Can modern IADS be neutralized now?

[Quiller]

Russia has devleoped, fielded, and has offered overseas sales of their S400 IADS which, on paper, looks pretty darn impressive. So much so that it looks to viscerate whatever edge western airpower can effectively muster these days. At least to the point that air losses would be politically unacceptable to most industrialized nations.

Even Russia's extended family of S300 IADS seems formidable. And China, increasingly a player in global geopolitics, has developed some IADS approaching that of Russia.

Now nobody is going to be launching a major air penetration of Russia anytime soon. But these IADS can filter out to other countries. Particularly those in hot spots. such as the Middle East.

So... modern IADS rely on mobility, advanced digital acquisition/engagement radar technologies, anti-jamming shielding technologies, and advanced DEADS destruction capabilities close in.

Is TRUE STEALTH the only answer? Meaning, for now, B-2A's and F22 survivability in the modern IADS environment? What would be the best way to neutralize modern IADS tech? Anybody?

 

[SpudmanWP]

No, stealth is not the only answer.

Decoys, jammers, hacking, PGMs, cruise missiles, etc. will also play a part.

 

[gf0012-aust]

it's about systems - it's not about platforms

 

[Feanor]

it's about systems - it's not about platforms

I think a better question to ask here would be "how effective can a third world/second world operator make his IADS, given the affordability and proliferation of modern Russian/Chinese systems in the coming years?" And perhaps "what new difficulties will modern IADS built with the use of these systems create for western militaries attempting SEAD and DEAD operations?"

 

[gf0012-aust]

I think a better question to ask here would be "how effective can a third world/second world operator make his IADS, given the affordability and proliferation of modern Russian/Chinese systems in the coming years?" And perhaps "what new difficulties will modern IADS built with the use of these systems create for western militaries attempting SEAD and DEAD operations?"

Its a better way to ask, unfortunately the starting premise that (eg) the S400 is a threat balancer against modern contemp 5th gen assets is just plain incorrect

as soon as someone talks about how "x" can counter 5th gen air assets such as B2, JSF, F-22 etc, it ignores the fundamental fact that these assets don't operate in isolation either.

eg ingress is planned around assisting those assets to penetrate - they don't go in blind

eg MIMO mapping.

 

[Quiller]

Its a better way to ask, unfortunately the starting premise that (eg) the S400 is a threat balancer against modern contemp 5th gen assets is just plain incorrect

as soon as someone talks about how "x" can counter 5th gen air assets such as B2, JSF, F-22 etc, it ignores the fundamental fact that these assets don't operate in isolation either.

eg ingress is planned around assisting those assets to penetrate - they don't go in blind

eg MIMO mapping.

Going in blind may be just what WILL happen with IADS like the S400. While the threat level of such IADS may be lessened by lesser-trained or competent
3rd world military, the system is very formidable. The 48N6E missiles have the kind of range that can use adjusted ballistic trajectories to take out AWACS aircraft, or force them to loiter much farther from the action so as to be less useful. Smaller jammer aircraft are equally at risk. Moreover the second tier missiles in the S400 batteries are specifically designed to take out cruise missiles, smart glide bombs, and HARM missiles.

The digital acquisition and engagement radars are using much shorter bands that are more difficult to jam. They are also using AESA with pulsed signalling, making tracking the signal much harder. And they are MOBILE, making them much more difficult to find. NATO air got a taste of this in 1999 over Serbia, but USAF seems to have ignored the lesson.

The USAF seems to have tried to minimize the threat posed, probably for political purposes. The F35 is NOT stealth anymore. Changes to its ventral shape reduced its stealthiness significantly in production models.

Some commentators have suggested that legacy fighters will not be able to deal effectively with S400 type batteries if fielded along Russian doctrine.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Going in blind may be just what WILL happen with IADS like the S400. While the threat level of such IADS may be lessened by lesser-trained or competent
3rd world military, the system is very formidable. The 48N6E missiles have the kind of range that can use adjusted ballistic trajectories to take out AWACS aircraft, or force them to loiter much farther from the action so as to be less useful. Smaller jammer aircraft are equally at risk. Moreover the second tier missiles in the S400 batteries are specifically designed to take out cruise missiles, smart glide bombs, and HARM missiles.

The digital acquisition and engagement radars are using much shorter bands that are more difficult to jam. They are also using AESA with pulsed signalling, making tracking the signal much harder. And they are MOBILE, making them much more difficult to find. NATO air got a taste of this in 1999 over Serbia, but USAF seems to have ignored the lesson.

