Tee_Centre_10
Member
F-35 electronic attack capability isn't due until Block 6 with an IOC of 2019, and maybe the RAAF would prefer to not be on the bleeding edge of non-core F-35 development. Let the USAF/USN bed in the capability first.
Royal Australian Air Force [RAAF] News, Discussions and Updates
The F35 will have Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) via it's APG-81 radar only in the initial stage of it's employment as I understand things.
Only later will it acquire an AEA capability anywhere near what Growler can provide despite it's "survivability issues"...
VerySneaky
New Member
Can anybody explain to me why this conversion is so expensive? $1.5b seems exorbitant when the flyaway cost of a growler is approx $68.2m (according to wiki - accuracy?). This means to buy 12 growlers outright would only cost around $800m..
wiki also makes note that the conversion was only expected to cost $300m in Feb of 2012, so where is the extra $1.2b going? is there that much extra infrastructure required to support the growlers?
Please correct me if any of these figures are wrong!
wiki also makes note that the conversion was only expected to cost $300m in Feb of 2012, so where is the extra $1.2b going? is there that much extra infrastructure required to support the growlers?
Please correct me if any of these figures are wrong!
Yes.
You can't just buy 12 ALQ-218 systems and pull out the 20mm guns from the Super Hornets and stick in the ALQ-218s and instantly have a Growler electronic attack capability. You have to acquire a lot of stuff, fund a lot of additional training, hire additional people and so on.
Growler is a great capability but funding the acquisition of it over the top of a well established plan for air force modernisation without any additional funds is a nightmare. The Government has brought itself a few headlines at a huge cost to the ADF.
the road runner
Active Member
The ADF/Government usually "buy's" a specific platform such as Growler ,with a "Life of type" style Contract.That includes training of the pilots,training ground staff,technicians,servicing the aircraft,wages for crew,simulators and upgrade,ect,all priced into the cost of purchasing the platform.
Well that's he way that i understand it
EDIT: Thanx for the clarification Abe.
Well that's he way that i understand it
EDIT: Thanx for the clarification Abe.
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The ADF has never brought a ‘life of type’ contract in a major weapon system. LAND 17’s self-propelled element was to be the first but it inflated the price so much it scared the government off! The price tag in this case is just an indication of how much stuff has to brought to stand up an electronic attack capability. The detail of the buy is available thanks to the FMS request:
When the Howard Government brought the Super Hornets they provided the air force with funding for the entire capability for 10 years in addition to existing funding outlays. Which made for a $6 billion allocated which various ignorants and rabble rousers assumed meant 24 aircraft cost $6 billion. This allocation was because they still planned on acquiring the F-35 at its original schedule and a lot of the funding for the F-111 force was to be rolled over into F-35 operations. A lot of this money was never spent because of the delays in standing up the F-35 force.
I love the inherent contradiction in Australian defence planning. Apparently spending $250 million on SPGs is too extravagant, because there is no threat that requires the capability, yet randomly spending $1.5 billion on a niche capability that is necessary only at the extreme end of high intensity conflict is perfectly fine. Apparently we don't need modern armoured vehicles for another 20 years, yet we need to spend $36 billion dollars on the most advanced conventional submarines in the world.
Do these supposed enemies that require Growlers and 100 JSFs and Wedgetails and AWDs and Collins IIs not have an Army? I never have worked out how the service that has by far seen the most operational service over the last 15 years can be so neglected.
Do these supposed enemies that require Growlers and 100 JSFs and Wedgetails and AWDs and Collins IIs not have an Army? I never have worked out how the service that has by far seen the most operational service over the last 15 years can be so neglected.
Reading between the lines, it does seem as if the government is tailoring the ADF for niche partnerships in a coalition, where we send some top shelf assets that can stay as far out of harm's way as possible. Sending our army would be very politically risky, but a token contribution of high end assets not too dangerous to one's re-election prospects.
Too bad if we ever have to act as an ADF combined arms force.
Army would not be my career choice if I was considering entering the ADF ATM.
The Government is theoretically tailoring the ADF to operate in our primary operating environment (ie, SWP). This is the why the Army theoretically doesn't need to be tailored towards high intensity conflict, as no where is the SWP will this be needed. Of course, last time I checked no one in the SWP had any capability to justify 100 JSF, Growlers, AWD, 12 Collins II etc. Of course, apparently the possible threats from outside the SWP do justify these capabilities, but they float around in clouds and don't ever set foot on the ground.
Echoed by me. When we exercised with the septics years ago the Light scales division (7th Inf Div) had more of everything than the entire Australian Army - and they were having to lend their "Auzzie cousins" basics like NVG's etc. Truthfully it was embarrassing.
That is probably just the flyaway price ... and even that seems a bit low.
Good point though. They should wait until they know whether or not extra superhornets are required.
If they are then they should just buy some growlers as part of that order.
1. The conversion was never going to cost $300m. That was a figure Joel Fitzgibbon plucked out of thin air during a media conference.
