The Royal Navy Discussions and Updates

RobWilliams

Super Moderator
Staff member
I have no idea, all I know is is that in March the MOD was considering what the effect of a closure of the TLAM production line would be and then now an order for 65 missiles suddenly pops up. Looks like the MOD know they need to make the order ASAP. I'd imagine that the last line of the MOD response about it not effecting current agreements means that production will end after all ordered production ends.

The last order for TLAM is for sub launched missiles only. VLS for the Type 26 doesn't come into it.

If anything, that could be taken as an indication against Mk41. With a shelf life of 30 years a TLAM order now could keep until the first Type 26's arrive, however for a bulk order which would need to be properly stored that's a large expense to be considered for something which won't get use for over half a decade.

The MOD is bigger than Hammond I agree, which means that when Hammond means he hasn't heard something doesn't mean there aren't people in the MOD who have.

& calm down about asking if replies are long enough, you've been given the advice, so heed it and move on please.
 

Bonza

Super Moderator
Staff member
No it is a bit difficult to judge when not to thank people with one lines but I hope my previous reply works.

Is this long enough or do I have to be removed from the board?
So i dont get it. If its ceasing production why so late then for the FMS if this is the last time it can ever be bought? The MOD is bigger than one Hammond. And still doesnt say why there's a wavering between Mk 41 and SYLVER.

If this reply long enough or do I have to extend it??????????????
Don't worry yourself too much, as you spend time on the forums you'll see the posting style we encourage used in a lot of discussions, and you'll get used to it. And at times a one liner might be appropriate, as I said earlier, if you're thanking someone or asking a very specific question that's relevant to the discussion. Just sit back and have a read through the threads that interest you, you'll get the idea pretty quickly. No need to get bent out of shape about it.
 

StobieWan

Super Moderator
Staff member
Just to touch on the reasoning behind terminating production of TLAM in the US - they've currently got enough stock for several years at current use rates so there's an assumption that they can terminate production while developing the successor, rather than continue to buy missiles which they plan to replace.

It's not a "stop buying, run out of missiles immediately and hope nothing bad happens" decision.
 

RobWilliams

Super Moderator
Staff member
I vaguely recall the numbers, something along the lines of 3000 stockpiled, general usage per year is 100.

UK had about 60 TLAM before Libya, fired off around a dozen during Ellamy and now there's another order for 65 so that'd be closer to 110 when the last order is in. I don't know how frequently we fire TLAM if it all, most of our test firings are testing the launching mechanism of our boats with floating inert dummies.

Presumably we piggy back off US live testing to demonstrate the missiles work.
 

CB90

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
I vaguely recall the numbers, something along the lines of 3000 stockpiled, general usage per year is 100.

UK had about 60 TLAM before Libya, fired off around a dozen during Ellamy and now there's another order for 65 so that'd be closer to 110 when the last order is in. I don't know how frequently we fire TLAM if it all, most of our test firings are testing the launching mechanism of our boats with floating inert dummies.

Presumably we piggy back off US live testing to demonstrate the missiles work.
Unlike say...Harpoon or SM-2, there's little to no point in firing TLAM for tactical training purposes. You can accomplish the training side fully through simulation only training.

The only possible value added is in verifying that various batches are working as advertised. Now as you noted, there's plenty of opportunity to piggyback off USN firings. Once you've determined a particular "lot" works to a certain statistical level of reliability, there's no longer any point in firing off those expensive live rounds.

As far as RN long term potential goes, if the RN is interested at all in continuing in purchasing additional TLAMs once USN production stops, again, that's value added for both parties. USN gets to punt on NGLAW as the TLAM production line stays open, RN continues to get TLAMs.
 

H-D

New Member
Just to touch on the reasoning behind terminating production of TLAM in the US - they've currently got enough stock for several years at current use rates so there's an assumption that they can terminate production while developing the successor, rather than continue to buy missiles which they plan to replace.

