T-90 in Comparison to Western Armour

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The Nakhidka IR and radar protection screen reduces radar signature by a factor of 6 and IR signature by a significant amount as well.
Its purpose is to make the tank invisible at extended ranges so while the T-90s thermal sight will allow the T-90 commander to clearly see an Abrams at ranges in excess of 7km, the Abrams commander will have a much greater problem of seeing the T-90 due to the IR screening.

http://i44.servimg.com/u/f44/15/54/62/79/d-90do10.jpg

Similar systems are available on the free market (like the Swedish Barracuda) and are in use on several AFVs.

Such a system is not incremental to an AFV. They can be integrated into every AFV out there so it is not a specific performance advantage of a single AFV but an option for everyone.

Such gadgets are only interesting for performance comparisons when they are only available for a specific vehicle or if the design features of a vehicle hinder an implemention.
That is true, but from what I have read the Russian upgraded tanks are going to be fitted with everything that works including ARENA etc so there is a high chance they will be fitted with Nakidka as well.

US tanks on the other hand are not assured of getting such things applied to them any time soon because most of their potential enemies don't have thermal sights anyway.
 
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Waylander

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
Similar systems are available on the free market (like the Swedish Barracuda) and are in use on several AFVs.

Such a system is not incremental to an AFV. They can be integrated into every AFV out there so it is not a specific performance advantage of a single AFV but an option for everyone.

Such gadgets are only interesting for performance comparisons when they are only available for a specific vehicle or if the design features of a vehicle hinder an implemention.
 

Berkut

New Member
Can anyone tell me if the T80 series is still in production? I know it is still listed as a For Sale item. I am unsure as to if it has seen ongoing development and successfull sales like its cousin the T90.
 

Waylander

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
In the big picture the US is so overhelmingly in front of everybody else that reducing the IR/radar signature of individual tanks is not going to change much.
Especially their highly networked force structure is impressive. A modern US heavy division tied into their force structure is really impressive when it comes to punch, agility, reconaissance and responsiveness. So the individual system has less impact on the capability of such a heavy division than with a force which can hardly employ combined arms tactics let alone the sort of networked sea/air/land-battle the US can (I am not referring to Russia here!).

And the Barracuda may very well suffer a little bit from NIH-syndrome.
 
Similar systems are available on the free market (like the Swedish Barracuda) and are in use on several AFVs.

Such a system is not incremental to an AFV. They can be integrated into every AFV out there so it is not a specific performance advantage of a single AFV but an option for everyone.

Such gadgets are only interesting for performance comparisons when they are only available for a specific vehicle or if the design features of a vehicle hinder an implemention.
That is true only in a very partial way. Let put the facts straight
1) The corrispective of Nakidka (also if in reality talk of a real corrispective would be technically incorrect)is SAAB MCS - Mobile Camouflage System - ; this product at contrary of,at example,ULCAS - Ultra Lightweight Camouflage Screen - from the same company (a corrispective of the Russian Volchitsa-KR camonet) is not a single polymer layer with multispectral capabilities but offer different layers customizable by the operators for a particular purpose

From the site of its producer SAAB :"Saab Barracuda’s Mobile Camouflage System (MCS) is intended primarily for protection of vehicles while moving and during combat. The Mobile Camouflage System is a flexible solution that can be applied in a number of configurations using different types of materials."
and "The Mobile Camouflage System (MCS) provides protection to vehicles while moving and during combat. Available in a range of different versions, the system is composed by a combination of camouflage materials with signature adaptation properties such as visual and near-infrared protection, thermal protection and radar protection."

SAAB MCS has of course also its advantages in respect to Nakidka ,at example, it is significantly more light ,it is cheaper, adaptable at the shape of the intended vehicle and mantain the typical blending surface of common camo-net ,adaptable to different environments, but it is a product in a completely different category in respect to Nakidka , the level of complexity of which render the product of NII Stali a true unique product, with no real equivalent at today woldwide (we must in fact remember that NII Stali has proudly publicized the outstanding capabilities offered by the export version of Nakidka , sure that no other producer at world could have claimed for a contemporary system ,parameter-vs-parameter, equal or better figures ...and that revealed itself true up to today ,SAAB included....)

