Rebuilding a smaller mid sized Navy

Future Fleet

New Member
Which is rather short-sighted of you. Canada as a prominent middle-power and member of the international community has obligations and interests that may require it to be involved in "adventures" where it might need them--especially if doctrine and experience indicate their usefulness--regardless of whether it intended to be or not.
Many times I've come across the idea that the generals always prepare for the last war they fought. An argument could be made to find a place for every piece of military hardware used in the last 50 years including battle ships. The next conflict could see Canadian tanks all in flames like the Israeli tanks were in Lebanon a few years back. They admit to 52 being badly damaged with some of these being totally destroyed and they barely got any distance into the country. We probably won't be lucky enough to have an under-equipped foe like the Taliban next time.

Outfitting the Canadian Forces on such a tight budget means that Canada has to be selective about what kind of military it creates. The money spent on heavy battle tanks could probably be spent elsewhere more effectively and since this is a naval forum, the demand on the Navy to transport these heavy things would be eliminated.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Can understand 15 SSKs may be too many. I'll revise to 10 SSKs. Even 2 SSNs would be enough. I disagree that they can't be used for patrol though. If it isn't war time there is no reason they can't give up their position when necessary.

The Type 214 only requires 27 crew and has an endurance of 84 days. It has a range of 12,000 miles too. Seems to be what Canada would need to me. Remember the 212 is for Germany, the 214 was designed for export.

I agree SSNs would be a tough sell to Canadian public. Remember, in a real war with a capable enemy navy, all surface vessels will have to run for their home ports. That is why subs are needed for defence and attack.
Even 10 SSK's would be too many for Canada to operate, without a significant increase in the size of both the defence budget and RCN personnel. Assuming that the Type 214 was acquired, and that they could be operated with a crew of 27, the RCN would need to have a personnel pool of ~13,000 in order to have enough submariners to crew all the vessels. It this is still ignoring whether or not a small European conventional sub would be capable of conducting the sort of submarine operations that the RCN would need. Again, the North Atlantic, Northern Pacific and Arctic Oceans are very different environments for a sub to operate from that of the Baltic or Med, or North Seas. The potential hostiles are going to be deep diving nuclear boats. A significant amount of power (electrical generation capacity) would be needed to operate the sensors and computer systems to be competetive, and the sub would need to be able to dive deep enough to get into or out of the appropriate water levels. To get a real appreciation for the type of sub that would be most relevant to RCN ops, look at the RAN and Japanses submarine services. This is not just about what the published range is with onboard fuel. The power generation capacity, onboard electronics and sensors systems and dive depth all have relevance here. Having a published range of 12k km does not mean a thing if the sub in question is unable to reach an appropriate dived depth for the area of operations, or has insufficient power generation and storage capacity to operate the computers or sonar arrays. Or alternatively, the most appropriate types of arrays are not included because the sub will not be able fit and/or power them.

Lastly, as mentioned the various submarine services operate with a similar level of security and secrecy as special forces do, even in peacetime. If subs did not operate this way, their ability to operate effectively in both wartime and peacetime would be seriously compromised. If a sub suddenly surfaced because a surface vessel was acting suspiciously, then potential hostiles could collect information of the operational capabilities of the submarine class, and/or individual subs. Not to mention that potential hostiles keep track of where subs were operating. In some cases, the mere potential for a sub to be operating in an area has been sufficient to keep potential aggressors in check. This has been achieved because the hostiles are not sure if a sub is around or not, and would not be aware of a properly handled sub's presence until it was effectively too late. Having a sub announce it's presence negates all such advantages. Not to mention one of the major peacetime missions of a sub is to perform ISR functions, and again having a sub reveal its presence or gave any information on sub areas of operation would compromise the ISR capabilities.

The Kingston class is a joke compared to the Visby. I'm not saying a Meko CSL wouldn't do the job better due to its size. Compared to what we have, the Visby is faster, better armed, can carry a helicopter, and perform anti-mine operations properly. The only drawback here may be its size. Interestingly, it is about 20 feet longer than our current coastal defence ship.
With respect to the Kingston-class MCDV and the Visby-class FSG... You have ignored the very different roles the vessels were designed to fufill, as well as the very different areas of operation which they were designed for. While you have focused on the speed and armament of the Visby-class being 'better' the comparison is so different as to be meaningless. Quite literally you are comparing a guided missile corvette, with a patrol and MCM vessel. A vessel closer to the Kingston-class in terms of role would be the Swedish Landsort-class MHC. Now, apart from the apples to oranges comparison, there is also the significant question of whether or not a Visby-class FSG could operate to a useful degree in the waters around Canada. Taking the Kingston-class MCDV as an example, while it is ~18 m shorter than a Visby-class, the Kingston-class has a broader beam and draught, both by approximately 1 m, and a Kingston-class MCDV has ~50% greater displacement than a Visby-class FSG. AFAIK such characteristics would generally give a Kingston-class better seakeeping abilities than a Visby-class, and again AFAIK the Kingston-class has been known within the RCN as being a 'rough' and 'wet' vessel to serve aboard, the sort of vessel which can wear out a crew during operations around Canada. I would therefore expect that any RCN Visby-class FSG's would likely have to return to port very frequently, or stay in port during rough weather. For the areas around Canada where the Kingston-class would perform patrol functions, the appropriate type of vessel would likely be an ocean-going vessel like the Castle or River-class OPV's. Vessels of smaller dimensions and lesser displacement would likely get tossed around too much, damaging the vessel and/or injuring the crew.