It's not a "stop buying, run out of missiles immediately and hope nothing bad happens" decision.
I don't doubt, that if the UK became embroiled in a conflict that consumed our stockpile of TLAMs, the US would be happy to offload some to us - if they're able to. But I am concerned that should an unforeseen conflict emerge, and the US started eating into their own stockpile, we may be left in a situation where our subs have no Tomahawks to launch.

I question the US decision to bury the TLAM at this stage. It is not a wise one, particularly as there has been no clear decision on it's replacement.
 

StobieWan

Super Moderator
Staff member
I don't doubt, that if the UK became embroiled in a conflict that consumed our stockpile of TLAMs, the US would be happy to offload some to us - if they're able to. But I am concerned that should an unforeseen conflict emerge, and the US started eating into their own stockpile, we may be left in a situation where our subs have no Tomahawks to launch.

I question the US decision to bury the TLAM at this stage. It is not a wise one, particularly as there has been no clear decision on it's replacement.
I think the USN have about 3,000 and we're running with what will be 90+ after this latest order (may be as much as 120)

If we manage to squirt off 120 and the USN are running a bit low from their 3,000, we'll be punting Trident not long after :)

If the replacement for TLAM drags on, we can just put an order in for a further run - the toolings aren't going away, the supply chain will be around for spares etc. If we ended up running low, I'd expect that the USN would be looking at the same idea.
 

RobWilliams

Super Moderator
Staff member
I don't doubt, that if the UK became embroiled in a conflict that consumed our stockpile of TLAMs, the US would be happy to offload some to us - if they're able to. But I am concerned that should an unforeseen conflict emerge, and the US started eating into their own stockpile, we may be left in a situation where our subs have no Tomahawks to launch.
Doubt that'll happen, if Libya is anything to go by then our TLAM contribution is pretty much a token gesture (something like 12 compared to 200 I think). We don't need to worry about expending our stocks because pretty much we don't use them all that often, especially not as much as the US even for training (and see CB90s response about how it benefits the UK in that regard).

I question the US decision to bury the TLAM at this stage. It is not a wise one, particularly as there has been no clear decision on it's replacement.
The premise is the less money they spend on buying TLAM the more they can spend on developing its successor and they believe they can do that based on usage rates of their current stock.

The US is looking at the costs of restarting production if necessary which Raytheon are saying it's very expensive (naturally because they want to keep production NOW) but it's definitely something which would be exercised if needs be IMO.
 

H-D

New Member
The premise is the less money they spend on buying TLAM the more they can spend on developing its successor and they believe they can do that based on usage rates of their current stock.

The US is looking at the costs of restarting production if necessary which Raytheon are saying it's very expensive (naturally because they want to keep production NOW) but it's definitely something which would be exercised if needs be IMO.
You optimism is resassuring, RobWiliams :).

I guess if circumstances require it, the expense of restarting the production line would be inconsequential if national security is an issue. I wasn't aware of the small number of Tomahawks our subs did launch during the Libya conflict - I thought it was more than that.

Now StobieWan, your comments are less reassuring than RobWilliams :). The thought of our "punting Trident" as you put it, is not a pleasent one.

Frankly, given the apparent recklessness exhibited in the 2010 defence review which delivered a virtually mortal blow to the Royal Navy, I would not be surprised that the 2015 defence review will deliver some kind of 'sucker punch' to the Navy's remaining capabilities. With regard to the 2010 defence review cuts, I cannot recall any conflict that the Royal Navy has been involved in where it has lost so many ships in so little time.

But that's straying to another topic...
 
Last edited:

Padfoot

New Member
You optimism is resassuring, RobWiliams :).

I guess if circumstances require it, the expense of restarting the production line would be inconsequential if national security is an issue. I wasn't aware of the small number of Tomahawks our subs did launch during the Libya conflict - I thought it was more than that.

