Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

[Volkodav]

I am a little concerned that the LHD is too specialised a platform to effectively operate F-35B in any tactically useful numbers or manner, especially without dramatically impinging upon their primary taskings. 28 very expensive and capable airframes tied to a non-purpose designed platform that will not facilitate their effective employment just seems a little strange to me.

If we were to go down the F-35B road then a purpose designed platform, also designed to operate MH-60R, would likely cost less than the price of two frigates and deliver far more capability than the sacrificed frigate numbers. I would even go so far as to say buying a pair of small carriers as replacements for the remaining Adelaide class FFGs would be better value than new FFGs or diluting the LHDs capabilities by trying to turn them into defacto carriers.

 

[Monitor66]

I am a little concerned that the LHD is too specialised a platform to effectively operate F-35B in any tactically useful numbers or manner, especially without dramatically impinging upon their primary taskings. 28 very expensive and capable airframes tied to a non-purpose designed platform that will not facilitate their effective employment just seems a little strange to me.

If we were to go down the F-35B road then a purpose designed platform, also designed to operate MH-60R, would likely cost less than the price of two frigates and deliver far more capability than the sacrificed frigate numbers. I would even go so far as to say buying a pair of small carriers as replacements for the remaining Adelaide class FFGs would be better value than new FFGs or diluting the LHDs capabilities by trying to turn them into defacto carriers.

There are a number of significant impediments to a true carrier capability for Australia. The first is the RAAF's lack of will in this area - they just don't want it. Then there is available budget and manpower, neither of which are in abundant enough supply to make even a single large carrier feasible.

The RAN is also very much a destroyer/frigate-centric navy and there is resistance to the very idea of a carrier at the highest levels. Frigate and destroyer numbers are already at the point of diminishing returns and any reduction in surface combatant numbers to make way for a carrier will bring into question the RAN's ability to physically provide enough hulls in the water to provide the range of options and coverage required.

And if there is a change of government at the next election or the one after that then forget it. Nothing goes against the grain of Labor's defence stance more than aircraft carriers (and tanks)!

 

[Volkodav]

Interestingly the RANs original carrier force and two of the ARAs three generations of tanks were ordered by Labor governments while carriers and tanks were both cut by Liberal governments and even Labors final nail in the coffin for carriers has since been revealed to have been the same decision as the previous Liberal government, they just hadn't announced it prior to the election.

That aside I must admit surface combatant numbers concern me a lot with only the 3 DDGs and 6 ANZAC replacements having been mentioned in recent years. There has been mention of a FFG life extension but not replacement and we should not forget that there are 8 ANZACs not 6. Compare the 9 hulls we appear to be heading towards with the 12 we had when we had a carrier or the 16 plus a dozen missile armed (Sea Sparrow), helicopter equipped corvettes we were building towards in the 90s, seen as a minimum sustainable force by a Labor government, we are a very long way from where we were.

There retirement of three DDGs without replacement still shocks me and then to follow it by retiring two FFGs early due to mismanagement of the FFGUP was just unbelievable. The AWD program became a replacement for the DDGs capabilities as it had been assumed we didn't need them any more then Timor showed differently forcing us to rely on USN assets. The FFGs were just not up to a job they had never been designed or intended to fill. End of the day we are replacing 9 hulls with 3 and it now looks like 8 are to be replaced with 6 when we should be increasing numbers in the light of Chinas expansion. If the 12 new subs go ahead we will have more of them than skimmers.

We can't even get OPVs to protect our boarders, making do with aluminium IPVs, let alone the planned multi-role corvettes that we planned and cancelled while so many other nations are now adopting quite similar vessels due to their utility and combat power (OPV, corvettes, light frigates, LCS, LCV etc.).

Long story short, we have neither numbers of good enough platforms or individual capability of exceptional platforms, rather an ever reducing number of formerly good enough ones.

