T-90 in Comparison to Western Armour

[Abraham Gubler]

For example, the Israelis were aware that the T-55 and T-62 tanks’ main guns would not depress by more than 5 or 6 degrees. Because of this limitation, in the 1973 Golan Heights tank battle the Syrians who were on the higher grounds had to expose themselves to shoot at the Israelis in the valley (the Valley of Tears), and the Israelis took advantage of that limitation to decimate the Syrian tank force with numerically inferior and outdated tanks.

Your example is false. The Israeli defensive positions in the Golan were on the sides of hills around the valleys. They took advantage of pre made firing platforms and the good depression of the Centurion tank to fire hull down from defilade at the advancing Syrians. Who were shooting back and knocked out quite a few Israeli tanks, especially at night when they had IR compared to only white light for the Israelis.

One of the many myths associated with defeated forces like the Soviets at the start of the Eastern Front and the Arabs against the Israelis is that they were no good at fighting. The Arab forces fought very hard in both the start of the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War.

The primary advantage of the Israelis was operational leadership. The Syrians after breaking through at the southern Golan didn’t launch their follow on echelons in time because the regime didn’t respond in time. In the Sinai the Egyptians threw away victory launching a massive attack outside their air defence umbrella for political reasons (supporting the broken Syrians).

The Israelis did show a much higher level of tactical determination and iniative but throughout the fighting. Also the western equipment, even old stuff, had a range of key advantages over the Soviet stuff. Things like higher turrets may have increased comparative weight but enabled better command and control and wider flexibility for firing positions.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

That reality and its importance was not only confirmed by the very ambitious MBT-70 project (from the failure of which borned both M1 Abrams and Leopard 2 projects), in which the capability to gun fire long range guided missiles was one of its central design requirement ,but also by subsequent attempts to engineerize suitable gun fired guided ammunitions capable to enlarge the range of engagement's footprint of western MBT, like the failed TERM program- Tank Extended Range Munition- .

TERM was not a “failed” project it was cancelled for cost reasons as part of the peace dividend after the defeat of the Soviet Union. However the US has kept similar projects running and might have a similar weapon for the M1A3 upgrade.

That aside X-Rod, TERM, MRM are nothing like the Soviet tank launched missiles. They are all ‘Assault Breaker’ beyond line of sight (BLOS) weapons with ranges over 8-12km fired in lofted trajectories designed to be used like artillery. So far from extending the tank’s line of sight direct fire range they turn armour units into artillery enabling swarming, shaping fires as directed by forward scout units.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Just fyi "Russia", or more accurately UVZ, has no problem making tanks. Their production figures for 2010 were iirc 350 tanks, putting them well ahead of anyone except possibly China or North Korea.

Actually production is the inherent problem with the T-90. The Russians have inherited a Soviet tank design and despite adding all sorts of good stuff to the T-90 it is still inherently compromised because of the design configuration choice made in the T-64 50 years ago. This is the choice of low turret height, inside turret ring autoloader and reduced internal hull volume. These choices were made to reduce the weight of the T-64 and subsequent vehicles by as much as possible so more could be produced. By a simplified view of material and personnel the Soviets were able to built three tanks (T-64 to T-90) for every two (M1s and co.) and crew four tanks (T-64 to T-90) for every three (M1s and co.).

While the subsequent tank was less robust and lethal than a higher, larger tank it provided an apparent systems advantage over being harder to hit (lower height) and available at 33 to 50% higher numbers for same cost. This also aligned strongly with the Stalinist political objective of maximum industrial unit output and Shaposhnikov’s dictum “mobilization is the opium of war”.

Until the Russians build a new tank not compromised by the T-64 design features (as Morozov wanted to with the fantastic T-74) they will suffer in any battle against contemporaries, all other things being equal.

 

[Mindstorm]

It's not like David or I ever used the slashing of Iraqis forces as an argument. You were the one who brought up desert storm stating that the ability to fire ATGMs would have altered the course of the tank clashes during this conflict.

I have cited Desert Storm because this war was not only ,in absolute, the most studied conflinct of modern military era, but also because the conspicuous data flow coming from this operational scenario, in particular the results achieved with the employement of new type of weapon systems and CONOPS has fatally very deeply influenced both subsequent analysis models and projections and startegic and tactical mindset in West.

Moreover i have cited it also as the most extensive and clear operational example (the others was the 1973 conflict ,on both fronts and in particular "Battle of Valley of Tears" and all the enormous volume of studies produced for the crucial "Fluda Gap" and "Great European Plain" WP's ground forces vector of assault's options) of the total inconsistency of a widely spreaded platitude concerning maximum effective range of engagement with LOS stand-off guided ammunitions in actual conflict scenario.

