Is the US's position in Afghanistan precarious?

[Palnatoke]

Cadredave

Regarding Algeria, I think you are mixing things together. The attempted millitary coup d'etat was parts of the millitary and Pied Noir(s) (that's french algerians) [not to be confused with ethnic Algerians who in large numbers surported and fought for the french.] Not accepting the political decision to (in reality) end french colonial presence in algeria, that was a (I think prudent) political decision, not a decision forced upon the french by a millitary defeat (like the case indochine or the US exit from Vietnam). Now whether it was a millitary defeat or not, depends on definition. As I wrote to you, the french millitary could never ever change the basic fact that algeria weren't "france", but it could beat down the insurgency, which I believe it did.

Which Line of operation in Afghanistan would you surrender to follow your gestapo tactics in front of the worlds media 24/7 and expect to get away with it name three of them please because im not impressed now.

Sigh. The "your gestapo" makes me sooo tired. Plz re-read what I am writing.

yes you implied that to win an insurgency Brutal methods are the only ways to win,

So you agree with me that I didn't "think that modern armies are using Freanch & American ways to fight insurgents using brutal methods"?
To your latest accusation, no I didn't imply anything, I just noted that many of the "wins" was by brutal methods - that's a neutral observation so plz don't go on and claim that I surport torture or brutal methods.

Your basic premise was that France use of brutal gestapo methods won the war in Algeria my counter was that those methods ulitmately lost public opinion at home which forced the Government to look for another way out of the conflict which ended with full Independance for Algeria.

I would rather say that the french used brutal methods to quickly (after initial hessitation) control the situation - "quickly" being the important word here.
Else I accept the last part as valid, though I think that (france leaving) was in any case the only possible outcome. I am not so certain about the "public oppinion" part. There was a vocal miniority strongly against the war and methods, though I think that "Nixon's silent majority" was hugely big in France on this subject. But that's always difficult to judge afterwards.

Irag successfully handed back to the Gov of Iraq once the US applied there COIN doctrine written by Gen David H. Petraeus same doctrine being applied in Afghanistan.

Let's just say that I have a different enterpretation of Iraq. Though Petraeus was/is smart. Afghanistan is in my oppinion just lost. No strategy is going to change that fact, at this advanced point of failure. But ofcourse that depends on how we "spin" the understanding of victory/defeat.

when i see someone talking about one line of operation in a COIN environment then I know you have no understanding of COIN.

Well, maybe you can help me, where do I speak of "line of operation", infact where do I at all speak of COIN operations as such? Unless I am much mistaken I am mostly speaking about the nature of insurgencies - something that I think (underline my personal oppinion) the west/NATO/US have blatantly neglected to either understand or at least act according to.

thank you I have studied & applied key lessons learnt in COIN Operations

Good for you

 

[MrConservative]

Palnatoke.

The comments above made by gf0012-aust in Red were directed at you.

You have failed to grasp not only that mod caution - but in fact are arguing with a person who all mods and fellow def pro's respect for his knowlege in this very area.

I strongly suggest you wind back the attitude and actually grasp what Cadre Dave is saying. Or you will have a holiday from posting - understand.

 

[Palnatoke]

Palnatoke.

The comments above made by gf0012-aust in Red were directed at you.

You have failed to grasp not only that mod caution - but in fact are arguing with a person who all mods and fellow def pro's respect for his knowlege in this very area.

I strongly suggest you wind back the attitude and actually grasp what Cadre Dave is saying. Or you will have a holiday from posting - understand.

I think I am perfectly entitled to my own oppinion and is as always easely swayed by the "good argument".

I am perfectly "grasping" what CadreDave is saying, I just A) don't agree in everything B) Corrects him when he implies I have said things, that I havn't.

But if there is a passage in the forum rules that forbids differences in oppinion with "respected" members, I will ofcourse abide (or rather, stay away).

Your opinions stray way wide of the actual issue and head into petty and irrelevant side arguments just for the sake of trying to win a point. Furthermore the rules are there to guide you. Editorial control is in the hands of the Mods.

 

[STURM]

The Taliban is weakened military. The SF operations in the beginning worked just fine. If you look at the Taliban what can they do nothing but road bomb, suicide missions, and suicide bombers. There not making any real military operation no more. The leadership is going down hill look at how many commanders are dead some were good leaders it will be hard replace these commanders. After 10 years of fighting American forces the Taliban starting to show that they are weakening.

