Here is the link from MindStorm's post.
Russian T-90 tank versus German Leopard 2A6 tank: Determining a victor | Video | RIA Novosti
Russian T-90 tank versus German Leopard 2A6 tank: Determining a victor | Video | RIA Novosti
T-90 in Comparison to Western Armour
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The comment "the Leopard didn't has a chance to come into fighting distance" is ridicilous at best.
This sounds like a report done because of hurt pride.
Nevertheless the original comment about the Leopard being that much cheaper was bullshit, too.
This sounds like a report done because of hurt pride.
Nevertheless the original comment about the Leopard being that much cheaper was bullshit, too.
Waylander you must take into account that T-90 is equiped with gun fired ATGM (like9M119M1) with an effective engagement footprint in excess of 5 Km and ,of course, with a PrHit- Probability to Hit - completely unrelated to range of engagement and to relative speed of engaging / engaged vehicle , at the contrary of APFSDS ammunitions .
Take into account that in the simulation has been foreseen a full mobile engagement where , like you well know, the habit by part of well trained, professional tank crews is to costantly modify speed and vector of motion patameters to cause systematic miss chances (at least until someone develop future-reading FCS....
) by part of computer generated fire solutions for APFSDS ,which naturally cannot in any way modify engagement trajectory of the kinetic penetrator after the round has leaved the barrel .That element become, of course, decisive at range of 2 km and over .
Take into account that a MBT at 35 Km / h cover about 9,7 meters at second ; now change continuously that parameter (a modification of even only +/- 10 Km /h is more than sufficient ) ,add a systematic change of direction from an ideal straight line , terrain level discontinuity , normal fire dispersion at 2 km and over, a round requiring 2 seconds or more to reach its target and try to realize what are the chances to hit an surface area equal to half of the actual projection of the opposing MBT's silhouette at the istant of the engagement .....you will also realize istantly what is the heavy impact of a significantly smaller and compact design on the PrHit in a mobile MBT's enagegement at long ranges .
Naturally all those elements become immensely less decisive for the final outcome if we modify the tactical employement of the weapon systems examined , at example using T-90 in semi-entrenced fixed positions ( like almsot the totality of Iraqi armoured divisions in Gulf Wars ) or imaging a local environment with very reduced LOS , that would modify drammatically the exchange ratio obtained at bthe end of the simulation.
These missiles are still beam-riding though. If you're going to imply that visual contact with the target is not continuous (which is what I took it to mean when you mention terrain level discontinuity and "MBT's silhouette at the instant of the engagement, apologies if you meant something else) then beam-riding missiles aren't exactly going to be 100% effective, are they?
If terrain and maneuver interferes with line of sight, it's going to interfere with the missile's guidance system and will likely interfere with bringing the missile to bear at its maximum range too, wouldn't it?
I'm not well-versed on armoured warfare but I don't know if I'm convinced it would be as cut and dried as you say. Certainly I think both vehicles have the capacity to kill one another but I'm curious as to why there is so little interest in missile-armed tanks in the majority of Western designs if their use is so decisive. It would be interesting to get the thoughts of the tankers in here.
If terrain and maneuver interferes with line of sight, it's going to interfere with the missile's guidance system and will likely interfere with bringing the missile to bear at its maximum range too, wouldn't it?
I'm not well-versed on armoured warfare but I don't know if I'm convinced it would be as cut and dried as you say. Certainly I think both vehicles have the capacity to kill one another but I'm curious as to why there is so little interest in missile-armed tanks in the majority of Western designs if their use is so decisive. It would be interesting to get the thoughts of the tankers in here.
But appear that your opinion is not shared not only by the same German and Pentagon equipes of experts getting the chance to extensively and experimentally test even only the resilience to enemy fire of original specimen of T-72 in middle '90 years but also by the same analysts of Army's National Training Center observing that in hundreds of simulated battle conducted just in those years ,at the NTC in the Mohave Desert ,the T72-equipped OPFOR almost systematically winned against the M1A1 equiped side (read John A. Nagl "A Tale of Two Battles: Victorious in Iraq, An Experienced Armor Task Force Gets Waxed at the NTC," ) and that even before become aware of the incredible toughness demonstarted by original Soviet T-72 series with composite armor and K-5 ; the motivation is simple : desert is a perfect environment for mobile , long range engagement of opposing MBT with gun fired ATGM from stand off range and to channel or outmanoeuvre opposing armoured divisions in area of terrain where the sand is too soft for a MBT in the M1A1 weight's class .
