OK, I just got the surface story and have no idea what's going on behind closed doors, lets hope they work out the details and its a successful buy that doesn't cause us trouble down the road
Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates
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Anixtu
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Merchant, or civilian, but not "commercial". "Government vessel on non-commercial service" or similar wording as contained in various international rules.
No, not at all.
Which international rules? Suspect you are looking at UNCLOS and here there are government ship operated for commercial purposes and those operated for non commercial purposes.
It matters not a jot as the definitions applicable are those in our legislation. In this case government ship....
Funnily enought the first part of this is the same as the defintiion of Commonwealth ship......... however the important part is "belongs to the defence force. this brings us to s.3 of the act
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If the ship is to be civilain operated this does not exclude it from the act in the same manner s.3 of the act applies to naval ships. The term commercial refers to "commercially operated" which would be the case with a civilian operator. If the ship is owned by the DoD and civilian operated it would be a "commonwealth ship" and subject to the Navigataion Act 1912 and Marine Orders as modified by marine Orders Part 62.
compliments of aunty:
one wonders whether the reports will include some fact about govts decision to make them unavailable and being directly responsible for shortening the main cycles....
Review reveals 'serious flaws' with Collins subs
Posted December 13, 2011 20:36:40
Photo: The second part of the review into the Collins Class submarines is due in April. (Australian Government, Department of Defence Home Page)
Related Story: Rough seas tipped for sub replacement project
Related Story: Smith announces review into $6b sub fleet
Map: Australia
The first part of a review into Australia's Collins Class submarines has identified significant systemic problems.
Defence Minister Stephen Smith commissioned the Coles Review after revelations that at times only one of the six submarines had been available for service.
It found there was no long-term strategic plan for the efficient use of the assets of the Navy's Collins Class submarine program and a lack of accountability, authority and responsibility.
Mr Smith has acknowledged the review's early findings are not flattering.
"The report itself makes very salutary reading and it is a no-holds-barred report into what I regard as a long-standing systemic difficulty so far as Collins Class maintenance is concerned," he said.
"It points to very serious flaws over a long period of time and draws attention to the need for fundamental reform in the way in which the maintenance and sustainment of the Collins Class is effected."
The Government has plans for a fleet of 12 new submarines and has started discussions with three overseas companies.
The second part of the report is due in April.
one wonders whether the reports will include some fact about govts decision to make them unavailable and being directly responsible for shortening the main cycles....
Review reveals 'serious flaws' with Collins subs
Posted December 13, 2011 20:36:40
Photo: The second part of the review into the Collins Class submarines is due in April. (Australian Government, Department of Defence Home Page)
Related Story: Rough seas tipped for sub replacement project
Related Story: Smith announces review into $6b sub fleet
Map: Australia
The first part of a review into Australia's Collins Class submarines has identified significant systemic problems.
Defence Minister Stephen Smith commissioned the Coles Review after revelations that at times only one of the six submarines had been available for service.
It found there was no long-term strategic plan for the efficient use of the assets of the Navy's Collins Class submarine program and a lack of accountability, authority and responsibility.
Mr Smith has acknowledged the review's early findings are not flattering.
"The report itself makes very salutary reading and it is a no-holds-barred report into what I regard as a long-standing systemic difficulty so far as Collins Class maintenance is concerned," he said.
"It points to very serious flaws over a long period of time and draws attention to the need for fundamental reform in the way in which the maintenance and sustainment of the Collins Class is effected."
The Government has plans for a fleet of 12 new submarines and has started discussions with three overseas companies.
The second part of the report is due in April.
And the second part will conclude with "If you want to operate a fleet of 6 submarine you need to fund the operation of a fleet of six submarines".
And as gf suggests it doesn't help when the government elects to layup a third of the fleet due to lack of crews as well as to save money.
Anixtu
New Member
I don't have the source documents handy, but UNCLOS, SOLAS, and most international shipping conventions exempt naval auxiliaries and/or government vessels on non-commercial service to some degree. That Australia has made no such provision in its own legislation is a local issue. I was principally objecting to your reference to the RFA as "commercial" or subject to commercial rules. The RFA broadly complies with Merchant rules, but the MoD is quite happy to ignore or sidestep them when they become inconvenient. There is occasionally tension between the MoD and MCA on the subject.
