Can modern IADS be neutralized now?

[gf0012-aust]

The risk isn't that some "countries want to think that their new purchase has given them skyguard capability" but that all you fancy military planners are so convinced that it hasn't provided formidable skyguard capability.

For someone who proclaims to be a strategic policy analyst you seem to be oblivious of how serious tac planners take the process.

nobody assumes that they are guaranteed supremacy - they work to acheive it no matter what the technology balance that appears to be in their initial favour.

 

[Quiller]

First and foremost.... I never said current IADS, whether S400 or China's, evicerate our current 5th Gen fighters capabilities. So repetitive assertions that I made such claims and that they are hogwash is specious. BTW this thread started as a query, intended to take the range of techniques to counter modern IADS.

And my comment you respond to is meant to illustrate that MANY military planners and strategic policy analysts tend to cling to their own gospel. My point is the overwhelming dismissivness sometimes seen here is propelled by a "the earth is flat" mentality.

I've already acknowleged my awareness of the Australian source flaws.

So can we all move on with this? Besides, I have seen enough policy failures within the USAF and NSC and elsewhere to know a lot of them think ignorance is bliss.

Asking a question about IADS and its effect on legacy fighters and military planning isn't the same as claiming the sky is falling. I never said S400 and its ilk have eliminated the West's decades-long air power advantage. I asked only how does it manipulate the new battleground.

 

[Todjaeger]

First and foremost.... I never said current IADS, whether S400 or China's, evicerate our current 5th Gen fighters capabilities. So repetitive assertions that I made such claims and that they are hogwash is specious. BTW this thread started as a query, intended to take the range of techniques to counter modern IADS.

And my comment you respond to is meant to illustrate that MANY military planners and strategic policy analysts tend to cling to their own gospel. My point is the overwhelming dismissivness sometimes seen here is propelled by a "the earth is flat" mentality.

I've already acknowleged my awareness of the Australian source flaws.

So can we all move on with this? Besides, I have seen enough policy failures within the USAF and NSC and elsewhere to know a lot of them think ignorance is bliss.

Asking a question about IADS and its effect on legacy fighters and military planning isn't the same as claiming the sky is falling. I never said S400 and its ilk have eliminated the West's decades-long air power advantage. I asked only how does it manipulate the new battleground.

No, but the opening post in this thread started with this...

Russia has devleoped, fielded, and has offered overseas sales of their S400 IADS which, on paper, looks pretty darn impressive. So much so that it looks to viscerate whatever edge western airpower can effectively muster these days. At least to the point that air losses would be politically unacceptable to most industrialized nations.

The quote managed to overlook a number of capabilities which top tier air forces have, which can be gotten into later.

From the opening post though, this discussion has not really been about IADS, but a ground-based IADS. This is significant, because a IADS relying upon GBAD has significant limitations vs. IADS making use of (or even largely reliant upon) aerial-based IADS.

There was an IADS thread which I had started about a year ago, but could not really get a chance to do more work on. Once I have time, I will get back to it, but there are elements here which are worth discussing.

In basic terms, an IADS will have four key elements. These are sensors, shooters, command, and comms. Eliminate any one of the four, and the IADS falls apart.

Now for some realities. Broad/wide area air search radar surveillance is best conducted from up high, to extend the radar horizon and also get above potential ground clutter. Unless the area the radar installation is located at is atop a lone mountain peak, with several hundred miles to the next mountainous area... there is going to null/deadspaces within the radar coverage. And that is assuming a powerful, fixed location radar emitter.

To perhaps better grasp the limitations that a ground-based radar array has (a non-bi or multi-static radar array that is...), the radar horizon at sea level is roughly 28 - 38 km. So, when the ground-based radar is operating at a flat site at sea level, attempting to detect a target also at sea level, assuming no obstructions like trees, buildings or raised terrain features like hills, mountains, ridgelines, etc, if the target is more than 38 km away, the ground radar station would not be able to get a return because the signal would be blocked by the curvature of the earth.

The actual reality is a bit more complicated in most cases, because there are terrain features and obstructions, but if one understands the range limitations imposed on ground-based radars, one can understand why so many US/NATO cruise missiles and AShM have low altitude terrain following/sea skimming flight profiles. Using a US TacTom LACM as an example, assuming the flat area, no obstructions give above and that the LACM target was the radar array, the TacTom would be flying at 0.9 Mach, or ~16 km/minute which would give the radar array up to ~2 minutes between the time the TacTom would be first detected, and the TacTom would strike the radar array. Two minutes for the radar contact to be detected, identified, have that information relayed to a command centre, have the command make a decision(s)/issue orders, have those orders relayed to SAM and/or AAG assets (assuming there are any located within close enough range to do any good), have the SAM's/AAG's get a firing solution on the moving TacTom and actually fire upon the incoming missile accurately enough to disable/destroy it before impacting on the radar array.