Naturally Iraqi "T-72s" have never shooted a single ATGM against any NATO target in both wars ( and ,for be complete, also any APFSDS or HEAT round even only worth this name..) for no other reason that them was completely uncapable to do that , and just this was the central element of Soviet disinformation achieved through "monkey models ".
On the subject of Soviet disinformation against NATO in those years and "monkey models" program i believe that the words of Victor Suvorov will be even more clear :
" When one of these `monkey-models' fell into the hands of Western specialists, they naturally gained a completely false impression of the true combat capabilities of the BMP-1 and of Soviet tanks. For what they were looking at was no more than a casing, or a container, like an empty money box which is of no value without its contents.
The Soviet Union is currently making deliveries abroad of T-72 tanks, MIG-23 fighters and TU-22 bombers. But these are very different from the models with which the Soviet Army has armed itself. When one of a man's pockets contains banknotes and the other simply holds pieces of paper, it is quite impossible to tell which is which from the outside. "
In fact in Western tank design environment the interests in developing a MBT capable to efficiently employ gun-fired ATGM was not simply great but huge ; ever heard of the ambitious MBT-70 project ( 50 tons of weight , low internal volume, low silhouette,3 crew with autoloader and capacity to gun fire ATGM.......yes, i know ,that remember something ), the project after the failure of which borned the Leo-2 and Abrams programs ?
Those was some words on the subject of US Army Lieutenant Colonel Dennis J. Szydloski in its now declassified " Will the US Army Have a Tank after 2020 ? " 1998 - pag. 7-
"Smarter and guided tank rounds have been and are being developed . These rounds offer the potential to increase the tank's effective engagement range and probability to hit. Studies of the Tank Extended Range Munition (TERM ) concept demonstrate that a longer range guided tank round offer significant increases in tank performance.
The Russians have fielded a number of radio and laser guided anti tank missiles that can be fired from tank cannons to allow accurate fire out to five kilometers"
Bonza ,as you can clearly see , the importance gived by western military insiders on similar capabilities for domestic MBT was very high , but you must remember that the nations, within NATO memebers, developing the vast majority of techical innovation in MBT design for the whole Coalition was historically Germany and UK , for which attempt for a second time a very high risky R&D road for develop a MBT with totally new concept and capabilities ,above all after a freshly failed project like MBT-70 ,was stimed a true absurdity .
Sorry I deleted my post as I noticed after posting it that it was in response to a post that was made a while back, in 2006! I didn't realise that I was on the very first page of this thread.
destructivetouch
Member
Т-90М. New Specs.
The new pictures and main specs of T-90M (ob.188M) were appeared on a Russian site. This tank was first time demonstrated for Putin in Dec.10 at N-Tagil. It has got:
- New bigger turret without weakened frontal areas and with the all-aspect ERA covering.
- ERA 'Relict'
- Additional roof protection against atop attacking munition.
- New additional autoloader, placed on the aft part of the turret and able using the new longer sub-caliber rods.
- Aft ammo storage.
- Panoramic 3-channel IR commander site with improved anti-split/rounds protection.
- 7.62 mm automatic turret instead of 12.7mm.
- Totally new 2A82 125 mm MG (2A46M5 - optional).
- FCS with the net-centric module.
- New radio.
- New navigation system.
- New anti-split kevlar layer instead of the standard Russian anti-neutron layer.
- new anti-fire system.
In work:
- Mono-block power unit on 1200 hp V-99 engine.
- Steering wheel control.
T-90M - is intended for the export purpose mainly. For domestic use there was confirmed 'Burlak' program with heavy Tomsk OKBTM's input.
link
The new pictures and main specs of T-90M (ob.188M) were appeared on a Russian site. This tank was first time demonstrated for Putin in Dec.10 at N-Tagil. It has got:
- New bigger turret without weakened frontal areas and with the all-aspect ERA covering.
- ERA 'Relict'
- Additional roof protection against atop attacking munition.