I could agree to 3 support ships. How about putting Aegis on the support ships directly? Cheaper than putting Aegis on 2 or 3 escorts who are there to try and create an Aegis umbrella for the 4th ship that does't have it.
Having Aegis or a similar combat system on the support ships would IMO be a waste of money. Firstly, one of the reasons to have multiple escorts is to create layers which an attacker would need to either delaminate or penetrate in order to get to the high value targets. Putting Aegis onto the support ships and eliminating or reducing the capabilities of the escorts just leaves the support ships that much more vulnerable. Secondly, in order for a system like Aegis to be useful, mid and long-ranged SAM's are required. Part of the reason I would have a problem with an Absalon-class vessel acting as an escort is that their most effective SAM is the ESSM, with room to carry ~36 IIRC. While the ESSM is a good missile, the max engagement range is ~25 n miles IIRC. OTOH SM-2 ER has a greater reach with published ranges of ~100+ n miles. Again, this gets back to having a layered defence, but having a highly capable system like Aegis without any weapon system able to make use of the extended detection capabilities IMO is a waste of money. Especially given that half or more of the cost of a warship comes from the weapons and sensor/electronics systems installed.

When considering what the RCN should acquire, one must keep in mind where the RCN is going to be operating, what roles the RCN needs to fufill, and then what sorts of vessels are able to meet the required roles and operational areas.

-Cheers
 

Sea Toby

New Member
When considering what the RCN should acquire, one must keep in mind where the RCN is going to be operating, what roles the RCN needs to fufill, and then what sorts of vessels are able to meet the required roles and operational areas.-Cheers
The Kingston class are good small ships for all of their missions except for patrol. Their main shortcoming is speed. Face it, there are many small commercial and pleasure craft which are faster. Whenever Canada decides to retire them, I wish Canada would build a similar ship a bit larger, say 80 meters in length, and with much more speed, up to 22 knots.
 

1805

New Member
Even 10 SSK's would be too many for Canada to operate, without a significant increase in the size of both the defence budget and RCN personnel. Assuming that the Type 214 was acquired, and that they could be operated with a crew of 27, the RCN would need to have a personnel pool of ~13,000 in order to have enough submariners to crew all the vessels. It this is still ignoring whether or not a small European conventional sub would be capable of conducting the sort of submarine operations that the RCN would need. Again, the North Atlantic, Northern Pacific and Arctic Oceans are very different environments for a sub to operate from that of the Baltic or Med, or North Seas. The potential hostiles are going to be deep diving nuclear boats. A significant amount of power (electrical generation capacity) would be needed to operate the sensors and computer systems to be competetive, and the sub would need to be able to dive deep enough to get into or out of the appropriate water levels. To get a real appreciation for the type of sub that would be most relevant to RCN ops, look at the RAN and Japanses submarine services. This is not just about what the published range is with onboard fuel. The power generation capacity, onboard electronics and sensors systems and dive depth all have relevance here. Having a published range of 12k km does not mean a thing if the sub in question is unable to reach an appropriate dived depth for the area of operations, or has insufficient power generation and storage capacity to operate the computers or sonar arrays. Or alternatively, the most appropriate types of arrays are not included because the sub will not be able fit and/or power them.

Lastly, as mentioned the various submarine services operate with a similar level of security and secrecy as special forces do, even in peacetime. If subs did not operate this way, their ability to operate effectively in both wartime and peacetime would be seriously compromised. If a sub suddenly surfaced because a surface vessel was acting suspiciously, then potential hostiles could collect information of the operational capabilities of the submarine class, and/or individual subs. Not to mention that potential hostiles keep track of where subs were operating. In some cases, the mere potential for a sub to be operating in an area has been sufficient to keep potential aggressors in check. This has been achieved because the hostiles are not sure if a sub is around or not, and would not be aware of a properly handled sub's presence until it was effectively too late. Having a sub announce it's presence negates all such advantages. Not to mention one of the major peacetime missions of a sub is to perform ISR functions, and again having a sub reveal its presence or gave any information on sub areas of operation would compromise the ISR capabilities.



With respect to the Kingston-class MCDV and the Visby-class FSG... You have ignored the very different roles the vessels were designed to fufill, as well as the very different areas of operation which they were designed for. While you have focused on the speed and armament of the Visby-class being 'better' the comparison is so different as to be meaningless. Quite literally you are comparing a guided missile corvette, with a patrol and MCM vessel. A vessel closer to the Kingston-class in terms of role would be the Swedish Landsort-class MHC. Now, apart from the apples to oranges comparison, there is also the significant question of whether or not a Visby-class FSG could operate to a useful degree in the waters around Canada. Taking the Kingston-class MCDV as an example, while it is ~18 m shorter than a Visby-class, the Kingston-class has a broader beam and draught, both by approximately 1 m, and a Kingston-class MCDV has ~50% greater displacement than a Visby-class FSG. AFAIK such characteristics would generally give a Kingston-class better seakeeping abilities than a Visby-class, and again AFAIK the Kingston-class has been known within the RCN as being a 'rough' and 'wet' vessel to serve aboard, the sort of vessel which can wear out a crew during operations around Canada. I would therefore expect that any RCN Visby-class FSG's would likely have to return to port very frequently, or stay in port during rough weather. For the areas around Canada where the Kingston-class would perform patrol functions, the appropriate type of vessel would likely be an ocean-going vessel like the Castle or River-class OPV's. Vessels of smaller dimensions and lesser displacement would likely get tossed around too much, damaging the vessel and/or injuring the crew.



Having Aegis or a similar combat system on the support ships would IMO be a waste of money. Firstly, one of the reasons to have multiple escorts is to create layers which an attacker would need to either delaminate or penetrate in order to get to the high value targets. Putting Aegis onto the support ships and eliminating or reducing the capabilities of the escorts just leaves the support ships that much more vulnerable. Secondly, in order for a system like Aegis to be useful, mid and long-ranged SAM's are required. Part of the reason I would have a problem with an Absalon-class vessel acting as an escort is that their most effective SAM is the ESSM, with room to carry ~36 IIRC. While the ESSM is a good missile, the max engagement range is ~25 n miles IIRC. OTOH SM-2 ER has a greater reach with published ranges of ~100+ n miles. Again, this gets back to having a layered defence, but having a highly capable system like Aegis without any weapon system able to make use of the extended detection capabilities IMO is a waste of money. Especially given that half or more of the cost of a warship comes from the weapons and sensor/electronics systems installed.

