F-35 Multirole Joint Strike Fighter

[Todjaeger]

There are already a few foreign force planners who see LnnD as CVL's

Not that I wish to re-open that particular discussion, but there are quite a few fanboi's out there who also seem to see LnnD = CVL...

Now, could the USMC switch to fast jet ops which are solely CTOL? I would have to say, "yes." The USMC already operates Hornets. What people would need to consider, and this really IMO strays OT, is just what changes to USMC CONOPS and OrBat would cancellation of the F-35B trigger. Expanding that out further, what would the implications really be for US defence posture OrBat.

-Cheers

 

[wormhole]

I
The USMC concept now is to build 12 pocket carriers like the America class, a modified America class with an angled deck and EMALS to launch/retrieve USMC F35C aircraft will still give the USMC TacAir if and when required, I think that a STOVL aircraft has its place within the CONOPS of the USMC, but if the project is cancelled it will not be the end of USMC TacAir just a revision on how that capability can be maintained. A pocket carrier for the USMC would still be a more than a match for most interventions with a typical air wing of 12 F35C, 8 Viper gunships, 4 CH-53K, 4 MH-60S, 10 V22 Osprey plus a fighting force of about 1600 Marine’s on board.

Looks more like the ship the RN needs; it makes more sense than a hybrid out of the Queen Elizabeth carriers and their shrinking airwings.

The F-35C the USMC is acquiring will fly off CVNs equipped with catapults (EMALS or conventional steam-powered variety). I'm pretty sure EMALs won't be a feature on the USS America-class fleet so the F-35B is the only game in town once the Harriers retire.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

the problem with using the F-35B as a ground attack unit is that it simply doesn't have the loiter time. With the STOVL configuration, it sacrifices the fuel which is needed to sustain vertical thrust or even fly a few extra circles around the combat zone.

This isn't even remotely true. On internal fuel and with a STOVL takeoff and landing a F-35B can still stay in the air for three hours. It can loiter better than EVERY aircraft the USMC currently has in its inventory, STOVL and CTOL.

There are four little pieces of metal in the engine system of a F-35B that are not up to scratch. These widgets are being replaced and the cause of the two year rectification/probation program. This is hardly a reason to start demanding the USN and USMC give up STOVL operations and integral TACAIR in MEUs.

 

[Volkodav]

There are already a few foreign force planners who see LnnD as CVL's

Not suggesting the LnnDs be used as CVLs, rather that if there is no F-35B that the various Lnns (e.g. the San Antonios) could be progressively replaced with ships of a through deck design, getting rid of the Wasp sized ships all together. If you have no need to fly Harriers / Lightnings off your deck it can be smaller.

 

[ADMk2]

well, in the Afghanistan Theater of Operations, there aren't exactly tanks, or vehicles, or armored, hardened buildings to destroy.

as proved in Tora Bora. Bombing isn't really effective in asymmetrical warfare. Precision munitions or AGMs are useful for targeting buildings or residences, but useless when it comes to real time air support. I maintain that a heavy MG and unguided rocket/flechette pod would be more useful than a PGB in a thick firefight.

You can maintain all you like, but Paveway II/III/IV, JDAM, AASM, and Hellfire/Brimstone weapons are the predominant air to ground weapons of choice in every major conflict since the Gulf War for a REASON, including and especially in CAS missions.

You'd really fire unguided munitions in a "danger close" situation would you? Then please don't offer to provide support to Australian troops.

Ever.

We've seen enough come home in body bags. We don't need to add fratricide to the list of ways our boys have been killed...

 

[t68]

The F-35C the USMC is acquiring will fly off CVNs equipped with catapults (EMALS or conventional steam-powered variety). I'm pretty sure EMALs won't be a feature on the USS America-class fleet so the F-35B is the only game in town once the Harriers retire.

That’s true at this stage USMC F35C Squadrons will integrate aboard USN carriers, but we are talking about the possibility IF the F35B is cancelled for whatever reason be it budgetary pressure or problems with the aircraft itself and the USMC want to keep TacAir within there own sphere of influence aboard the amphibious ships, then other mean will have to be sort.