Prior to WWII we had 2 modern heavy cruisers and 3 new light cruisers, an obsolescent light cruiser and 5 WWI vintage destroyers. Equate WWII cruisers to modern destroyers and frigates and we are not far off that force now.

 

[ngatimozart]

There are a number of significant impediments to a true carrier capability for Australia. The first is the RAAF's lack of will in this area - they just don't want it. Then there is available budget and manpower, neither of which are in abundant enough supply to make even a single large carrier feasible.

If the RAAF were to fly and service said aircraft and the RAN responsible for the ship then the RAAF may be amenable. It would be to their advantage, because they would get a number of F35 aircraft bringing a new capability to the ADF and they do not lose their current hold on fast jet ops. If they look at how the RAF & RN intend to utilise their Bs, as a fleet capability and how the USMC operate their Harriers and and will operate their Bs from forward airfields, then that introduces new dynamics and capabilities, freeing up the As and other assets if needs require.

The RAN is also very much a destroyer/frigate-centric navy and there is resistance to the very idea of a carrier at the highest levels. Frigate and destroyer numbers are already at the point of diminishing returns and any reduction in surface combatant numbers to make way for a carrier will bring into question the RAN's ability to physically provide enough hulls in the water to provide the range of options and coverage required.

In the end they do what they are told. If the govt decides that is the way of things that's it. How much power does the ADF CDF have? In NZDF CDF has operational control of all 3 services and the service chiefs report to CDF. If they don't like what CDF decides they have to build a bridge and get over it - if they can't take a joke they shouldn't joined.

And if there is a change of government at the next election or the one after that then forget it. Nothing goes against the grain of Labor's defence stance more than aircraft carriers (and tanks)!

That's the thing, we live in a democracy and we have to take the good (freedoms) with the bad (politicians). At the moment the F35B in Australian colours is nothing more than a kite floated by the Minister. That is the main point. Until a formal proposal is made etc., etc., all the discussion about it is purely theoretical. Having said that, the forthcoming discussions will be interesting and at times entertaining.

 

[Monitor66]

Interestingly the RANs original carrier force and two of the ARAs three generations of tanks were ordered by Labor governments while carriers and tanks were both cut by Liberal governments and even Labors final nail in the coffin for carriers has since been revealed to have been the same decision as the previous Liberal government, they just hadn't announced it prior to the election.

That aside I must admit surface combatant numbers concern me a lot with only the 3 DDGs and 6 ANZAC replacements having been mentioned in recent years. There has been mention of a FFG life extension but not replacement and we should not forget that there are 8 ANZACs not 6. Compare the 9 hulls we appear to be heading towards with the 12 we had when we had a carrier or the 16 plus a dozen missile armed (Sea Sparrow), helicopter equipped corvettes we were building towards in the 90s, seen as a minimum sustainable force by a Labor government, we are a very long way from where we were.

There retirement of three DDGs without replacement still shocks me and then to follow it by retiring two FFGs early due to mismanagement of the FFGUP was just unbelievable. The AWD program became a replacement for the DDGs capabilities as it had been assumed we didn't need them any more then Timor showed differently forcing us to rely on USN assets. The FFGs were just not up to a job they had never been designed or intended to fill. End of the day we are replacing 9 hulls with 3 and it now looks like 8 are to be replaced with 6 when we should be increasing numbers in the light of Chinas expansion. If the 12 new subs go ahead we will have more of them than skimmers.

We can't even get OPVs to protect our boarders, making do with aluminium IPVs, let alone the planned multi-role corvettes that we planned and cancelled while so many other nations are now adopting quite similar vessels due to their utility and combat power (OPV, corvettes, light frigates, LCS, LCV etc.).

Long story short, we have neither numbers of good enough platforms or individual capability of exceptional platforms, rather an ever reducing number of formerly good enough ones.

Prior to WWII we had 2 modern heavy cruisers and 3 new light cruisers, an obsolescent light cruiser and 5 WWI vintage destroyers. Equate WWII cruisers to modern destroyers and frigates and we are not far off that force now.