Now StobieWan, your comments are less reassuring than RobWilliams :). The thought of our "punting Trident" as you put it, is not a pleasent one.

Frankly, given the apparent recklessness exhibited in the 2010 defence review which delivered a virtually mortal to the Royal Navy, I would not be surprised that the 2015 defence review will deliver some kind of 'sucker punch' to the Navy's remaining capabilities. With regard to the 2010 defence review cuts, I cannot recall any conflict that the Royal Navy has been involved in where it has lost so many ships in so little time.

But that's straying to another topic...

The Falklands?

It's relative somewhat, is it not? For example, the RN of 2020 will be vastly superior to the RN that went to the South Atlantic in 1982. Would any admiral on the planet say otherwise? I know the narrative is certainly one of decline and regression, but is it really true?

The narrative in the tabloids, even the BBC is that we sent 150 ships to retake the Falklands. It's nonsense of course. How many escorts did we really send in 1982 - three Type 42s and Two Type 22s? Five escorts. The three Type 42s(two were sunk, one was badly damaged) were relieved after the landings by two fresh ships.

The Type 21, the backbone of the navy, shouldn't have ever been put in harms ways. Totally under equipped with functional AA weaponry, horrendous sea-keeping, a ship that couldn't actually defend itself. They fired over 80 sea slug missiles and didn't record one hit.

It was almost criminal to send them. The sailors on them may as well have been throwing rocks. The Type 42 wasn't much better. Admiral Woodward said it was a dud from day one.

Don't even mention that the navy had no real amphibious capability in 1982.

The comparative size of navies hides as much as it conveys - like I said, it's relative. For sure numbers and statistics aren't meaningless but a side by side(RN 1982 vis a vis RN 2020 say) comparison of force totals can only be useful if each era built precisely the same ships and weaponry for the same objective. Technology and actual capability make the numbers debate somewhat redundant, no?

I think the debate in Britain totally misses this point.
 

H-D

New Member
The comparative size of navies hides as much as it conveys - like I said, it's relative. For sure numbers and statistics aren't meaningless but a side by side(RN 1982 vis a vis RN 2020 say) comparison of force totals can only be useful if each era built precisely the same ships and weaponry for the same objective. Technology and actual capability make the numbers debate somewhat redundant, no?

I think the debate in Britain totally misses this point.
Padfoot, you make a valid point. Certainly, the technological superiority of the Royal Navy's current warships cannot be disputed. I would argue though, that no matter how capable a warship may be, it can't be in two places at once.

With regard to the missiles fired by the Type 21 frigates, I think you may be referring to the Seacat. The Seacat featured an optical fire control system and I believe it was credited with at least one 'kill' when a missile shot down an Argentine Skyhawk. I recall the 'Seaslug' missile you were referring to was fitted to the 'County' class of destroyers of which only a couple served during the Falklands War. The Seaslug was fired in anger during this war, but I think it was only used against shore targets. The 'Sea Dart' fitted to the Type 42 destroyers was a much more capable weapon than the older 'Seaslug'.
 

rnrp

New Member
The Falklands?

It's relative somewhat, is it not? For example, the RN of 2020 will be vastly superior to the RN that went to the South Atlantic in 1982. Would any admiral on the planet say otherwise? I know the narrative is certainly one of decline and regression, but is it really true?

The narrative in the tabloids, even the BBC is that we sent 150 ships to retake the Falklands. It's nonsense of course. How many escorts did we really send in 1982 - three Type 42s and Two Type 22s? Five escorts. The three Type 42s(two were sunk, one was badly damaged) were relieved after the landings by two fresh ships.

The Type 21, the backbone of the navy, shouldn't have ever been put in harms ways. Totally under equipped with functional AA weaponry, horrendous sea-keeping, a ship that couldn't actually defend itself. They fired over 80 sea slug missiles and didn't record one hit.

It was almost criminal to send them. The sailors on them may as well have been throwing rocks. The Type 42 wasn't much better. Admiral Woodward said it was a dud from day one.