Smith is going to be interviewed on the ABC this morning, discussion around changes and Collins in particular,,,
and from the Advertiser in SA: (note ref to S-80 and Scorpene, I've mentioned these not being in contention before)
AUSTRALIA'S Collins Class submarines are more than twice as costly to operate as US Navy nuclear submarines.
New figures obtained by The Advertiser show the six Collins boats cost about $630 million a year or $105 million each to maintain, making them the most expensive ever put to sea.
At present, just two of the fleet of six boats could go to war and with a maximum of three available at any one time, the costs are even higher when applied to serviceability.
The annual price for "sustainment" (maintenance and support) is $415.9 million for 2011-12, with operating costs (fuel, rations, wages, weapons) running at $213.4 million.
By comparison, a US Navy Ohio Class nuclear attack submarine, which is more than three times the size of a Collins boat, costs about $50 million a year.
The disturbing cost figures come as Defence officials revealed that at least two possible contenders for the navy's new submarine fleet, the Spanish S-80 and French-Spanish Scorpene class boat, have been ruled out of the future submarine project.
Answering questions on notice from Opposition spokesman David Johnston, Defence said both vessels did not meet "Australia's broad needs as outlined in the Defence White Paper".
They are smaller than the Collins and the White Paper calls for 12 larger submarines to cost up to $36 billion.
In 2008, an embarrassed navy brass ceased to report on the performance of the Collins fleet in the Defence annual report.
The 2007-08 performance outcome for the Collins fleet showed that it achieved just 64 per cent of its mission capability or 559 days of actual availability.
Since then the figures have been classified as "secret", but assuming a similar outcome then sustainment and maintenance of the subs now cost taxpayers a total of $1,643,835 a day for the six vessels or $273,972 a day each.
With only two or three available for duty that cost blows out to more than $500,000 a day.
Senator Johnston accused the Government and Defence Minister Stephen Smith of taking their eye off the ball when it came to the submarines.
A decision on the direction of the future submarine project is due to be made late this year or early in 2012.
and from the Advertiser in SA: (note ref to S-80 and Scorpene, I've mentioned these not being in contention before)
AUSTRALIA'S Collins Class submarines are more than twice as costly to operate as US Navy nuclear submarines.
New figures obtained by The Advertiser show the six Collins boats cost about $630 million a year or $105 million each to maintain, making them the most expensive ever put to sea.
At present, just two of the fleet of six boats could go to war and with a maximum of three available at any one time, the costs are even higher when applied to serviceability.
The annual price for "sustainment" (maintenance and support) is $415.9 million for 2011-12, with operating costs (fuel, rations, wages, weapons) running at $213.4 million.
By comparison, a US Navy Ohio Class nuclear attack submarine, which is more than three times the size of a Collins boat, costs about $50 million a year.
The disturbing cost figures come as Defence officials revealed that at least two possible contenders for the navy's new submarine fleet, the Spanish S-80 and French-Spanish Scorpene class boat, have been ruled out of the future submarine project.
Answering questions on notice from Opposition spokesman David Johnston, Defence said both vessels did not meet "Australia's broad needs as outlined in the Defence White Paper".
They are smaller than the Collins and the White Paper calls for 12 larger submarines to cost up to $36 billion.
In 2008, an embarrassed navy brass ceased to report on the performance of the Collins fleet in the Defence annual report.
The 2007-08 performance outcome for the Collins fleet showed that it achieved just 64 per cent of its mission capability or 559 days of actual availability.
Since then the figures have been classified as "secret", but assuming a similar outcome then sustainment and maintenance of the subs now cost taxpayers a total of $1,643,835 a day for the six vessels or $273,972 a day each.
With only two or three available for duty that cost blows out to more than $500,000 a day.
Senator Johnston accused the Government and Defence Minister Stephen Smith of taking their eye off the ball when it came to the submarines.
A decision on the direction of the future submarine project is due to be made late this year or early in 2012.
So are the papers trying to position nuclear submarines are a real viable alternatives? Or are they just comparing apples to oranges.