"It's not like there were many situations were US tank forces approached the enemy and had them in their sights with no way to attack because they lacked a 5km tube launched ATGM."

Interesting ; because only on the single "Battle of 73 Easting" (against Iraqi armoured division mostly in fixed positions and also horribly prepared as Stephen Biddle very clearly has explained) that was the rule not the exception ,at the point that after-battle analysis called even for modifications of long range gunnery training !

Those are some extracts on the subject from the famous "Dragon Roar: 1-37 Armor in the Battle of 73 Easting" by Second Lieutenant Richard M. Bohannon

"TF 7-6 and TF 1-37 reported additional troopsand vehicles at 2000-4000 meters.
They destroyed these targets with coax, TOW, 25mm, and tank main gun fire. Four unidentified vehicles fled to the east of the enemy’s position and were not engaged, due to the extended range (4.0 - 4.8 kilometers)."

"The attack continued toward the east. To our front we faced dismounted troops in trenches and numerous armored vehicles in defilade, consisting predominantly of T-72s and BMP-1s. We fired at most of the vehicular targets at ranges of 2200-2800meters, but engagements beyond 3000 meters were not uncommon. One
MlA1 on the move hit a BMP with a HEAT round at 3250 meters. The longest shot with a confirmed kill was 3750 meters."

"There were a lot of gunnery lessons here. First, because one of the MlA1’s advantages is its stand-off capability. We should consider long range
gunnery training."

What is your personal experience with the employment of heavy combined arms forces?

My work is Physics ,and in all those years i must still find as single collague, in any place of world, questioning the validity of cited figures or linear inferences produced on the basis of data strictly validated by authorative,benchmark names in a particular specialized field ,often after extensive experimental testing and modeling, asking for personal involvement (naturally statistically totally irrilevant in the validation process of a scientifical model of representation of a phenomenon ) in the test of any theoretical principle cited......."intelligenti pauca".

[Mod Edit: You are trolling and consistantly trolling defence professionals across multiple threads. The Mod Team have reviewed your prior posts. As previously mentioned it to you in another thread there will be no further warnings to be issued with regards to your behaviour.]

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Interesting ; because only on the single "Battle of 73 Easting" (against Iraqi armoured division mostly in fixed positions and also horribly prepared as Stephen Biddle very clearly has explained) that was the rule not the exception ,at the point that after-battle analysis called even for modifications of long range gunnery training !

So if you’ve read Biddle you should know that if the Iraqi T-72s were positioned in proper two step fighting holes and actually crewed before the battle then the results would have been considerable casualties for the US forces, even with the poor standard of Iraqi skills. While I have no answer as to why the Iraqis loved berms and not holes – probably because of their experience in high water table fighting along river lines against the Iranians – the reason the tanks were not fully manned was the air threat. So even if they had been equipped with T-90 tanks with 5km engagement capability they would not be utilised because hardly any tanks were occupied out of fear of air strike. So what would have made a difference in 73 Eastings is air defence or the Iraqi air force holding their own.

My work is Physics ,and in all those years i must still find as single collague, in any place of world – SNIP - asking for personal involvement

No but I’m sure they would raise an eyebrow or two if a non physicist – say someone like David Beckham or Katy Perry – was to come into your lab and start telling you what to do and how wrong all your research and understanding of the physical world is?

To guys like Waylander and myself your opinion is to the military state of art like in physics David Beckham is to Georges Charpak.

 

[Mindstorm]

"That aside X-Rod, TERM, MRM are nothing like the Soviet tank launched missiles. They are all ‘Assault Breaker’ beyond line of sight (BLOS) weapons with ranges over 8-12km fired in lofted trajectories"

Absolutely not true . Those was the options present for TERM (from Lieutenant Colonel John Woznick piece on the system) :

· a tank-launched, precision guided
mortar round with a tandem warhead
· a smart, long-range missile with a
tandem warhead
· a smart top-attack multipurpose
round with a unitary CE warhead
· a guided, smart, top-attack, fire-andforget
round (flyover shoot down)
· a LOS-only, tank-launched kinetic
energy missile
· a LOS-only, guided, kinetic energy
round
· a LOS/BLOS KE munition (either
missile or bullet)

and ,as you well know , preliminary tests and models proved (like cited in the previous post on the subject) that BLOS usefulness was exploitable and considered advantageous over a LOS version (much more cheap ,with greater warhead and not dependent on corollary assets to work ) only in terrain where long range LOS was rare .
That is the motivation for which it is cited by the US Army Lieutenant Colonel Dennis J. Szydlosky in its "Will the Us Army have a Tank in 2020? " pag - 7

