Extracts from “A REPLACEMENT AIRCRAFT CARRIER AND FIXED WING AIRCRAFT FOR THE R.A.N. 1962” as can be seen a lot of the operational needs of the RAN are still current to what the operational needs in 2014 nothing seems to have changed except we now have bigger capital ships to protect, with China flexing and enhancing her ties in the South Pacific most notably Fiji.
Abraham Gubler show me the way to it some time ago on another forum.
"To ensure the use of the seas of our areas of interest for our own and for friendly shipping and to deny them to the shipping of the enemy”. The priority of the sea responsibilities may vary from time to time but it is contended that, for an effective contribution, the Navy needs an offensive capability. If we have no offensive capability the initiative remains at all times with the enemy, the maxim that the best method of defence is attack is undoubted true.
The R.A.N. must be prepared to meet the responsibilities listed in paragraph 1, and , in common with our other Defence Forces to operate in two dissimilar types of war :
(a) In conjunction with allies, to meet our Treaty obligations in south East Asian waters.
(b) To operate alone, for a time at least, in the defence of the Australian mainland and island territories
A situation could exist where both the above requirements need to be met concurrently. Australia has already nominated for planning purposes the majority of her readily available forces to the various SEATO plans.
To enable 'the Navy to meet its responsibilities and perform all its t asks effectively, it will be shown that fixed winged aircraft, operate from a modern aircraft carrier, are essential.
SEATO planning which assumes a non-hostile Indonesia has made clear that with commitments facing the U.S. and U.K. forces, Australia will be responsible for the escorting and logistic support of her contribution to the area of hostilities in South East Asia. When these forces have arrived the RAN will operate in concert with its allies, but since little or no assistance from these allies can be expected before this, our own resources must be sufficient to the safety and timely arrival of our national contribution.
Air defence of convoys.
The operational radius of shore based fighter especially with supersonic capability is necessarily limited, and to provide combat air patrol and the concentrated effort needed the “airfield” must be near the convoy, vis, an aircraft carrier. There is no other means of providing air defence or strike for a convoy in areas of Indonesian aircraft or surface forces can operate and our forces cannot. To assume that shore based aircraft can be brought up to the necessary position in the ocean hundreds of miles from land to counter a developing attack is irrational.
The provision of anti-submarine protection is done in conjunction with the Air Force, within the range and availability of its aircraft. Ground support for army and air cover over the beaches in an amphibious landing are additional tasks which may be required in the future. This emphasis the need for fighter/strike at ranges beyond shore based aircraft can operate continuously. Lack of this capability will confine any amphibious operation to areas to within range of shore based aircraft if any air threat however slight, exists. Such a situation will preclude the full mobility which control of the seas and local air superiority can impart.
The role of a carrier in the RAN would be
1. Reconnaissance
2. Air Defence
3. Submarine detection & destruction
4. Air Strike
5. Airborne early warning and air direction
6. Ground support
I would like to think as time goes on and we have the LHD with troops on board and they are intercepted by a non-allied third party fast jets and to see how exposed they were and the realization of the implications of not supplying adequate defence measures, those how reside in the lodge will get the message.