I agree entirely. Platform numbers are a huge concern for the RAN, not least because of the expanse of ocean we have charge over. The ADF seems to have this mentality that it can keep reducing numbers as long as the replacement platforms are more advanced and capable than their predecessors.

This logic only works to a degree. Bit like trying to play test match rugby with only 10 players whilst the opposition fields a full 15 strong side. No matter how many star players you might have, sooner or later the other team will overwhelm you.

It is tempting to cite the F-35 purchase commitment as evidence that the RAAF always seems to escape such culling, but when you look at the size of the Air Lift Group with 12 C-130J-30s and the 10 incoming C-27J Spartan light tactical airlifters it is clear that in terms of numbers it has been decimated in the last few years. In 2009 it had 12 H and 12 J model Hercs and 14 Caribou - 38 aircraft in total.

Yes the Caribou's were aging and in dire need of replacement but I don't care how advanced the avionics are on the new C-27Js, a reduction from 38 airframes to 22 is a massive reduction in capability. No amount of spin from RAAF or Govt will convince me otherwise.

 

[Raven22]

Yes the Caribou's were aging and in dire need of replacement but I don't care how advanced the avionics are on the new C-27Js, a reduction from 38 airframes to 22 is a massive reduction in capability. No amount of spin from RAAF or Govt will convince me otherwise.

Well, there is the small matter of the six C-17s, which alone have about the same airlift capacity of all 38 C-130Hs/Js and Caribous. There are very few people that would argue that the future airlift fleet is less capable than the one of 10 years ago.

I agree entirely. Platform numbers are a huge concern for the RAN, not least because of the expanse of ocean we have charge over. The ADF seems to have this mentality that it can keep reducing numbers as long as the replacement platforms are more advanced and capable than their predecessors.

Out of interest, do you have examples of this? Very few capabilities have lost significant numbers of platforms, and most of the ones that have is due to a rebalancing to other emerging capabilities.

 

[Monitor66]

Well, there is the small matter of the six C-17s, which alone have about the same airlift capacity of all 38 C-130Hs/Js and Caribous. There are very few people that would argue that the future airlift fleet is less capable than the one of 10 years ago.

I would have pegged the C-17 as a strategic airlift asset, not tactical, which is where the thrust of argument was aimed.

Out of interest, do you have examples of this? Very few capabilities have lost significant numbers of platforms, and most of the ones that have is due to a rebalancing to other emerging capabilities.

In the late 1990s the absolute minimum number of surface combatants with which the RAN thought it could remain effective was 14. About 10 years ago it was 12. Now it is 11. Sooner or later it must reach a tipping point beyond which there are simply not enough ships to do what it required. In amphib assets the outlook is much brighter than it was 5 or 10 years ago and the capability miles ahead, but in the DDG/FFG space numbers matter.

As for Army, 54 M777 155mm towed howitzers to replace 115+ Hamel 105mm light guns and 36 M-198 155mm towed howitzers; 59 M1A1 Abrams for 90 Leopard AS1 gun tanks. In each case the replacement capability is a noticeable improvement but noticeable too is the reduced numbers.

Capability is critical but meaningless if you don't have enough assets to ensure that capability remains viable beyond the first few engagements. I hope we never have to learn that lesson the hard way.

 

[Volkodav]

Out of interest, do you have examples of this? Very few capabilities have lost significant numbers of platforms, and most of the ones that have is due to a rebalancing to other emerging capabilities.

Three DDGs and six FFGs being replaced with just 3 AEGIS equipped DDGs, 90 Leopards replaced with 59 Abrams (although you have mentioned that a third squadrons worth should be ordered), Army fixed wing aviation, reserve armoured and artillery units. Must admit I am pretty impressed with what the RAAF has done with their transport fleet, a massive increase in capability combined with covering all bases better then before, i.e. they didn't used to have a high end at all now they have six C-17 while finally managing to replace the Bou with the C-27 and keeping a full Sqn of Hercs. The RAAF are expert at selling the need for capability and IMO the other services should find out how they do it.