When considering what the RCN should acquire, one must keep in mind where the RCN is going to be operating, what roles the RCN needs to fufill, and then what sorts of vessels are able to meet the required roles and operational areas.

-Cheers
Agree on the subs, I actually think there is a lot of logic in Canada, at least seeking to align with the RAN sub replacement programme. The addition of 4-6 boats is likely to reduce overall costs and through life maintainence, even if (as is likely) the the boats a built in Canada.

I would have throught the Dutch would also be potential partners, maybe enabling a production run of c20-30 boats?

I am not sure I follow the logic of not putting advanced air defence systems on support/capital assets, the an escort is an escort view is to conservative. I can see big advantages, radars higher, more VLS, cheaper than having 2 ships, 100% coverage. I like the Absalons, but I think the Danes would have been even more radical, instead of 2 support and 3 AWD they could have just built 3 slightly larger ships combining both roles and maybe 6 smaller OPV/light frigates (networked) to provide a layered/screen.

Back to Canada, I think there should be a full dock, the potential for USV is huge in the future. I thinking Thunderbird are go ;-) ....2-4100-200t cats, with small TAS, full a few 21" AS torpedo, working in hunting packs, sprint/drift.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Agree on the subs, I actually think there is a lot of logic in Canada, at least seeking to align with the RAN sub replacement programme. The addition of 4-6 boats is likely to reduce overall costs and through life maintainence, even if (as is likely) the the boats a built in Canada.

I would have throught the Dutch would also be potential partners, maybe enabling a production run of c20-30 boats?
I had not considered a tie-in with the RNLN submarine programme. When is the RNLN expecting to replace the Walrus-class SSK and what are they anticipating as a replacement?

I am not sure I follow the logic of not putting advanced air defence systems on support/capital assets, the an escort is an escort view is to conservative. I can see big advantages, radars higher, more VLS, cheaper than having 2 ships, 100% coverage. I like the Absalons, but I think the Danes would have been even more radical, instead of 2 support and 3 AWD they could have just built 3 slightly larger ships combining both roles and maybe 6 smaller OPV/light frigates (networked) to provide a layered/screen.
My issue with putting advanced air defence systems onto a high value support asset is if that is done so as a cost savings measure, and therefore such systems are not fitted to the escort vessels. Having such advanced systems on a JSS in addition having the escorts properly kitted out is fine. Of course this is also is only acceptable if the sensor, electronics and weapons fitout does not negatively impact the primary roles of a JSS-type vessel. Attempting to have one vessel which can provide itself with air, surface and undersurface self-defence, while also acting as a sealift and/or replenishment vessel would force the vessel to compromise in areas which would have a negative impact on the different capabilities.

-Cheers
 

1805

New Member
I had not considered a tie-in with the RNLN submarine programme. When is the RNLN expecting to replace the Walrus-class SSK and what are they anticipating as a replacement?
I don't know, they are getting on and the timescales may not match,although they have been refitted. I suspect the Dutch will not go it alone now. They are likely to want local construction, it could well turn out to be a Type 214 variant, but I think the experience/learning with the Collins class actually puts the RAN in a good place to develop a true great. My hope would be they build all 12, but in batches (say 2, 4 & 6) to refine the design, and take account of developments (they could be in production 30 years?).
 

1805

New Member
My issue with putting advanced air defence systems onto a high value support asset is if that is done so as a cost savings measure, and therefore such systems are not fitted to the escort vessels. Having such advanced systems on a JSS in addition having the escorts properly kitted out is fine. Of course this is also is only acceptable if the sensor, electronics and weapons fitout does not negatively impact the primary roles of a JSS-type vessel. Attempting to have one vessel which can provide itself with air, surface and undersurface self-defence, while also acting as a sealift and/or replenishment vessel would force the vessel to compromise in areas which would have a negative impact on the different capabilities.

-Cheers
I agree it would probably would not work for the larger navies, I could actually see it adding to the cost. For smaller navies without carriers, much in the way of logistic/asset, it migth make more sense. Back on the subject of the RNLN, maybe their excellent AWD could have been merged with the LPD capability.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
I agree it would probably would not work for the larger navies, I could actually see it adding to the cost. For smaller navies without carriers, much in the way of logistic/asset, it migth make more sense. Back on the subject of the RNLN, maybe their excellent AWD could have been merged with the LPD capability.
I still disagree, if such sensor/elesctronics systems on a JSS-type vessel are at the expense of having advanced sensors and electronics systems on the escorts. If the escort vessels lack proper air/surface search radars, combat data systems and the like, then the escort vessels would no longer be able to conduct independent operations since they would lack much of the basic self-defence systems required to operate in a moderate to high risk environment. This would also mean that the escort vessels would be effectively worthless if they were tasked to escort vessels other than the JSS in such environments. What this could then mean is that ships taken up from trade to perform support operates would no longer have appropriate escorts, and/or that NGS or escorts positioned at choke points would themselves require escorting to operate with a reasonable amount of safety.

-Cheers
 

StobieWan

Super Moderator
Staff member
Agreed - if you've a limited pot of money and a limited pool of people, then putting AEGIS into an auxiliary just sucked money right out of the escort pool and forces you to find 8-10 people just to staff the CMS, which pushes your through life costs on the otherwise cheap to run ships.


This stuff all costs money - nothing wrong with sticking some point defence measures on the things, Phalanx 1b or even RAM if you're feeling frisky but anything anywhere as expensive as an area defense, then there's a rapid escalation in capability that gets dragged along.