There are 12 planned ships proposed to be built for amphibious fixed wing air support no well dock with LHA-6 under construction, it is not unheard of for a straight deck design to be altered into an angled deck design, with the USS Midway, HMAS Melbourne either changed whist under construction or as a upgrade modernisation program.

EMALS can be accommodated aboard a modified America class as it use the ships own electrical power, has a lesser space loss compared to a steam catapult weight of the system is less and predicted to require less maintenance and manpower to operate.

 

[ADMk2]

The F-35B is going to impact the Marines far greater than the EFV ever would. Air support/superiority/dominance is that critical. The Corps will still be getting a new cheaper water taxi to get the job done and the CONOPs really hasn't been afffected that much.. they'll just launch a bit closer to shore I believe.

You missed the point there. USMC argued every bit as vociferously for EFV as they have for F-35B, but they didn't get their own way anyway. A lack of funding and massive cost and schedule over-runs meant they didn't get their own way despite the program previously being considered "essential"...

You task the Marines to do a job and they come up with their vision of how they want to fight the coming wars, not how they were fought even in the recent past. The threat is changing and the Corps has thought long and hard how they can get best get the job done with least cost of lives and treasure. That vision is built around the F-35B. What really is the cost differential between buyng the C and the B in the first place? If you're going to give the USMC TacAir, why not give them what they want? Its their lives at risk. Its tyhey who'll get the blame if body bags start piling up. They've learned the some hard lessons along the way. I don't get that compromise deal with the Navy to buy both the C and the B for the Marines..purely a political maneuver to finally get the Navy to stop pushing for an All-F-35C fleet.

No it's because USMC are required to provide aircraft squadrons to fill carrier slots because the USN doesn't have the financial resources to fill all the slots themselves and F-35B's can't fly from CVN's...

The Need for a Reinvigorated “Revolt of the Admirals” | SLDInfo

Joint isn’t always the answer…

Despite the great successes over the years inside of the Joint arena, there are still many challenges that loom in combat operations despite the overwhelming technological advantage that our services hold. This becomes particularly acute as we begin to examine our current and future operational capabilities in the light of service doctrinal roles.

The Marine Corps, as an example, is now actively moving toward reestablishing its amphibious and expeditionary roots aboard naval shipping. When embarked, and furthermore when employed across the spectrum of operations, what has typically been readily available in terms of Joint fire support over the last decade—as an example—will no longer be readily available. The service, then, has to be prepared to address that and other capability shortfalls as part of its doctrinal responsibilities when embarked aboard the Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG).

It is this particular operational shortfall, which has driven the Marine Corps to define a requirement for the F-35B. In addition to that particular niche, however, the F-35B is capable of not only providing V/STOL Close Air Support (CAS) like its predecessor the AV-8 Harrier, but through the benefits of technological innovation, also provides enhanced force protection through kinetic and non-kinetic fires, provides Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities to support the MAGTF in all phases of operations, as well as providing a critical enabler for the command and control at sea or ashore.

At the same time, it also brings the attributes of a 5th Generation Fighter along with it, which simultaneously enhances the force protection umbrella for the ARG. Despite the fact that many would argue those capabilities are resident within the Joint Services as a whole, even when those capabilities are available for tasking, they may not present a solution that best serves the operational, tactical and environmental conditions on the ground.


Case and point: for the first time since Vietnam, a living Marine–Corporal Dakota Meyer–will receive the Medal of Honor for his actions in Afghanistan in September, 2009. Corporal Meyer bravely raced into the kill zone of a firefight in the Ganjgal Valley to retrieve the bodies of three Marines and a Navy Corpsman who were killed by enemy fire.