The biggest hit has been in RAN surface combatant numbers and capabilities. With the loss of fixed wing carrier aviation upon the retirement of HMAS Melbourne the RAN was to have seen an increase in numbers and individual capability of surface combatants to cover off some of the lost capability. This started to occur in the second half of the 90s after Australian shipbuilding had been sorted out and was finally starting to deliver with the on schedule and below cost delivery of the ANZAC class tier 2 patrol frigates. The issue is the eight tier 1 guided missile destroyers / frigates (intended to replace the nine DDG / FFG in service) and the ten to twelve missile armed, helicopter equipped corvettes (to replace the 15 Fremantle class PBs) were never ordered.

Eventually, after a shipbuilding black hole had done its damage, three AWDs were ordered, at a ludicrous mark-up that we could have bought a fourth ship or even three Flight IIA DDG51s for, as were 12+2 aluminium tinnies from Austal. The ANZACs are now being upgraded to try and fill the gap, that's a bit like whacking an ASLAV turret on an M-113 and calling it a tank though.

The fact is at retirement the DDGs were more capable than and could do things the FFGs could not, just as the FFGs were a level beyond the ANZACs in capability both before and especially after upgrade. All DDGs and two FFGs, five of our most capable warships, have been retired without replacement to date. Of the remaining twelve combatants only three DDGs are being built and six replacement frigates are being discussed.

 

[Raven22]

In the late 1990s the absolute minimum number of surface combatants with which the RAN thought it could remain effective was 14. About 10 years ago it was 12. Now it is 11. Sooner or later it must reach a tipping point beyond which there are simply not enough ships to do what it required. In amphib assets the outlook is much brighter than it was 5 or 10 years ago and the capability miles ahead, but in the DDG/FFG space numbers matter.

What the Navy planned is irrelevant. Australia has had about a dozen major surface combatants for the last 50 years. This will likely be reduced 11 next decade. In the same timeframe, the submarine arm has expanded and the amphibious capability massively increased. None of which is strong evidence that the government keeps reducing platform numbers with each generation.

As for Army, 54 M777 155mm towed howitzers to replace 115+ Hamel 105mm light guns and 36 M-198 155mm towed howitzers; 59 M1A1 Abrams for 90 Leopard AS1 gun tanks. In each case the replacement capability is a noticeable improvement but noticeable too is the reduced numbers. .

The M777s are enough to replace every single gun that the Army had in service. Realistically the Army can't man the guns we have - lots of RAA manpower has gone to massively increasing the number of JFOs/JTACs and the raising of a UAV/STA regiment.

The Abrams buy replaced the Leopard capability we had in service - 2 squadrons. Since the Leopards entered service we have also bought 257 ASLAVs, upgraded more M113s than we needed, and bought over 1000 Bushmasters. Again, this is not particularly strong evidence that we keep reducing platform numbers with each generation.

There are some capabilities where platform numbers have dropped, but they are in the minority. At the same time other capabilities have grown and continue to grow. A lot of the reduction in numbers is due to changing requirements and force structures, not a basic belief that more capable platforms can offset a reduction in numbers, which is what you said.

Perhaps more to the point, I don't understand the constant need on this forum to compare what we have now/will have in the future with what we had in the past. The strategic circumstances today are very different to those in the past, so why use the past as a benchmark? Why not base what we need now/in the future on today's requirements? Otherwise we would never evolve. With this thinking we would have the Australian Army going to war in WWII with Light Horse Regiments mounted on horses, because that is what we had in the past.