Definitely not...
 

1805

New Member
I am not sure I would go along with a full AWD fit on an auxillary or even a full JSS (whatever that is). However if you look at a hybrid ship like the Absalon, I would feel more comfortable. For the smaller navies (still rich countries with powerful expeditionary forces) such a the Dutch, Canadian & Danish I think there is a case. Even smaller spending nations without AWD capability a frigate/capability might be appropriate (NZ, Eire, Portugal etc?).

So say the Dane's merged their AWD with the Logistic ships and you produced a 12,000 full AWD fit, flexideck (the plus I would seek to add is a dock for sizable USV plus MCM, LCU and small patrol craft). You have far better helicopter platfrom, plus higher radars, and potenial for a dock. But then you could argue, I would merge the flexideck with a AWD rather thena the other way round.

I'm not sure this argument (you might not agree it would work for any navy mind) works for a larger navy/requirement.

If a logistis ships role is to support sizable land forces then I think an Absalon is a compromise and expensive way to provide logistics support. However if it is to support raiding, small deployments then I like them more.
 

Equinox

New Member
Many times I've come across the idea that the generals always prepare for the last war they fought. An argument could be made to find a place for every piece of military hardware used in the last 50 years including battle ships. The next conflict could see Canadian tanks all in flames like the Israeli tanks were in Lebanon a few years back. They admit to 52 being badly damaged with some of these being totally destroyed and they barely got any distance into the country. We probably won't be lucky enough to have an under-equipped foe like the Taliban next time.

Outfitting the Canadian Forces on such a tight budget means that Canada has to be selective about what kind of military it creates. The money spent on heavy battle tanks could probably be spent elsewhere more effectively and since this is a naval forum, the demand on the Navy to transport these heavy things would be eliminated.
And you think that light armoured vehicles are going to perform any better, even if you have more of them? I'm sorry, eliminating a capability based on the fact you don't "want" to be involved where they could be used (which, I would say, severely limits where you could be going--especially if the Canadian Army has found a use for them) is short-sighted. It's not just in regards to tanks, but everything; you develop or get rid of capability based on assessments of if you are going to need it or not (in an ideal world at least..). It's similar to what Todjaeger is saying about the smaller European subs--whether you need them, and whether you can actually use them.
 

Future Fleet

New Member
And you think that light armoured vehicles are going to perform any better, even if you have more of them? I'm sorry, eliminating a capability based on the fact you don't "want" to be involved where they could be used (which, I would say, severely limits where you could be going--especially if the Canadian Army has found a use for them) is short-sighted. It's not just in regards to tanks, but everything; you develop or get rid of capability based on assessments of if you are going to need it or not (in an ideal world at least..). It's similar to what Todjaeger is saying about the smaller European subs--whether you need them, and whether you can actually use them.
Not to get too political but I will again ask you all how Canada has benefited from any of the adventures we have been on lately. Peace keeping under the UN or our own flag, and disaster relief is all our army needs to be doing (armoured cars are sufficient for that IMO). That is what builds good will in the world. Our Navy could do that with three joint support ships and a couple of escorts for each. A small fleet of subs (10-12 for domestic defence and international use) and some type of surface vessel (you guys don't seem to like the Visby) for coastal defence and limited blue water patrols. I understand perfectly what you are saying about capability based on doctrine, I just think the doctrine is flawed and though this blog was about how we would restructure the navy, not how we would build one to continue current doctrine.

BTW, here is what Frontline Canada had to say about the Visby's capability:

"Despite their smaller size, advances in hull form design along with computer con- trolled ‘Fly-by-Wire’ propulsion and stabilization have given modern corvettes a blue water capability far beyond their predecessors. This makes the corvette an ideal platform for interdiction operations within a nation’s 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Vessels such as Sweden’s Visby-Class, with its stealthy design and high speed, are capable of quickly inter- cepting potential threats with minimal risk of detection." Sounds like a replacement for Kingston class to me.... Especially working in concert with the subs which would presumably be operating in the same zone but further out.

Littoral subs from Europe are for defence, not blue water duty, I understand that. I'd prefer the new Type 216 if it is as good as some are saying but all specs aren't out yet and it may not be the sub I'm hoping it would be for Canada. I definitely think my idea of teaming up with Australia is the way to go whether its the 216 or another sub we build together. BTW yes I still think 10 to 12 subs is possible. I understand our navy is not configured for a flotilla of subs that large but your talking about some restructuring in the navy and recruitment. The delivery date for those subs is a long way off. I'm sure a country of 35 million people could find enough willing people to crew 10 - 12 subs. Pay them more and you'll find no problems.
The Chinese are building / have lots of subs and we would be wise to as well.

Here is what the Canadian Navy says about subs:

"For a nation like Canada, the potency and stealth capability of submarines makes these warships one of the most effective means of deterring a military or other major challenge to our national security from anyone who would exploit the sovereignty of our maritime economic zone. The modern diesel electric submarine is capable of being deployed anywhere in the world in support of Canada’s foreign policy objectives, whether to participate in an international military exercise with our allies, or as part of Canada’s contribution to a multi-national military operation. Canadian submarines will be capable of conducting independent or coordinated patrols in foreign water to monitor or intercept suspicious maritime traffic or protect Canadian and coalition warships in a dangerous environment. " And they operate at 1/3 the cost of frigates or destroyers."

On another note, what happens to the Aegis equipment on the three destroyers? I know it sounds too easy but why not install them on the new support ships. I bet there is good reason why it can't be done but it sounds great on paper since they going and coming around the same time.

Liked rips idea of a joint project with the Americans to design and build a better Arctic Patrol Ship together. The PC-5 rated ones we're looking at now don't seem to do anything the Coast Guard can't do right now besides fire off a missile or two. Still need a sub that can go under ice. Type 216 or Aussie build? You guys don't seem to think the Type 214 can cut it.