If one understands the above scenario which I outlined above, and some realities about radar operation, then one should be able to understand that any system which relies to a large extent upon ground-based assets (sensors in particular) can be picked apart by an opposing force, if the opposing force has sufficient time.

-Cheers

 

[gf0012-aust]

If one understands the above scenario which I outlined above, and some realities about radar operation, then one should be able to understand that any system which relies to a large extent upon ground-based assets (sensors in particular) can be picked apart by an opposing force, if the opposing force has sufficient time.

-Cheers

and euphemistically referred to as "delamination"

 

[Todjaeger]

and euphemistically referred to as "delaamination"

I think you mean "delamination" but I could be wrong...

What people seem to keep on missing is that IADS stands for Integrated Air Defence (or defense if one prefers) System. It is not a single piece of kit, or a single unit, or indeed any single thing. It is a system, and being a system there will be various exploitable weaknesses. The delamination or an IADS rollback would be conducted by exploiting the known weaknesses a particular IADS has, assuming one's own system has the capabilities to do so.

The heavy interest some seem to have in GBAD tends to ignore some fundamental handicaps such systems start with automatically.

-Cheers

 

[gf0012-aust]

I think you mean "delamination" but I could be wrong...

picked it up just as you decided to expose my phat fingerz...

What people seem to keep on missing is that IADS stands for Integrated Air Defence (or defense if one prefers) System. It is not a single piece of kit, or a single unit, or indeed any single thing. It is a system, and being a system there will be various exploitable weaknesses. The delamination or an IADS rollback would be conducted by exploiting the known weaknesses a particular IADS has, assuming one's own system has the capabilities to do so.

The heavy interest some seem to have in GBAD tends to ignore some fundamental handicaps such systems start with automatically.

-Cheers

and the same problem exists with people comprehending VLO/LO (and usually called "stealth")

they are not defined empirical widgets that can be countered with another silver bullet

not sure if the relevant reports are in the public domain yet, but when you look at how the US targeted specific nodes and massaged an event by manipulating how red team could "see" they were able to leave various hostile systems "on" so that they could interrogate enemy behaviour before committing other forces.

it was akin to progressively developing the enemies playbook without the enemy realising that all their considered actions and activities were actually generated by the other side having C2/3/4 dominance.

 

[My2Cents]

Another problem with GBAD is the limited coverage. It takes a lot of units to cover the border of even a modest sized country, say one every 50km to 70km, maybe more depending on terrain. The distance is determined by the range of the SAM battery’s tracking radar to get a firing solution, or the missile’s ‘no escape’ range, whichever is less. But you should probably have at least twice that number to allow for redundancy, otherwise they will just take out one battery and go through the hole. You will have to increase the number even more if you want to cover the interior. The best GBAD in the world won’t do you much good if the enemy can land a SOCOM team just over the horizon to sneak in and plant a couple charges at night.

It takes on a fraction as many aircraft to give you the same coverage. They are also extremely mobile, so if they take out the coverage in one area, it can be usually be resealed in minutes, not hours. They can also pursue aircraft that penetrate further into the country.

 

[Quiller]

No, but the opening post in this thread started with this...



The quote managed to overlook a number of capabilities which top tier air forces have, which can be gotten into later.

From the opening post though, this discussion has not really been about IADS, but a ground-based IADS. This is significant, because a IADS relying upon GBAD has significant limitations vs. IADS making use of (or even largely reliant upon) aerial-based IADS.

There was an IADS thread which I had started about a year ago, but could not really get a chance to do more work on. Once I have time, I will get back to it, but there are elements here which are worth discussing.

In basic terms, an IADS will have four key elements. These are sensors, shooters, command, and comms. Eliminate any one of the four, and the IADS falls apart.

Now for some realities. Broad/wide area air search radar surveillance is best conducted from up high, to extend the radar horizon and also get above potential ground clutter. Unless the area the radar installation is located at is atop a lone mountain peak, with several hundred miles to the next mountainous area... there is going to null/deadspaces within the radar coverage. And that is assuming a powerful, fixed location radar emitter.