2. You are assuming that what is listed in the DSCA announcement so far, is all we're getting...
I see launch rails and command launch computers for HARM and AARGM missiles listed in the DSCA announcement, the drawings of the aircraft attached to the media release show HARM missiles being carried, yet we haven't seen any word on a weapons package to go along with this acquisition.
Yet we have a seemingly enormous price tag going for this program.
Join the dots...
also this is the unclas info, there is also a lot of clas stuff
this gives an outline of the mod kit
Federal Register, Volume 77 Issue 106 (Friday, June 1, 2012)
1. The EA-18G modification kit consists of the following sensitive
components:
a. The ALQ-218(V)2 Radio Frequency Receiver system makes use of
hard/software developed for the Precision Direction-Finding System
(PDFS) and forms the receiver section of the electronic attack systems
installed aboard the EA 18G and the EA-6B. The equipment is teamed with
variants of the AN/ALQ-99 tactical jamming system and is designed to
facilitate a narrowband jamming capability that is aimed at countering
frequency agile threats. The hardware for each modified aircraft will
include wingtip pods, interface units, pre-selectors, Weapon
Replacement Assembly Weapon Replacement Assemblies (WRAs) and antennas.
b. The ALQ-227(V)1 Communication Countermeasures Set (also known as
the RT-1919), including hardware for each modified aircraft is a
digital receiver/exciter that makes use of the AN/ALQ-99 noise jamming
system that transmits ``complex'' communications jamming waveforms over
a ``broad'' frequency range.
c. The CP-2640/ALQ Electronic Attack Unit (EAU) provides the
integration and management of all Radio Frequency (RF) and
communication sensors within the EA-18G.
2. The AN/ALQ-99F(V) Tactical Jamming System pod is equipped with a
hardback that supports fore and aft transmitters, a nose-mounted Ram
Air Turbine (RAT), a centrally-mounted Universal Exciter Unit (UEU), a
pod control unit, and two steerable high-gain transmission arrays. The
UEU is central to the pod's function and is a digitally controlled
signal generator that receives threat parameter data from the TJS
computer and generates an appropriate response by modulating a radio
frequency oscillator. This output is then amplified and emitted by the
appropriate transmitter.
3. The CN-1717/A Interference Cancellation System (INCANS) is an
aircraft-mounted system that provides secure voice communications with
friendly forces while simultaneously jamming enemy communications. The
main concern on INCANS is its compatibility with the AN/ALQ-99 tactical
jamming system which will allow the EA-18G to conduct voice
communications over ultra-high radio frequencies with friendly forces,
while simultaneously jamming enemy communications.
4. The R-2674(C)/A Joint Tactical Terminal Receiver (JTTR) System
and associated hardware provides eight receive channels that enable the
aircraft to access near real-time threat, survivor and Blue Force
Tracking data that will be transmitted to the pilot, thereby increasing
the users' critical situational awareness.
5. The LAU-118 is a guided missile launcher that is reusable and
completes the F/A-18 suspension and launching system for the AGM-88
High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) and AGM-88E Advanced Anti-
Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM). The launcher consists of the launcher
housing, forward and aft fairing assemblies, forward and aft launcher
tracks, suspension lugs, insert plugs, and internal electrical
components
6. The Command Launch Computer (CLC) for HARM and AARGM is an
electronics subsystem installed on the airframe to interface with HARM/
AARGM Missiles and the F/A-18E/F and EA-18G aircraft. The CLC receives
target data from the missile and onboard avionics, processes the data
for display to the aircrew to the appropriate display, determines
target priority, and collects aircraft data for pre-launch hand-off to
the HARM/AARG missiles. The CLC determines time coincidence between the
HARM/AARGM missiles and the Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) directional
data and pulse repetition intervals and formats. The identification
data is processed by the CLC to perform target identification,
prioritization, and display information. The CLC generates targeting
commands to the HARM/AARGM missiles for appropriate target and provides
Targeting and guidance information for the missiles to Target of
Interest (TOI) on offensive attack missions
7. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge
of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could
be used to develop countermeasures that might reduce weapon system
effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or
advanced capabilities.
this gives an outline of the mod kit
Federal Register, Volume 77 Issue 106 (Friday, June 1, 2012)
1. The EA-18G modification kit consists of the following sensitive
components:
a. The ALQ-218(V)2 Radio Frequency Receiver system makes use of
hard/software developed for the Precision Direction-Finding System
(PDFS) and forms the receiver section of the electronic attack systems
installed aboard the EA 18G and the EA-6B. The equipment is teamed with
variants of the AN/ALQ-99 tactical jamming system and is designed to
facilitate a narrowband jamming capability that is aimed at countering
frequency agile threats. The hardware for each modified aircraft will
include wingtip pods, interface units, pre-selectors, Weapon
Replacement Assembly Weapon Replacement Assemblies (WRAs) and antennas.
b. The ALQ-227(V)1 Communication Countermeasures Set (also known as
the RT-1919), including hardware for each modified aircraft is a
digital receiver/exciter that makes use of the AN/ALQ-99 noise jamming
system that transmits ``complex'' communications jamming waveforms over
a ``broad'' frequency range.
c. The CP-2640/ALQ Electronic Attack Unit (EAU) provides the
integration and management of all Radio Frequency (RF) and
communication sensors within the EA-18G.
