I'm more inclined to believe this - and as Growlers becoming more like proxy directors in small flights. it fits in with a "junior" wedgetail role...
one would expect to see new conops being touted......
Royal Australian Air Force [RAAF] News, Discussions and Updates
one would expect to see new conops being touted......
I've been on leave for the last 6 months so have missed out on some of the scuttleb......
but going on prev behaviour, I suspect that these are "instead of"
what's unavoidable is that we now are committed to a mixed fleet force, so any savings that were "philosophised" by prev Ministers have changed the game plan
in fact I'd argue that the change in philosphy is going to screw up a few other acquisitions. I can't imagine that the the other services are too happy about the circumstances - and not from a service rivalry perspective, but from a force development position
I was contracting to the private sector at the time, but I am aware that Boeing first approached RAAF in Mar 2006, so LM have had more than fair warning that the Plan B option was real.
LM would have also been well aware of the fact that the USN was committed to making sure that RAAF was looked after and that we maintained some sync with their own future intent
RAAF is committed to JSF, but you'd have to say that the odds are damn good that the final volume buy is going to go south.
Ministers are inherently risk averse. and you could also argue that some aren't prepared to keep on sitting on the fence.
6 Sqn to run the Growlers and to continue to provide OCU capability for Shornet crews.
75 Sqn is the most likely destination for the new Shornets, assuming they are going ahead and all classics to be consolidated at Willy...
Or so I heard, today...
John Newman
The Bunker Group
GF, thanks for your thoughts, brings up some interesting questions in my mind.
I'd love to be a 'fly on the wall' in the Def Min's office and the halls of Defence over the comming months.
I'm sure there will be a hell of a lot of lobbying before the decision is announced, and I'm sure that the lobbying is also currently in full flight too.
It's interesting that you mention the USN, yes so much commonality of systems in service or will come into service with both the ADF and the USN, eg, Super Hornets, Growlers, MH60R's, P8A's and probably Triton too.
Boeing will no doubt be pushing hard, and of course LM too, I wonder if either have any 'incentives' to offer.
I also wonder which way the US Government would like to see Australia go in its defence equipment selections, I wonder if there will be any pressure applied, or if pressure is applied to the US goverment from the various US 'senators' where defence industries are big employer's too.
Then of course we have the upcoming White Paper before the election, and if as most of us suspect there will be a change of Government, I've heard the Coalition will want to produce it's own White Paper too.
Things might change direction again, who knows, going to be a bumpy ride!!
John Newman
The Bunker Group
Sounds logical, what I though might happen, and assuming all goes ahead too.6 Sqn to run the Growlers and to continue to provide OCU capability for Shornet crews.
75 Sqn is the most likely destination for the new Shornets, assuming they are going ahead and all classics to be consolidated at Willy...
Or so I heard, today...
Interesting that you say that 6 Sqn will be the OCU for the Shornets.
It was only 6mths or so ago (and this is a good example of how quickly things change), that the RAAF announced that once the first 6 Shornets started their conversion to Growlers that training for Shornets crews was going cease and return to the USN.
Be reasonable to assume that a pool of around 30 Shornets will be split between 1 and 75 Sqns and 6 Sqn be equipped with 12 Growlers and the remaining 6 Shornets in the training role.
And of course all the Classic airframes in a pool at Williamstown.
A couple of disjointed observations
buying extra Shornets/Growlers kills off the single fleet model, it will also eventually come in and hurt other acquisitions which I'm pretty sure that the other services will want RAAF to take out of their own hide rather than out of broader service requirements
buying extra Shornets preharnessed as Growlers changes force development models and conops
buying extra Growlers takes some burden off the wedgetails and the P8's (not a lot, but certainly it provides opportunities)
No matter what Boeing say, the pref would be for extra JSF over Growlers as the latter offers far more combat capability and can do far more within the virtual array space.
Once we -re-embrace mixed fleet solutions, then it opens the door (for Boeing especially) to pitch their own next gen manned visions.
I don't think some really appreciate how buying extra SHornets/Growlers changes and impacts upon the acquisition and force construct /force development issues.