Not my intention to dispute what you're saying but would you not agree that though the Taliban has suffered thousands of KIA, amongst them many experienced field commanders who were hard to replace, they are still a major player in Afghanistan? ISAF press conferences keep reminding us that the Taliban lose almost every tactical engagement they're involved in and that the Taliban have lost 'x' number of men, but to what end? IMO, the fact they have resorted largely to IEDs or suicide bombers to inflict casualties, is irrelevant, the point is they are inflicting casualties, and from their perspective, that's what counts.

Despite their battlefield reversals and their inability to overthrow the Karzai government, they have managed not only to survive but still remain a major problem for the coalition - to the extent that the Karzai government, with apparent American approval, is seeking talks with them due to the realisation that Afghanistan can't be won militarily and that the Taliban must be part of any future peace process. After 10 years of war, after billions spent by the U.S. and after thousand of Afghans killed, which side is the one that has weakened and which side is the one that has come closer to achieving its objectives? Bear in mind that the main goal of the Taliban is not to export their ideology to the West or to their neighbours, but to keep on fighting until all foreign troops have left, would you not agree that they are close to their goal?

According to this report, the U.S. has had meetings with the Taliban. Not too long ago, we were told that the Taliban had no place in a future 'democratic' Afghanistan.

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2012/02/201221615510252691.html

 

[platinum786]

Regarding the point a member made earlier about using hugely overwhelming force and gestapo tactics to end an insurgency. As much as I hate to say it, but he has a point. Mass genocide works, it's worked for Russia in Chechnya. There aren't enough Chechens left to put up a fight.

I think the USA really missed a trick with this entire so called war on Terror. To take on the Taliban was their biggest mistake, they should have focused on working with the Taliban to remove the Taliban, if you read the book Mullah Zaeef wrote, the Taliban weren't all to pleased by what the "camels" as they referred to Al Queda, had bought to their doorstep.

Lets face it, the Taliban might be backward, and opressive, but no more so than Saudi Arabia, and the USA gets along just fine with them. I think it was a matter of blood lust which dragged America into this war.

The next mistake the USA made was with siding with the Northern Alliance, Afghanistan prior to the Taliban (and indeed to an extent including during their regime) was strife with ethnic warfare, to pick the weaker and minority ethnic groups to form the bulk of "your guys" was a mistake, the pukhtun were never going to stand for it.

The people you should have empowered, even if you did use the Northern Alliance as your foot soldiers, were the Pukhtun tribes, who are Afghanistans real power brokers. Without the blessing of the tribes, there is no Taliban. Had these people been given a proportional representation in government, and control over their own areas, you wouldn't have seen the re-rise of the Taliban, or such a strong Taliban.

The other issue with supporting the NA was going to be Pakistan. Pakistan is a big power broker in Afghanistan, they don't get along with the NA, they were never going to allow peace in Afghanistan, until a pro-Pakistan element was in charge. When Karzai and Co started cosying up with India (which they have a right to), Pakistan decided it could not tolerate them, simply because Pakistan has the strength in the region to do so.

It was mistake after mistake, and the real shame is, after so much bloodshed, the terrorists are probably stronger than ever.

 

[STURM]

Regarding the point a member made earlier about using hugely overwhelming force and gestapo tactics to end an insurgency. As much as I hate to say it, but he has a point. Mass genocide works, it's worked for Russia in Chechnya. There aren't enough Chechens left to put up a fight. .

Yes but what is the population and size of Afghanistan and Iraq, compared to Chechnya, not to mention the other countries where ''bush wars'' were fought in during the Cold War?

The next mistake the USA made was with siding with the Northern Alliance, Afghanistan prior to the Taliban (and indeed to an extent including during their regime) was strife with ethnic warfare, to pick the weaker and minority ethnic groups to form the bulk of "your guys" was a mistake, the pukhtun were never going to stand for it.

What choice did the U.S. have? At the time of 9//11, the NA was the most organised and effective resistance. This was at a time where the various Pashtuns tribes were squabbling, inneffective and divided. The Pashtuns are indeed never going to stand for an Afghanistan dominated by the minorities and but are the minorites going to stand for an Afghanistan that is dominated by the Pashtuns? There were Pashtun leaders, like Haq and Karzai, who wanted to step up efforts against theTaliban but prior to 9//11 they did not receive any support.