To perhaps better grasp the limitations that a ground-based radar array has (a non-bi or multi-static radar array that is...), the radar horizon at sea level is roughly 28 - 38 km. So, when the ground-based radar is operating at a flat site at sea level, attempting to detect a target also at sea level, assuming no obstructions like trees, buildings or raised terrain features like hills, mountains, ridgelines, etc, if the target is more than 38 km away, the ground radar station would not be able to get a return because the signal would be blocked by the curvature of the earth.

The actual reality is a bit more complicated in most cases, because there are terrain features and obstructions, but if one understands the range limitations imposed on ground-based radars, one can understand why so many US/NATO cruise missiles and AShM have low altitude terrain following/sea skimming flight profiles. Using a US TacTom LACM as an example, assuming the flat area, no obstructions give above and that the LACM target was the radar array, the TacTom would be flying at 0.9 Mach, or ~16 km/minute which would give the radar array up to ~2 minutes between the time the TacTom would be first detected, and the TacTom would strike the radar array. Two minutes for the radar contact to be detected, identified, have that information relayed to a command centre, have the command make a decision(s)/issue orders, have those orders relayed to SAM and/or AAG assets (assuming there are any located within close enough range to do any good), have the SAM's/AAG's get a firing solution on the moving TacTom and actually fire upon the incoming missile accurately enough to disable/destroy it before impacting on the radar array.

If one understands the above scenario which I outlined above, and some realities about radar operation, then one should be able to understand that any system which relies to a large extent upon ground-based assets (sensors in particular) can be picked apart by an opposing force, if the opposing force has sufficient time.

-Cheers

I thank you for your straightforward and informational post. I think I see the IADS forest now... not so much the individual trees. It's about systems and systemnic approach of course.... not platforms. At least not a particular platform in total isolation when it comes to IADS (and yes, I know, other offensive/defensive elements.) Sorry I was being so dense... and that sentiment is sincere.

 

[Quiller]

For someone who proclaims to be a strategic policy analyst you seem to be oblivious of how serious tac planners take the process.

nobody assumes that they are guaranteed supremacy - they work to acheive it no matter what the technology balance that appears to be in their initial favour.

Mea culpa. That's just the brash yank in me trying to be clever, and failing. I know warforce planners take this extremely seriously... as if everybody's life depended upon it... since it clearly does. I'm not an IADS person... as I guess I demonstrated quite hilariously. I stumbled (I use that verb intentionally) upon the APA stuff and sought to explore its dimensions. Hadn't come across it before because, as I said, I'm not an IADS person. Those who conduct analysis have their niches... I guess I shall quietly repair to mine.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Mea culpa. That's just the brash yank in me trying to be clever, and failing. I know warforce planners take this extremely seriously... as if everybody's life depended upon it... since it clearly does. I'm not an IADS person... as I guess I demonstrated quite hilariously. I stumbled (I use that verb intentionally) upon the APA stuff and sought to explore its dimensions. Hadn't come across it before because, as I said, I'm not an IADS person. Those who conduct analysis have their niches... I guess I shall quietly repair to mine.

No harm no foul.

If you do some searches in here you'll see that a number of us are vigorous in our pursuit of reinforcing that warfighting is about systems and not about platforms - hence the frustration when we see the like of APA throw out canned scenarios that don't even remotely reflect how things evolve and are prosecuted.

VLO/LO platforms, like everything else in the delivery and decision chain have relevance along various prosecution points, they work in conjunction with other assets - and without meaning to sound trite - it's a symbiotic relationship. There is no silver bullet solution.

 

[Feanor]

Using a US TacTom LACM as an example, assuming the flat area, no obstructions give above and that the LACM target was the radar array, the TacTom would be flying at 0.9 Mach, or ~16 km/minute which would give the radar array up to ~2 minutes between the time the TacTom would be first detected, and the TacTom would strike the radar array. Two minutes for the radar contact to be detected, identified, have that information relayed to a command centre, have the command make a decision(s)/issue orders, have those orders relayed to SAM and/or AAG assets (assuming there are any located within close enough range to do any good), have the SAM's/AAG's get a firing solution on the moving TacTom and actually fire upon the incoming missile accurately enough to disable/destroy it before impacting on the radar array.

Given the above, what do you think of the recent interception of a cruise missile by a pair of Pantsyr-1S systems?