It seems simple and in some areas is eminently sensible, but we've just inherited a whole pile of additional hurt in doing so.
buying extra Shornets/Growlers kills off the single fleet model, it will also eventually come in and hurt other acquisitions which I'm pretty sure that the other services will want RAAF to take out of their own hide rather than out of broader service requirements
buying extra Shornets preharnessed as Growlers changes force development models and conops
buying extra Growlers takes some burden off the wedgetails and the P8's (not a lot, but certainly it provides opportunities)
No matter what Boeing say, the pref would be for extra JSF over Growlers as the latter offers far more combat capability and can do far more within the virtual array space.
Once we -re-embrace mixed fleet solutions, then it opens the door (for Boeing especially) to pitch their own next gen manned visions.
I don't think some really appreciate how buying extra SHornets/Growlers changes and impacts upon the acquisition and force construct /force development issues.
It seems simple and in some areas is eminently sensible, but we've just inherited a whole pile of additional hurt in doing so.
How much work would be involved in upgrading the F/A-18F to an E/A-18G?
My guess would be that Canberra is simply exploring the possibility of getting new build Growlers instead of upgrading the Super Hornets. It may well be a cheaper option and would not involve pulling aircraft out of service when they are probably most needed.
If we were going to increase the number of Growlers from 12 to 24 then why would they not just order 24 new Growlers?
My guess would be that Canberra is simply exploring the possibility of getting new build Growlers instead of upgrading the Super Hornets. It may well be a cheaper option and would not involve pulling aircraft out of service when they are probably most needed.
If we were going to increase the number of Growlers from 12 to 24 then why would they not just order 24 new Growlers?
For a pre-wired aircraft? Supposedly only a couple of days at a depot.
For an aircraft not pre-wired? Who knows? Maybe it would have to go back to Boeing, for re-manufacture...
I would suggest that DSCA announcement may be amended soon. There seems to be a few things strange about it...
RubiconNZ
The Wanderer
I wonder how US sequestration may affect the Super Hornets production, I wonder if only to preserve the multi year buy without inducting new aircraft the USN gives up current production slots and transfers them straight to the RAAF.
I don't mean to over simplify budgetary or acquisition processes but thought it was worth putting out there.
It certainly seems possible given the how the original tranche was purchased, if the decision is made how soon does the RAAF "need" them?
I don't mean to over simplify budgetary or acquisition processes but thought it was worth putting out there.
It certainly seems possible given the how the original tranche was purchased, if the decision is made how soon does the RAAF "need" them?
That would seem to be the logical solution to cover a period of stasis, which means that its so sensible it won't get picked up /grin on
One would think that this Govt would argue that its time to batten down the hatches as a foil to offer if the USG started cutting back on mil spending
monkey see, monkey do
King Wally
Active Member
I've been thinking the same thing actually. Half expecting news to that effect. It also has me thinking about all maner of military sales that the US may be tempted to make to clear up their books. Hell maybe we may see some interesting things pop up in the next 6 months.
Maybe time to head state side with a shopping list, just tell the PM it will win votes in Western Sydney and it will happen.
Seriously though in the current situation we could probably get some pretty generous finance deals on any gear we were after.
The report of 12 of each could be read as an Option A and Option B so the Govt can remain flexible.
Although if we are to go for a mixed fleet it would make sense to go for 24 Growlers. They at least bring something extra to the table rather than just duplicate the capabilities of the JSF.
The 12 remaining F's can then either be used for training and gap-filler until enough JSFs come online. I doubt in the current economic climate that the USN would buy back our F's.
I do believe having a 2-seater frontline aircraft will become important when UCAVs become an option. The second pilot to act as a UCAV controller.
Although if we are to go for a mixed fleet it would make sense to go for 24 Growlers. They at least bring something extra to the table rather than just duplicate the capabilities of the JSF.
The 12 remaining F's can then either be used for training and gap-filler until enough JSFs come online. I doubt in the current economic climate that the USN would buy back our F's.
I do believe having a 2-seater frontline aircraft will become important when UCAVs become an option. The second pilot to act as a UCAV controller.