Why don't they compare the Collins to say the Canadian Victoria class. Didn't one boat only have 1 day of operation since purchased? So surely they would have to be the most expensive ever put to sea in terms of availabilities to cost.
It specifically list S-80 and scorp as not being considered, but does this mean other European (german?) types may be considered or at least are able to put in a design proposal.
I notice smith's announcement is just after the end of the navy spanking case. Obviously trying to put some positive stuff out there sounding like hes fixed all the problems the defence force had.
Why don't they compare the Collins to say the Canadian Victoria class. Didn't one boat only have 1 day of operation since purchased? So surely they would have to be the most expensive ever put to sea in terms of availabilities to cost.
It specifically list S-80 and scorp as not being considered, but does this mean other European (german?) types may be considered or at least are able to put in a design proposal.
I notice smith's announcement is just after the end of the navy spanking case. Obviously trying to put some positive stuff out there sounding like hes fixed all the problems the defence force had.
because the press don't know the difference between a sub and a prawn trawler, by association they have dumbed down the general public as the only dross the general public see is the rubbish in mainstream
we looked at the upholders in 99, the press didn't elect to report it because it didn't suit their commentary. plus, every other major sub program in the last 25 years has had problems, even the virginias - and they are the gold standard for build efficiencies. again, cost per capability on a greenfields build is something the press don't seem to get, even nations with a history of sub bields have struggled
they'll look for proposals, if the euro builders have any brains they'll have worked out that what will be critical will be who they partner up with on things like combat systems and fitout. they don't have to be nostradamus to work out who we align with on C4/ISR technologies etc....
weegee
Active Member
So what is everyone's take on the new ship? what will she be? I seem to remember a few months ago that the fellows down Hobart were saying that the RAN were seriously looking at the CAT they had and that had no owners as of yet. This was put down to Incat making their own press, were they actually being serious and speaking out of school to early? I wonder if they offered it to the RAN at a too good to pass up price being that they don't have a buyer for her and I would say she owes them a few $?
Having a Roro capability has worked for us in the past but is limited due to not having guaranteed access to ports etc. Now we having the addition of HMAS Choules with the wet dock she can well and truly overcome to short comings of the other ship? So does this make a cheap Roro cat more attractive?
Having a Roro capability has worked for us in the past but is limited due to not having guaranteed access to ports etc. Now we having the addition of HMAS Choules with the wet dock she can well and truly overcome to short comings of the other ship? So does this make a cheap Roro cat more attractive?
Do any of the defence press commentators or politicians who comment on submarine aquisition actually research?
One of the most succinct treatises on the subject and one that should be mandatory reading is Derek Woolner's paper "TAKING THE PAST TO THE FUTURE - THE COLLINS SUBMARINE PROJECT AND SEA 1000".
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HMAS Jervis Bay was leased for a specific mission, and its short distance to and from ET made it perfect for the operation. unless we invade a pacific island, i dont see us getting another one on lease.
I would like to see a HSV as part of our future amphib, but right now we need to get a basic force moving. With a HSV we could do more in the pacific other then an annual pacific partnership as well as train with IRR to deploy fast and efficently. But again we need a reason for this, and theres litte value and need in the budget for it.
Although it would have made more sense to have an INCAT over OP and windimere...as they at least could work well within navy Amphib. at no stage would OP have been useful to the RAN other then having Seaman conduct training onboard, although having seen these JS have to go from OP to a (albeit foreign) navy vessel being HMNZS Canterbury, i can say that it was just a cruise compared to the real world for them and the training value was minimal. we really could have saved money by not leasing the damn thing.
The high speed ferries are great for intra theater duties but aren't of much use in world wide use, i.e., lifting soldiers and their equipment from the west coast of the US to Hawaii, or across the Atlantic to Europe or Africa. 1,200 nautical miles isn't 3,000 or more cargo miles. The flying distance from San Francisco to Honolulu is 2,387 miles. A cargo load of 600 short tons doesn't ship many M1A1 tanks either.
General Characteristics
Primary Function: The JHSV Program will provide high speed, shallow draft transportation capability to support the intra-theater maneuver of personnel, supplies and equipment for the U. S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Army.