- New additional autoloader, placed on the aft part of the turret and able using the new longer sub-caliber rods.
- Aft ammo storage.
- Panoramic 3-channel IR commander site with improved anti-split/rounds protection.
- 7.62 mm automatic turret instead of 12.7mm.
- Totally new 2A82 125 mm MG (2A46M5 - optional).
- FCS with the net-centric module.
- New radio.
- New navigation system.
- New anti-split kevlar layer instead of the standard Russian anti-neutron layer.
- new anti-fire system.
In work:
- Mono-block power unit on 1200 hp V-99 engine.
- Steering wheel control.
T-90M - is intended for the export purpose mainly. For domestic use there was confirmed 'Burlak' program with heavy Tomsk OKBTM's input.
link
I knew that gun launched ATGMs would get mentioned here.
These missiles do not provide enough penetration to penetrate modern MBTs over most of their frontal arc.
Not to talk of the difficulties of keeping a moving and maneuvering tank sized target in ones optic to bring a beam rider into the target. A T also has to reduce it's speed to use one.
There is a reason for russian tanks having only a handfull of them onboard in their combat load.
They are used for the occassional long range sniping against light/medium armored targets or a happy side shot against tanks. They are not intended for plinking MBTs frontally in a meeting engagement.
These missiles do not provide enough penetration to penetrate modern MBTs over most of their frontal arc.
Not to talk of the difficulties of keeping a moving and maneuvering tank sized target in ones optic to bring a beam rider into the target. A T also has to reduce it's speed to use one.
There is a reason for russian tanks having only a handfull of them onboard in their combat load.
They are used for the occassional long range sniping against light/medium armored targets or a happy side shot against tanks. They are not intended for plinking MBTs frontally in a meeting engagement.
You'll notice they're in no hurry to upgrade or develop new barrel-launched ATGMs. They're happy with what they have, and are instead prioritizing on more traditional aspects. It would be interesting to know how many BMP-3 equipped units carry their respective ATGM loads.
Weren't tube launched ATGM's originally intended to be used against hovering helicopters? Does the Ukraine offer tube launched ATGM's along with it's MBt's for exports?
Vietnam365
New Member
There has never been an Abrams that was destroyed or stuck behind enemy lines.
:flame
As the acronym ATGM implies, ATGMs were intended to be used against tanks. They can be used against helicopters.
I read very often those type of arguments of that subject , them are generally founded on some shallow figures ,often completely out of line, widely spreaded on the net...not differently ,at the end of the day ,than the very narrow angle , academic ,perfect head-on RCS figures publicized for VLO aircraft (the famous 0,001-0,0001 Sqm...) ,used grossly for "compute" range of tracking of a particular radar against a date low observable aircraft
.Naturally reality is much more complex than similar generalizations, a lot of spots ,even in the frontal projection of turret , are very ,very vulnerable to ATGM in the class of Invar/Invar-M with penetration capability in the 850/950 RHA range; among them are the gun mask area, gunner sight encasement, rear side turret projection (a big problem present strongly in Abrams and Leopard 2 design for incoming fire at inception angles on 30 degrees and above ) externally mounted sensor etc..etc.. and that only for turret.
At those elements you must add also that Russian CONOPS for this type of weapons ,since Soviet era, foresee employement of two ATGM against a single enemy MBT ,shooted from relative engaging angles of 25 degrees or more, to assure at least one and possibly two side contacts (the operators of opposing MBT cannot ascertain what ATGM is directed against what target of the brigade except in the last seconds of the engagements ,therefore attempt to manoeuvre to "face" at least one of the two incoming missile can become a very difficult task) ,moreover the laser beam is mantained above the intended target and collimated only in the very last seconds .
On average each tank would have the chance to shoot at least 3 ATGM before the opposing side would even only come at maximum APFSDS engagement range ,where naturally PrHit against a mobile target is very slim and penetration capability reduced ; in all the models that Russian analysts produced resulted that about 60% of western opposing MBT wouldn't even reach maximum APFSDS engagement range and that a significant fraction of the surviving would suffer damages of different level to theirs sensor suit ; for this reason no more than 6-8 ATGM ,of which one or two with thermobaric warheads for engage reinforced building and covered infantry , was stimed the most cost-effective solution for annunition's mix.