The USAF seems to have tried to minimize the threat posed, probably for political purposes. The F35 is NOT stealth anymore. Changes to its ventral shape reduced its stealthiness significantly in production models.

Some commentators have suggested that legacy fighters will not be able to deal effectively with S400 type batteries if fielded along Russian doctrine.

Sorry, thats just abject nonsense.

anyone who has been involved with tactical planning knows that cute throw away comments like this have got nearly zero to do with the reality of how events and missions are planned.

there's hyperbole - and there's reality.,

if countries want to think that their new purchase has given them a new skyguard capability - then good luck to them - but saying that it neutralises assets such as contemp 5th gen fighters is just plain tosh and demonstrates more about the lack of understanding about how missions and events are planned in tier 1 airforces more than anything else that flows from their pens afterwards

for the last time, people who draw scenarios around specific platforms have no idea how these missions are planned in real life

no amount of wailing and enthusiastic bleating changes that.

 

[Quiller]

A fairly cogent discussion of this can be found here: Surviving the Modern Integrated Air Defence System

True this article was written in 2009 -- and at first blush it looks like it might have been designed to support efforts to keep F22's in productin -- but it was written by Australians who had little (I would think) political or business connection with the F22 or its subsystems, and the narrative seems compelling and straightforward.

While there may have been some hardware and software upgrades to western military air electronics since 2009 with these issues in mind, they've kept it pretty quiet. Haven't been alerted to any material changes to HARM missiles or to the evasion capabilities of older western cruise missiles.

 

[gf0012-aust]

and I rest my case

AirPowerAustralia is your supporting evidence??

teenage heaven - not factual analysis

I suggest that you do some more reference checking of your sources in future

you could even search in here.

common google search terms "clown club" + JSF

good luck

 

[Quiller]

Sorry, thats just abject nonsense.

anyone who has been involved with tactical planning knows that cute throw away comments like this have got nearly zero to do with the reality of how events and missions are planned.

there's hyperbole - and there's reality.,

if countries want to think that their new purchase has given them a new skyguard capability - then good luck to them - but saying that it neutralises assets such as contemp 5th gen fighters is just plain tosh and demonstrates more about the lack of understanding about how missions and events are planned in tier 1 airforce
s more than anything else that flows from their pens afterwards

I appreciate your efforts to avoid sarcasm and dismissiveness in your post.
I also don't think I suggested that modern 5th gen fighers are neutralized by systems like the S400. What I suggested was the game is undergoing change, and western air forces may not be so invincible as they were in 1991.

The risk isn't that some "countries want to think that their new purchase has given them skyguard capability" but that all you fancy military planners are so convinced that it hasn't provided formidable skyguard capability.

 

[Quiller]

I have reviewed a couple of other threads on here just now dealing with IADS and I see several commentators hold the Australian thing with disdain. No one explains why, but I see it is widespread. Fair enough.

Even if so, that doesn't mean future military actions against effectively fielded modern IADS will be some sort of cakewalk.

I apologize to all for, apparently, wasting time and space.

 

[gf0012-aust]

I appreciate your efforts to avoid sarcasm and dismissiveness in your post.
I also don't think I suggested that modern 5th gen fighers are neutralized by systems like the S400. What I suggested was the game is undergoing change, and western air forces may not be so invincible as they were in 1991.

The risk isn't that some "countries want to think that their new purchase has given them skyguard capability" but that all you fancy military planners are so convinced that it hasn't provided formidable skyguard capability.

some of the smartest advice given to me at work was that I should studiously avoid threads and forums involving references to APA and just let them consume oxygen and have their regular forays into the sun and be happy for them.

So I will continue to take that advice

my last on this. planning is a considered event - its not done on a best case
scenario for blue team. even countries that have an overmatch still assume worst case scenarios for blue team. "the implied arrogance that a modern force might have overestimated their capacity to disrupt, deter, deflect, destroy red team might take the fancy of the enthusiasts, but its not the reality. Nobody has a one trick pny, and nobody is assuming that the platform is the game changer in isolation of the rest of the system. 5th gen assets on their own provide an advantage, but its their utility within the systems construct that makes the impact. So when someone says S400 will make "stealth" redundnant - then yes, thats abject unmitigated nonsense as it ignores the complexity of the planning event

there may be others who may elect to jump in and add, but not from me.

Do your research on your sources first

 

[RobWilliams]

I appreciate your efforts to avoid sarcasm and dismissiveness in your post.
I also don't think I suggested that modern 5th gen fighers are neutralized by systems like the S400. What I suggested was the game is undergoing change, and western air forces may not be so invincible as they were in 1991.