"Smarter and guided tank rounds have been and are being developed . These rounds offer the potential to increase the tank's effective engagement range and probability to hit. Studies of the Tank Extended Range Munition (TERM ) concept demonstrate that a longer range guided tank round offer significant increases in tank performance.
The Russians have fielded a number of radio and laser guided anti tank missiles that can be fired from tank cannons to allow accurate fire out to five kilometers"

[Mod Edit: There is a difference between disagreement and disrespect. You inherently disrespect the intelligence of members of this forum who read your posts by consistently insisting that you are correct, when there are obvious deficiencies in what you post. In this case, the Mod Team opted not to delete your post to serve as a cautionary tale on how not to behave in this forum.]

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Absolutely not true .

LOL. Obviously you don't know what the X-Rod is so how can you know what TERM is? You just have one article giving an outline of the concept from almost 20 years ago and the options study to prove that LOS missiles aren't worth it as proof of your point of view?

The XM1007 Tank Extended Range Munition (TERM), also known as the Tank Extended Range Munition-Kinetic Energy (TERM-KE), was a new 120 millimeter munition for the M1A2 Main Battle Tank, that would extend the maneuver commander's battlespace beyond line of sight (BLOS) to more than 8 kilometers. TERM exploits the capabilities of the Future Scout and Cavalary System vehicle to identify and illuminate BLOS targets to pass digitized targeting information, in real time, to the tanker.

I can see how someone with no contextual understanding can misrepresent a single report to align with a cherished opinion. However its not science, its not military science and isn't relevant to this discussion. All X-Rod and derviative programs have been about providing US tanks with a BLOS weapon to exapand engagement beyond line of sight direct fires. Deal with it.

 

[Waylander]

So from a couple of unidentified vehicles (which shows how hard target tracking and identification is at these ranges) which fled out of main gun range as well as some successfull 3+ km engagements you draw the conclusion that a tube launched ATGM is essential?
It doesn't contradict my statement at all that Abrams crews were perfectly able to reach out and touch nearly all of their targets.

Calling for more long range gunners training when deploying to a desert area of operations just means that one should train for the mission.

And we are still talking about a desert environment. So even in this most favourable terrain for long range engagements you quote a report about 4 fled vehicles as an evidence for what a game changer tubed launched ATGMs are. This is not an evidence. That only proves that only a small fraction of enemy targets could not be serviced by main gun fire.

And your statement that actual experience with the stuff we are talking about has no value in this discussion is ridicilous. Abe already made this point.

You totally ignore the diffiulties I stated of getting just more than a usefull 1.5-2 km LOS even in the favourable mech/armour terrain of northern germany.
The idea that a company of Ts will regularly be able to find suitable firing positions with a LOS of 4+ km from which they can exploit the range of their ATGMs (preferably from the sides) is just plain wrong. Most of the time the terrain just doesn't allow this. Having a good open killing area with a LOS of just 3+ km with the enemy running into it is a tankers dream and seldomely achievable.

 

[Feanor]

Actually production is the inherent problem with the T-90. The Russians have inherited a Soviet tank design and despite adding all sorts of good stuff to the T-90 it is still inherently compromised because of the design configuration choice made in the T-64 50 years ago. This is the choice of low turret height, inside turret ring autoloader and reduced internal hull volume. These choices were made to reduce the weight of the T-64 and subsequent vehicles by as much as possible so more could be produced. By a simplified view of material and personnel the Soviets were able to built three tanks (T-64 to T-90) for every two (M1s and co.) and crew four tanks (T-64 to T-90) for every three (M1s and co.).

While the subsequent tank was less robust and lethal than a higher, larger tank it provided an apparent systems advantage over being harder to hit (lower height) and available at 33 to 50% higher numbers for same cost. This also aligned strongly with the Stalinist political objective of maximum industrial unit output and Shaposhnikov’s dictum “mobilization is the opium of war”.

Until the Russians build a new tank not compromised by the T-64 design features (as Morozov wanted to with the fantastic T-74) they will suffer in any battle against contemporaries, all other things being equal.

I wasn't talking about the design decisions, or performance. I was talking about the physical production facilities that UVZ has.