Naturally when opinions and models....as desired and ,in some way, programed by the same Soviets .....are modulated on engagements against '50 and '60 years MBT and purposely heavily downgraded export "monkey models" of T-72 , with full steel armor ,scaled down FCS,devoid of any type of ERA, uncapable to employ any type of guided ammunitions and armed with 3BM-17 rounds (phased out in URSS since 1971 even only for training purposes ) with half propellant , the question begin to fall in a horrible spiral of great misconceptions,wronged models and disinformation-guided technical mistakes.
It sounds to me like you place a great deal of credence in publicly available data for Russian weapons systems so long as the data is of Russian origin, while dismissing similar data of Western origin as "misconceptions" or "disinformation-guided". Maybe you should apply critical thinking to both sides of the equation, rather than just one.
You also haven't explained how these laser-guided weapons are supposed to be targeted on the weak spots you mentioned during maneuver warfare, and I don't imagine this would be made easier if your claim that the laser is maintained over the target and then focused in the final seconds of flight is true.
Carrying 6-8 ATGM, with 1-2 intended for anti-building use, gives each tank 4-7 rounds for anti-tank use. That seems to me to indicate the vehicles may do well in a brief engagement, but accounting for potential misses and engagement length, their effectiveness would drop off sharply after a brief period.
Furthermore, laser guidance doesn't simply equate to an instant hit. The laser must be maintained on the target during maneuver and across terrain, and the missile has a longer flight time than a typical APFSDS round (at least I'm fairly certain it does), so if that round is fired via a modern FCS I'm not entirely sure the advantage is as substantial as you claim.
It doesn't seem like it would be very difficult for Western forces to equip their MBTs with similar systems if they wished to - the Americans did it with the M551 Sheridan and M60A2 after all, and yet decided against using such systems in subsequent AFVs bar TOW missiles on some lighter vehicles.
As I said, I'm sure these tanks are quite capable of killing one another, but to me it doesn't seem like you've made a very strong case. I'm not trying to argue with you but just saying how it appears to me. I don't know enough about AFVs to say for certain but your position leaves me with many questions. Reality is, as you say, rather complex.
You also haven't explained how these laser-guided weapons are supposed to be targeted on the weak spots you mentioned during maneuver warfare, and I don't imagine this would be made easier if your claim that the laser is maintained over the target and then focused in the final seconds of flight is true.
Carrying 6-8 ATGM, with 1-2 intended for anti-building use, gives each tank 4-7 rounds for anti-tank use. That seems to me to indicate the vehicles may do well in a brief engagement, but accounting for potential misses and engagement length, their effectiveness would drop off sharply after a brief period.
Furthermore, laser guidance doesn't simply equate to an instant hit. The laser must be maintained on the target during maneuver and across terrain, and the missile has a longer flight time than a typical APFSDS round (at least I'm fairly certain it does), so if that round is fired via a modern FCS I'm not entirely sure the advantage is as substantial as you claim.
It doesn't seem like it would be very difficult for Western forces to equip their MBTs with similar systems if they wished to - the Americans did it with the M551 Sheridan and M60A2 after all, and yet decided against using such systems in subsequent AFVs bar TOW missiles on some lighter vehicles.
As I said, I'm sure these tanks are quite capable of killing one another, but to me it doesn't seem like you've made a very strong case. I'm not trying to argue with you but just saying how it appears to me. I don't know enough about AFVs to say for certain but your position leaves me with many questions. Reality is, as you say, rather complex.
Bonza i talk simply of parametrical ,technical evidency ; opinions in similar sectors have zero value .
After First Gulf War,at example, several projection models of possible engagements (including some ,updated and very complex on the most advantageous force placement and density for the critical and deeply studied ,in Cold War years,armoured clashs in the Fulda Gap ) between MBT NATO and WP tanks were produced, with a great impact on the startegic posture, force deployement ,tactical force composition, logistical line deepness and reinforcement time window's cycles .
All of them was very deeply influenced by the figures ,the operational results and the parametrical elements surfacing from that conflict (for T-72, the constructed empyrical "evidency" showed a true paper tank uncapable to stand against even only the most outdated among NATO anti-tanks weaponry ) and all of them was, for this same reason , completely wronged in theirs innermost, foundative basis.