Air Force Brat
Member
I think you're onto it Jack, that will indeed place additional growlers into the mix, at a time when that capability may well become critical to us all in the South Asia/Pacific theatre as a US/AU asset, which will provide AU with immediate capability, while maintaining the SH production line, there is very little doubt that sequestration will further roll back IOC on lots of Lightning IIS. I have little doubt that the US is looking for ways to keep Aus on board with the F-35, and to provide interim capability, untill the F-35s are ready to be stood up. Cheers Brat
the road runner
Active Member
+1 For Greg Sheridan ,The Australian news paper and a change in the winds by a journalist for the JSF.
Cookies must be enabled. | The Australian
Beats the dribble we hear from other news articles.Good to see him ride off the 4 Corners program.As for a future buy of F-18 i hope we are just getting a price off Boeing and not going threw with a purchase.
Cookies must be enabled. | The Australian
Beats the dribble we hear from other news articles.Good to see him ride off the 4 Corners program.As for a future buy of F-18 i hope we are just getting a price off Boeing and not going threw with a purchase.
If you don't have an account with The Australian, google this: For security's sake, Joint Strike Fighter is way of the future. That is the articles title. the Australian certainly makes it difficult to get at their articles.
the road runner
Active Member
For some reason i posted the whole article but now its directing it to a short story.
Hmmm Strange, was a good article.
The Australian has a habit of doing that and it can be a right royal pain. So googling the article title & going thru Google gets you to the article. If anybody has trouble getting pm me and I flick you a pdf copy of it.
If it's ok, I'll paste it for those outside of australia
IN the middle of this year, Defence Minister Stephen Smith will make a crucial decision. He will announce either that Australia is buying another squadron of 24 F-18 Super Hornets, or that we will stick with the plan to have an operational squadron of F-35s, the Joint Strike Fighter, by the end of the decade or a bit before.
In many ways, this is a decision fundamental to Australia's future. It is a choice, really, between the future and the past. It goes to what sort of defence force we intend to have, and even to what sort of society we intend to be.
There is a lot of controversy about the JSF. Like every significant technological advance in military aircraft it has had a good share of problems and delays. These can be difficult for the layman to assess. But a few common sense tests can be applied. The JSF is being introduced as the main combat aircraft for the US air force, navy and marines.
Unless the shape of the world we live in has completely upended itself, the US air force, navy and marines will not fly an inferior aircraft. They will fly the best. And the best will be the JSF.
It is a 5th-generation stealth fighter. The Super Hornet is a 4th-generation plane. The Super Hornet is very good, but there is really no comparison.
Some of the critics of the JSF say it can't turn quite as quickly as some of its competitors and therefore it might lose a dogfight. In this, they are failing to understand the nature of the technological advance the JSF represents.
Think of it this way. When aircraft carriers started to make their first appearance, the proponents of traditional battleships might have argued their superiority. If you lined up a battleship against an aircraft carrier separated by 500m of water, then the battleship's superior guns and rapid fire ability would have destroyed the aircraft carrier.
You could argue, as the critics of the JSF argue (and this criticism was preposterously presented as fact in a ludicrous Four Corners episode recently), that in a dogfight, the JSF might lose.
But 5th-generation fighter technology is not designed for traditional dogfights. A dogfight is like a knife fight in a telephone booth - even if you win, you'll sustain a lot of damage. Just as the carrier would have lost to the battleship up close, the problem for the battleship was that the carrier never came close. The carrier could stand off, hundreds of kilometres away, and destroy the battleship with planes before it could ever fire a shot in anger. The battleship was obsolete.
The air force has a saying: know first, shoot first, kill first. That's what the JSF will do every time. Though smaller than the Super Hornet, the JSF has a much longer range. It is a stealth aircraft, which means it is extremely difficult to detect by radar or any other method. While a 4th-generation fighter is looking for the JSF, the JSF, full of sensors and generating and accessing elaborate information networks, will destroy it.
The ADF has conducted a number of reviews of the JSF and they come to the same conclusion. It's the best plane for us.
Angus Houston, one of the most respected chiefs of the Defence Force we have had, and before that a chief of the air force, wrote recently of the JSF: "It was the only 5th-generation multi-role combat aircraft and the advantages it presented in terms of stealth, advanced sensors and avionics, commonality with the US, a future upgrade path and economic benefits from being a small part of a very large project were clear ... The other aircraft options were mature, off-the-shelf, third/fourth-generation aircraft with reasonably well known performance characteristics that ... were approaching the end of their upgrade paths and provided limited future growth potential to face future threats."