From what I understand this was a X-55 (Kh-55) missile launched by Tu-95MS. Granted the Pantsyr crews knew there was a missile inbound, and even knew where the missile was supposed to strike. But the Pantsyr unit with their support elements made a rapid march, and had to deploy from the move within a fairly small time window. Two missiles were used to intercept the incoming cruise missile.

This was part of a larger air-defense exercise, and a total of 4 cruise missiles were launched, but 3 were intercepted by other means. There's a few pics here, but they don't illustrate much for the purposes of this discussion.

lelik1970 - "

 

[Todjaeger]

Given the above, what do you think of the recent interception of a cruise missile by a pair of Pantsyr-1S systems?

From what I understand this was a X-55 (Kh-55) missile launched by Tu-95MS. Granted the Pantsyr crews knew there was a missile inbound, and even knew where the missile was supposed to strike. But the Pantsyr unit with their support elements made a rapid march, and had to deploy from the move within a fairly small time window. Two missiles were used to intercept the incoming cruise missile.

This was part of a larger air-defense exercise, and a total of 4 cruise missiles were launched, but 3 were intercepted by other means. There's a few pics here, but they don't illustrate much for the purposes of this discussion.

lelik1970 - "

Honestly, not much. Knowing that a missile is inbound and what the target is, significantly cuts down on the time needed to ID the contact and make a firing decision.

To properly understand how effective the unit was, the rules of the air defence exercise would need to be known. In looking at things though, if the missile was a Kh-55, then its flight path would have had it at an altitude of ~110 m, which would have given the Pantsyr a radar horizon of ~51 km, which is actually further than the stated detection range of 36 km... Basically that leads me to believe that the Pantsyr was essentially pre-positioned for the exercise. There may have been a movement ordered on initial detection of the Kh-55 launch, since a Tu-95 at altitude has a radar horizon in excess of 400 km... However, if the Pantsyr was already in position by the time the Kh-55 entered its area of operations, and the Pantsyr crew had already received orders to engage, then it would really be a matter of if/when the crew detected the Kh-55 and could get a firing solution. This also makes me wonder what sort of flight time the Kh-55 had, before it entered the Pantsyr's local area, and where the local area was relative to the intended target.

To be properly representative of a delamination strike which is part of an IADS rollback, the strike target would need to be a picket radar installation set back from an unfriendly national border approx. 25 km unless that would locate the radar station on the reverse slope of a series of mountains. That or a coastal radar picket, set back perhaps 5 km from the shoreline unless terrain features would interfere with radar operations. The reason these distances are significant, is that there is not much depth of defence available. Going further with that, a real vs. diversionary strike would likely not make use of launch vehicles which would provide the hostiles amply time to prepare for the inbound missiles, unless the strike was to be made en masse. Remember, there is a limit to the number of targets a Pantsyr can engage simultaneously, as well as a limit to how many SAM's can be guided at once, so it might only require 5 - 6 inbound munitions to overwhelm a Pantsyr and destroy the radar picket.

Once one or perhaps even as many as two or three radar pickets are disabled or destroyed, an ingress/egress corridor has been opened. This can then be further exploited to eliminate additional radar sites, comms, and/or command/control facilities.

-Cheers

 

[Feanor]

Honestly, not much. Knowing that a missile is inbound and what the target is, significantly cuts down on the time needed to ID the contact and make a firing decision.

That's true. However this is significant because it's the first practical test of the Pantsyr-1S in interception of actual cruise missiles. In other words it gives confirmation of the capability. The conditions were likely made fairly easy to make sure the exercise was successful. I would love to see results on the joint use of S-300PM and Pantsyr-1S from Kapustin Yar, where they practiced against imitation targets mimicking cruise missile strikes.

To properly understand how effective the unit was, the rules of the air defence exercise would need to be known. In looking at things though, if the missile was a Kh-55, then its flight path would have had it at an altitude of ~110 m, which would have given the Pantsyr a radar horizon of ~51 km, which is actually further than the stated detection range of 36 km... Basically that leads me to believe that the Pantsyr was essentially pre-positioned for the exercise. There may have been a movement ordered on initial detection of the Kh-55 launch, since a Tu-95 at altitude has a radar horizon in excess of 400 km...

I don't think the movement was on detection. I think there was a forced march of the Pantsyr detachment, followed by it occupying a position, setting up a temporary HQ in a ruined structure (very strange, since most Russian SAM/SPAAGs have mobile command posts on wheeled or tracked chassis usually unified with the SAM, and don't require a dismounted field HQ), and then proceeded to fire on incoming cruise missile, once it entered the engagement envelope.

