They might be effective warships, they may be disasters. Look at the number of new things going on in that class of ships.
- Brand new radar
- Brand new VLS Cells
- Brand new hull form
- Brand new barrel launched missile system (6" AGS)
- New to the USN Propulsion system (similar to T45 IEP isnt it?)
- New to the USN Crew saving automation (based on LCS??)
How many new operational combat ship classes throughout history have this many new innovations on them?
The design is for a technological testbed.
Edit: And just about all current destroyer classes should be classified as cruisers based on size and role.
A couple of comments here, and linked in with AegisFC shortlist.
The issue is not so much about what vessel carried new technology, but what that vessel did to create a change in capability constructs and how the concept of operations (CONOPS) sometimes dramatically changed.
Those vessels triggered change dramatic to the point where in some cases their near peers were regarded as obsolete overnight.
USS Monitor
whats more important IMO is that even though Gt Britain had been running iron clads prior to the US, it was the US that gave the design momentum and shifted it from the inertia that ironclads were in. eg ironclads and turrets even though it was fought to a draw showed that manouvre for obtaining best firing solution had just been rewritten. ie the turretted ironclad could dictate angles of engagement without going through excruciating manouvre which not only wasted time, but was subject to currents, placement etc..., low draft on the same vessel meant that those vessels could go in close to a bank while a traditional vessel could not manouvre with the same dexterity and possibly lose its optimum firing position.
Even though Lake Eyre etc were brown water wars (with green water weather conditions) they showed what was coming. Look at the US Canada war of 1812 and events on Lake Eyre. If those ships had been monitors then the outcomes would have dictated some different outcomes. Whoever owned Lake Eyre dictated invasion and engagement points.
HMS Dreadnaught.
It was about uniform yield of throw and speed, their were heavier gunned ships to compete, but none had the same turret placement, absolute weapons to bear uniform weight yield advantage and speed. Dreadnought literally turned near peer navies obsolete to the point where a number of navies terminated ship constrcution to revisit design. Gt Britain completely dislocated the power of all her competitors "overnight"
HMS Argus and USS Langley
They were advanced enough for smaller navies to understand that the carrier could take away the absolute advantage of heavy gunned ships. eg both the US and Japan understood that concept, the advocates within their navies fully grasped what Mitchell achieved against McArthur in the 1920's-1930's trials
Again, it was a sea change in conops impact.. Remember that in the 20's both the US and Japan regarded the UK as a threat to their presence due to undue influence heavily underlined by sea power. Gt Britain was Japans baseline reference model and stayed very close to RN developments from 1898 through to the late 30's. The US was slower off the mark due to tribal wars between the USN and USAAC about the effectivess of battleships, vs bombers, vs carriers (which they didn't understand properly even straight after Mitchells demonstration of capability). Ironically for Gt Britain, the US, even with its service tribal wars understood the impact of carrier air much faster than the RN did. The Japanese saw it straight away
USS Long Beach.
Nuclear power, the first non carrier iteration of primitive phased array (albeit clunky and energy hungry tubes). It was her impact as a companion system that had the most impact even though the idea was shelved within a generation
Enterprise, Long Beach, Truxton and Bainbridge spooked other navies as at a combat level the USN could literally field a fuel independant force and fight wherever she wanted without having to have RAS. The nuke carrier double dutied as RAS. A literal independance of action and force delivery. A GM nuke cruiser was a serious contender, and her array was an unknown quantity but immediately implied hemispherical detection and immediacy of detection. The fact that Enterprise and Long Beach were both fielding primitive array systems did cause some concern.