That is a video of the same NII Stali explaining the characteristics of the material composing Nakidka and its operational impact
Note : Is not the radar signature of the protected vehicle, but the radar tracking range at being reduced to 1/6 .


[nomedia="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pYpwPx--exs"]РПМ Ðакидка - YouTube[/nomedia]
 
In the big picture the US is so overhelmingly in front of everybody else that reducing the IR/radar signature of individual tanks is not going to change much.
Especially their highly networked force structure is impressive. A modern US heavy division tied into their force structure is really impressive when it comes to punch, agility, reconaissance and responsiveness. So the individual system has less impact on the capability of such a heavy division than with a force which can hardly employ combined arms tactics let alone the sort of networked sea/air/land-battle the US can (I am not referring to Russia here!).

And the Barracuda may very well suffer a little bit from NIH-syndrome.
f you have read Net Working Warfare by David S. Alberts, Frederick P.Stain and John J. Garstka ,or other publiation ,in particular on the sensor network in tracking and surveillance operations, you will realize that obviously net working warfare, like any concept in this world, don't contain only positive trends and potentials, but also evident lackings leading to points of breacking of its same constituent structure.

One of those weak points is just related to surveillance and tracking sensor network, the information's chain linked to it and the strategic and the tactical actions triggered ,at an unified level, by that same data flow; one of the most fearful point of breacking in NWW is just that any system technically capable to neutralize or interfere with the main elements in tracking sensor network, cause effectively the whole net worked structure to act as a potent catalyst of completely wronged proactive or reactive actions, that potentially destructive sequence’s cascade in the force command structure is ,obviously ,enormously exacerbated in conflicts against enemies which have invested in systems enjoying "metric" or, for better say, extensive advantages (engagement envelop of missile, the off-road speed of an IFV, the time of reaction or number of target engageable in a time unit by a particular SAM, etc..etc...) offering hardware linear advantages not easily reducible .

To clarify even more what now expressed i will do some examples : Image an offensive/defensive operation where E-8 Joint STARS or an E-3 AWACS was scanning a particular sector ,now in a group of trees of this sector a Penela-1/2 ,under a Volchitsa-KR ,go active. The surveillance assets scan the sector providing the overall position of various enemy assets (a mobile command center, an advancing mechanized regiment, a pair of SAM launchers , sevral MRLS etc...),with the only particular that those informations has been selectively corrupted and twisted by the Pelena-1/2.
From this moment those wronged information begin to spread at enormous speed in the whole force structure quickly triggering an horrible ,almost instantaneous ,chain of wronged decisions and net worked reaction, the system, in brief, begin to act against itself !
Naturally an enemy enjoying hardware parametrical advantages against the correspondent systems of its enemy, can transform a similar situation from serious to deadly; an air attack against the MLRS artillery pieces tracked in a position ,and in reality at 50-60 km of distance, could cause the whole air group committed at the task to be washed-out by the SAM elements not tracked or tracked in completely different positions, the allied ground forces contestually retreated to prevent that them was engaged and destroyed by the enemy superior (both in range and fire power) MLRS ,could open a deadly corridor for the enemy ground divisions to exploit etc..etc... the possibilities are infinite.
In brief any enemy asset capable to act even only slightly and slowly in the mechanisms of the surveillance and tracking sensor network is very likely to produce exponentially greater and quicker negative effects in the whole chained structure of a networked force.

you can, at this point, easily realize how a system as Nakidka, at the exact contrary of what you had asserted, represent an example of those a crucial assets capable to produce disproportionate effect just against an enemy which have heavily pointed on situational awareness superiority and information data sharing/management superiority, (important also for compensate several metrical deficiencies ,on a one vs one basis , of its offensive/defensive systems against the corresponding of its main competitor).

