Feanor,
Would appreciate if you would share your thoughts regarding these excerpts I have posted. Would you agree, as this writer is firmly convinced about, that Soviet philopshy in regards to the design ot MBTs was based on the ''hit avoidance'' principle? Sorry for the lenghty excerpts, as I felt that in order to give a true picture behind the writer analysis, it was needed to include them.
[1] ''the overall Soviet approach to MBT design in the post-World War II era was found to be flawed on two major counts: namely, the gamble on not being hit rather than on surviving hits, and the refusal to perceive survivability of the tank crew as a quite distinct issue from survivability of the vehicle, with the former having priority over the latter. ''
[2] ''When confronted with such ‘hard facts’ along with the Army’s criticisms about the lack of even a ‘decent’ hunter-killer fire-control system (when compared to the likes on board the AMX-40), members of the Soviet delegation were clearly red-faced and a depressed lot, and it took several bottles of vodka during and after dinner-time to come out with the truth: according to the MBT’s designers, the performance characteristics of all weapons produced in the USSR were dictated purely by the warfighting doctrine of the country’s armed forces. ''
[3] ''The T-90S was procured simply because the Arjun Mk1 wasn’t available when it should have been. What the fielding of the T-90AM proves is the following:
1) The Russians have FINALLY admitted to the fact that an ammo bustle located in the turret is better than the carousel-mounted bustle sitting on the floor of the hull--an admittance about which the Soviets and Russians were in denial since early 1991. Of course, the Ukrainians too had admitted and recognised the reality, but did so much earlier than the Russians.
2) Since the export market for high-end MBTs is extremely small and limited, the Russians have no choice but to implement and incorporate the MBT survivability features which are insisted upon by its principal MBT export customers, i.e. India.
3) Despite this belated upgrade, Russia’s chances of selling such MBTs to India in large numbers in future are slim. At most, less than 500 T-90AMs would be procured by India, while the rest of the T-90S MBTs will be upgraded to T-90AM standard.
4) Between the T-90AM and Arjun Mk2, the latter would still reign supreme on the battlefield since it can fire both HESH and FSAPDS rounds.
5) If the R & D momentum is maintained or even accelerated for the Arjun Mk3 (which is the FMBT) then the Arjun Mk3 will be a generation ahead of the T-90AM in terms of integrated vectronics suite, mobility, firepower and reliability/serviceability.''
[4] ''The reality on Soviet/Russian MBTs being developed around the philosophy of hit avoidance was never a figment of my personal imagination, but was conveyed in such words by none other than Soviet MBT designers to the Indian Army evaluation team back in 1980s. Ask any Indian Army personnel type-certified on T-72s and T-90s and they will corroborate it. Folks like Vassily Fafanov et all may argue about this endlessly, but it still doesn’t change the reality about what was then the official explanation from the Soviets in response to serious queries emanating from a potential export customer,.i.e. India, during the T-72’s evaluation process. And I had also explained in my earlier thread what exactly was the operational art concerning the massed employment of MBTs of Soviet MBTs. I as a customer would give a damn about weight restrictions applicable to another country and would never try to even justify the retention of such restrictions if it interferes with MBT survivability aspects. It would be totally illogical to do so, maybe except for the Soviets. As for Soviet MBTs having the same volume-to-armour ratio with their Western counterparts, try telling that to export customers like the Indian Army, which were never even allowed to be exposed to ERA-equipped T-72s throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. In addition, do try comparing the volume-to-armour ratio of IDF-Army M-60A3s equipped with CMS-developed ERA tiles versus the Syrian T-72Ms as they clashed in the Bekaa Valley in mid-1982 and the discrepancy will increase even further. Furthermore, as I had mentioned in my previous thread, the frontal armour of a standard Indian T-72M was routinely penetrated by 105mm FSAPDS rounds fired by an Indian upgunned T-55. Regarding blow-up panels and their existence on either the Arjun Mk1 or Arjun Mk2, all I can say is seeing is believing, if not at an operational base, then at least during a DEFEXPO expo and one will find convincing answers. Regarding fair versus unfair fights, way back in 1992 when I was attending a firing demonstration in Sweden of the BOFORS BILL ATGW, in front of the entire assembled audience (which was allowed to do a hands-on inspection of the wreckage after the firing demo), a BILL not only went pass the ERA tiles mounted on a ex-Warsaw Pact T-80UD MBT, but also penetrated the frontal armour of the MBT. The issue of a fair fight or unfair fight simply does not arise. OEMs making MBTs must simply build better MBTs instead of providing excuses like the MBTs were employed in a way that they were not meant to—that’s the only logical and obvious conclusion. Lastly, Merkava MBTs destroyed? And that too beyond usage or retrieval? Where’s the proof? Damaged or disabled maybe, but destroyed beyond retrieval by RPGs and Metis-M and Kornet-E ATGMs? Where’s the proof? None of the links provided by you provide any kind of conclusive evidence. Bottomline: Videos uploaded on YouTube never provide the kind of evidence required for definitive conclusions. Whereas first-hand in-depth analysis of an incident,plus interacting with the operators and OEMs of weapons do produce conclusive results.''