 

[t68]

As a key part of Australia's defence strategy, The Royal Australian Air Force must be able to control Australia's air approaches and enable and support friendly operations in the land, sea and air environments.
Defence White Paper 2013, p. 87

http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper2013/docs/WP_2013_web.pdf

One can draw a long bow with this reference; if they want persistent coverage in a heightened situation they must either order more supporting KC-30A air-to-air refueling aircraft in a maritime environment or move those aircraft onto a floating airfield. Whilst the aircraft between models in regards to their avionics are pretty much the same if you are going to have dissimilar version of the aircraft least acquire an aircraft that will enhance No. 82 Wing role in strike and reconnaissance with F35C.

I can see the fixation of the F35B and a temporary floating airfield in the LHD but as Volkodov point out not going to be much chop when kited out with an ARG aboard and then limits your maritime fixed wing fast jet capability.



In addition to the AAR I will quote a text from, Leveraging UK Carrier Capability. A Study into the Preparation for and Use of the Queen Elizabeth-Class Carriers by Tobias Ellwood MP

Land-Air versus Marine-Air Sorties

Although Tornado missions flown from RAF Marham were hailed as a success, there are lessons to be learnt from the detail of how these tasks were executed in comparison with US carrier-based operations:

• For every four Tornados tasked to Libyan airspace, a further two were required to be airborne in order to replace one or more of the four Tornados in case they became unserviceable after taking off

• The cost per flying hour for the Tornado is £32,000, meaning that the total cost per flying mission of thirty hours (four aircraft flying for seven hours, with two additional flying for one) was at least £960,000. This does not include the flight of the VC-10 tanker for over eight hours in support of the missions, or the cost of the ordnance expended

• As a comparison, US Marine Corps AV-8B missions from the USS Kearsage, located around 50 miles from the Libyan coast, took about 90 minutes per tasking without a requirement for mid-air refueling.

 

[old faithful]

As a key part of Australia's defence strategy, The Royal Australian Air Force must be able to control Australia's air approaches and enable and support friendly operations in the land, sea and air environments.
Defence White Paper 2013, p. 87

http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper2013/docs/WP_2013_web.pdf

One can draw a long bow with this reference; if they want persistent coverage in a heightened situation they must either order more supporting KC-30A air-to-air refueling aircraft in a maritime environment or move those aircraft onto a floating airfield. Whilst the aircraft between models in regards to their avionics are pretty much the same if you are going to have dissimilar version of the aircraft least acquire an aircraft that will enhance No. 82 Wing role in strike and reconnaissance with F35C.

I can see the fixation of the F35B and a temporary floating airfield in the LHD but as Volkodov point out not going to be much chop when kited out with an ARG aboard and then limits your maritime fixed wing fast jet capability.



In addition to the AAR I will quote a text from, Leveraging UK Carrier Capability. A Study into the Preparation for and Use of the Queen Elizabeth-Class Carriers by Tobias Ellwood MP

Land-Air versus Marine-Air Sorties

Although Tornado missions flown from RAF Marham were hailed as a success, there are lessons to be learnt from the detail of how these tasks were executed in comparison with US carrier-based operations:

• For every four Tornados tasked to Libyan airspace, a further two were required to be airborne in order to replace one or more of the four Tornados in case they became unserviceable after taking off

• The cost per flying hour for the Tornado is £32,000, meaning that the total cost per flying mission of thirty hours (four aircraft flying for seven hours, with two additional flying for one) was at least £960,000. This does not include the flight of the VC-10 tanker for over eight hours in support of the missions, or the cost of the ordnance expended

• As a comparison, US Marine Corps AV-8B missions from the USS Kearsage, located around 50 miles from the Libyan coast, took about 90 minutes per tasking without a requirement for mid-air refueling.

excellent post, thanks for posting.
Cost benefit of a carrier and air wing is looking good......

 

[Volkodav]

Raven, you are missing the point, twelve surface combatants is the number we had when we had carriers and it was never the number we needed, just the number we had. When the last of the carriers were retired numbers and capability where to have increased and actually started to increase but then dropped again significantly.