A regiment of Iskander-M equipped with Nakidka not detected by a RQ-4 Global Hawk at useful range would lure the US command to order the quick coordinate transference to a “safe” airfield of bombers, fighter, AWACS ,EW aircraft and other assets for a planned air attack, obtaining instead ,as disastrous outcome, that in few minutes you would have that airfield literally reduced to a sprawl of smoking craters; with losses simply incalculable for your side and lacking any systems with the same kinematical qualities of that employed by your opponent you wouldn’t have any chance to respond.
A division of T-90 followed by a mechanized infantry with BMP-3M or “Smerch” MLRS equipped with Nakidka could effectively use the opponent’s dependency on shared tracking data and quick decision and reaction chain as a powerful weapon against them effectively engaging enemy forces perfectly coordinated for displace themselves, manoeuvre and concentring assets as the area was free of enemy presence; of course,the Nakidka-equipped elements could in this way also exploit at maximum the enormous difference in engagement envelop and fire power enjoyed over the enemy equivalent assets ,with fatal consequences for the opposing forces….. the examples possible are almost infinites.
When you think at a particular type of warfare concept ,you must image what would be the countermeasures adopted by high end enemies not immensely inferior ones, moreover while you cannot teach to your missile to go farther , to your aircraft to have a greater autonomy, to your air defence to engage more target contemporaneously etc…etc…the military forces of an advanced nation can, with very little modifications to operational process ,force structure or employment of the introduction of purposely designed system greatly influence the delicate system’s architecture at the basis of a force constructed around a Network Centric structure
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
A gentle reminder for those who are new.

There are members in here who have first hand experience and a working familiarity with weapons systems (and I use systems in a theatre force construct and force delivery fashion)

I would be incredibly cautious about lecturing people how weapons systems work - esp from a marketing and vendor perspective

There are enough defence professionals in here who have first hand experience in how the marketing and brochure claims mean squat - and more to the point, how the wonderful claims oft promoted on the internet are borderline rubbish.

and finally, quite a few people in here have first hand direct experience on dealing with notional "enemy" warfighting systems and operational constructs
 

Waylander

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
I never said that the trend for more network based command structures doesn't has it's drawbacks. The ability of guys thousands of km away to micromanage individual firefights is just one of them...

The increasing vulnerability against electronic warfare is one of them but it is also hardly new and the cold war has seen extensive preparations on both sides to disrupt and trick enemy electronic signals and emissions of all kinds.

But rattling down a number of possible scenarios how a highly networked high tech force may get it's head banged because of some innovative tactics and technologies doesn't alter the fact that modern forces gain alot by using all kinds of battlefield management systems and command and control networks in a flexible force structure. That Russia is trying to achieve this too with the introduction of new systems and force structures should show you alot.

Sure a war against a well trained and equipped foe may very well lead to some ugly surprises but this is war. Just because not everything may work as planned doesn't mean new technologies, tactics and force structures are not worth using them. And it's not as if well planned maskirovkas or tricky tactics didn't lure enemies into killzones before. This is not new.

Now back to Nakidka. I wouldn't believe too much in sales brochures from any company and country. Barracuda is reducing the signature of an AFV. How effective it really is is difficult to say as this is totally dependent on the environment and the stuff used to locate it. A 1st generation TI in a steaming jungle will be much more affected by it than a modern TI somewhere in Norway. Because of this i would be carefull about statements like reducing the radar signature by six times.

Fact is that Barracuda is available and in use with several AFVs. Nakidka may very well work a bit better but it will not be a fundamental advantage as it's basic features are not unique. Making a warwinning capability out of it reminds me too much of the hype around tube launched ATGMs.
 

Palnatoke

Banned Member
f you have read Net Working Warfare by David S. Alberts, Frederick P.Stain and John J. Garstka ,or other publiation ,in particular on the sensor network in tracking and surveillance operations, you will realize that obviously net working warfare, like any concept in this world, don't contain only positive trends and potentials, but also evident lackings leading to points of breacking of its same constituent structure.

One of those weak points is just related to surveillance and tracking sensor network, the information's chain linked to it and the strategic and the tactical actions triggered ,at an unified level, by that same data flow; one of the most fearful point of breacking in NWW is just that any system technically capable to neutralize or interfere with the main elements in tracking sensor network, cause effectively the whole net worked structure to act as a potent catalyst of completely wronged proactive or reactive actions, that potentially destructive sequence’s cascade in the force command structure is ,obviously ,enormously exacerbated in conflicts against enemies which have invested in systems enjoying "metric" or, for better say, extensive advantages (engagement envelop of missile, the off-road speed of an IFV, the time of reaction or number of target engageable in a time unit by a particular SAM, etc..etc...) offering hardware linear advantages not easily reducible .