 

[peschernik]

М1А2 SEP can shoot on distance over 3 kilometers and hit target. Yes. But Abrams in this time should be at stop without moving. And your target also should stay without moving. Why? Because LRF Abrams is not perfect. You already have to be carefull when you lase at 3000m because you can get multiple returns, you sometimes can have to lase 3 or 4 times to get a proper reading. It all will take time. And need be wary.

(From the Abrams Gunner Guide):
"WARNING! The laser in the M1's LRF can burn out if you overuse it, so be careful!
To be safe, never fire more than four pulses in an 8-second period. Don't hold the lase button down for a long time. If you see a green F next to the range numbers in the GPS and the red reticle disappears, you have burned out the LRF."

(From the Abrams Gunner Guide):
«THE ART OF LASING
As stated in the previous tutorial, the laser rangefinder (LRF) works by sending out a pulse of laser light, and using the return times of the reflections to calculate the range. Note that there may be more than one return time to measure because of multiple reflections. Although the pulse of laser light is a focused beam, this beam does widen over distance. At a range of two or three kilometers, the beam will be spread out so much that a tank might NOT block the entire beam. In this case, some laser light might be reflected off the ground well in front of the target, and some may be reflected off the ground or trees well behind the target.
When the LRF receives multiple returns, a bar appears over the range display numbers in the GPS. The gunner must then decide whether the displayed range is valid. The displayed range will be based on either the FIRST return or the LAST
return, depending on the setting of the RANGE SWITCH (at the time the target was lased)»

And also we should keep in mind: on big distance, a shell of Abrams will gradually lost his kinetic energy. (Kinetic energy on the big distance? What speak about the 3 kilometers if Abrams can’t penetrate armor of T-90 even from distance 250 meters? Tests conducted in the presence of the Indian delegation by bombardment with application of the shells like foreign М829А2 have shown its invulnerability. Thus bombardment was spent from the minimum (250m) distances. The penetrators-shells just cracked on pieces by ERA. After these tests Indian customers become very amaze and buy many T-90.)

On the big distance (over 3-4 kilometers) need use rockets, all experts agree with this.

I don't tell what the rockets it is big advantage of Russian tanks over the western tanks. Not important big this advantage or small, but this some advantage and all experts it recognize. I want says Т-90 has many such "small" advantages (I can list these advantages) and in a complex all these advantages (BUT NOT ONLY ROCKETS) give an occasion to experts to tell that - Т-90А (modernized variant of Т-90) is the best serial tank in the world.

 

[gf0012-aust]

peschernik, there is a chasm of difference between someone who reads manuals and quotes the internet and those who do it for a job

I suggest that you ratchet your enthusiasm down and start listening/reading more.

you're heading towards a holiday on current posting trends.

we don't have much tolerance for chest beating in here


Thread closed for Mod review and discussion

 

[gf0012-aust]

The thread is now open.

There will be no more patriotic nonsense. If thats how people want to engage in debate then head off to youtube instead.

I would add again, that when people are identified with bluetags as Defence Professionals then its because they have served or have a degree of subject matter expertise acquired through time in the relevant industries.

scraping the internet is well and dandy, its not the same as having first hand knowledge.

any further strays from the debate and the posts will be deleted without negotiation

 

[Abraham Gubler]

М1А2 SEP can shoot on distance over 3 kilometers and hit target. Yes. But Abrams in this time should be at stop without moving. And your target also should stay without moving. Why? Because LRF Abrams is not perfect. You already have to be carefull when you lase at 3000m because you can get multiple returns, you sometimes can have to lase 3 or 4 times to get a proper reading. It all will take time. And need be wary.

This is a gross misinterpretation relying on obsolete issues that were never significant anyway. Firstly on the laser range finder the time limits apply to the first generation laser built in the 1970s that have all been replaced on modern Abrams tanks. Secondly so what? The object of a laser rangefinder is to find the range which is inputted into the ballistic computer it is not to designate the target (which requires a far higher pulse per second laser). There is no tank in the world that can displace enough in the time it takes to compete a firing solution, fire the gun and time of flight to target to so change its range from the firing gun as to make a significant error in accuracy. This is direct fire and the target is going to be along the bearing. In the old days before laser ranging a good firing technique was not even to bother with ranging but set the range for say 1km, fire, then drop 500m (500m range), fire, then add 1,000m (1,500m range) and fire. If the tank was anywhere from point blank to about 2,000m away it would be hit by one of those three shells.