The people you should have empowered, even if you did use the Northern Alliance as your foot soldiers, were the Pukhtun tribes, who are Afghanistans real power brokers. Without the blessing of the tribes, there is no Taliban. Had these people been given a proportional representation in government, and control over their own areas, you wouldn't have seen the re-rise of the Taliban, or such a strong Taliban.

The U.S. did realise that the full support of the Pashtuns tribes were needed and did make the attempt. The main reasons however, that led to a Taliban resurgence was not so much the dissastifaction of the Pashtuns due to being sidelined but due to a number of reasons, namely flawed policies undertaken by the U.S. [supporting the warlords, a lack of development and aid projects, killing civilians by mistake], which had also shifted its attention to Iraq, and Pakistani cooperation with theTaliban. The Taliban's extensive network in Pakistan also played a huge role in its comeback as well as big cash donations from wealthy individuals and charities in theGulf states.

Another major problem was that for the first few years after 9/11, the priority of the U.S. was AQ not the Taliban. And as long as Pakistan cooperated in hunting down AQ, the U.S. closed a blind eye to the fact that Pakistan was increasingly becoming a haven for the Taliban and even the fact that Pakistan was even co-operating with theTaliban. As Ahmad Rashid points out in his book, the same time elements of the ISI were providing intel to the U.S. on targetting the Taliban, other elements were also advising the Taliban in the field as to what to attack and how to take advantage of the strict political guidelines ISAF troops were operating under.

 

[surpreme]

Not my intention to dispute what you're saying but would you not agree that though the Taliban has suffered thousands of KIA, amongst them many experienced field commanders who were hard to replace, they are still a major player in Afghanistan? ISAF press conferences keep reminding us that the Taliban lose almost every tactical engagement they're involved in and that the Taliban have lost 'x' number of men, but to what end? IMO, the fact they have resorted largely to IEDs or suicide bombers to inflict casualties, is irrelevant, the point is they are inflicting casualties, and from their perspective, that's what counts.

Despite their battlefield reversals and their inability to overthrow the Karzai government, they have managed not only to survive but still remain a major problem for the coalition - to the extent that the Karzai government, with apparent American approval, is seeking talks with them due to the realisation that Afghanistan can't be won militarily and that the Taliban must be part of any future peace process. After 10 years of war, after billions spent by the U.S. and after thousand of Afghans killed, which side is the one that has weakened and which side is the one that has come closer to achieving its objectives? Bear in mind that the main goal of the Taliban is not to export their ideology to the West or to their neighbours, but to keep on fighting until all foreign troops have left, would you not agree that they are close to their goal?

According to this report, the U.S. has had meetings with the Taliban. Not too long ago, we were told that the Taliban had no place in a future 'democratic' Afghanistan.

Karzai confirms Afghan-US talks with Taliban - Central & South Asia - Al Jazeera English

@Sturm I will said I agree with you on this. Well said no comment.

 

[steve33]

@Sturm I will said I agree with you on this. Well said no comment.

The war in Afganistan is lost and it was lost the day they went in there with the hope of building the country into something modern.

The country is something from the stoneage and will probably always be so.

Special forces,CIA and drones are the way to go when high value targets are located getting in and out quick.

Trying to rebuild the country is like trying to win a horse race on a donkey.

Forget it.

 

[lopez]

Thats not true... You make it sound as though the place was never a "country" in the seventies it was a functioning nation. The war could be won if we commit the resources. Which we wont. Even then all hope isn't lost.

but as an aside. Has anyone defined victory for Afghanistan? what is the goal? what have they stated and worked towards as the objective?

 

[Herodotus]

Thats not true... You make it sound as though the place was never a "country" in the seventies it was a functioning nation. The war could be won if we commit the resources. Which we wont. Even then all hope isn't lost.

but as an aside. Has anyone defined victory for Afghanistan? what is the goal? what have they stated and worked towards as the objective?

Defining victory is tricky, especially in insurgency warfare. In the beginning of this long conflict I think the goals were: defeat al-Qaeda, prevent the Taliban from returning to power, and create a sustainable democracy in Afghanistan (to prevent Afghanistan from exporting terrorism).