To clarify even more what now expressed i will do some examples : Image an offensive/defensive operation where E-8 Joint STARS or an E-3 AWACS was scanning a particular sector ,now in a group of trees of this sector a Penela-1/2 ,under a Volchitsa-KR ,go active. The surveillance assets scan the sector providing the overall position of various enemy assets (a mobile command center, an advancing mechanized regiment, a pair of SAM launchers , sevral MRLS etc...),with the only particular that those informations has been selectively corrupted and twisted by the Pelena-1/2.
From this moment those wronged information begin to spread at enormous speed in the whole force structure quickly triggering an horrible ,almost instantaneous ,chain of wronged decisions and net worked reaction, the system, in brief, begin to act against itself !
Naturally an enemy enjoying hardware parametrical advantages against the correspondent systems of its enemy, can transform a similar situation from serious to deadly; an air attack against the MLRS artillery pieces tracked in a position ,and in reality at 50-60 km of distance, could cause the whole air group committed at the task to be washed-out by the SAM elements not tracked or tracked in completely different positions, the allied ground forces contestually retreated to prevent that them was engaged and destroyed by the enemy superior (both in range and fire power) MLRS ,could open a deadly corridor for the enemy ground divisions to exploit etc..etc... the possibilities are infinite.
In brief any enemy asset capable to act even only slightly and slowly in the mechanisms of the surveillance and tracking sensor network is very likely to produce exponentially greater and quicker negative effects in the whole chained structure of a networked force.

you can, at this point, easily realize how a system as Nakidka, at the exact contrary of what you had asserted, represent an example of those a crucial assets capable to produce disproportionate effect just against an enemy which have heavily pointed on situational awareness superiority and information data sharing/management superiority, (important also for compensate several metrical deficiencies ,on a one vs one basis , of its offensive/defensive systems against the corresponding of its main competitor).

A regiment of Iskander-M equipped with Nakidka not detected by a RQ-4 Global Hawk at useful range would lure the US command to order the quick coordinate transference to a “safe” airfield of bombers, fighter, AWACS ,EW aircraft and other assets for a planned air attack, obtaining instead ,as disastrous outcome, that in few minutes you would have that airfield literally reduced to a sprawl of smoking craters; with losses simply incalculable for your side and lacking any systems with the same kinematical qualities of that employed by your opponent you wouldn’t have any chance to respond.
A division of T-90 followed by a mechanized infantry with BMP-3M or “Smerch” MLRS equipped with Nakidka could effectively use the opponent’s dependency on shared tracking data and quick decision and reaction chain as a powerful weapon against them effectively engaging enemy forces perfectly coordinated for displace themselves, manoeuvre and concentring assets as the area was free of enemy presence; of course,the Nakidka-equipped elements could in this way also exploit at maximum the enormous difference in engagement envelop and fire power enjoyed over the enemy equivalent assets ,with fatal consequences for the opposing forces….. the examples possible are almost infinites.
When you think at a particular type of warfare concept ,you must image what would be the countermeasures adopted by high end enemies not immensely inferior ones, moreover while you cannot teach to your missile to go farther , to your aircraft to have a greater autonomy, to your air defence to engage more target contemporaneously etc…etc…the military forces of an advanced nation can, with very little modifications to operational process ,force structure or employment of the introduction of purposely designed system greatly influence the delicate system’s architecture at the basis of a force constructed around a Network Centric structure
"A regiment of Iskander-M equipped with Nakidka not detected by a RQ-4 Global Hawk at useful range would lure the US command to order the quick coordinate transference to a “safe” airfield of bombers, fighter, AWACS ,EW aircraft and other assets for a planned air attack"

Why?
What's compelling the US-forces to do so?
Like in chess, you can't assume that the enemy voluntarely will move in a manner suitable for you plan, you'll have to force him; to "dictate" him to move in a manner suitable for your plan.
 
