Palnatoke;
The french army won the war as far as weapons and soldiers could win it, but the war didn't change the fundamental political problem (that Algerians, except the Pied noir, didn't quite fell as french as the french thought they ought to be),
On 4 November de Gaulle announced a “new course”, which would eventually lead to an “Algerian Algeria”. He directed a referendum on the issue of “self-determination” to be held on 8 January 1961. Despite the appalling riots in Algiers, this went on and presented de Gaulle with an overwhelming vote of support from a war-weary French population.
Challe, shabbily treated since his return to France, saw this as a betrayal of all he had fought to achieve in Algeria, and resigned from the service. Even more so: when de Gaulle announced the decision to negotiate with the FLN, he offered his leadership to the military plotters. A speech by de Gaulle on 11 April 1961, in which he referred to “decolonisation” in Algeria, acted as the spark for revolt. On the same day Challe – accompanied by General André Zeller (erstwhile Inspector-General of Ground Forces) - flew secretly to Algeria, made contact with an ex-air force general, Edmond Jouhaud, and prepared a mutiny by many senior officers, based on the headquarters of the 1e REP, at Zeralda. Their plan was for the 1e REP to seize key centres in Algiers and for the generals – soon to be joined by Salan – to take power. They would then rule Algeria until the ALN had been defeated, after which a pied noir government would be appointed.
The storm broke on 21 April 1961, when four generals – Salan, Challe, Edmond Jouhard and André Zeller – instigated a military coup in Algiers, which was seen as a first step in the overthrow of the Paris government. Supported by dissident paras, they held the city for five days, but to no avail: the plan did not work.
Tanks rolled on the streets of Paris as precaution against a possible airborne coup from Algeria: indeed, two groups of paras, totalling 2.400, were waiting in woods outside Paris, but, deprived of their leaders and reinforcement from Algeria, they disbanded. Most of the 45 Noratlas transports in Algeria flew empty to airfields in southern France, but combat air patrols were flown by Super Mystére fighters along the Rhone valley to force down any aircraft making for the capital. The French public rallied to de Gaulle in an amazing display of national solidarity, forcing the generals to abandon their plans. Without support in France itself the revolt was unsuccessful and the leaders had to flee: by 25 April Challe and Zeller were forced to surrender, while Salan, Jouhard and most of the other officers involved went underground. The 1e REP was disbanded and never re-established. In the aftermath of the failed coup five generals and 200 other officers were arrested and hastily trialled.
It dont mater how well you might perform on the battlefield if you lose the political battle then you lost and thats the difference with Malaya you cant escape that fact, The above is not a victory parade for a victorious French Army after Algeria.
Cadredave is right that the methods employed by the french army was unacceptable to a part of the french public, but that didn't really affect the war effort,
Didnt affect the war effort maybe not but it affected Public opinion this is what sways the politicians who then direct the Military and the French public were warry of this war they wanted out and the Generals lost sight of there
Political Master who have the last say.
though did present france with a trauma that's still quite a live. On the other hand France left Algeria more or less head up after having held a proper refferendum. That was not to the liking of neither the army nor the Pied Noir, but the alternative was simply not part of reality.
Got know idea what your on about please elaborate.
"These two are used today by us Military pers & Defence Colleges in how not to conduct a conflict against insurgencies"
Not impressed.
Not impressed what COIN experience do you have please tell me im very interested and will bow to your ultimate knowledge, here my question to you,
Question:
Which Line of operation in Afghanistan would you surrender to follow your gestapo tactics in front of the worlds media 24/7 and expect to get away with it name three of them please because im not impressed now.
if you think that modern armies are using Freanch & American ways to fight insurgents using brutal methods then your wrong"
Did I say that?
yes you implied that to win an insurgency Brutal methods are the only ways to win,
"you might win the battle but you will lose the war ask france. "
Again a fundamental misconception. The millitary can't change basic political conditions (in fact it doesn't change much in the modern world), though it can beat down an insurgency, if used correctly.
The insurgency in Algeria was beaten down, the fundamental political conditions meant that Algeria was, and in retrospect had always been, lost for France.
Your basic premise was that France use of brutal gestapo methods won the war in Algeria my counter was that those methods ulitmately lost public opinion at home which forced the Government to look for another way out of the conflict which ended with full Independance for Algeria.
In the french indochine wars
,
Indo China the French were defeated by general Giap using conventional means not by an insurgency totally different.
A classic case of not understanding that conventional tactics will not defeat an insurgency.
Irag successfully handed back to the Gov of Iraq once the US applied there COIN doctrine written by Gen David H. Petraeus same doctrine being applied in Afghanistan.
The same doctrine that i as part of our govt contribution to Afghanistan have applied in our Area of Operations succesfully so successfully that our area has begun transition to GIRoA, im not impressed by someone trying to school me when it is plane to me you have no understanding of the doctrine & its practicable application in very trying conditions . Im not some key board warrior thank you I have studied & applied key lessons learnt in COIN Operations when i see someone talking about one line of operation in a COIN environment then I know you have no understanding of COIN.
COIN is about the
populace thats why its called Hearts & Minds security does not have primacy over the other Lines of Ops they are interlocked concentrate to much on security and you will loss the populace and the war.
last but not least:
"The West has all the watches but we have all the time"
And this is why western governments will fail in COIN Ops its all about the long game not voing cycles.