The third goal is already dead given the US's backing of the corrupt Karzai regime. The first and second goals have had varying successes in implementation, but still far from anything I would classify as unequivocal victory. al-Qaeda is not defeated, and the Taliban may return to power after NATO troops leave.

The problem with Afghanistan is it is a victim of its geography, surrounded by great powers who play their games of regional dominance at the expense of the Afghans. That isn't likely to change once NATO troops are gone.

 

[STURM]

The war in Afganistan is lost and it was lost the day they went in there with the hope of building the country into something modern.

The country is something from the stoneage and will probably always be so.

I couldn't disagree more. The war was lost when the U.S. failed to grasp from the very start that defeating the Taliban, not AQ, was the key, when it failed to apply pressure on its ''ally'' Pakistan to completely sever its relationship with the Taliban and other extremist groups, and when it failed to realise, despite previous experiences elsewhere, that building a ''better'', functioning country had to go hand in hand with military efforts. And when it relied on firepower and technology, based on attrition.

The war could be won if we commit the resources. Which we wont. Even then all hope isn't lost.

What resources more need to be committed to ensure victory? All the troops that can be spared were sent and billions have been spent.

but as an aside. Has anyone defined victory for Afghanistan? what is the goal? what have they stated and worked towards as the objective?

That depends on who you ask. Victory for Pakistan is ensuring a ''friendly'' Afghan government in power, limiting the amount of influence India has, continuing using Afghanistan as leverage over Kashmir and Afghanistan playing the role the Pakistani's have also coveted - providing strategic depth against India. It's not often realised but Afghanistan has a long standing claim on parts of Pakistan's FATA, that it has chose not to pursue.

For the Taliban, who are not interested in exporting their ideology beyond their borders, victory will be achieved when all foreign occupying troops leave Afghanistan.

For the U.S. and the West, victory is ensuring a ''friendly'', not too Islamist government in power that will not permit the country to a breeding ground for groups like AQ again. Bulding up the ANA and Afghan police, securing more international aid, etc, is part of that goal.

It's funny when you look at at it. Back in the 1990's, the U.S. [like many others] was at first not willing to criticise the Taliban as it was felt that they could be a stabilising force. They even had low level contacts with the Taliban and a Taliban delegation visited the U.S. and met members of congress as part of a campaign for a U.S. company to lay an oil pipeline to the north. The Pakistanis played a big part - as they had made the Taliban their main proxy after their ''man'' Hetmayar was defeated and fled into Iran - by convincing the U.S. that the Taliban could bring change to the devastated country and deal with the warlords. Then came 9/11 and at present, the U.S. is open to the idea of the Taliban playing some future role in the country and has even had talks with it and approves Karzai's talks with them.. The wheel has gone full circle, like it did with Saddam and Gadaffi.

Defining victory is tricky, especially in insurgency warfare. In the beginning of this long conflict I think the goals were: defeat al-Qaeda, prevent the Taliban from returning to power, and create a sustainable democracy in Afghanistan (to prevent Afghanistan from exporting terrorism).

The main goal for the first 2-4 years was indeed AQ. That's why the U.S. turned a blind eye to Pakistani ''involvement'' with the Taliban.- Pakistan was allowed to do what ever it wanted as long as it cooperated in the hunt against AQ. The Taliban was not taken too seriously then as it was thought that they were a spent force. Nation building and democracy was something the Pentagon under Rumsfeld was not interested in. That only came later when the U.S. because of it's need to divert resources to Iraq and frustrated with failure in Afghanistan turned to the UN and the EU for assistance, in providing troops, funds for development, etc.

 

[steve33]

Thats not true... You make it sound as though the place was never a "country" in the seventies it was a functioning nation. The war could be won if we commit the resources. Which we wont. Even then all hope isn't lost.

but as an aside. Has anyone defined victory for Afghanistan? what is the goal? what have they stated and worked towards as the objective?

Do you seriously think Afganistan is going to be a successful democracy you are dreaming the country is so poisened with corruption at all levels with people just looking out for themselves lining their own pockets they care for nothing else and their woman are seen as nothing.