I am of the school of thought that surface ships in a conventional war will quickly become useless. All that science about them being able to stop x income threats so fire X+1 at them and the Falklands example with aircraft, submarines, and anti-ship missiles (which lucky for the Brits were too few and mostly didn't detonate). Surface ships will quickly be destroyed or will run for their home ports. Subs and aircraft will carry the day.

PS. Army needs assessment are based on current government doctrine which I believe has redefined us as peace makers not peace keepers. I would have that changed back and yes many will not like the sound of that but I don't think our soldiers should be put at risk for political gain and trade negotiation deals with our allies which btw don't even happen anyway. Involvement in Afghanistan did little to resolve Canadian trade disputes with the US.
 

Cadredave

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Not to get too political but I will again ask you all how Canada has benefited from any of the adventures we have been on lately.
Well that is being political thats an answer best given by your politicians not Defence Talk where all here to debate defence related matters only.
Peace keeping under the UN or our own flag, and disaster relief is all our army needs to be doing (armoured cars are sufficient for that IMO). That is what builds good will in the world.
This is best debated in the Army & Land Forces Thread not here this thread will lose its direction too quickly and get bogged down in my stick is bigger than yours debates.
Our Navy could do that with three joint support ships and a couple of escorts for each. A small fleet of subs (10-12 for domestic defence and international use)
can you elaborate a bit more on why you need these ships so we can all understand your POV?.
and some type of surface vessel (you guys don't seem to like the Visby) for coastal defence and limited blue water patrols.
You have had some very knowledgable pers stating why the Visby would not suit the RCN some have alot of knowledge on ship design, sailors, procurement etc with no axe to grind. Does the Visby have the same endurance as a Halifax Class frigate at 18 knots?, whats the highest seastate it can operate a Helicopter in since it does not have a Hangar? can it operate in seastate 6 in open ocean or will it have to run to a sheltered inlet for protection these are answers that you have not provided to back your case.
A quick search found the following infomation which speaks volumes on its design.

Visby was conceived while the Cold War was still “hot,” and Sweden was engaged in mine countermeasures and antisubmarine operations close to home. Its mission was defensive: to ward off potential interference to the East, and to keep Baltic waters safe for commercial shipping – to strengthen Sweden’s hand in its own shoal-water, island-filled environment, by enhancing what has traditionally been called Sweden’s “littoral know-how”.

EXTREME LITTORALS
That know-how dovetailed perfectly with the broad international shift away from open-sea naval operations, toward actions in more contained and difficult environments. In littoral waters, piloting and navigation difficulties, and the opponent’s proximity, increase a combatant’s risks, so these waters have since gained the urgent-sounding name “Extreme Littoral” – defined as a high-threat environment that places additional demands on a vessel’s efficiency, performance, and survivability.


Now a shallow water designed ship is going to help you how in the Atlantic & Pacific oceans there are other designs out there that will cope with both these Oceans better than a Visby.
I understand perfectly what you are saying about capability based on doctrine, I just think the doctrine is flawed and though this blog was about how we would restructure the navy, not how we would build one to continue current doctrine.
Government sets the Political Objectives it requires from its Armed Forces if those have not changed then the Strategic Plan will remain the same until your Government says otherwise then it is status quo. At this point I'll say that your Defence force Doctrine is meeting those said objectives. Doctrine has to be compatable with other like minded countries the same countries that Canada have been doing successful UN Type operations, The same Doctrine they are using in Afghnistan with other NATO countries.

If I may this is the Mission of your navy:
Mission:
The Royal Canadian Navy maintains combat-capable, multi-purpose maritime forces to meet Canada's defence objectives.
Its roles include:
• Defending Canadian sovereignty by upholding the laws around its shores.
• Protecting the environment and safeguarding our fisheries and energy resources
• Contributing to the defence of North America.
• Assisting other government departments in times of emergency or natural disaster.
• Supporting Canadian interests abroad through NATO, the United Nations and coalition operations and humanitarian missions.
From this im reading that the RCN is meeting everything that you wish to change?.