We have get the chance to discover the enormous assessment's mistakes we had maked only after Germany reunifications ,when the equipe of M. Held performed a series of tests on the armors of some original specimen of Soviet T-72A and B (massively present in East Germany soil in '80 years) some with K-5 ERA ,the result of which systematically showed the inability of pratically all the anti-tanks weapons present in NATO arsenal in those years to penetrate them.
After this alarm bell had so strongly sounded ,the Pentagon himself ordered even more extensive tests to be conducted (under the guide of L. Ness ) , tests which confirmed completely the data obtained by the previous series of live tests .
Naturally that is only one of the thousands of similar situations in which russian disinformation ,mainly through "monkey models", has produced similar potentially catastrofic results .
Take in examination, at exmple, the analysis produced by some western experts (today declassified) of Beeka Valley's events and technical "lessons" learned by Soviets .
If you read some of them ,like the most famous of all : "Moscow Lesson from the 1982 Lebanon Air War " writed at end of 1984 by Benjamin S. Lambeth for RAND in which the author present and comment an analysis of the events maked by Colonel V. Dubrov on the "Aviatsiia i Kosmonavtika" of October 1983 , you will remain litterally shocked ; because you ,knowing the "future", can realize as the technical inferences maked by those military analysts was totally wronged and utterly corrupted by Soviet disinformation and information denial .
Lambeth ,at example , was convinced ,like majority of its collagues of the time,that Syrian Mi-23, except maybe for Apex missile and Highlark radars, was effectively "virtual carbon copies" of the best operative in URSS !!
;after it declare itself very surprised .... and even implicitly belittle Col V. Dubrov...... for the complete incapacity ,by part of the Soviet official, to realize the great impact on the air to air engagements in Beeka Valley achieved by AIM-9L (resposible for the vast majority of the downing by part of IAF against the AA-2 equiped Syrian aircraft ).B. S. Lambeth describe the weapon as a true revolutionary system under a technical and tactical stand point, and the main technical deciding factor in the air over Lebanon, a true "star performer" with its own words, sustaining also that the silence of Dubrov on this wonder must be considered a sad attempt to hide at the RuAF operators the great capabilities enjoyed by the enemy and the absence in Soviet arsenal of anything similar.
Today ,of course, we laugh of similar assertions ,because we already know that Col Dubrov himself probably had laughed soundly thinking at the efficency of theirs disinformation program ,and because we are perfectly aware that at the time in which that analysis was writed not only Soviets had already introduced R-73 , at comparison with which the AIM-9L employed by IAF and USAF was litterally a toy , but also the first HMS , but at the time , in the fog of Cold War those was the positions shared by majority of NATO's analysts .
Bonza image that still today ,in 2011, someone is still convinced that "T-72" was the paper tank of Gulf War and "Mig-29" the aircraft confronted in Kosovo !!
This show clearly the true winning ingredient in the "monkey model" program's recipe : it point on our blinding tendency at self celebration.
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I can assure you that western armies were never sure that Sovjet/Russian T-72s are easy to defeat just because the coalition whipped the floor with Iraqi T-72s.
And you cannot have it both ways.
On the one hand we talk about a totally unrealistic battle in a flat like a pan desert between an equal number of T-90s and Leopards which is going to result in most Leopards being destroyed before they enter effective firing range.
On the other hand you talk about Russian tanks tactics were several tanks are able to concentrate their fire from different angles.
As if a sane commander would run head on into an enemy position without any numerical superiority, cover or support.
How often do you think a T can exploit the range of it's missiles? Even in a desert one rarely gets the LOS to do it.
I also already mentioned how hard it is to keep a maneuvering target in sight at these distances.How often did Sovjet crews made live fire training with these missiles, how often do Russian crews now?
The idea of the tube launched missiles being the ultimate killer which decimates enemy tank forces at leisure doesn't work in real life.
There are reasons for these missiles not getting developed that much anymore, for Russians trying to get longer KE penetrators into their autoloaders, for tanks normally carrying just a small number of them,...
And you cannot have it both ways.