While the award is a celebration of Corporal Meyer’s ultimate bravery, what will not be listed on his Summary of Action are many of the external conditions that led to his bravery in the first place; much of which was the result of a glaringly tragic operational shortfall. In the executive summary of the investigation into the incident in the Ganjgal Valley in Afghanistan on 8 September 2009[1], it was clearly noted that Joint fire support was available within the Coalition Joint Task Force (CJTF-82) during the operation, but “Timely aviation and indirect fire support were not provided.” The report also goes on to state that repeated requests for the Quick Response Force (QRF) were not supported, and that a lack of situational awareness, decisive action and a sister services “…lack of commitment to support partner units with the same focus and emphasis as organic units” contributed to the operational failure.

While it is not my intent to minimize this tragedy to just a few sound bites or to commercialize the loss of lives, what is clear is that the Joint fire support system broke down enough to contribute to the death of three Marines, a Navy Corpsman and an Army soldier—along with several coalition Afghan Soldiers—due to lack of dedicated, responsive fire support that could have reacted when they needed it most.

An organic, USMC F-35B in the mix could have made a significant—if not life saving—difference in terms of building situational awareness for the ground force and the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) before, during and after the attack. The F-35B could also have supported through decisive action and the delivery of kinetic and non-kinetic fires, or by providing multi-spectral support prior to the operation to inhibit or deter the enemy’s desires to do harm in the objective area prior to the coalition troops ever arriving. Want to know why the Marines want and need the F-35B? Look no further than the loss of life in Ganjgal Valley.

So let me get this right, if only USMC STOVL capable fixed wing assets had been operating from conventional runways in Afghanistan, in support of non-USMC operations, such a tragedy could have been averted?

Aha...

Erm, why exactly would a -B model have been any better at such a role than a -C model?

It wouldn't. In fact the -C model would have been the far solution in this instance with better payload and loiter capabilities and the same sensor and SA capabilities...

Can't help but view this as General's simply wanting their toys and being unwilling to give them up, if this is the best scenario they can provide to support the acquisition of the -B model...

 

[gf0012-aust]

as proved in Tora Bora. Bombing isn't really effective in asymmetrical warfare. Precision munitions or AGMs are useful for targeting buildings or residences, but useless when it comes to real time air support. I maintain that a heavy MG and unguided rocket/flechette pod would be more useful than a PGB in a thick firefight.

sorry, that bit in bold green is absolute crap - and we know its aboslute crap because of the CAS we currently receive in theatre from high altitude assets using PGMs - and often at DC levels - especially in Afghanistan, where the single seaters and helos don't have the persistence, and cannot go deep to assist, and in single seater events, they often are pass limited. The heavies go deep, have persistence, and are repeaters. Helos and fighters can't and don't have this ability, and are vulnerable in some of the geographics. Forces that are base bound can benefit from proximity support, but the long range teams need and expect (and get) more.

B-52's and B1's have been dropping PGM's DC to friendly forces - the JTACs have the confidence and authority to call them in because of those PGMs, they would not have the same level of confidence in calling in unguided munitions in those circumstances.

we know from real world experience that the JTACs will not be calling in unguided ord near friendlies

I suggest that you actually speak to someone who does this for a job..

 

[old faithful]

well, in the Afghanistan Theater of Operations, there aren't exactly tanks, or vehicles, or armored, hardened buildings to destroy.

as proved in Tora Bora. Bombing isn't really effective in asymmetrical warfare. Precision munitions or AGMs are useful for targeting buildings or residences, but useless when it comes to real time air support. I maintain that a heavy MG and unguided rocket/flechette pod would be more useful than a PGB in a thick firefight.

useless in real time air support?
I dont understand your point.
Im a soldier on the ground. I call in air support. Do I want rockets sprayed at/near the target, or a 2000lber dropped on the target that I designate. I dont need a pilot trying to interperate a target that I am trying to describe under fire/stress. I want him to absolutley stuff it, and Ill even point it out to his bomb for him, all he has to do, is get it there. Useless, I dont think so.

 

[t68]

Do the heavies drop the entire load at once or can they drop part loads and go around to make another strike at a different loc?