The Super Hornet will soon go out of production. It is owned only by the US navy and the Australian air force. No one else has bought it.
The US navy, which if it stood alone would be about the fourth biggest air force in the world, will start retiring its Super Hornets in 2025, but it will keep some in service until the 2030s. The US air force and marines will go solely to JSFs.
Australia has a very small defence force. When we make big investments we need to get it right. Because of delays with the JSFs, the Howard government bought a squadron of 24 Super Hornets, to supplement the 71 "classic Hornets", which make up the bulk of our fast jet fleet. This was a prudent purchase and the Labor government, also sensibly, has upgraded a number of the Super Hornets with the "Growler" electronic warfare capability. This allows the planes to suppress air defences and a number of other radars. But there is an absolute limit to how far you can take a 4th-generation plane. Many of the JSF's capabilities are classified and secret, but everyone who sees them wants them.
Australia's military doctrine rests on a few basic considerations. We are rich but with a very small (dangerously small, in my view) population. And we are intimate US allies. We use our wealth and access to US technology to keep a technological edge over our neighbours.
The government is considering another 24 Super Hornets with a view to getting some JSFs some time in the future, and eventually running a mixed fleet. But given the length of time we keep planes in service - 40 years for the F-111s - and the dire state of the defence budget, it would probably be many years, 2025 at the absolute earliest, before we ever got any JSFs.
In the long run, this would leave us with an inferior air force and higher costs. An air force, by say 2035 or 2040, of 48 Super Hornets and 50 JSFs would be vastly inferior to an air force of 100 JSFs. As well, it would be more expensive to have two separate training and maintenance operations and to integrate two radically different planes into single-mission capabilities. More important, many of our wealthy neighbours will have JSFs or something like them. Japan has committed to a substantial JSF purchase. Given that, it is difficult to see South Korea sticking with a 4th-generation plane while Tokyo has the 5th generation. The Singaporeans are said to favour the JSF, especially the short take off and landing version, which gives them the ability to use even some of their roads as runways if necessary, and thus get round one of their vulnerabilities, that their air fields could be attacked.
More importantly, both China and Russia are very hard at work on 5th-generation fighters. They are well behind the Americans and one beauty of the JSF for Australia is that we become automatically locked into the continual upgrade path, especially software upgrades, to which the Americans will devote huge resources.
If we go for the Super Hornet we decide, deliberately, to have a second-tier air force, to be unable to do the things for ourselves that we need to do and have always wanted to do in the past.
The first JSF operational squadron has been working out in the US in recent months. The US marines have scheduled their first full deployment of fully operational JSFs for 2015/16. Of course there are teething problems, but the question is this: do we invest in the future or in the past? Do we care enough about our own security to operate the best?
.
IN the middle of this year, Defence Minister Stephen Smith will make a crucial decision. He will announce either that Australia is buying another squadron of 24 F-18 Super Hornets, or that we will stick with the plan to have an operational squadron of F-35s, the Joint Strike Fighter, by the end of the decade or a bit before.
In many ways, this is a decision fundamental to Australia's future. It is a choice, really, between the future and the past. It goes to what sort of defence force we intend to have, and even to what sort of society we intend to be.
There is a lot of controversy about the JSF. Like every significant technological advance in military aircraft it has had a good share of problems and delays. These can be difficult for the layman to assess. But a few common sense tests can be applied. The JSF is being introduced as the main combat aircraft for the US air force, navy and marines.
Unless the shape of the world we live in has completely upended itself, the US air force, navy and marines will not fly an inferior aircraft. They will fly the best. And the best will be the JSF.
It is a 5th-generation stealth fighter. The Super Hornet is a 4th-generation plane. The Super Hornet is very good, but there is really no comparison.
Some of the critics of the JSF say it can't turn quite as quickly as some of its competitors and therefore it might lose a dogfight. In this, they are failing to understand the nature of the technological advance the JSF represents.
Think of it this way. When aircraft carriers started to make their first appearance, the proponents of traditional battleships might have argued their superiority. If you lined up a battleship against an aircraft carrier separated by 500m of water, then the battleship's superior guns and rapid fire ability would have destroyed the aircraft carrier.