Secondly on issues of moving and stabilisation the sighting systems and training provided to the gunner on modern tanks enables hits from moving vehicles to moving targets at long ranges. Obviously if the target rapidly changes its direction of travel during the time of flight you will miss but so to for most guided missiles with human’s in the loop. However the important advantage of tank guns against moving targets is the far lower time of flight. There is not much evasion a ground target can do in 2-3 seconds.

However the key disadvantage of guided missiles is their long time of flight. It takes a typical missile 20 seconds to reach a range of 3km (much faster, gun launched Svir takes 18 seconds to reach 5km). During this time a target moving at 40kph can displace 200m! Now that’s no big deal if its driving right towards you but if it sees your firing signature (which it will) and starts major evasive action you will struggle to keep it in your sighting picture.

Not to mention all the time this enables the target to deploy countermeasures. There is no soft kill countermeasure to a tank gun shell because all the targeting is completed before the firing signature. Missiles on the other hand give the game away at launch and need to be targeted until the kill enabling a soft kill system to dazzle the guidance system or the actual shooter to be engaged with hard kill. Not to mention how much easier it is for an active protection system to defeat a guided missile compared to a long rod KE penetrator.

Even worse for a missile is the total engagement time. Missiles take much longer to load and the weapon often needs time to warm up. Combined with the long time of flight this significantly reduces the number of targets you can engage. A tank could typically engage 4-8 targets in the time it took for a TOW system to engage one. Which is why NATO in the 1980s moved to replace their missiles with fire and forget weapons (Javelin, TRIJAT), very high speed missiles (LOSAT) or anti tank guns.

And also we should keep in mind: on big distance, a shell of Abrams will gradually lost his kinetic energy. (Kinetic energy on the big distance? What speak about the 3 kilometers if Abrams can’t penetrate armor of T-90 even from distance 250 meters? Tests conducted in the presence of the Indian delegation by bombardment with application of the shells like foreign М829А2 have shown its invulnerability. Thus bombardment was spent from the minimum (250m) distances. The penetrators-shells just cracked on pieces by ERA. After these tests Indian customers become very amaze and buy many T-90.)

The Russians are claiming that Relkit can defeat the M829A2. The M829A2 can defeat Kontakt 5 out to combat ranges. Relkit is actually not an armour. Its an active protection system and to defeat the M829A2 it requires radar warning of the incoming round and standoff activation. In effect it is like Drozd for long rod KE penetrators. But like Drozd has a range of disadvantages compred to a hit to kill APS system. AFAIK the Indian T-90s are only equipped with Kontakt 5 which can be defeated by М829А2.

I don't tell what the rockets it is big advantage of Russian tanks over the western tanks. Not important big this advantage or small, but this some advantage and all experts it recognize. I want says Т-90 has many such "small" advantages (I can list these advantages) and in a complex all these advantages (BUT NOT ONLY ROCKETS) give an occasion to experts to tell that - Т-90А (modernized variant of Т-90) is the best serial tank in the world.

The only ‘experts’ who claim it’s a big advantage are Russian trying to sell these tanks. The T-90 has a significant disadvantage to western tanks like the M1. It can’t depress its main gun enough to use enfilade, turret down firing positions. When penetrated by enemy fires it invariably suffers a catastrophic explosion killing all crew and completely destroying the tank. As seen in Iraq and in Lebanon in the past few years the M1 and Merkava can be defeated by anti tank weapons but invariably suffers minor damage enabling the tank to be repaired and returned to the battle within hours and without significant crew casualties. It doesn’t matter what cool fire control systems, missiles, active armour arrays and the like are added to the T-90 it still suffers from being a non survivable tank.

 

[Feanor]

To sum up the previous discussion, barrel-launched ATGMs are useful in certain scenarios, and are nice to have on top of everything else. They are not game changers, they are not the main weapon of WarPac MBTs, and they certainly don't shoot down low-flying aircraft in anything other then extremely favorable conditions. All other things equal, they're a plus, but in a comparison for say a prospective buyer they are low on the significance list.

 

[Feanor]

The Russians are claiming that Relkit can defeat the M829A2. The M829A2 can defeat Kontakt 5 out to combat ranges. Relkit is actually not an armour. Its an active protection system and to defeat the M829A2 it requires radar warning of the incoming round and standoff activation. In effect it is like Drozd for long rod KE penetrators. But like Drozd has a range of disadvantages compred to a hit to kill APS system. AFAIK the Indian T-90s are only equipped with Kontakt 5 which can be defeated by М829А2.