Don't even mention that the navy had no real amphibious capability in 1982.

The comparative size of navies hides as much as it conveys - like I said, it's relative. For sure numbers and statistics aren't meaningless but a side by side(RN 1982 vis a vis RN 2020 say) comparison of force totals can only be useful if each era built precisely the same ships and weaponry for the same objective. Technology and actual capability make the numbers debate somewhat redundant, no?

I think the debate in Britain totally misses this point.
Padfoot there I have to disagree, technology plays a part yes. A type 42 with adaws 4 is a world apart from capabilities of a type 45 in radar performance and processing power etc. I can't see the difference when it comes to hill numbers though, one type 45 can still only be in the same one deployed place as one type 42 was! It's about redundancy and with 19 escort hulls we no longer have it.

As for amphibious capability, in 1982 we very nearly lost it, but we generated 2 lpd with 6 lsls to conduct amphibious landings. Today yes we posess two albions with 3 LSD. Admittedly the albions are a huge leap forward from fearless as are the bay class but that's still only 5 hulls.

We fight with the tools we have, so technology wise Woodward would be in a better place with type 23 & 45 yes but he had type 12, leanders, 21, 22, 42 & 82 that's is the reality but he absorbed casualties, can we do that now? I wonder.
Anyone's thoughts?
 

StobieWan

Super Moderator
Staff member
You optimism is resassuring, RobWiliams :).

I guess if circumstances require it, the expense of restarting the production line would be inconsequential if national security is an issue. I wasn't aware of the small number of Tomahawks our subs did launch during the Libya conflict - I thought it was more than that.

Now StobieWan, your comments are less reassuring than RobWilliams :). The thought of our "punting Trident" as you put it, is not a pleasent one.

Frankly, given the apparent recklessness exhibited in the 2010 defence review which delivered a virtually mortal blow to the Royal Navy, I would not be surprised that the 2015 defence review will deliver some kind of 'sucker punch' to the Navy's remaining capabilities. With regard to the 2010 defence review cuts, I cannot recall any conflict that the Royal Navy has been involved in where it has lost so many ships in so little time.

But that's straying to another topic...
Oh, we've lost more ships in less time than this before :) We've lost ships in greater numbers than our entire surface fleet..

The Knott review (which we were spared from in part, thanks to a shooting war springing up) would have been much deeper.
 

RobWilliams

Super Moderator
Staff member
Padfoot there I have to disagree, technology plays a part yes. A type 42 with adaws 4 is a world apart from capabilities of a type 45 in radar performance and processing power etc. I can't see the difference when it comes to hill numbers though, one type 45 can still only be in the same one deployed place as one type 42 was! It's about redundancy and with 19 escort hulls we no longer have it.
Interesting claim when the Type 45's came out was that a single Type 45 could detect, track and engage as many targets as the remaining (at that time, 5) Type 42's could together.

Considering the discussion over in the USN thread about the ability of the AB to take on the role of a Tico riding shotgun, I looked into the Type 45's ability to conduct such a role and it confirmed my thoughts, considering a Type 45 is designed to be able to operate as a flagship, it should have the comms fitout etc to allow a 'Commander Air Warfare' to run operations from a Type 45 for the Queen Elizabeth class like a Tico does for a US CVN.

As an aside, found out recently that the growth potential for the Type 45 was outlined as a key user requirement to be at least 11.5% of her displacement.
 

Riga

New Member
The Falklands?

It's relative somewhat, is it not? For example, the RN of 2020 will be vastly superior to the RN that went to the South Atlantic in 1982. Would any admiral on the planet say otherwise? I know the narrative is certainly one of decline and regression, but is it really true?

The narrative in the tabloids, even the BBC is that we sent 150 ships to retake the Falklands. It's nonsense of course. How many escorts did we really send in 1982 - three Type 42s and Two Type 22s? Five escorts. The three Type 42s(two were sunk, one was badly damaged) were relieved after the landings by two fresh ships.