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wormhole

New Member
Its safe to assume that data/intelligence would be streaming in from all sorts of sources that would be evaluated/discarded/refined/integrated to arrive at a reasonably level of SA. This would be going on 7 X 24. On top of that, the massive onboard computing ability of new platforms like Gen5 aircraft enable them perform real-time threat assessment.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
To quiet the fights, as it stands Nakidka is not in service with active units, and there aren't any publicly known plans to introduce it.

Ahmedfire what you're talking about would require that the Russian military have a decisive advantage in C4ISTAR from the tactical to the strategic level. This is simply not the case, which is what Waylander is trying to say. Russia is playing catch up, and Nakidka is one example of this. They are doing it rather well (all things considered) and certainly produce some individual platforms and pieces of equipment that are decisively superior to western analogues under certain real circumstances. However a thermal shroud, even if combined with proactive use of decoys, and aggressive EW, does not make a decisive difference when the disadvantage is so great.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Can anyone tell me if the T80 series is still in production? I know it is still listed as a For Sale item. I am unsure as to if it has seen ongoing development and successfull sales like its cousin the T90.
They are not in production, but significant stocks of T-80B, and some T-80U exist in Belarus, Russia, and possibly Ukraine. Russia also maintains a fleet of T-80BV and T-80U/UD/UM variants in service.
 
Now back to Nakidka. I wouldn't believe too much in sales brochures from any company and country. Barracuda is reducing the signature of an AFV. How effective it really is is difficult to say as this is totally dependent on the environment and the stuff used to locate it. A 1st generation TI in a steaming jungle will be much more affected by it than a modern TI somewhere in Norway. Because of this i would be carefull about statements like reducing the radar signature by six times.
NII Stali in reality has declared even more than the reduction of RCS of six times

The Company has in fact declared a reduction of the detection range of unities protected by Nakidka to 1/6 of the normal in a no jammed environment !!!
See at 5:40 of the video of NII Stali on Nakidka


[nomedia="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pYpwPx--exs"]РПМ Ðакидка - YouTube[/nomedia]


Naturally this ,like you well know,is not generated by the mere reduction of RCS or reradiating energy for a particular platform, but by the unique combination with the powerful synergetic effect generated by the ground clutter "inverted noise bell" effect ,which effectively ,for a slow moving ground vehicle multiply several times the effect achieved by any reduction or partial dispersion of radar energy in the radar reradiating cones (this component of ground clutter is also one of the factor leading to the detection of a tank target type by part of a particular radar at ranges being usually a fraction of that relative to an air target of similar overall RCS).


Fact is that Barracuda is available and in use with several AFVs. Nakidka may very well work a bit better but it will not be a fundamental advantage as it's basic features are not unique. Making a warwinning capability out of it reminds me too much of the hype around tube launched ATGMs
Remind to you the hype around tube alunched ATGM ? Very strange because to me the "hype" around tube launched ATGM, instead ,remind a whole western military scientifical community of the sector (naturally leaded,as always, by the Germans...) frantically attempting to produce theirs "by far most advanced MBT project" within 50 tons of weight ,with autoloader and ,above all,.....capable to gun fire long range ATGM (MBT-70) or the RAS -Risk Assessment Survey - of US DoD before Desert Storm which ,before decide if a ground operation was a suitable option, give as its first priority to assess if the.... 500 export "T-72-M".....had any operational TI sight and,above all, any capability to gun-fire ATGM , or the TERM project etc.... to me all that appear as the (failed) attempt to don't be forced ,in a very unlucky hypothesis, to fight in a battle as 73 Easting or ,even worse, a Soviet offensive in the Great European Plain, against enemy MBT engaging happily your Abrams MBT, Bradley AFV, M113 APC etc.. with salvo after salvo of AT-8/11 from 4-5 km of range without owning any weapon for respond .
But naturally the best way to loosen those deep concerns of the western experts's community of the sector is ....to be absolutely sure that those type of weaponries ,even in theirs most downgraded export version ,was not present in the arsenals of the infinitely inferior opponents which you selectively engage in your "power projection" military policy and instead engage with your M1 Abrams and Bradley in the iraqi desert only enormously scaled down T-72-M with a thin full steel armor,vastly downgraded FCS and tracking systems, equiped only with the full steel 3BM17 APFSDS with half propellant and uncapoable to employ any type of standoff gun fired ATGM and ,after the war, praise the miraculous advantages provided by networked information, situational awareness superiority and data sharing capabilities .
And that is a tactic which garantee a sure success :D