Relikt is ERA not an APS. Drozd-2 and ARENA are the only two relatively new APS that Russia is offering. In other words it doesn't require radar warning or stand-off activation. It is NOT like Drozd.

With regards to the Indian T-90, somewhere in the middle of their 1600 tanks the T-90S is to be supplemented by the T-90M which will feature Relikt. It's unclear whether the package will be retrofitted to older tanks, though given what we have been told about it, it's quite likely in the long run.

There's close-ups of Relikt ERA on the T-72B2 Rogatka prototype, here: Ò-72Á «Ðîãàòêà»

Just scroll down.

The only ‘experts’ who claim it’s a big advantage are Russian trying to sell these tanks. The T-90 has a significant disadvantage to western tanks like the M1. It can’t depress its main gun enough to use enfilade, turret down firing positions. When penetrated by enemy fires it invariably suffers a catastrophic explosion killing all crew and completely destroying the tank. As seen in Iraq and in Lebanon in the past few years the M1 and Merkava can be defeated by anti tank weapons but invariably suffers minor damage enabling the tank to be repaired and returned to the battle within hours and without significant crew casualties. It doesn’t matter what cool fire control systems, missiles, active armour arrays and the like are added to the T-90 it still suffers from being a non survivable tank.

Unless you add a turret bustle with blow-out panels to it (like the new T-90M is supposed to have). There is also the solution of only carrying the rounds in the auto-loader, instead of the turret itself. Finally in recent conflicts there has been a recurring pattern where most tanks are either destroyed from the air, or abandoned and captured. In other words in major conventional conflicts the catastrophic explosion issue is going to be relatively minor compared to things like lack or presence of friendly air cover, arty support, and proper infantry-tank coordination. In the first assault on Grozny T-72s and T-80s burned like boxes of matches. In the assault on Grozny in winter 1999-2000 the same T-72s and T-80s took virtually no casualties. Factors other then the marginal improvements in tank technology were responsible for the change in outcome.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Relikt is ERA not an APS. Drozd-2 and ARENA are the only two relatively new APS that Russia is offering. In other words it doesn't require radar warning or stand-off activation. It is NOT like Drozd.

If Relikit doesn’t have a standoff attack against long rod KE penetrators then I doubt it can have the kind of significant protection improvement required to defeat third generation long rod KE penetrators like M829A2 or fourth generation M829A3s and the next generation M829E4. The E4 is designed to defeat hit to kill APS and any ERA out to 4km.

Unless you add a turret bustle with blow-out panels to it (like the new T-90M is supposed to have). There is also the solution of only carrying the rounds in the auto-loader, instead of the turret itself.

The charges beneath the turret in the carousel are still highly vulnerable to sympathetic combustion. Effectively to be remotely survivable it needs a new turret. Not really an endorsement.

Finally in recent conflicts there has been a recurring pattern where most tanks are either destroyed from the air, or abandoned and captured. In other words in major conventional conflicts the catastrophic explosion issue is going to be relatively minor compared to things like lack or presence of friendly air cover, arty support, and proper infantry-tank coordination.

Staggeringly bad assessment. How many Russian tanks were destroyed by air in Chechnya and Georgia? How many M1 Abrams and Merkavas suffered similar? None. Even for fast moving forces invading Iraq destroying their own disabled vehicles at least the crew got out alive! Saying this isn’t much of an issue is just phenomenally bad analysis.

In the first assault on Grozny T-72s and T-80s burned like boxes of matches. In the assault on Grozny in winter 1999-2000 the same T-72s and T-80s took virtually no casualties. Factors other then the marginal improvements in tank technology were responsible for the change in outcome.

This is a terrible example. The reason the Russians didn’t lose as many tanks second time as well is they were kept back from direct assault. This meant more Russian infantry had to die from unsuppressed fire points and more Chechnyan civilians had to die from attempt to suppress via mass artillery barrages.

I’m amazed at the attempts by armchair generals in Russia to try and excuse fundamental failings of their last generation of tanks. They are significantly inferior to their western counterparts and have costed plenty of tankers their lives proving it.

 

[Feanor]

If Relikit doesn’t have a standoff attack against long rod KE penetrators then I doubt it can have the kind of significant protection improvement required to defeat third generation long rod KE penetrators like M829A2 or fourth generation M829A3s and the next generation M829E4. The E4 is designed to defeat hit to kill APS and any ERA out to 4km.

Once again Relikt is nothing more then new ERA. It CAN be combined with ARENA, but I doubt that anything along those lines is in the works. As it is, there are no real plans to equip in service MBTs with an APS.