 

[gf0012-aust]

Do the heavies drop the entire load at once or can they drop part loads and go around to make another strike at a different loc?

they can cash and carry, eg a little bit here, a little bit there etc... they have a a large load and they can do discretionary drops because they also have persistence (and obviously projection)

SHornets have often only been able to do one pass. Tankers can give them range, but they don't have release flexibility. Guns have been a limited benefit and are imprecise when compared to PGM's

 

[GelbOne]

oh please,

don't think I'm stupid.
I never suggested using rockets in danger-close scenarios. I understand the dangers of using unguided systems with friendlies near. what I meant by the use of unguided rocket munitions was that they should be expended against hostiles who have been scouted by ground forces previously.
Say this happens:
a recon team with a laser designator finds a target, which they light up.
an AH-64 comes in, locates the target via TADS, and engages with rockets.

plus, in a danger-close scenario, the Apache can circle around the target and provide precise support with it's MG, while the F-35 can fly in, drop bombs, and speed away.

If you're a soldier on the ground, would you rather have consistent firepower (albeit of less magnitude), directed by yourself which can loiter in the combat radius, or bombs and missiles which wreak havok on the enemy for a couple of minutes (if they hit) and then disappear to refuel/reload.

even the A-10 seems like a more sensible choice than the F-35 for an asymmetrical combat role.

 

[old faithful]

yep the A10 is awsome, and appriciated in the Stan at the moment with its loiter cap. (by Aust especially).
But dont forget that there have been some awfull stuff ups using fire support from the air to. Having a Apache brass up friendlies can be avoided by PGM's by fast movers. Ask the Brits.
I was just replying to your next to useless comment, and I dont agree. PGM's are extremly useful.

 

[Todjaeger]

oh please,

don't think I'm stupid.
I never suggested using rockets in danger-close scenarios. I understand the dangers of using unguided systems with friendlies near. what I meant by the use of unguided rocket munitions was that they should be expended against hostiles who have been scouted by ground forces previously.
Say this happens:
a recon team with a laser designator finds a target, which they light up.
an AH-64 comes in, locates the target via TADS, and engages with rockets.

plus, in a danger-close scenario, the Apache can circle around the target and provide precise support with it's MG, while the F-35 can fly in, drop bombs, and speed away.

If you're a soldier on the ground, would you rather have consistent firepower (albeit of less magnitude), directed by yourself which can loiter in the combat radius, or bombs and missiles which wreak havok on the enemy for a couple of minutes (if they hit) and then disappear to refuel/reload.

even the A-10 seems like a more sensible choice than the F-35 for an asymmetrical combat role.

You are aware that there has been work done to develope a guided version of the venerable FFAR, right? That would strongly suggest that the performance of unguided rockets still manages to leave something to be desired. As a close range, area saturation/suppression weapon, they are fine. That does not mean they can can/would guarantee a given target's destruction. Same with the cannon, useful, and properly aimed can be deadly, but not on the same scale as a SDB, AGM-65 Maverick or similar.

Now, for the 'if they hit' remark... Given the systems integration and development work being done on the F-35, there is the distinct possibility that in addition to being able to operate at ~20,000 ft to remain above 'trashfire', an F-35 could act as a harvester. What this means is that unlike your example given of ground forces locating a target on the ground and calling in air support to strike it, the F-35 could detect ground targets and then que weapons on them, while advising friendly ground forces of red force locations and dispositions.

Now, as a response to the question of what troops on the ground would rather have... I rather suspect what they would prefer is CAS when they need it, where they need it. Given the flight endurance goal set for the F-35, plus the available internal and external warloads, as well as the expected accuracy of F-35 deployed PGM's, I suspect that the F-35 would be amongst the preferred CAS aircraft amongst the troops once in service.

-Cheers

 

[GelbOne]

You are aware that there has been work done to develope a guided version of the venerable FFAR, right? That would strongly suggest that the performance of unguided rockets still manages to leave something to be desired. As a close range, area saturation/suppression weapon, they are fine. That does not mean they can can/would guarantee a given target's destruction. Same with the cannon, useful, and properly aimed can be deadly, but not on the same scale as a SDB, AGM-65 Maverick or similar.