You talk doctrine but have no clear understanding of what it is and how it is applied, the NZDF Doctrine is compatable with the following, NATO, ABCA, & individual Countries [UK, Australia, US etc] we use that doctrine to give us a commom platform for us to work within a larger Task Force / Division etc.
I'd prefer the new Type 216 if it is as good as some are saying but all specs aren't out yet and it may not be the sub I'm hoping it would be for Canada. I definitely think my idea of teaming up with Australia is the way to go whether its the 216 or another sub we build together.
Have a read of the RAN thread reference the Collins class and why Australia will not buy another paper sub, 216 looks good on paper but the pitfuls of upscalling a design just dont work the Collins Class was an enlarged version of Swedish shipbuilder Kockums' Västergötland class and originally referred to as the Type 471, Kockums over promised & under delivered if im wrong then my Auzzie brothers will correct me.
I understand our navy is not configured for a flotilla of subs that large but your talking about some restructuring in the navy and recruitment.
Nice but to better understand where you are coming from what exactly are you proposing? a complete scrapping of the surface fleet or a complete change to a Coast Guard type force.
I'm sure a country of 35 million people could find enough willing people to crew 10 - 12 subs. Pay them more and you'll find no problems.
I hear this alot its a throw away line what alot of people dont realise is that private enterprise will always outstrip a Government department when it comes to recruiting, we are after the same type of recruit a Defence Force just cant compete for wages vs private industry and thats a fact regardless if you have 35 million.
Here is what the Canadian Navy says about subs:
"For a nation like Canada, the potency and stealth capability of submarines makes these warships one of the most effective means of deterring a military or other major challenge to our national security from anyone who would exploit the sovereignty of our maritime economic zone. The modern diesel electric submarine is capable of being deployed anywhere in the world in support of Canada’s foreign policy objectives, whether to participate in an international military exercise with our allies, or as part of Canada’s contribution to a multi-national military operation. Canadian submarines will be capable of conducting independent or coordinated patrols in foreign water to monitor or intercept suspicious maritime traffic or protect Canadian and coalition warships in a dangerous environment. " And they operate at 1/3 the cost of frigates or destroyers."
No brainer but what context was the speaker delievering the above quote from can you post the link from it so we can all get a better picture.
On another note, what happens to the Aegis equipment on the three destroyers? I know it sounds too easy but why not install them on the new support ships. I bet there is good reason why it can't be done but it sounds great on paper since they going and coming around the same time.
Does your Navy have the Aegis combat system on the Iroquois-class, I see they went thru the TRUMP upgrade replaced everything except the Radar system or are you talking about something else.
Liked rips idea of a joint project with the Americans to design and build a better Arctic Patrol Ship together. The PC-5 rated ones we're looking at now don't seem to do anything the Coast Guard can't do right now besides fire off a missile or two.
Makes sense to work with your neighbour to develop a Artic patrol ship what ship do you recommend and why to me ive got no idea of an artic patrol ship does it need to be an ice breaker type or like the RNZN OPV.
Still need a sub that can go under ice. Type 216 or Aussie build? You guys don't seem to think the Type 214 can cut it.
wiki might not be the most accurate but a quick search did bring this up:
The Type 214 procurement programs of international customers have had a history of technical problems. The first Type 214 submarine sold to Korea, Son Won-il, was reported to suffer noise problems allegedly due to faults in HDW's Type 214 design. South Korean and Greek Type 214 submarines had a host of other nearly identical problems, including instability while surfaced, periscope vibrations and seawater leaking in the hydraulics. While these problems in the South Korean Type 214s have been reportedly resolved, the noise level has yet to be reduced as promised by HDW. The company was fined $4.1 million by DAPA in February 2008 for ongoing technical problems. In November, a South Korean National Assembly demanded price reductions for the remaining six submarines, arguing that HDW was using the South Korean market to correct faults in the Type 214 to increase the submarine's overall international export potential. It is uncertain if DAPA received a price reduction for the fourth unit when it was contracted to DSME
I am of the school of thought that surface ships in a conventional war will quickly become useless. All that science about them being able to stop x income threats so fire X+1 at them and the Falklands example with aircraft, submarines, and anti-ship missiles (which lucky for the Brits were too few and mostly didn't detonate). Surface ships will quickly be destroyed or will run for their home ports. Subs and aircraft will carry the day.
What old school are you from WW2, Cold war, Gulf War the lessons the RN re-learnt were not new without the navy the falklands will be Argentian now yes they lost ships thats always going to happen in War.
Here is a question how is the RAF & Submarine fleets going to re-take the Falklands have a read of the amount of tanker support it took the RAF to drop one bomb on the airstrip.
PS. Army needs assessment are based on current government doctrine which I believe has redefined us as peace makers not peace keepers.
A Government does not set doctrine the Military sets doctrine in line with the Governments Strategic outlook i gather your government is playing its part as a global citizen.
I would have that changed back and yes many will not like the sound of that but I don't think our soldiers should be put at risk for political gain and trade negotiation deals with our allies which btw don't even happen anyway. Involvement in Afghanistan did little to resolve Canadian trade disputes with the US.
This should be debated in another thread not here i will say though defence is linked no matter how much you dislike it to Foreign Affairs & Trade, if you wish to become isolationist then be prepared to give up the big screen TV, cars, iphones etc because nothing comes free and I know our country has spent the last 20 years in the wilderness its only now NZ is seeing real change.
 
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Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Littoral subs from Europe are for defence, not blue water duty, I understand that. I'd prefer the new Type 216 if it is as good as some are saying but all specs aren't out yet and it may not be the sub I'm hoping it would be for Canada. I definitely think my idea of teaming up with Australia is the way to go whether its the 216 or another sub we build together. BTW yes I still think 10 to 12 subs is possible. I understand our navy is not configured for a flotilla of subs that large but your talking about some restructuring in the navy and recruitment. The delivery date for those subs is a long way off. I'm sure a country of 35 million people could find enough willing people to crew 10 - 12 subs. Pay them more and you'll find no problems.
The Chinese are building / have lots of subs and we would be wise to as well.
Good grief. If one does not bother reading the comments and rebuttals offered by others, do not expect to last long here. Now, time to inject a little reality. As I have previously mentioned, if the RCN were to adopt a fleet of 10 Type 214 submarines, which would most likely be unappropriate for where and how Canada wished to operate subs... Then the RCN would need to expand its pool of personnel in order to ensure adequate crews for the Type 214 subs. Again, assuming it was the Type 214 which was selected, and the RCN operated these subs with crews of 27 personnel, then the RCN would require 270+ submariners. Given the standards which most navies require their submariners to meet, then only about 2% - 3% of naval personnel would likely qualify to be crews of the Type 214's. This in turn means that the RCN would need a regular establishment strength of somewhere between ~9,000 - 13,000 personnel. At that low end, the regular RCN would need to 5.9% beyond what it is currently at. At the high end, the RCN would require ~52% more personnel than are currently serving. And this would all be so that the RCN could crew boats which would likely not be able to meet Canadian conops requirements. Even just a 5.9% increase is the numbers of personnel, never mind the increase of specialty personnel like submariners, is that sort of increase which needs to be planned for and managed carefully to ensure standards are met and maintained.