[5]''Yet, despite all this, India’s Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs of the day decreed that the T-72M and T-721982 (powered by a Model V-84MS four-stroke 12-cylinder multi-fuel engine developing 840hp and offering a power-to-weight ratio of 18.8 hp/tone) would be the Army’s future MBTs, and a procurement contract for 2,418 T-72s was subsequently inked. Interestingly, while the first off-the-shelf shipments of T-72Ms began arriving by ship in Mumbai in mid-1982, in Lebanon the 105mm APFSDS rounds fired by Israeli Merkava Mk1 MBTs with 105mm rifled-bore guns routinely pierced the Syrian T-72M’s front glacis, went straight through the MBT and exited through the engine compartment, leaving a turretless hulk behind. Five years later, The Indian Army’s worst fears were realised when got a first-hand demonstration of the T-72M’s acute vulnerability in October 1987, after LTTE guerrillas exploded improvised explosive devices underneath two T-72Ms deployed with the Army’s 65 Armoured Regiment for Operation Pawan during the battle for Jaffna, which resulted in armour penetration and the ensuing catastrophic detonation of the MBT’s ammunition reserve (this being stored alongside the carousel autoloader on the turret’s floor), resulting in the turrets being blown off.''
Would appreciate if you would share your thoughts regarding these excerpts I have posted. Would you agree, as this writer is firmly convinced about, that Soviet philopshy in regards to the design ot MBTs was based on the ''hit avoidance'' principle? Sorry for the lenghty excerpts, as I felt that in order to give a true picture behind the writer analysis, it was needed to include them.
[1] ''the overall Soviet approach to MBT design in the post-World War II era was found to be flawed on two major counts: namely, the gamble on not being hit rather than on surviving hits, and the refusal to perceive survivability of the tank crew as a quite distinct issue from survivability of the vehicle, with the former having priority over the latter. ''
[2] ''When confronted with such ‘hard facts’ along with the Army’s criticisms about the lack of even a ‘decent’ hunter-killer fire-control system (when compared to the likes on board the AMX-40), members of the Soviet delegation were clearly red-faced and a depressed lot, and it took several bottles of vodka during and after dinner-time to come out with the truth: according to the MBT’s designers, the performance characteristics of all weapons produced in the USSR were dictated purely by the warfighting doctrine of the country’s armed forces. ''
[3] ''The T-90S was procured simply because the Arjun Mk1 wasn’t available when it should have been. What the fielding of the T-90AM proves is the following:
1) The Russians have FINALLY admitted to the fact that an ammo bustle located in the turret is better than the carousel-mounted bustle sitting on the floor of the hull--an admittance about which the Soviets and Russians were in denial since early 1991. Of course, the Ukrainians too had admitted and recognised the reality, but did so much earlier than the Russians.
2) Since the export market for high-end MBTs is extremely small and limited, the Russians have no choice but to implement and incorporate the MBT survivability features which are insisted upon by its principal MBT export customers, i.e. India.
3) Despite this belated upgrade, Russia’s chances of selling such MBTs to India in large numbers in future are slim. At most, less than 500 T-90AMs would be procured by India, while the rest of the T-90S MBTs will be upgraded to T-90AM standard.
4) Between the T-90AM and Arjun Mk2, the latter would still reign supreme on the battlefield since it can fire both HESH and FSAPDS rounds.