The risk isn't that some "countries want to think that their new purchase has given them skyguard capability" but that all you fancy military planners are so convinced that it hasn't provided formidable skyguard capability.

It's silly to even suggest that military planners are sure that modern air defence systems AREN'T effective. Those people have access to mountains more data and information than most of us here and to them this sort of think is their work and not some spare time hobby.

Of course the game was going to change; it's always changing and will always change. When ways to penetrate air defences are created, ways to stop them are + then ways to defeat the systems and so on and so on.

Believe it or not, but the USAF aren't stupid. They've not just got the HARM and thought "that's good enough for the next 30 years", in the spring of this year IOT&E exercises have been done with the AARGM (involving various software + hardware upgrades over HARM) with fulll rate production authorised in August this year + is due to be intergrated on the F-35.

Whilst this alone obviously isn't going to be a huuuuuuge game changer, there will be various other assets in place and not just an aircraft with this munition, as others have said.

EDIT: IIRC the main beef people have with APA is that they exaggerate and over emphasise (in some cases downright inventing) negative issues on particular platforms whilst at the same time ignoring or refuting with no evidence the positives. Defence magazines with such an aggressive agenda - which that attitude shows - are generally frowned upon, sure - take everything with a grain of salt and all that - but with APA you need a truckload.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Even if so, that doesn't mean future military actions against effectively fielded modern IADS will be some sort of cakewalk.

At no point in my responses in here have I even remotely implied that.

The throw away commentary about game changing red systems taking away blue systems leads in areas such as 5th gen platforms is just plain wrong.

Its not as simple as that and the commentators (APA) have been convenient in their own assessment.

Keep on searching the references to APA, Clown Club and JSF and you'll see why they are dismissed (and with a degree of contempt)

This is probably my last on this, but noi doubt others might jump in.

If your premise is that modern forces automatically assume that 5th gen platforms give them an advantage - then any premise based on a platform changing the outcome is brave.

again

Its about systems, not platforms. Stealth or more correctly VLO/LO is about a capability advantage within the system. It's never about a platform (unless you subscribe to magic bullet wish lists)

 

[Feanor]

Its a better way to ask, unfortunately the starting premise that (eg) the S400 is a threat balancer against modern contemp 5th gen assets is just plain incorrect

as soon as someone talks about how "x" can counter 5th gen air assets such as B2, JSF, F-22 etc, it ignores the fundamental fact that these assets don't operate in isolation either.

eg ingress is planned around assisting those assets to penetrate - they don't go in blind

eg MIMO mapping.

Well I was trying to broaden the discussion past the S-400 in particular, on to networked IADS with a heavy GBAD component in general. Especially given that the S-400 itself isn't likely to see exports any time soon. Meanwhile plenty of other capable platforms are being marketed actively, and are already being exported.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Well I was trying to broaden the discussion past the S-400 in particular, on to networked IADS with a heavy GBAD component in general. Especially given that the S-400 itself isn't likely to see exports any time soon. Meanwhile plenty of other capable platforms are being marketed actively, and are already being exported.

The problem is that people often only look at force a vs force b at a given location - eg attacking force against IADS

The attacking force is not just about the kinetic assaulters

that small fact seems to be lost in a lot of these scenarios.

its not just about fighting within the range ring

 

[Feanor]

The problem is that people often only look at force a vs force b at a given location - eg attacking force against IADS

The attacking force is not just about the kinetic assaulters

that small fact seems to be lost in a lot of these scenarios.

its not just about fighting within the range ring

Well sure. You mean like when the Israelis used a computer virus to disable Syrian SAMs and radars, and then hit an alleged nuclear reactor inside Syria? But even that would be harder to do when dealing with modern command and control elements. They'll be more resistant to electronic attack. It's also a lot harder to avoid the engagement envelopes, when planning ingress and egress routes for strike platforms, if you can't effectively detect some of the IADS elements because they're standing-by cold, getting tracking data from other sources, and only activating when the blue team aircraft is in range. So, to use Syria, as an example, their older obsolete systems could easily be defeated by Israeli EW, however as they get put out of action, that serves as a warning to newer systems. Given their high mobility, they would not remain static, or even activate on the move in the case of the Pantsyr. Their changes of taking out the inbound aircraft aren't good, but then the Syrian IADS isn't good either. They could, however, effectively intercept stand-off munitions launched from them.

So what I'm really getting at is, what if a third world operator with much greater resources tries to build an IADS based around easily available Russian and Chinese systems? With an airborne component, naturally. What new difficulties could they create for a 1st world opponent?