The charges beneath the turret in the carousel are still highly vulnerable to sympathetic combustion. Effectively to be remotely survivable it needs a new turret. Not really an endorsement.

It will be interesting to see (once better public info is available) what exactly is being done to the turret in the T-90M. All the changes may amount to a new turret.

Staggeringly bad assessment. How many Russian tanks were destroyed by air in Chechnya and Georgia? How many M1 Abrams and Merkavas suffered similar? None. Even for fast moving forces invading Iraq destroying their own disabled vehicles at least the crew got out alive! Saying this isn’t much of an issue is just phenomenally bad analysis.

Casualties of US M1s in Iraq are essentially negligible. To put it bluntly they were so small they had virtually no impact on US ability to fight the war. All they did was given the insurgents some morale victories, and the US government a repair bill.

This is a terrible example. The reason the Russians didn’t lose as many tanks second time as well is they were kept back from direct assault. This meant more Russian infantry had to die from unsuppressed fire points and more Chechnyan civilians had to die from attempt to suppress via mass artillery barrages.

I'm not talking about the second battle for Grozny. I'm talking about the assault on Grozny in the second Chechen war, just to clarify. That's first-off, second off plenty of armor was used as direct fire support with infantry formations. In fact much of the arty you talk about was also used in a direct fire role. In regards to infantry casualties, it would be interesting to see your numbers. Assuming you have some, of course.

 

[Feanor]

This is a terrible example. The reason the Russians didn’t lose as many tanks second time as well is they were kept back from direct assault. This meant more Russian infantry had to die from unsuppressed fire points and more Chechnyan civilians had to die from attempt to suppress via mass artillery barrages.

Just to clarify, you don't think that consistent use of dismounted infantry to protect armor contributed to changes in the casualty numbers?

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Once again Relikt is nothing more then new ERA. It CAN be combined with ARENA, but I doubt that anything along those lines is in the works. As it is, there are no real plans to equip in service MBTs with an APS.

The report I read said that Relic was triggered by radar warning to provide a pre impact explosion and stand off effect. Because of the way ERA counters long rod KE penetrators such a stand off attack on a threat shell would be a lot more effective than an attack on the surface of the tank. If it doesn’t then it’s less of a protection. While Relic is probably targeted towards defeating A2 rounds which would be compromised thanks to their heavy use in OIF I very much doubt it could defeat the A3 or E4 round. Both of which is what Relic would face if such an equipped tank was unfortunate enough to encounter US Army heavy BCTs.

I'm not talking about the second battle for Grozny. I'm talking about the assault on Grozny in the second Chechen war, just to clarify. That's first-off, second off plenty of armor was used as direct fire support with infantry formations. In fact much of the arty you talk about was also used in a direct fire role. In regards to infantry casualties, it would be interesting to see your numbers. Assuming you have some, of course.

Both Chechen Wars saw the Russians deploy tanks against infantry. How it applies to the lack of survivability against other tanks is hard to quantify. What both conflicts did show is that the Russian tanks were highly vulnerable to infantry anti tank weapons even when equipped with ERA.

Because of this in the second Chechen War their tanks were used with a lot more circumspection as part of their entire strategy. In the initial invasion phase (1999-2000) the Russians used standoff assaults culminating in the siege of Grozny. The key difference is the tanks kept back from Chechen forces in the main so as to stay out of the range of RPGs. This is the opposite of M1 tank infantry support tactics where the tank approaches to very close range of the enemy infantry to completely suppress them. The result of the Russian tank vulnerability determined tactics is that out of an overall force of some 90,000 (1999-2000) they lost over 2,000 killed. This is 2% KIA of the overall force compared to 0.05% KIA in the US lead invasion of Iraq in 2003 (40 times difference).

Just to clarify, you don't think that consistent use of dismounted infantry to protect armor contributed to changes in the casualty numbers?

This is not a clarification but a petty attempt at a smear. The failed Russian ‘thunder run’ into Grozny on New Years Eve 1994 re-demonstrated the high vulnerability of Soviet designed tanks to infantry weapons. The very similar thunder runs into Baghdad in 2003 in which the armoured columns did not operate with dismount screens demonstrated how much better survivability in western vehicles was. 100% KIA vs 0.1% KIA is a pretty clear indication.

As I’ve said above the key difference between 1st and 2nd Chechen Wars in Russian tank deployment was not dismount screens but keeping their tanks beyond the range of infantry anti tank weapons. Which subsequently resulted in much higher casualties for the infantry who only had stand off tank support rather than close tank support.