The war can't be won and won't be won no matter how much resources are committed because wars are not just about resources they are about will and in the west people don't have the stomach for long drawn our wars they tire of the casulties and just tire of the time the war is taking 10 years is generally the limit.

As the saying goes in Afganistan you have the watches we have the time and that is why everyone who has gone in there will fail.

 

[steve33]

I couldn't disagree more. The war was lost when the U.S. failed to grasp from the very start that defeating the Taliban, not AQ, was the key, when it failed to apply pressure on its ''ally'' Pakistan to completely sever its relationship with the Taliban and other extremist groups, and when it failed to realise, despite previous experiences elsewhere, that building a ''better'', functioning country had to go hand in hand with military efforts. And when it relied on firepower and technology, based on attrition.

The war was lost the day they went in there because they were never committed to what they were doing there was never going to be enough troops sent not even close and they were going into a country where most of the country can't read or write there are no jobs and the majority of people in power are corrupt and you have an entire generation of people who know nothing but war.

You are talking about at least a generation 25 years to turn things around and that is committing all the military power the west has plus the maximum civilian efforts as far as reconstruction projects go and educating up skilling the population.

No western public have the stomach or will for a 25 year war with trillions spent and soldiers dying everyday and on top of that the Islamic movements like the Taliban won't quit no matter how many of them you kill they want western forces out of Afganistan and won't stop until they achieve it.

The west was always going to give up in Afganistan before the Taliban and Al Qaeda that is why the operation was doomed to fail from day one.

We have the tech they have the will and will is going to win them this fight.

I don't like the outcome but it was always going to end this way history shows that.

 

[STURM]

The war was lost the day they went in there because they were never committed to what they were doing there was never going to be enough troops sent not even close

Oh they were very well committed, the only problem is they were initially committed in doing the wrong things, in the wrong manner. As to having enough troops, if one's overall strategy is flawed from the start, what difference does it make whether enough troops have been committed or not? I don't claim to be an authority of the Afghan war or on counter insurgency but according to what I've read, a whole lot of mistakes were made during the 2002-2004 period, that could have been avoided. This was at a time when the Taliban had yet to make a total comeback and the vast majority of Afghans welcomed the presence of foreign troops in the hope that this could bring lasting change. The U.S. campaign was not doomed to failure from the start, things could have been different.

where most of the country can't read or write there are no jobs and the majority of people in power are corrupt and you have an entire generation of people who know nothing but war.

But the same, to a certain extent, would also apply to other countries where counter insurgency campaigns have been conducted. At the end of the day, certain key fundamental mistakes were made, despite having learnt from previous mistakes,and efforts were made to later correct these mistakes. As to the end result, we have to wait and see.

 

[Sampanviking]

You only need to look at current events to see just how little trust and good faith existed previously between populace and occupier.

The "mishandling" episode at Bagram has the hallmarks of the straw that breaks the Camels back. I strongly suspect that the damage and fallout from this incident will be permanent and irreparable.

 

[My2Cents]

Oh they were very well committed, the only problem is they were initially committed in doing the wrong things, in the wrong manner. As to having enough troops, if one's overall strategy is flawed from the start, what difference does it make whether enough troops have been committed or not? I don't claim to be an authority of the Afghan war or on counter insurgency but according to what I've read, a whole lot of mistakes were made during the 2002-2004 period, that could have been avoided. This was at a time when the Taliban had yet to make a total comeback and the vast majority of Afghans welcomed the presence of foreign troops in the hope that this could bring lasting change. The U.S. campaign was not doomed to failure from the start, things could have been different.

But the same, to a certain extent, would also apply to other countries where counter insurgency campaigns have been conducted. At the end of the day, certain key fundamental mistakes were made, despite having learnt from previous mistakes,and efforts were made to later correct these mistakes. As to the end result, we have to wait and see.

Frankly, as long as the Taliban and al-Qaeda have a safe haven and base of operations and recruiting in Pakistan, I doubt any level of commitment short of a willingness to invade Pakistan would make any difference in the long run. The fundamental mistake was assuming that Pakistan would be a true ally in this war.

 

[STURM]

The fundamental mistake was assuming that Pakistan would be a true ally in this war.