The Type 21, the backbone of the navy, shouldn't have ever been put in harms ways. Totally under equipped with functional AA weaponry, horrendous sea-keeping, a ship that couldn't actually defend itself. They fired over 80 sea slug missiles and didn't record one hit.

It was almost criminal to send them. The sailors on them may as well have been throwing rocks. The Type 42 wasn't much better. Admiral Woodward said it was a dud from day one.

Don't even mention that the navy had no real amphibious capability in 1982.

The comparative size of navies hides as much as it conveys - like I said, it's relative. For sure numbers and statistics aren't meaningless but a side by side(RN 1982 vis a vis RN 2020 say) comparison of force totals can only be useful if each era built precisely the same ships and weaponry for the same objective. Technology and actual capability make the numbers debate somewhat redundant, no?

I think the debate in Britain totally misses this point.
We are moving from more than 30+ DD/FF to possibly 14, from 12 SSN to 7. The technological sophistication of those platforms is not in doubt - neither is the fact that the aggressor countries may also be investing in offensive capability thus nullifying those advances and you conveniently forget to mention that many of our platforms are fitted for and not with.
 

rnrp

New Member
Interesting claim when the Type 45's came out was that a single Type 45 could detect, track and engage as many targets as the remaining (at that time, 5) Type 42's could together.

Considering the discussion over in the USN thread about the ability of the AB to take on the role of a Tico riding shotgun, I looked into the Type 45's ability to conduct such a role and it confirmed my thoughts, considering a Type 45 is designed to be able to operate as a flagship, it should have the comms fitout etc to allow a 'Commander Air Warfare' to run operations from a Type 45 for the Queen Elizabeth class like a Tico does for a US CVN.

As an aside, found out recently that the growth potential for the Type 45 was outlined as a key user requirement to be at least 11.5% of her displacement.
Rob that would not be hard a 42 was capable of engaging two targets at any one time as sea dart was a semi active homing weapon, utilising the 909 radar of which they had two. As for tracking targets a 42 would have had a track block allocated in the hundreds, whereas a. 42 with adimp would have an internal system block of 999, then a two hundred odd track block.
The batch one auto track was not very good and even later versions still had to be manually managed.
I believe with Sampson and S1805 the tracking and processing power are far greater than a feranti fm1600 computer, as well as the combined radars 1022,996 or even more archaic 965/ 992q or r.
Never mind multiple engagements with birds in the air.

So I'm not challenging that a T45 can engage and track more than 10 targets at once, it all comes back to six T45 replacing 12 T 42.
 

StobieWan

Super Moderator
Staff member
I'll go along with that - I mean, Type 23 with 48 Sea Ceptor would be carrying more missiles in one load than was fired in the entire FI conflict - but it's one 19 ships in the whole navy vs 30 ships in one task force. If one of them is off prosecuting a sub contact, it can't be doing local area defence for an LPD 200 miles away, etc.
 

swerve

Super Moderator
The Falklands?

The narrative in the tabloids, even the BBC is that we sent 150 ships to retake the Falklands. It's nonsense of course. How many escorts did we really send in 1982 - three Type 42s and Two Type 22s? Five escorts. The three Type 42s(two were sunk, one was badly damaged) were relieved after the landings by two fresh ships.
.
Nine of our escorts were sunk or damaged. The official count of escorts sent up to the surrender is 23, consisting of eight destroyers & 15 frigates, i.e. more than we have now.

The Advanced Group had eight escorts: five destroyers & three frigates. They were the first to sail.
That was followed by the Carrier Battle Group, amphibs & transports with four frigates.
That's 12 escorts by the time the ground troops set sail.

The remaining 11 escorts were distributed from Ascension southwards by the time the amphibious group caught up with the carrier group off the islands.

So no, we didn't send just five escorts.
 
Top