However, if the Pantsyr was already in position by the time the Kh-55 entered its area of operations, and the Pantsyr crew had already received orders to engage, then it would really be a matter of if/when the crew detected the Kh-55 and could get a firing solution. This also makes me wonder what sort of flight time the Kh-55 had, before it entered the Pantsyr's local area, and where the local area was relative to the intended target.

Fairly long flight time. The missiles were launched above the ocean. The Pantsyr crews were given a chance to track the first three missiles, before they were intercepted by other means. Then the fourth, last missile, was the one they fired on. Out of the two Pantsyrs, only one fired, and it fired two missiles at it. I don't know the exact relationship between the target area, and the deployment of the Pantsyrs, but the info provided suggests that it was between the launch point and the target area. Observers say that they could feel and hear the first three missiles as they flew by, as well as observe the rotation of the Pantsyr turret, as it tracked the missiles.

To be properly representative of a delamination strike which is part of an IADS rollback, the strike target would need to be a picket radar installation set back from an unfriendly national border approx. 25 km unless that would locate the radar station on the reverse slope of a series of mountains. That or a coastal radar picket, set back perhaps 5 km from the shoreline unless terrain features would interfere with radar operations. The reason these distances are significant, is that there is not much depth of defence available. Going further with that, a real vs. diversionary strike would likely not make use of launch vehicles which would provide the hostiles amply time to prepare for the inbound missiles, unless the strike was to be made en masse. Remember, there is a limit to the number of targets a Pantsyr can engage simultaneously, as well as a limit to how many SAM's can be guided at once, so it might only require 5 - 6 inbound munitions to overwhelm a Pantsyr and destroy the radar picket.

Concentrating disproportionate numbers of offensive assets against a defender that has to spread his assets to protect the entire area. And even with a system as sophisticated and modern as the Pantsyr, everything you say applies perfectly. (a system very rare, and many times more sophisticated and capable then what most third/second world countries operate)

Once one or perhaps even as many as two or three radar pickets are disabled or destroyed, an ingress/egress corridor has been opened. This can then be further exploited to eliminate additional radar sites, comms, and/or command/control facilities.

-Cheers

This is very helpful. Thank you.

So lets consider a scenario as follows. We have 3 S-400 btlns (8 launchers, 3 different radars, and associated C4I elements each) whose radars are actively searching the airspace. They are ~50kms from the border, deployed in a triangular pattern, with interlocking and overlapping engagement envelopes (such that each can effectively intercept an ARM targetting any of the other ones). Their C4I nodes are passing data to ~ 12 Pantsyr-1S pickets (lets say two Pantsyrs each, that seems to be the tactic they employ), but the Pantsyrs themselves are cold, their radars are off. The S-400 units are there to defend against actual enemy aircraft. The Pantsyrs protect the S-400 from SEAD, and serve as a last line of defense. How would a delamination effort against this sort of set up look?

 

[gf0012-aust]

The Pantsyrs protect the S-400 from SEAD, and serve as a last line of defense. How would a delamination effort against this sort of set up look?

Response is also based on known configuration issues, and patterns of behaviour - unless you're in denmark or large swathes of flat bits (eg some of the Fulda) - then there are going to be blind spots.

tac planners conduct missions around the threat

you can degrade the system by manipulating other C2/3/4 nodes

you don't need to kinetically delaminate the enemy - you just need to aggravate their posture and break their operational tempo.

one flows into the other.

 

[STURM]

Does anyone know how exrensive Iraq's KARI was? Did it cover large parts of Iraq or only Baghdad and some other cities? If I recall correctly the prime contractor was Thomson CSF- now Thales?

 

[Bonza]

I'm hoping the more specific examples above (though in general, specifics can be difficult to discuss properly), when taken along with the context granted by Tod's earlier posts in the thread, make for a more detailed and thorough examination of the various factors that must be considered when discussing a topic of this sort. It's not rock-paper-scissors - as I hope has been demonstrated, there's quite a lot more to it than that.

Cheers all

 

[gf0012-aust]

I'm hoping the more specific examples above (though in general, specifics can be difficult to discuss properly), when taken along with the context granted by Tod's earlier posts in the thread, make for a more detailed and thorough examination of the various factors that must be considered when discussing a topic of this sort. It's not rock-paper-scissors - as I hope has been demonstrated, there's quite a lot more to it than that.

Cheers all

yep, and warfare and its technology is changing all the time.

with more than a passing association with dealing with IADS/GBADS/C"nn" refer to CHAMP