That was the price to be paid. Musharaf demanded and got assurances that Uncle Sam would not ask any uncomfortable questions on democracy as part of the price for Pakistan assistance in hunting down AQ. Uncle Sam also was forced to turn a blind eye to Pakistan's involvement [or double dealing] with the Taliban, which was part of it's longstanding strategy of dealing with the Kashmir issue and with India. To be fair, the Pakistanis had been left in the lurch before and are very worried as to how committed the U.S. will remain in the years to come. As one Pakistani official said - ''the U.S. wants us to act in their short term interests, which would be detrimental to our long term interests''.

A very informative video which mentions some of the mistakes made with the lack of any serious effort at nation building which came back to haunt the U.S. later. It also mentions concessions the Taliban has made.

[nomedia="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OyvGxuHSoPg"]NATO Review - Where now for Afghanistan? Interview with Ahmed Rashid - YouTube[/nomedia]

 

[Beatmaster]

Imo this war was lost before it even did began.
Yes Taliban forces have been crushed to a near defeat.
But could it effective be defeated? Simple NO.
The Taliban is spread over more then 20 nations from middle east all the way to Africa.
So a 100% defeat of the Taliban would be virtually impossible.
Having that said this is not even the biggest reason why Afghanistan should be considered as a epic fail.

The US and Coalition forces did do a seriously good job and honor to those who fought on the ground as i know some friends who where based in Kamp holland, their stories are a serious proof of what really happened there.
However the thing is simple:

The US & Coalition forces did their job by reaching out and show respect to the people and try to build them a better future.
Which is a memorable thing.
However the Taliban was fighting by FEAR, Terror and Violence and that is a really serious tool to convince the people there to take the side of the Taliban (Willing or unwilling)

Its simple let me put up a example:

A Coalition soldier offers you Food, Education and a possible brighter future ok?
But you know that your sister, brother and son is being held by the Taliban and by accepting the help from a western soldier you condemn your family to death.

Which side would you pick?

Now having that said what do you think that happens when the US and Coalition forces back their bags and move out?

Moral? Afghanistan is a epic fail and there is nothing much we can do about it, because we acted to late, to little and none of all the involved nations did take into account that this would be a war that would last more then 10 years and they did not take into account that it would take another 10 years to at least do something serious and lasting.

And as others said Time is the biggest weapon the Taliban has.

 

[Sampanviking]

It sounds as though you are confusing Al-Qaeda with the Taliban.
The Taliban are almost exclusively local to Pashtun areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan and so it is not so much that relatives are being held but are active and dedicated members.

Most families will not betray their sons, brothers or fathers to a stranger no matter how decently they may present. If the strangers go around acting with heavy handed indifference and mishandling people and objects, the decision becomes far more easy.

 

[Beatmaster]

It sounds as though you are confusing Al-Qaeda with the Taliban.
The Taliban are almost exclusively local to Pashtun areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan and so it is not so much that relatives are being held but are active and dedicated members.

Most families will not betray their sons, brothers or fathers to a stranger no matter how decently they may present. If the strangers go around acting with heavy handed indifference and mishandling people and objects, the decision becomes far more easy.

Yeah you are right sorry for that.
Let me put Taliban and Al-Qaeda for this moment under the same banner.
Just for the sake of the topic.
I do realize that they are completely different however its easier for me to explain and make my point.

And again you are right.
But what i mean with holding people is a simple first hand story.
My friend Dennis who served in Kamp Holland during the Chora battle was eye witness from a fresh killing.
The Taliban tied up a young son to a tree and left him there to rot, because his daddy did accept coaltion forces into his compound.
After this the family went nuts and hated the Taliban even more so daddy took a brave action and helped the Coalition forces even more result?
The same Daddy (Town chief) and his wifes, kids and grand parents where found slaughtered in public display a few days later when Coalition forces where inspecting the Compound during a routine patrol mission.

That family was made a example for the whole region to see.
What happened next? 12 out of the 33 compounds in the direct region of camp Holland refused to help Coalition forces out of fear that the Taliban would visit them at night and kill them.

Now i am not saying that everything is good and dandy because its not.
However you do have to agree that such fear is a serious tool to get something done.
US & Coalition forces in all their might cannot reply to such violence.
Specially if Taliban and Al-Q forces hide under the same cloths and in the same buildings as the civilians.
Infact its known that during the day Taliban was poring thea into Coalition cups during a town meeting while at night they grabbed the AK-47 and did hit patrols..