2. The AN/ALQ-99F(V) Tactical Jamming System pod is equipped with a
hardback that supports fore and aft transmitters, a nose-mounted Ram
Air Turbine (RAT), a centrally-mounted Universal Exciter Unit (UEU), a
pod control unit, and two steerable high-gain transmission arrays. The
UEU is central to the pod's function and is a digitally controlled
signal generator that receives threat parameter data from the TJS
computer and generates an appropriate response by modulating a radio
frequency oscillator. This output is then amplified and emitted by the
appropriate transmitter.
3. The CN-1717/A Interference Cancellation System (INCANS) is an
aircraft-mounted system that provides secure voice communications with
friendly forces while simultaneously jamming enemy communications. The
main concern on INCANS is its compatibility with the AN/ALQ-99 tactical
jamming system which will allow the EA-18G to conduct voice
communications over ultra-high radio frequencies with friendly forces,
while simultaneously jamming enemy communications.
4. The R-2674(C)/A Joint Tactical Terminal Receiver (JTTR) System
and associated hardware provides eight receive channels that enable the
aircraft to access near real-time threat, survivor and Blue Force
Tracking data that will be transmitted to the pilot, thereby increasing
the users' critical situational awareness.
5. The LAU-118 is a guided missile launcher that is reusable and
completes the F/A-18 suspension and launching system for the AGM-88
High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) and AGM-88E Advanced Anti-
Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM). The launcher consists of the launcher
housing, forward and aft fairing assemblies, forward and aft launcher
tracks, suspension lugs, insert plugs, and internal electrical
components
6. The Command Launch Computer (CLC) for HARM and AARGM is an
electronics subsystem installed on the airframe to interface with HARM/
AARGM Missiles and the F/A-18E/F and EA-18G aircraft. The CLC receives
target data from the missile and onboard avionics, processes the data
for display to the aircrew to the appropriate display, determines
target priority, and collects aircraft data for pre-launch hand-off to
the HARM/AARG missiles. The CLC determines time coincidence between the
HARM/AARGM missiles and the Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) directional
data and pulse repetition intervals and formats. The identification
data is processed by the CLC to perform target identification,
prioritization, and display information. The CLC generates targeting
commands to the HARM/AARGM missiles for appropriate target and provides
Targeting and guidance information for the missiles to Target of
Interest (TOI) on offensive attack missions
7. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge
of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could
be used to develop countermeasures that might reduce weapon system
effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or
advanced capabilities.
It is widely accepted that there is corruption in procurement, it would be strange if Australia was the only country not affected by this diseaseyes you are
welcome to Govt decision making - not Defence decision making
I wouldn't be that harsh - its not endemic etc... politicians are certainly on the nose - especially when they ignore professional advice, or when some of those who can advise with influence don't follow through with resolve
its also an indictment on the quality of the opposition shadow for the defence minister - and the quality of broadsheet journalism where investigative journalism seems bounded by forays into youtube abd google
Wow, what a couple of weeks, watching F/A18,s F15SG,s F16s,, SU27,s and 30,s and now a B52 fly over head. great to watch.
Growler is hardly a niche capability that is necessary at the extreme end of high intensity conflict and is probably the most "Joint" purchase that has been made for a while in terms of what it brings to the ADF as a whole.
While searching online for information re: RAAF F111's, I came across a site for a free novel called Vostok Station. But the link to download no longer works.
I was wondering if anyone has read it and where it might still be available.
The plot as described sounds a bit like an APA wet dream. (Super RAAF F111 fights through soviet and chinese military to save the world).
But I'll try it anyway because techno-thrillers about the ADF are few and far between.
The question I was origanly looking up is why were the F18's sent to the Gulf War and not the F111's.
On paper the F111 was a far better strike aircraft. It's heavier weapon load and longer loiter time seem to be better suited for the missions that were flown.
Was there an initial fear of air to air combat with Iraq. Or was it simply to tap into the American supply chain.
I was wondering if anyone has read it and where it might still be available.
The plot as described sounds a bit like an APA wet dream. (Super RAAF F111 fights through soviet and chinese military to save the world).
But I'll try it anyway because techno-thrillers about the ADF are few and far between.
The question I was origanly looking up is why were the F18's sent to the Gulf War and not the F111's.
On paper the F111 was a far better strike aircraft. It's heavier weapon load and longer loiter time seem to be better suited for the missions that were flown.
Was there an initial fear of air to air combat with Iraq. Or was it simply to tap into the American supply chain.
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Which we can all be very thankful for.