You could argue, as the critics of the JSF argue (and this criticism was preposterously presented as fact in a ludicrous Four Corners episode recently), that in a dogfight, the JSF might lose.
But 5th-generation fighter technology is not designed for traditional dogfights. A dogfight is like a knife fight in a telephone booth - even if you win, you'll sustain a lot of damage. Just as the carrier would have lost to the battleship up close, the problem for the battleship was that the carrier never came close. The carrier could stand off, hundreds of kilometres away, and destroy the battleship with planes before it could ever fire a shot in anger. The battleship was obsolete.
The air force has a saying: know first, shoot first, kill first. That's what the JSF will do every time. Though smaller than the Super Hornet, the JSF has a much longer range. It is a stealth aircraft, which means it is extremely difficult to detect by radar or any other method. While a 4th-generation fighter is looking for the JSF, the JSF, full of sensors and generating and accessing elaborate information networks, will destroy it.
The ADF has conducted a number of reviews of the JSF and they come to the same conclusion. It's the best plane for us.
Angus Houston, one of the most respected chiefs of the Defence Force we have had, and before that a chief of the air force, wrote recently of the JSF: "It was the only 5th-generation multi-role combat aircraft and the advantages it presented in terms of stealth, advanced sensors and avionics, commonality with the US, a future upgrade path and economic benefits from being a small part of a very large project were clear ... The other aircraft options were mature, off-the-shelf, third/fourth-generation aircraft with reasonably well known performance characteristics that ... were approaching the end of their upgrade paths and provided limited future growth potential to face future threats."
The Super Hornet will soon go out of production. It is owned only by the US navy and the Australian air force. No one else has bought it.
The US navy, which if it stood alone would be about the fourth biggest air force in the world, will start retiring its Super Hornets in 2025, but it will keep some in service until the 2030s. The US air force and marines will go solely to JSFs.
Australia has a very small defence force. When we make big investments we need to get it right. Because of delays with the JSFs, the Howard government bought a squadron of 24 Super Hornets, to supplement the 71 "classic Hornets", which make up the bulk of our fast jet fleet. This was a prudent purchase and the Labor government, also sensibly, has upgraded a number of the Super Hornets with the "Growler" electronic warfare capability. This allows the planes to suppress air defences and a number of other radars. But there is an absolute limit to how far you can take a 4th-generation plane. Many of the JSF's capabilities are classified and secret, but everyone who sees them wants them.
Australia's military doctrine rests on a few basic considerations. We are rich but with a very small (dangerously small, in my view) population. And we are intimate US allies. We use our wealth and access to US technology to keep a technological edge over our neighbours.
The government is considering another 24 Super Hornets with a view to getting some JSFs some time in the future, and eventually running a mixed fleet. But given the length of time we keep planes in service - 40 years for the F-111s - and the dire state of the defence budget, it would probably be many years, 2025 at the absolute earliest, before we ever got any JSFs.
In the long run, this would leave us with an inferior air force and higher costs. An air force, by say 2035 or 2040, of 48 Super Hornets and 50 JSFs would be vastly inferior to an air force of 100 JSFs. As well, it would be more expensive to have two separate training and maintenance operations and to integrate two radically different planes into single-mission capabilities. More important, many of our wealthy neighbours will have JSFs or something like them. Japan has committed to a substantial JSF purchase. Given that, it is difficult to see South Korea sticking with a 4th-generation plane while Tokyo has the 5th generation. The Singaporeans are said to favour the JSF, especially the short take off and landing version, which gives them the ability to use even some of their roads as runways if necessary, and thus get round one of their vulnerabilities, that their air fields could be attacked.
More importantly, both China and Russia are very hard at work on 5th-generation fighters. They are well behind the Americans and one beauty of the JSF for Australia is that we become automatically locked into the continual upgrade path, especially software upgrades, to which the Americans will devote huge resources.
If we go for the Super Hornet we decide, deliberately, to have a second-tier air force, to be unable to do the things for ourselves that we need to do and have always wanted to do in the past.
The first JSF operational squadron has been working out in the US in recent months. The US marines have scheduled their first full deployment of fully operational JSFs for 2015/16. Of course there are teething problems, but the question is this: do we invest in the future or in the past? Do we care enough about our own security to operate the best?
.