Builder: Austal USA
Propulsion: Water Jet
Length: 103 Meters (338 feet)
Beam: 28.5 meters (93.5 feet)
Displacement: 2362 long tons
Draft: 13 feet (3.97 meters)
Speed: 35-40 knots
Range: 1,200 nautical miles
Crew: 21 civilian mariners
Put simply, fast high speed ferries don't have a lot of range sufficient for ocean crossings. And if you are going to travel slower at a modest fuel efficient speed, why buy fast high speed ferries?
Westpac Express (as leased to the US veggies) did a couple of transoceanic crossings.
the issue is about speed and economy, flog the cats and they'll run out of juice pretty quickly, although Austal seem to have been able to realise new efficiencies in later designs and can cash and carry at high speed.
one of the DefPros on here did the test and evals for JB for east timor and had quite a few USN and USMC geeks on board, soon after USN, USMC went out and bought cats - one leased austals, one leased INCATs
Yes, the US bought/leased high speed ferries for the Okinawa run from Japan and other short hops, not for crossing the oceans. And while one will cross an ocean at slow speeds, a bigger ship can do so much more economically. The US does see the high speed ferries useful in the Caribbean, the Hawaiian Islands, and other archipelagoes.
High speed ferries are great for short hops, but not even the cruise lines, much less ferry companies, are using them for long hops.
Sorry mate, I used the term "law" rather flippantly, should have been a bit more specific
Can we, in an Australian context, change the Defence Act to potentially cover these issues in our determination of what constitutes a warship, be it commisioned or not, under Australian law ? Or would this still conflict with out international maritime obligations ?
SOLAS does not exempt naval auxillaries...... it does not apply to warships except where speciffical noted in the convention. UNCLOS does not exempt naval auxillalries........... in fact it specifically referes to them.
RFA vessesl are certifed under SOLAS, MARPOL, load Line, tonnage, AFS and other application conventsion in the same amnner as "trading vessels". Agree there are issues between MoD and MCA, however, there is an MOU in place for this.
Please provide me a quote from the application provisions of SOLAS, or any other convention, that removes governments ships on non-commercial service. In fact SOLAS states
Main ship types in SOLAS are a " Passenger Ship" being is a ship which carries more than twelve passengers, and a "cargo ship" being any ship which is not a passenger ship.
Ships operated by the RFA are genrally certified as cargo ships (hence the use of the term commercial certification). I understand some are, or have been, Special Purpose Ships. These are again "cargo ships" but built and certifed to the SPS code which allows the carriage of non STCW crew above 12 where these are associated with the operation of the vessel. Not sure if any RFA have ny vessel certified as passenger vessels.
IIRC even canberra was reclassified as a troopship once she got pulled into service during the falklands.
Warships are defined as naval ships under s.3 of the navigation act. The includes any ship belonging to, or operated by, an arm of the defence force.Sorry mate, I used the term "law" rather flippantly, should have been a bit more specific
Can we, in an Australian context, change the Defence Act to potentially cover these issues in our determination of what constitutes a warship, be it commisioned or not, under Australian law ? Or would this still conflict with out international maritime obligations ?
This does not preclude the use of ther term naval auxillary but it is not a term in law at the moment. There are issues with how civilian ships are regulated where their primary purpose is to provide support to the military. If they are excluded from the jurisdiction of the civilian regulator this poses problems for the civilian crew as this removes the protection of a number of pieces of supporting legislation as they are all linked.
The government could do it if they liked but I suspect the seafarers would be less than happy as they would effectively be under military command.
Finally there is a risk with having the 'flag state' as the customer. For 'commercial ships' the flag is seperate from the Classificaiton society and the customer. Class works for flag under an appointment as an RO. Class also works for the ship operator to survey and certifiy the ship. The benifit of this is that, while the operator may pressure Class to provide a relaxation, the flag are generally intolerant of any deviation below, or near, minimum standards. Class cannot agree to any deviation without the Flag approval.
Where the flag and operators are the same; say for example a Navy is flag adminstration (as it usually is for warships) and the customer (being the operator)then there could be a perpensity to agree to deviations from required survery and certification, as well as maintenace routines, due to operational demands. Unless the flag has an unequiviocal right of veto you can get in trouble in such situations.
Note: I said "a Navy" as this is an theoretical example fo a situation.
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