Now, for the 'if they hit' remark... Given the systems integration and development work being done on the F-35, there is the distinct possibility that in addition to being able to operate at ~20,000 ft to remain above 'trashfire', an F-35 could act as a harvester. What this means is that unlike your example given of ground forces locating a target on the ground and calling in air support to strike it, the F-35 could detect ground targets and then que weapons on them, while advising friendly ground forces of red force locations and dispositions.

Now, as a response to the question of what troops on the ground would rather have... I rather suspect what they would prefer is CAS when they need it, where they need it. Given the flight endurance goal set for the F-35, plus the available internal and external warloads, as well as the expected accuracy of F-35 deployed PGM's, I suspect that the F-35 would be amongst the preferred CAS aircraft amongst the troops once in service.

-Cheers

please clear this issue up for me, because I readily admit that I don't know this:

if the Taliban and Al Qaeda forces use foot mobiles as their primary type of ground unit, then how would the F-35 even identify targets? If it can't identify foot mobiles, then its PGM stocks are next-to-useless, right?
the reason I think a MG turret makes sense is that the aircraft uses a handful of bullets against each enemy soldier, while using a PGM is just wasteful. Plus, since a lot of Afghanistan is rocky mountainous terrain, the Talib fighters are spread evenly through the mountains, so one PGB (unless on a command post or firing position) would be useless against dispersed infantry.

BTW, when I mentioned unguided rockets, I was trying to apply the venerable concept of KISS (Keep it Simple, Stupid). the Rockets can be used against CPs or firing positions or vehicles, and the MG can be used against foot mobiles.
thus, in one vehicle, both of the major enemy opposition points are covered.

don't get me wrong, I'm not trying to be snide or sassy or anything, I just want to know why my reasoning is wrong, that's all.

 

[gf0012-aust]

oh please,

don't think I'm stupid.

I suggest that you go back and look at the way you present your discussions, as they obviously need context - if you aren't precise then people who do work with these systems and who do have a deeper understanding are going to move very quickly to correct things in case people get the wrong impression. CAS is one of those subjects where people seem to have a spectacular lack of awareness about how much its changed in the last 3-4 years

I never suggested using rockets in danger-close scenarios. I understand the dangers of using unguided systems with friendlies near. what I meant by the use of unguided rocket munitions was that they should be expended against hostiles who have been scouted by ground forces previously.

Look at what people have specifically responded to - theres not much room for confusion in the way that you've stated the claim about what the warfighters want - and what I am others are telling you is that this is patently not so - and we have provided context as to why.

Say this happens:
a recon team with a laser designator finds a target, which they light up.
an AH-64 comes in, locates the target via TADS, and engages with rockets.

Its about context, its about force separation. Thats what determines what weapons can be used safely. Thats why we do vignettes based on safety critical assessments (as part of the engineering accreditation process) The JTAC makes the call. The pilot is owned by the JTAC

plus, in a danger-close scenario, the Apache can circle around the target and provide precise support with it's MG, while the F-35 can fly in, drop bombs, and speed away.

Thats not how CAS works, there is a platform separation issue, fighters aren't going in unless they have clear space, rotaries are not going to be playing the same space - esp at a gun range level. Air control is tightly managed and no JTAC is going to mix and match air capability where those platforms are also using disparate weapons sets.

If you're a soldier on the ground, would you rather have consistent firepower (albeit of less magnitude), directed by yourself which can loiter in the combat radius, or bombs and missiles which wreak havok on the enemy for a couple of minutes (if they hit) and then disappear to refuel/reload.

that would be why the warfighters prefer the heavies, as repeatedly explained prev.
you seem to have a fundamental misunderstanding of what local aircraft can do in the mission delivery cycle - its why the fighters can only often do one pass runs, they don't have the endurance and the tankers are not always available. Again, this is specifically so in Afghanistan

you also don't seem to be aware of the economy of effort and efficiency of how an SDB can kill a target with precision at range - and in a heavy they're carrying the equiv and often in excess of a full squadron of fighters warload

Fighters are there (literally) for minutes, helos longer (depending on how deep the fight is as both are range and thus persistence limited). Heavies don't have that limitation and time and time again, in real life are doing the CAS job that was previously thought to be the province of the short lifters.