Pure numbers are not the whole story either, it is the most capable platforms that have been retired with newer but less capable platforms retained. Numbers have been cut but capability has been cut even more as many of the command, control and air defence functions lost with the retirement of the DDGs will not be regained until the AWDs are commissioned.

If the army followed the same spiral in replacing MBTs instead of Centurion being replaced with Leopard and then Abrams it would have been Centurion, Bradley, Bushmaster. Not every armoured vehicle is a tank, not every warship is a destroyer, in fact even our new destroyers are really frigates as future governments will come to realise when they try and upgrade them in coming decades.

 

[ngatimozart]

As a key part of Australia's defence strategy, The Royal Australian Air Force must be able to control Australia's air approaches and enable and support friendly operations in the land, sea and air environments.
Defence White Paper 2013, p. 87

http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper2013/docs/WP_2013_web.pdf

One can draw a long bow with this reference; if they want persistent coverage in a heightened situation they must either order more supporting KC-30A air-to-air refueling aircraft in a maritime environment or move those aircraft onto a floating airfield. Whilst the aircraft between models in regards to their avionics are pretty much the same if you are going to have dissimilar version of the aircraft least acquire an aircraft that will enhance No. 82 Wing role in strike and reconnaissance with F35C.

I can see the fixation of the F35B and a temporary floating airfield in the LHD but as Volkodov point out not going to be much chop when kited out with an ARG aboard and then limits your maritime fixed wing fast jet capability.



In addition to the AAR I will quote a text from, Leveraging UK Carrier Capability. A Study into the Preparation for and Use of the Queen Elizabeth-Class Carriers by Tobias Ellwood MP

Land-Air versus Marine-Air Sorties

Although Tornado missions flown from RAF Marham were hailed as a success, there are lessons to be learnt from the detail of how these tasks were executed in comparison with US carrier-based operations:

• For every four Tornados tasked to Libyan airspace, a further two were required to be airborne in order to replace one or more of the four Tornados in case they became unserviceable after taking off

• The cost per flying hour for the Tornado is £32,000, meaning that the total cost per flying mission of thirty hours (four aircraft flying for seven hours, with two additional flying for one) was at least £960,000. This does not include the flight of the VC-10 tanker for over eight hours in support of the missions, or the cost of the ordnance expended

• As a comparison, US Marine Corps AV-8B missions from the USS Kearsage, located around 50 miles from the Libyan coast, took about 90 minutes per tasking without a requirement for mid-air refueling.

Hmm, but what is the cost of USS Kearsage and it's day to day operational costs? How many USMC Harrier flight hours were there? I'm just trying to get things in perspective in my own mind.

 

[Raven22]

Raven, you are missing the point, twelve surface combatants is the number we had when we had carriers and it was never the number we needed, just the number we had. When the last of the carriers were retired numbers and capability where to have increased and actually started to increase but then dropped again significantly.

Pure numbers are not the whole story either, it is the most capable platforms that have been retired with newer but less capable platforms retained. Numbers have been cut but capability has been cut even more as many of the command, control and air defence functions lost with the retirement of the DDGs will not be regained until the AWDs are commissioned.

If the army followed the same spiral in replacing MBTs instead of Centurion being replaced with Leopard and then Abrams it would have been Centurion, Bradley, Bushmaster. Not every armoured vehicle is a tank, not every warship is a destroyer, in fact even our new destroyers are really frigates as future governments will come to realise when they try and upgrade them in coming decades.

Actually, I am not missing the point. You are making my point.

Numbers are not dropping in any significant manner - which was Monitors point.

But to your point - why is how many ships we had in service 30+ years ago relevant to the present or future? If you were arguing that we need more destroyers or frigates because there is a lack of capability now or will be in the future, fine. That is an adult argument that is actually relevant.