Now, if the RCN were to build up a fleet of ~10 subs which likely could meet RCN conops requirements, then they would likely require a crew of ~50+ per sub, roughly analogous to RCN and RAN sub crew sizes currently. This would suggest that the RCN would then need to have a pool of ~480 - 500 submariners. Again, this would then suggest that the RCN would need an establishment strength of somewhere between 16,000 - 24,000 personnel. Put another way, the RCN would need to double or triple the number of personnel serving in uniform to make sure that there would be sufficient numbers of personnel able to serve aboard RCN subs. That sort of size increase in personnel cannot be achieved just by reorganizing. In fact, outside of the RCN gearing up for a major war, that kind of increase in personnel numbers would take years (try like a decade or two, or perhaps even three) to achieve.

Here is what the Canadian Navy says about subs:

"For a nation like Canada, the potency and stealth capability of submarines makes these warships one of the most effective means of deterring a military or other major challenge to our national security from anyone who would exploit the sovereignty of our maritime economic zone. The modern diesel electric submarine is capable of being deployed anywhere in the world in support of Canada’s foreign policy objectives, whether to participate in an international military exercise with our allies, or as part of Canada’s contribution to a multi-national military operation. Canadian submarines will be capable of conducting independent or coordinated patrols in foreign water to monitor or intercept suspicious maritime traffic or protect Canadian and coalition warships in a dangerous environment. " And they operate at 1/3 the cost of frigates or destroyers."
I would be quite interested to see the source for the quoted comment, especially the portion which I bolded, as it has been my understanding that submarines typically have a higher operating cost than many surface warships. That and when I checked the RCN's page on the Victoria-class subs, there was no mention aboue the RCN subs having such a low operating cost.

I am too tired at this point to repeat what I have previously commented regarding having a JSS or other support vessel mount Aegis...

At this point, it seems pretty clear that one lacks even a basic understanding on what certain assets are capable of, what their various strengths and weaknesses are, or how assets are deployed or countered.

Unfortunately, if this just keeps on going with someone repeating their or someone else's theories on what the Royal Canadian Navy should do, without reacting to any of the flaws in their arguments which have been pointed out, then continuing to point out even basic flaws and holes is a waste of time and bandwidth.

-Cheers
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Many times I've come across the idea that the generals always prepare for the last war they fought. An argument could be made to find a place for every piece of military hardware used in the last 50 years including battle ships. The next conflict could see Canadian tanks all in flames like the Israeli tanks were in Lebanon a few years back. They admit to 52 being badly damaged with some of these being totally destroyed and they barely got any distance into the country. We probably won't be lucky enough to have an under-equipped foe like the Taliban next time.

Outfitting the Canadian Forces on such a tight budget means that Canada has to be selective about what kind of military it creates. The money spent on heavy battle tanks could probably be spent elsewhere more effectively and since this is a naval forum, the demand on the Navy to transport these heavy things would be eliminated.
Yes I agree 1000% get rid of all armour and the troops will be much safer from the ATGWs, they will however be mown down by the infantry weapons the enemy possesses in abundance, not to mention mortar and rocket fire, IEDs, RPGs, suicide vests, landmines etc. Canadas solidiers in the field will rest easy knowing there are a dozen corvettes iced in port and another dozen type 214 submarines back home insteasd of Leo 2s and a new AIFV to keep them safe.
 

1805

New Member
Good grief. If one does not bother reading the comments and rebuttals offered by others, do not expect to last long here. Now, time to inject a little reality. As I have previously mentioned, if the RCN were to adopt a fleet of 10 Type 214 submarines, which would most likely be unappropriate for where and how Canada wished to operate subs... Then the RCN would need to expand its pool of personnel in order to ensure adequate crews for the Type 214 subs. Again, assuming it was the Type 214 which was selected, and the RCN operated these subs with crews of 27 personnel, then the RCN would require 270+ submariners. Given the standards which most navies require their submariners to meet, then only about 2% - 3% of naval personnel would likely qualify to be crews of the Type 214's. This in turn means that the RCN would need a regular establishment strength of somewhere between ~9,000 - 13,000 personnel. At that low end, the regular RCN would need to 5.9% beyond what it is currently at. At the high end, the RCN would require ~52% more personnel than are currently serving. And this would all be so that the RCN could crew boats which would likely not be able to meet Canadian conops requirements. Even just a 5.9% increase is the numbers of personnel, never mind the increase of specialty personnel like submariners, is that sort of increase which needs to be planned for and managed carefully to ensure standards are met and maintained.

Now, if the RCN were to build up a fleet of ~10 subs which likely could meet RCN conops requirements, then they would likely require a crew of ~50+ per sub, roughly analogous to RCN and RAN sub crew sizes currently. This would suggest that the RCN would then need to have a pool of ~480 - 500 submariners. Again, this would then suggest that the RCN would need an establishment strength of somewhere between 16,000 - 24,000 personnel. Put another way, the RCN would need to double or triple the number of personnel serving in uniform to make sure that there would be sufficient numbers of personnel able to serve aboard RCN subs. That sort of size increase in personnel cannot be achieved just by reorganizing. In fact, outside of the RCN gearing up for a major war, that kind of increase in personnel numbers would take years (try like a decade or two, or perhaps even three) to achieve.



I would be quite interested to see the source for the quoted comment, especially the portion which I bolded, as it has been my understanding that submarines typically have a higher operating cost than many surface warships. That and when I checked the RCN's page on the Victoria-class subs, there was no mention aboue the RCN subs having such a low operating cost.

I am too tired at this point to repeat what I have previously commented regarding having a JSS or other support vessel mount Aegis...

At this point, it seems pretty clear that one lacks even a basic understanding on what certain assets are capable of, what their various strengths and weaknesses are, or how assets are deployed or countered.

Unfortunately, if this just keeps on going with someone repeating their or someone else's theories on what the Royal Canadian Navy should do, without reacting to any of the flaws in their arguments which have been pointed out, then continuing to point out even basic flaws and holes is a waste of time and bandwidth.