5) If the R & D momentum is maintained or even accelerated for the Arjun Mk3 (which is the FMBT) then the Arjun Mk3 will be a generation ahead of the T-90AM in terms of integrated vectronics suite, mobility, firepower and reliability/serviceability.''
[4] ''The reality on Soviet/Russian MBTs being developed around the philosophy of hit avoidance was never a figment of my personal imagination, but was conveyed in such words by none other than Soviet MBT designers to the Indian Army evaluation team back in 1980s. Ask any Indian Army personnel type-certified on T-72s and T-90s and they will corroborate it. Folks like Vassily Fafanov et all may argue about this endlessly, but it still doesn’t change the reality about what was then the official explanation from the Soviets in response to serious queries emanating from a potential export customer,.i.e. India, during the T-72’s evaluation process. And I had also explained in my earlier thread what exactly was the operational art concerning the massed employment of MBTs of Soviet MBTs. I as a customer would give a damn about weight restrictions applicable to another country and would never try to even justify the retention of such restrictions if it interferes with MBT survivability aspects. It would be totally illogical to do so, maybe except for the Soviets. As for Soviet MBTs having the same volume-to-armour ratio with their Western counterparts, try telling that to export customers like the Indian Army, which were never even allowed to be exposed to ERA-equipped T-72s throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. In addition, do try comparing the volume-to-armour ratio of IDF-Army M-60A3s equipped with CMS-developed ERA tiles versus the Syrian T-72Ms as they clashed in the Bekaa Valley in mid-1982 and the discrepancy will increase even further. Furthermore, as I had mentioned in my previous thread, the frontal armour of a standard Indian T-72M was routinely penetrated by 105mm FSAPDS rounds fired by an Indian upgunned T-55. Regarding blow-up panels and their existence on either the Arjun Mk1 or Arjun Mk2, all I can say is seeing is believing, if not at an operational base, then at least during a DEFEXPO expo and one will find convincing answers. Regarding fair versus unfair fights, way back in 1992 when I was attending a firing demonstration in Sweden of the BOFORS BILL ATGW, in front of the entire assembled audience (which was allowed to do a hands-on inspection of the wreckage after the firing demo), a BILL not only went pass the ERA tiles mounted on a ex-Warsaw Pact T-80UD MBT, but also penetrated the frontal armour of the MBT. The issue of a fair fight or unfair fight simply does not arise. OEMs making MBTs must simply build better MBTs instead of providing excuses like the MBTs were employed in a way that they were not meant to—that’s the only logical and obvious conclusion. Lastly, Merkava MBTs destroyed? And that too beyond usage or retrieval? Where’s the proof? Damaged or disabled maybe, but destroyed beyond retrieval by RPGs and Metis-M and Kornet-E ATGMs? Where’s the proof? None of the links provided by you provide any kind of conclusive evidence. Bottomline: Videos uploaded on YouTube never provide the kind of evidence required for definitive conclusions. Whereas first-hand in-depth analysis of an incident,plus interacting with the operators and OEMs of weapons do produce conclusive results.''
[5]''Yet, despite all this, India’s Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs of the day decreed that the T-72M and T-721982 (powered by a Model V-84MS four-stroke 12-cylinder multi-fuel engine developing 840hp and offering a power-to-weight ratio of 18.8 hp/tone) would be the Army’s future MBTs, and a procurement contract for 2,418 T-72s was subsequently inked. Interestingly, while the first off-the-shelf shipments of T-72Ms began arriving by ship in Mumbai in mid-1982, in Lebanon the 105mm APFSDS rounds fired by Israeli Merkava Mk1 MBTs with 105mm rifled-bore guns routinely pierced the Syrian T-72M’s front glacis, went straight through the MBT and exited through the engine compartment, leaving a turretless hulk behind. Five years later, The Indian Army’s worst fears were realised when got a first-hand demonstration of the T-72M’s acute vulnerability in October 1987, after LTTE guerrillas exploded improvised explosive devices underneath two T-72Ms deployed with the Army’s 65 Armoured Regiment for Operation Pawan during the battle for Jaffna, which resulted in armour penetration and the ensuing catastrophic detonation of the MBT’s ammunition reserve (this being stored alongside the carousel autoloader on the turret’s floor), resulting in the turrets being blown off.''
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