Simply stating that because we had 12 surface combatants and carrier in the distant past therefore we should have them now, which is what you do more or less constantly, is irrelevant. Its even worse when you use a a random plan from the past, such as the 17 surface combatant three-tier fleet from the '90s, to justify future capability.

 

[Volkodav]

Hmm, but what is the cost of USS Kearsage and it's day to day operational costs? How many USMC Harrier flight hours were there? I'm just trying to get things in perspective in my own mind.

The same could be asked of the cost of the airbase and the supporting tankers that are not always needed but have to be there just in case. Its all a trade off but as I see it operating at extreme range works for one off high value strikes but went you need persistent strike local or carrier basing is better unless you have B-1Bs in your OOB.

 

[Nick underscore]

In terms of surface numbers, would it not be better to compare relative to RN/RCN currently, rather than RAN 80's and 90's? In this instance I would think Australia is batting better than the average..

 

[StingrayOZ]

But going with the C model would require completely new ships. The LHD can't be tasked with ARG and carrier, but can do both separately (sort of), although as a carrier IMO you have about 2 weeks of operations at a decent rate (supporting say 6 F-35B aircraft) before fuel, maintenance and stores dry up. Not great, hardly worthy of calling it a carrier, but still useful.

You also have two of these ships, that can perform training, small missions, support missions etc. You also get compatibility with USMC, UK, italian carriers, and most likely Japanese, Korean, Spanish, Turkey and possibly Singaporean assets. Also they could operate their planes from our ship. Handy.

If you could get a LHD built with say twice the fuel storage more bunkerage, containerised maintenance etc but otherwise much the same you would have a ship able to support a decent airwing(up to 8) for a useful amount of time and also able to perform a pretty expansive amphibious role. There is already a build program and partnerships in place and is fairly low risk. When not functioning as a carrier she would be well suited to normal amphibious missions, particularly with rotary assets.

At pretty much any time you would be able to have two ships available and be able to sustain two ships for a significant period of time. Huge amphibious capability with some fixed wing carrier capability. Given that we would most likely operate with land based air and allied naval air as well that would seem to be okay.

That said there are other options that would make for a heck of a lot more capable carrier (PoW or an America class). But does Australia really need a pure carrier? What sort of operations is it required to have one? Would we have to trade in say some of 2048p5, Choules, FFG's, etc to get it. If we have to trade some of that, then a LHD type ship that can actually do some of those roles makes more sense IMO.

Im sure politicians will make all sorts of noises, but where does the money come from and what are we trading off for it. Colour me skeptical.

 

[Volkodav]

Actually, I am not missing the point. You are making my point.

Numbers are not dropping in any significant manner - which was Monitors point.

But to your point - why is how many ships we had in service 30+ years ago relevant to the present or future? If you were arguing that we need more destroyers or frigates because there is a lack of capability now or will be in the future, fine. That is an adult argument that is actually relevant.

Simply stating that because we had 12 surface combatants and carrier in the distant past therefore we should have them now, which is what you do more or less constantly, is irrelevant. Its even worse when you use a a random plan from the past, such as the 17 surface combatant three-tier fleet from the '90s, to justify future capability.

Numbers matter because of geography, so long as the ships concerned are of a suitable level of capability to do the job within a given threat level you will still need a minimum number of ships on station. Ships on station means ships in port and refit as well to support them. I do not have it on hand, maybe Abe does, but the result of the only detailed strategic study into what the RAN was required to do and what they needed to get the job done resulted in the 8 tier 1, 8 tier 2 and 10-12 tier 3 fleet levels I constantly refer to. Every other determination on force levels has been either cost or politically driven. This was the RANs plan Beersheba and they got screwed.

As for numbers when we had the carrier you need to factor in the stand off ASW and strike capability as being worth multiple additional escorts, i.e. each Sea King on station was equated to a frigate in the ASW screen. Again I will defer to Assail and Abe on this as they are more knowledgeable than I.

