.

It's no secret, the Argentinian armed forces are in much worse shape (massively so) than ours is. I suppose it doesn't help when a significant proportion of their surface fleet is powered by RR turbines

Their submarine forces are only just getting back into sailing shape, their surface fleet barely leaves port anymore and their air force is the same vintage (except smaller) as it was in 1982 and like their surface fleet is suffering from lack of spares.

There was a flurry of chatter about the Argentines purchasing and licensing the Chinese JF-17 a year ago

Thinkdefence did a nice peace about the ramifications of such an endeavour

CAC FC-1 Xiaolong: Argentina

Wake me when Argentina purchases modern fighters/tankers/ships/sea lift/air lift in significant numbers. Otherwise the whole scenario is either a no go or a win for us.

 

[ASSAIL]

In contrast, last year, I believe the Argentine Navy had something like 260 sailing days - between their entire force! One solitary capital ship in the RN spent more days out in the water than the entire Argentine navy..dearie me..

We could actually put a task force of some sort together and retake the islands, it'd just be a lot different and you'd have a bit more tap dancing to do in logistics.

If you were really getting Tom Clancy, get the Navy down there, throw a defensive bubble around a space, lay down a very rapidly constructed runway and then break out the surface to air batteries, you've got your air head, the rest comes down by air. White knuckle stuff but doable..

Three T45's could hold off (and probably shoot down) the entire air force, particularly with the bag draggers in play with ASAC giving over the horizon cover. The Argentine airforce in contrast hasn't flown any of their mirages in 9 years, they have no credit line internationally to buy more stuff and the average British infantry now looks like a cross between a terminator and Robocop when it comes to basic kit, firepower and body armour.

It'd be different but short of another south american country pitching in, Argentina hasn't got a look in in holding the Islands, even assuming they managed to take them vs the very strong defences at Mt Pleasant.

I'd like to see the Tiffies down there armed with air to surface kit to back that up but generally, the assumptions have been that if we prevent the Argentinians investing the islands, we have succeeded.

The main thrust of my post was to illustrate that multi TG power projection deployments were a thing of the past for the RN and not to fixate on the FI. The link I used was to illustrate the overall decline in force numbers from 1982 to 2010 (I couldn't find a better one which was up to date). Although to force has declined, there seems to be a reluctance for many average Britons to accept the new reality as apparent from the post I replied to.

 

[Padfoot]

The main thrust of my post was to illustrate that multi TG power projection deployments were a thing of the past for the RN and not to fixate on the FI. The link I used was to illustrate the overall decline in force numbers from 1982 to 2010 (I couldn't find a better one which was up to date). Although to force has declined, there seems to be a reluctance for many average Britons to accept the new reality as apparent from the post I replied to.

Could the Cold War RN really have organised 'multi TG power projection deployments'?

Apropos of that Daily Mail article. Are not the media being disingenuous by just quoting numbers? For example, 29 subs. That includes 21 1950s built Porpoise and 1960s built Oberon class. Why doesn't it explain what the RN lost in not maintaining this capability? What would we use them for now? What do we really gain?

My logic, far from not being able to see 'the new reality', was more to do with actually being able to see 'the reality'.

I certainly understand that the RN can't fight a war of attrition, that it can't fight on several fronts. But could it even if it was twice the size? A green water, general purpose navy? This is the reality, the tradeoff.

At the end of the day, reality is that Admiral Woodward would have taken the 2020 RN to Corporate over what he had the make do with in 1982, no hesitation whatsoever.

 

[harryriedl]

Could the Cold War RN really have organised 'multi TG power projection deployments'?

Apropos of that Daily Mail article. Are not the media being disingenuous by just quoting numbers? For example, 29 subs. That includes 21 1950s built Porpoise and 1960s built Oberon class. Why doesn't it explain what the RN lost in not maintaining this capability? What would we use them for now? What do we really gain?

My logic, far from not being able to see 'the new reality', was more to do with actually being able to see 'the reality'.

I certainly understand that the RN can't fight a war of attrition, that it can't fight on several fronts. But could it even if it was twice the size? A green water, general purpose navy? This is the reality, the tradeoff.

At the end of the day, reality is that Admiral Woodward would have taken the 2020 RN to Corporate over what he had the make do with in 1982, no hesitation whatsoever.

This has been reflected in the interviews I have had with senior RN admirals and other senior staff the ones near the ends of the careers wish they could have started now rather than during the 80s or 90s and have surprised me with their optimism.