CAS is a capability, not a platform, and it's about flexibility of delivery of weapons coupled with persistence and projection.

Ask the warfighter whether he wants sustained presence and delivery or a 1 minute pass - esp when the 1 minute pass is not a repeater. All the evidence shows that sustained persistent CAS on time and when needed is what they want. JTACs know that the heavies are on station and literally minutes away, everything else is literally in 10's of minutes -and the immediacy is just not there. You might not think that 10-20 minutes is a big deal - speak to anyone who's been on the job and under sustained contact and you'll get a very different view

even the A-10 seems like a more sensible choice than the F-35 for an asymmetrical combat role.

In context that may well be so, and it also applies in reverse. It would be interesting to know how you think the A-10's could have helped out on deep support in afghanistam - quite clearly the majority of long range CAS support is not A-10 territory. You need to consider the CONOPS and the logistics when making such claims.

The CAS planning cycle is a bit more complex than what you're portraying.

Believe it or not, the people replying to your posts are trying to assist by adding context and by providing comment garnered by experience, you do need to pause and understand the message and intent.

"Throw away" claims that are platform centric are going to be short lived on here....

 

[Ozzy Blizzard]

if the Taliban and Al Qaeda forces use foot mobiles as their primary type of ground unit, then how would the F-35 even identify targets?

EOTS, & i have no idea as to the exact resolution of the AN/APG-81's SAR modes but from what I've seen i wouldn't be surprised if it couldn't distinguish a human sized target.

Anyway warfare doesn't occur in a vacuum. It isn't just one fighter looking for one guy, out there in the desert. Any army operates in units, with supporting elements. Those units come into contact with opfor units which have their own supporting elements. In Afghanistan you are talking multiple, sophisticated ISTAR assets in the battle space plus the unit which actually called for support. We aren't talking interdiction here we are talking CAS.

If it can't identify foot mobiles, then its PGM stocks are next-to-useless, right?

No. AFAIK that's not how CAS works, especially in Afghanistan. Fighting in a semi built up environment, which often happens in Afghanistan IIRC, targets are usually buildings or firing positions, not individual people. Once a firing position is identified geographically then the position is addressed with indirect fires. If said fire is a PGM the CEP is small and thus so is the risk to blue and collateral, yet the PK is high. The thing about fighting light infantry in rural villages or an open environment is they aren't very mobile, and once fixed in a firefight don't really need to be individually ID'ed to be engaged. Therefore PGM's are ace.

In any case, the platform isn't the only sensor in the battlespace.

the reason I think a MG turret makes sense is that the aircraft uses a handful of bullets against each enemy soldier, while using a PGM is just wasteful.

You assume that you are always going to see clearly identifiable targets out in the open. Again I'm not sure how much that happens on the ground.

Plus, since a lot of Afghanistan is rocky mountainous terrain, the Talib fighters are spread evenly through the mountains, so one PGB (unless on a command post or firing position) would be useless against dispersed infantry.

Wow, what a massive generalization and a simplification all rolled into one.

1) Yes allot of Afghanistan is rocky and mountainous. But all the people and built up rural areas (you know, the area the Taliban is attempting to dominate) are in the valleys. A LOT of fighting has occurred in these areas AFAIK, which is why the US wanted to move away from relying too heavily on indirect fires during the 'surge' i.e. too much collateral effecting support for the local government. If all the fighting was up in the mountains away from the villages why would they bother? In fact, why would the Taliban even be an issue?

2) Why are all these Taliban so dispersed? If they are just spread 'evenly' throughout the countryside why are they a problem? Why are they causing casualties? Why are ground forces even having to fight anyone more than a lone guy with a rusty old AK? Why? Because the Taliban aren't useless. As I said before any army operates in an organized manner. These organizations of individual people are refereed to as a unit. A unit fights together to achieve mass. A unit is, thus, not dispersed. It is concentrated. A 2000lb JDAM has a fragmentation range of 3000ft, a blast shrapnel range of 1200ft, a minimum safety range of 400 meters (meaning 50% of exposed persons will die) and a lethal blast radius of 110 feet (meaning 100% of persons within this range will die regardless or reasonable cover). How dispersed are these guys again?