-Cheers
I agree with you, I don't see a need for 10 subs, 4-6 would be useful, but your observations on % crews to total navy numbers don't look not sound. Apply the same logic to the WW2 German U-boat crews? I don't know the numbers, but I am not sure they would compare with say Sweden. The representative sample of navies you quote is to small to create a general rule, although I agree the challenges of resourcing should not be underestimated.
 

swerve

Super Moderator
... As I have previously mentioned, if the RCN were to adopt a fleet of 10 Type 214 submarines, which would most likely be unappropriate for where and how Canada wished to operate subs... Then the RCN would need to expand its pool of personnel in order to ensure adequate crews for the Type 214 subs. Again, assuming it was the Type 214 which was selected, and the RCN operated these subs with crews of 27 personnel, then the RCN would require 270+ submariners. Given the standards which most navies require their submariners to meet, then only about 2% - 3% of naval personnel would likely qualify to be crews of the Type 214's. This in turn means that the RCN would need a regular establishment strength of somewhere between ~9,000 - 13,000 personnel. At that low end, the regular RCN would need to 5.9% beyond what it is currently at. At the high end, the RCN would require ~52% more personnel than are currently serving. And this would all be so that the RCN could crew boats which would likely not be able to meet Canadian conops requirements. Even just a 5.9% increase is the numbers of personnel, never mind the increase of specialty personnel like submariners, is that sort of increase which needs to be planned for and managed carefully to ensure standards are met and maintained.

-Cheers
How does that work out? What you're saying is that because on 2-3% of naval personnel have qualified as submariners in navies which have not sought more, then that ratio is fixed. Does not follow.

Firstly, assuming your ratio is correct, why do you need to keep all the surplus people? Why not just target the recruitment of people suited to subs, to increase the ratio, & also accept a higher wash-out rate? Expensive, but much less so than keeping thousands on the payroll with no job.

Also, where is the evidence that only 2-3% of those fit for general naval service are capable of being competent submariners? Who, & where, has tried & failed to push the ratio higher? If nobody has tried, it's not been tested.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
How does that work out? What you're saying is that because on 2-3% of naval personnel have qualified as submariners in navies which have not sought more, then that ratio is fixed. Does not follow.

Firstly, assuming your ratio is correct, why do you need to keep all the surplus people? Why not just target the recruitment of people suited to subs, to increase the ratio, & also accept a higher wash-out rate? Expensive, but much less so than keeping thousands on the payroll with no job.

Also, where is the evidence that only 2-3% of those fit for general naval service are capable of being competent submariners? Who, & where, has tried & failed to push the ratio higher? If nobody has tried, it's not been tested.
Some of the information I have is anecdotal, some comes from a friend who served in the USN aboard a Los Angeles-class SSN, with more coming from looking at several different navies which operate submarines.

Specifically, I looked at the regular establishment strength of four sub operating navies, the RCN, the RAN, the JMSDF and the USN. I also tooks at the type and number of subs the different navies each had and their respective crew complements. With the exception of the RCN, where the numbers could be a bit skewed due to the limited operability of the Victoria-class subs due to their condition at time of purchase as well as the fire one suffered while in transit to Canada... the trend is that the total sub crew complement for each navy would comprise between 2% - 3.5% of their respective regular establishment strengths'.

It is also possibly worth noting that the RN's submarine crew complement stands at ~3.8% of total regular RN personnel, and that once the Astute-class SSN has completed replacing the Trafalgar-class, then the RN figure would be back down to ~3.3%. One reason why the RN figure is currently so high, is that that Trafalgar-class SSN has ~32 more crew members than the replacing Astute-class SSN. IMO there has to be some reason why the RN would desire a replacing SSN design with ~30% less crew than its predecessor.

Now, I agree that the ratio likely could be pushed higher, either by dropping the standards a bit, or more stringent recruitment, or a mix of the two. However, attempting a dramatic increase is the sort of thing which can cause distortions in the overall force composition.

Unfort have to run, more to follow later.

-Cheers
 

Future Fleet

New Member
Had great post that I just lost. Oh, well here are the highlights:

Source from the Canadian Navy for 1/3 cost and more:

Can't post a link yet - Google the following: Royal Canadian Navy: In Depth - Fact File - Submarines: An Indispensable Asset

Minimum sub usage: 2 per coast + 2 international operations = 8 + 1 to 2 off at any one time = 9 to 10. I would say ideally more like 3 per coast at least.

Subs can patrol 125,000 square kilometres much cheaper than the Halifax class can so why not reduce the surface fleet and increase the sub fleet? Of course there still would be surface ships, just not as many.

Subs will also be more effective in a conventional war with a real power. As noted earlier, all surface vessels in striking distance of an enemy will be destroyed or running for port which leaves submarines to carry the day. Sure surface vessels are still important for peace time and third world issues but it is important to be truly flexible. Also, if Canada builds a sub with the Aussies and or Germans we gain the technological capability to build our own in the future.

I'm sure there is a way to find a few hundred people capable of crewing subs at any one time. Sorry Todjarger, I just can't buy your 2-3% rule unless you're talking about the immediate short term. Australia is planning for 12 subs and has a much smaller population than Canada, and a Navy of similar size.

New navy:

15 Submarines (if Australia can build 12 I"m sure we can manage 15)
3 Arctic Patrol Ships rated PC-1 for Coast Guard
12 Offshore patrol boat to replace Kingston Class
6-8 SCSC ships
3 Supply Ships
 

Vivendi

Well-Known Member
Now, if the RCN were to build up a fleet of ~10 subs which likely could meet RCN conops requirements, then they would likely require a crew of ~50+ per sub, roughly analogous to RCN and RAN sub crew sizes currently. This would suggest that the RCN would then need to have a pool of ~480 - 500 submariners. Again, this would then suggest that the RCN would need an establishment strength of somewhere between 16,000 - 24,000 personnel.
Sorry for the OT but does the above imply that you believe Australias plans for 12 subs are unrealistic?
 
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