Some points would need a ship capable of self defence against air, surface and sub-surface threats, an FFG would do or an ANZAC at a stretch. Some would need a ship able to extend its air defence umbrella to a degree, i.e. more comprehensive radar suit and command functions etc. Some point could be adequately patrolled by a light combatant with point air defence minimal anti surface and no ASW capability. Some could be covered by a submarine or a RAAF Orion on station.

So the answer is geography and what is the minimum number of platforms and capabilities required to maintain control of that geography.

 

[t68]

But going with the C model would require completely new ships. The LHD can't be tasked with ARG and carrier, but can do both separately (sort of), although as a carrier IMO you have about 2 weeks of operations at a decent rate (supporting say 6 F-35B aircraft) before fuel, maintenance and stores dry up. Not great, hardly worthy of calling it a carrier, but still useful..

That’s true but the whole point of sea based fixed wing aircraft is that they can be available when needed not just part of the time.

You also have two of these ships, that can perform training, small missions, support missions etc. You also get compatibility with USMC, UK, italian carriers, and most likely Japanese, Korean, Spanish, Turkey and possibly Singaporean assets. Also they could operate their planes from our ship. Handy..

Depending on the size of the ship they still can use a carrier; they just don’t need to be assisted off.

At pretty much any time you would be able to have two ships available and be able to sustain two ships for a significant period of time. Huge amphibious capability with some fixed wing carrier capability.

RAN cannot guarantee both ships would be available on short notice deployment that is not foreseen, if only one LHD is available and you want or need both an amphibious assault ship and aircraft carrier which has the priority?

That said there are other options that would make for a heck of a lot more capable carrier (PoW or an America class). But does Australia really need a pure carrier?.

A ship the size of QEC can function as both a carrier and airborne assault ship with a 50-50 split between fixed wing and helicopter ops with the magazine capacity and bunkerage to support both.

What sort of operations is it required to have one? Would we have to trade in say some of 2048p5, Choules, FFG's, etc to get it. If we have to trade some of that, then a LHD type ship that can actually do some of those roles makes more sense IMO..

If we have to trade away capability no we should not, Choules is meant to be strategic sea lift not an assault ship. Isn’t the AWD replacing the Adelaide Class FFG anyway?

Im sure politicians will make all sorts of noises, but where does the money come from and what are we trading off for it. Colour me skeptical.

I am still skeptical that we will see the F35B anyway

 

[aussienscale]

although as a carrier IMO you have about 2 weeks of operations at a decent rate (supporting say 6 F-35B aircraft) before fuel, maintenance and stores dry up. Not great, hardly worthy of calling it a carrier, but still useful.

Navantia does quote that in "Aircraft Carrier Profile" that the ship can support up to 12 Stovl and 12 Helicopters for up to 50 days:

"In the case of the LHD operating as
a temporary aircraft carrier, the vehicles and material would
be substituted by between 10 and 12 STOVL planes, as well
as the dozen helicopters previously mentioned. In order to
provide support for airborne operations, it is estimated that
the ship has sufficient fuel, spare parts and arms so that the
embarked aircraft could carry out their operations without the
ship needing replenishment for up to a maximum of 50 days"

http://www.navantia.es/ckfinder/userfiles/files/sala_pr/folleto LHD_marzo_para navantia_ingles.pdf

What this is based on I have no idea though, does not mention sortie rates, munition depletion rates/mission sets etc. The only firm number we do know is that they can carry 900t of aviation fuel, and although there has been much speculation of space/capacity for munitions bunkerage, I have never seen any official indication of that capacity.

If this was ever to go ahead with the B's the LHD would operate as either one or the other, not a combination of both. It would either be doing the amphib thing with Tigers or it would for what ever reason be in the "Carrier" role, the aircraft would be RAAF, and just because we have them does not mean they will be on the LHD's all the time, I sure the RAAF can find several ways to play around with them

But it is all academic, it was just a comment and any possibility is a loooong way off