BTW, when I mentioned unguided rockets, I was trying to apply the venerable concept of KISS (Keep it Simple, Stupid). the Rockets can be used against CPs or firing positions or vehicles, and the MG can be used against foot mobiles.
thus, in one vehicle, both of the major enemy opposition points are covered.

I don't think anyone is claiming Attack helo's don't have their place, but AFAIK they have projection and persistence issues.

 

[wormhole]

You missed the point there. USMC argued every bit as vociferously for EFV as they have for F-35B, but they didn't get their own way anyway. A lack of funding and massive cost and schedule over-runs meant they didn't get their own way despite the program previously being considered "essential"...
They didn'r "get their own way" because it was the USMC Commandant who pulled the plug on the troubled program. I give him credit for that. I don't see the Corps pulling the plug on the F-35B.


No it's because USMC are required to provide aircraft squadrons to fill carrier slots because the USN doesn't have the financial resources to fill all the slots themselves and F-35B's can't fly from CVN's...

Oh they can fly from CVNs all right though not using the catapult and they will require some changes in flight deck procedures to accommodate them. As to filling USN slots, yeah I know and its internal politics within the Dept. of the Navy. That's life.


So let me get this right, if only USMC STOVL capable fixed wing assets had been operating from conventional runways in Afghanistan, in support of non-USMC operations, such a tragedy could have been averted?

Aha...

Erm, why exactly would a -B model have been any better at such a role than a -C model?

It wouldn't. In fact the -C model would have been the far solution in this instance with better payload and loiter capabilities and the same sensor and SA capabilities...

Can't help but view this as General's simply wanting their toys and being unwilling to give them up, if this is the best scenario they can provide to support the acquisition of the -B model...

The incident begs the questioin where was USAF TACAIR support. Where was USN TACAIR? Probably they were busy somewhere else doing important stuff no doubt but unavailable to help when needed. It seems to be more a point of Marines depending on Marines no matter what vs. the possibility of things falling in between the cracks as the article seemed to imply. Anyway, IF a F-35B was available, it would PROBABLY have been operating from an austere forward air base closer to the action. This would MOST :LIKELY allow for a more timely response. AT least thats the logic I understand the Marines follow.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

The incident begs the questioin where was USAF TACAIR support. Where was USN TACAIR? Probably they were busy somewhere else doing important stuff no doubt but unavailable to help when needed. It seems to be more a point of Marines depending on Marines no matter what vs. the possibility of things falling in between the cracks as the article seemed to imply. Anyway, IF a F-35B was available, it would PROBABLY have been operating from an austere forward air base closer to the action. This would MOST :LIKELY allow for a more timely response. AT least thats the logic I understand the Marines follow.

Marine aviation has the task of providing air support to marine ground forces. The same as US Army aviation and part of USAF provide air support to US Army ground forces. US Navy aviation is tasked with fighting the sea battle much like the balance of USAF (that not supporting the US Army’s land battle) fights the air battle.

From time to time with the joint nature of warfare and the lack of air and sea threats in current campaigns various TACAIR units may be providing air support to various ground forces. But the reason these particular air forces exist is to fight their particular types of battles.

When it comes to marine aviation the nature of their tasking is air support to the land battle of an expeditionary and amphibious nature. This means they are far more likely to have to build their own air bases and have less logistics support and so on compared to USAF elements providing support to US Army land battles. So in this situation things like STOVL provide significant operational and strategic benefits by reducing the demands on airfield engineering to bring TACAIR into the battlefield. The tactical considerations of proximity to the battlefield are secondary compared to actually being able to establish a TACAIR capability.

 

[GelbOne]

I see.
I think I understand now. these platforms are used in conjunction with one another, so that the massive, precise firepower of the JSF can be utilized along with the persistence of the AH-64, and thus cater to the needs of ground units.

thanks for clearing this confusion up for me!