Why?
What's compelling the US-forces to do so?
Because,at example,that is exactly what US-Forces did in virtually any pasted conflict in the last 20 years?
I image that you have have read GWAPS and have realized as even only bring in a theatre (in this istance in the airfields offered to NATO forces by Saudi Arabia) the assets to even only prepare an air campaign against an enemy with a weak and largely outdated AD structure, is a critical process ,very very slow and during which your vulnerability to almost any type of enemy attack (except if you already own in the place and extensive,very strong IAD....pratically a non-existent istance for any Air Forces involved in any power projection mission around the world) is simply enormous ; so become a true strategic "dictat" attempt to complete those operations as quickly as possible capitalizing at maximum the flow of shared informations of the presence of enemy menaces coming from surveillance and tracking sensor network .
 

Waylander

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
We had this discussion about tube launched ATGMs carried not long ago, so I won't get into this again.

Is NII providing exact comparisons of Nakidka vs different kinds of Radars and TIs? That's where the problem is. Just like with the zillions of Air Force threads here generalisation is not possible with such a complex topic as detection of an AFV by a multidude of different systems.

As for network centric warfare. Do you think any other country could have pulled of the same like what the US did in the conventional phase of OIF? Their ability to effectively integrate their whole air, land and sea forces during this campaign shows how far away from the rest of the world they are.

And all these theories about some specific hypotetical situations always seem to assume that some clever tactics and technologies give the US a headache. But this is war and I doubt that military planners think that every country will be a pushover like Iraq. Some losses to the US doesn't make the other side win the war.


Not to talk of the fact that in all these scenarios the other side seems under no pressure by the US-NATO ability to disrupt and destroy their command, control and support infrastructure...

The US as well as the Russians were lured into more local defeats by the germans than one can count during WWII. Did this made them loose the war?
 

Berkut

New Member
They are not in production, but significant stocks of T-80B, and some T-80U exist in Belarus, Russia, and possibly Ukraine. Russia also maintains a fleet of T-80BV and T-80U/UD/UM variants in service.
So is the T84 the next development of the T80 series, or is this quite a new piece of kit?
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
So is the T84 the next development of the T80 series, or is this quite a new piece of kit?
Yes. It's development on the T-80UD by Ukraine. It is in "production". However to the best of my knowledge only batch production or LRIP. There are rumors of large orders from Bangladesh and Thailand, but I don't think production on any of those has started yet. The Ukranians themselves purchased iirc 10 of them, and Georgia ordered another 12.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Not to talk of the fact that in all these scenarios the other side seems under no pressure by the US-NATO ability to disrupt and destroy their command, control and support infrastructure...

The US as well as the Russians were lured into more local defeats by the germans than one can count during WWII. Did this made them loose the war?
What he describes is a level of information dominance via stealth of assets, and use of fake assets and misinformation that would allow the Russian military to effectively misdirect, and manipulate the actions of a hostile military, then utilize the created opening to destroy the enemy on an operational and operational-strategic level. While it is in theory possible, the level of superiority required simply does not exist.

This is, assuming, that I understand what he's trying to get at. I might be way off...
 

T.C.P

Well-Known Member
Yes. It's development on the T-80UD by Ukraine. It is in "production". However to the best of my knowledge only batch production or LRIP. There are rumors of large orders from Bangladesh and Thailand, but I don't think production on any of those has started yet. The Ukranians themselves purchased iirc 10 of them, and Georgia ordered another 12.
The Bangladesh army was considering the T-84, but after the MBT-2000 deal I think its after to say there will be no T-84s for us. Any more news on the supposed Thai order?(apologies in advance if this is too off topic)
 
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