 

[Feanor]

The report I read said that Relic was triggered by radar warning to provide a pre impact explosion and stand off effect. Because of the way ERA counters long rod KE penetrators such a stand off attack on a threat shell would be a lot more effective than an attack on the surface of the tank. If it doesn’t then it’s less of a protection. While Relic is probably targeted towards defeating A2 rounds which would be compromised thanks to their heavy use in OIF I very much doubt it could defeat the A3 or E4 round. Both of which is what Relic would face if such an equipped tank was unfortunate enough to encounter US Army heavy BCTs.

I'd be very interested to see the report. Given that Relikt offered as an upgrade package for T-72s includes the option of adding ARENA, and given that the actual NII Stali only claims that Relikt is a form of ERA with improved performance and increased modularity of design (allowing easy retro-fit of premanufactured screens in field conditions), all signs point to it not having any sort of active elements, sensors, or anything else.

Here's the manufacturers page, if you flip through the images of BMPT, T-72s, and a T-80, as well as their explanations, it becomes fairly clear that there are no radars associated with it. It is, for all intents and purposes, K-5 on steroids.

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Both Chechen Wars saw the Russians deploy tanks against infantry. How it applies to the lack of survivability against other tanks is hard to quantify. What both conflicts did show is that the Russian tanks were highly vulnerable to infantry anti tank weapons even when equipped with ERA.

Lets be real, even if the 131st Maykop was equipped with M1s going into Grozny, the outcome would not have been much different.

Because of this in the second Chechen War their tanks were used with a lot more circumspection as part of their entire strategy. In the initial invasion phase (1999-2000) the Russians used standoff assaults culminating in the siege of Grozny. The key difference is the tanks kept back from Chechen forces in the main so as to stay out of the range of RPGs. This is the opposite of M1 tank infantry support tactics where the tank approaches to very close range of the enemy infantry to completely suppress them.

No argument there. However this is not quite the same as what you said earlier. You said: "This is a terrible example. The reason the Russians didn’t lose as many tanks second time as well is they were kept back from direct assault. This meant more Russian infantry had to die from unsuppressed fire points and more Chechnyan civilians had to die from attempt to suppress via mass artillery barrages."

Tanks were indeed used in the direct assault and direct fire support role. The key distinction being that instead of marching into the city blind, deaf, in parade-style columns, there were huge numbers of dismounted infantry assault teams moving through the city, with the tanks providing direct fire support for them.

The result of the Russian tank vulnerability determined tactics is that out of an overall force of some 90,000 (1999-2000) they lost over 2,000 killed. This is 2% KIA of the overall force compared to 0.05% KIA in the US lead invasion of Iraq in 2003 (40 times difference).

Your earlier claim was that there were greater infantry casualties between the first assault on Grozny, and the storm of Grozny in winter of 99-00. I certainly hope you didn't think I was disputing that the US had taken less casualties then Russia in Iraq vs Chechnya. That would be ridiculous.

This is not a clarification but a petty attempt at a smear. The failed Russian ‘thunder run’ into Grozny on New Years Eve 1994 re-demonstrated the high vulnerability of Soviet designed tanks to infantry weapons.

No. It demonstrated the vulnerability of armored columns in a prepared urban environment against a determined and organized opponent. When you look at the Russian Army "thunder run" into Tshinval in '08 you notice that the Georgian army wasn't able to do much about Russian armor, not for lack of anti-tank weapons, but because they were too disorganized and unprepared, as well as positively lacking a desire to fight. When their comms went down, HQ and Arty got taken out by Tochkas and Iskanders, their infantry certainly didn't put up much of a fight, anti-tank weapons or otherwise.

The very similar thunder runs into Baghdad in 2003 in which the armoured columns did not operate with dismount screens demonstrated how much better survivability in western vehicles was. 100% KIA vs 0.1% KIA is a pretty clear indication.

Hardly the same situation. Instead of intense urban fighting against a determined opponent, the US faced a rapidly deteriorating and unwilling opponent. This is not to say that this was the only reason, or even the primary reason, but among other this contributed to the methods chosen by the US military.

As I’ve said above the key difference between 1st and 2nd Chechen Wars in Russian tank deployment was not dismount screens but keeping their tanks beyond the range of infantry anti tank weapons. Which subsequently resulted in much higher casualties for the infantry who only had stand off tank support rather than close tank support.

I'd love to see a source on higher infantry casualties in the assault on Grozny winter 99-00 vs winter of 94-95.