 

[Bonza]

EDIT: IIRC the main beef people have with APA is that they exaggerate and over emphasise (in some cases downright inventing) negative issues on particular platforms whilst at the same time ignoring or refuting with no evidence the positives. Defence magazines with such an aggressive agenda - which that attitude shows - are generally frowned upon, sure - take everything with a grain of salt and all that - but with APA you need a truckload.

I think too one of the biggest issues in addition to the above is that APA misrepresent their own interests, IE there's very little mention that they were a part of a proposal to procure F-22s to replace Australia's Hornets, and to perform a massive upgrade program on the F-111 fleet - of which the primary contractor would have been a company owned by one of those who run the Air Power Australia website. Thus having a vested financial interest in seeing the F-35 fail.

Also you add to that some of their claims - Kopp's claim, for example, that he is a foremost radar expert in Australia, despite never having held ANY of the clearance levels necessary to work on military radars, his claims that the F-35's LO characteristics will somehow be compromised by advances in technology while applying no such logic to the Sukhois he puts so much faith in - the more you read about them, the more layers of deceit, hypocrisy and poorly concealed self interest you will discover.

If people want to use them as a source it really is up to them, but I would encourage anyone reading their material at all to seriously consider the above and research it for themselves if they wish. I don't have a horse in this race - but I do take exception to the malicious spread of cherry-picked data, half-truths or deliberately poor analysis as a cover for personal gain. My advice would be to use whatever sources you wish - but do some background reading on them before you accept their words as gospel (or even credible).

 

[gf0012-aust]

Well sure. You mean like when the Israelis used a computer virus to disable Syrian SAMs and radars, and then hit an alleged nuclear reactor inside Syria?

Nope, I hadn't even factored that in - I was talking about what comes in to play in the range ring - and those elements that are used to plan and bring them in. (hence my cryptic reference to MIMO)

bear in mind that the US conducted whats considered to be the first space based delivery in 1991. ie the C"nn" layers were all managed from and via space based assets.

the cyber warfare adds another dimension completely - and for the sake of this "discussion" would alter things dramatically.

you would know of my historical frustration at seeing things dumbed down to "the polka dot people have a brand new IADS which renders "stealth" deaf and dumb."

That is just abject nonsense and is usually proposed by those who are still living in a platform centric world, or lust for the days of jousting where one visible force could be countered by another visible force.

My additional frustration is that a lot of material on how the war(s) were fought in Gw1 and Gw2 are still classified as they're still relevant to today - but people blithely think that the latest IADS has tipped the balance. There are some fundamental things that have to be in place before countries with a new fangled IADS can stop todays Tier 1 forces or high end forces from progressively delaminating their defence network.

Very few have it in place,. the US, Israel, France etc.... and the latter 2 a re a golden mile in distant second from the US as far as a coherent capability is concerned.

Pat terms such as asymmetrical response etc don't address the other systems capabilities that must be dealt with.

Until people comprehend the systems vs platform issue, until they understand that VLO/LO are systems events in their own right and are just a layer within the broader systems delamination/destruction construct, then we will continue to have the kind of infantile scenarios that APA and their kin put forward as proof of life about modern warfare.

replace russia with america, swap the names around, replace S400 with Patriot and its flavours and the basic arguments and detail re containment, constriction, destruction still apply.

The argument is usually akin to someone claiming that a regional satellite constellation of 3 satellites can now change and up the ante against a global constellation of 32 satellites

reality has to kick in somewhere otherwise the cassus belli for the question is preloaded to make a case rather than be something of considered discussion. eg APA and their Flanker scenarios where its all preloaded and ignores the basic reality check of logistics and geography.

or to really dumb it down to a level that should have been self evident - its not about the kinetics during the fight - its about the spectrum management and ownership before the fight

/rant off

 

[Abraham Gubler]

The 48N6E missiles have the kind of range that can use adjusted ballistic trajectories to take out AWACS aircraft, or force them to loiter much farther from the action so as to be less useful.

Assuming the AEW&C aircraft remains completely passive and ignorant that it is under attack. Which I’m pretty sure none of them are planning to do.

Maximum range in air defence terms is a figure used to frighten the ignorant. What is important is no escape zone. For engagements outside of the NEZ one needs a target that is unaware it is being attacked. No matter how more energetic the rocket motor of the S400 is it still has to burn against gravity to get up and away towards its targets and it still relies on radars to find and designate targets. These are all fundamental vulnerabilities in the air defence calculation.