On the one hand we talk about a totally unrealistic battle in a flat like a pan desert between an equal number of T-90s and Leopards which is going to result in most Leopards being destroyed before they enter effective firing range.
On the other hand you talk about Russian tanks tactics were several tanks are able to concentrate their fire from different angles.
As if a sane commander would run head on into an enemy position without any numerical superiority, cover or support.
How often do you think a T can exploit the range of it's missiles? Even in a desert one rarely gets the LOS to do it.
I also already mentioned how hard it is to keep a maneuvering target in sight at these distances.How often did Sovjet crews made live fire training with these missiles, how often do Russian crews now?
The idea of the tube launched missiles being the ultimate killer which decimates enemy tank forces at leisure doesn't work in real life.
There are reasons for these missiles not getting developed that much anymore, for Russians trying to get longer KE penetrators into their autoloaders, for tanks normally carrying just a small number of them,...
Unrealistic battle ? Are you serious Waylander?
For be concise : in virtually all the battlefields of the most crucial and decisive MBT's battles of the last 40 years , both fought ( from "Valley of Tears" battle of 1973 to "Battle to 73 Easting" or Basra Battle of 1991 ) or ....luckily.... never fought (like the truly capital ,and super-accurately studied "Fulda Gap" battle ) similar capability would have been not only fully used , but a substantial unused range's margin would have been present !!
About "concentrate" two ATGM from different angles at the same target , it become a very easy task when you enjoy a range of engagement advantage truly crushing (in the order of several Km) and your opponent is a behemoth with a turret even disproportionately bigger and longer for its overall size .
And i also already mentioned how ,at the exact contrary ,the farther is your target the more become easy to keep it in gunner's sight even using only manual command ? (naturally in T-90, the whole after-targeting sequence is executed automatically by the 1V528-1 Tank Ballistic Computer including collimation of laser beam with the selected target in the last seconds of engagement ).
Yeah, I am serious.
Putting two companies of tanks into a pan flat desert and letting them punch it out while they are on a collision course is not realistic.
The Valley of tears showed that a fast firing, accurate and powerfull gun is what is needed the most as well as crew protection and being able to reload and evacuate without having to expose oneself on the tank.
Et voila the Merkava was born...
The ability to reach out and touch at 4+ km comes at a distant rank. The Israelis adressed this by introducing the Lahat but just as with the Russians it's not the ultimate game changer nor is it perceived as such by the Israelis.
The battle of Eastings 73 as well as other engagements in ODS saw Abrams crews being able to service their targets with their gun fire without having to rely on the Brads and their TOWs for long range sniping (although the additional AT-capability provided by the IFVs came in handy).
The Iraqis would have gained much more from better guns/ammunition and optics/TIs than from some tube launched ATGMs.
It's not like their BMP mounted AT-5s carried the day for them even against Bradleys.
You are blowing the impact tube launched ATGMs have on armored warfare way out of proportions. I am not saying that they aren't usefull. They sure are in some situations that's why the Sovjets/Russians decided to carry a handfull of them. But making such a game changer out of them is way over the top.
Putting two companies of tanks into a pan flat desert and letting them punch it out while they are on a collision course is not realistic.
The Valley of tears showed that a fast firing, accurate and powerfull gun is what is needed the most as well as crew protection and being able to reload and evacuate without having to expose oneself on the tank.
Et voila the Merkava was born...
The ability to reach out and touch at 4+ km comes at a distant rank. The Israelis adressed this by introducing the Lahat but just as with the Russians it's not the ultimate game changer nor is it perceived as such by the Israelis.
The battle of Eastings 73 as well as other engagements in ODS saw Abrams crews being able to service their targets with their gun fire without having to rely on the Brads and their TOWs for long range sniping (although the additional AT-capability provided by the IFVs came in handy).
The Iraqis would have gained much more from better guns/ammunition and optics/TIs than from some tube launched ATGMs.
It's not like their BMP mounted AT-5s carried the day for them even against Bradleys.
You are blowing the impact tube launched ATGMs have on armored warfare way out of proportions. I am not saying that they aren't usefull. They sure are in some situations that's why the Sovjets/Russians decided to carry a handfull of them. But making such a game changer out of them is way over the top.
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