Also the Force Structure Review of 1991 (or later year, can't remember) detailed that another six Anzac hulls would be built tailored for AAW.
Also the Force Structure Review of 1991 (or later year, can't remember) detailed that another six Anzac hulls would be built tailored for AAW.
I was soundly spanked on another site for suggesting that this may have been a better way to go rather than upgrading the FFGs.Also the Force Structure Review of 1991 (or later year, can't remember) detailed that another six Anzac hulls would be built tailored for AAW.
The AAW Anzac would have been a much better ship than a FFG upgrade (it would be new for starters) but the FFG upgrade was always a gap fill between the Perth DDGs and the AWD. Unfortunately the filler has taken almost as long as he gap to be ready… But chronologically they are incompatible, the FFG upgrade only exists because of the AWD program and would not have been needed if AAW Anzacs had been ordered around 2000 to replace the FFG.I was soundly spanked on another site for suggesting that this may have been a better way to go rather than upgrading the FFGs.
Six new build AAW Anzacs would cost a lot more than the FFG upgrade (3-4 times as much) and could have possibly been built with CEAPAR from scratch if the risk appetite was there. The ninth Anzac and first AAW Anzac wouldn’t be available until 2008 at the earliest even if production dovetailed with the original 10 Anzacs. Williamstown would be full up building them until 2018 for six. Even then they wouldn’t have the space to think about building a LHD without a major multi year levelling and rebuilding of the entire yard. With the Batch 2 Anzac contract it is very unlikely Tenix would have bid for the LHD prime.My thinking was it would deliver a significant increase in capability, possibly at lower cost and would have provided a much better platform for CEAPAR than the standard ANZACs once it became available. It would have kept the work force that built the ANZACs together and perhaps led on to a full local build of the LHDs
The main opponent to AAW Anzacs was the Navy. They did all these studies with AMT and didn’t like the look of what they came up with. Even a stretched MEKO 200 is no where near as big as a KDX II and would be hard pressed carrying anything more than 24-32 VLS cells as well as the medium level AAW system (SPY-1F AEGIS or SPS-48 NTU). The Navy wanted a full DDG 51 type capability because that is what you need for CEC and high end AAW. The Howard Government were more than happy to go along with it after the security rethink bought about by events in 1999-2001.Such a ship would have been a contemporary to the Korean KDX II and could have led to an indigenous capability to design (with US assistance) and build an AWD down the track (following the OCVs?)
I am not familiar with the planned OPCs, could someone point me in a direction where I can read up about what they were planned for? From reading this, it sounds like they would have replaced (complimented?) the Fremantle's and perhaps been something like the OCV's being bandied about. Is that correct?The 1990s FSR was to build the six AAW Anzacs after the first batch and to also build 12 OPCs at Tenix. So if the Howard Government had kept this plan in office presumably they would have kept the OPCs as well. Cancelling the OPCs to save a few hundred million in ship build cost was the worst force structure decision they made. The additional cost compared to the ACPB would easily have been recouped in the past five years and the next 10 via the redundancy of MFUs in border control missions. Not to mention how more capable they would be.
Except for that giant oversized Seasprite (scale people) that is the OPC. They were designed for SEA waters and the maritime interdiction role. 12 were to replace the Fremantles from around 2000ish onwards. Tried to sell them to Malaysia but that when down the drain when our then PM told off their then PM. I've got a .pdf of the brochure somewhere and will post it here when I find it.im not sure but this might be what their talking about
Shipbucket - Never Built Designs/Australia/Aus OPV Transfield JPV-OPC 1.gif
Interesting that the sketch includes what looks like Harpoon tubes and what I assume is a small VLS for Sea Sparrow or something similar. Added to the gun (76mm?) and the Typhoon system it seems like a lot more firepower than I'd expect from a Fremantle replacement. I'd like to see the pdf if you can find it mate.Except for that giant oversized Seasprite (scale people) that is the OPC. They were designed for SEA waters and the maritime interdiction role. 12 were to replace the Fremantles from around 2000ish onwards. Tried to sell them to Malaysia but that when down the drain when our then PM told off their then PM. I've got a .pdf of the brochure somewhere and will post it here when I find it.
Weapon fit was to be (from front to back) a MK 2 57mm Bofors, 2XMk 36 SRBOC, 4 Harpoon missles, 8 Nulka decoys and a 25/30mm gun.Interesting that the sketch includes what looks like Harpoon tubes and what I assume is a small VLS for Sea Sparrow or something similar. Added to the gun (76mm?) and the Typhoon system it seems like a lot more firepower than I'd expect from a Fremantle replacement. I'd like to see the pdf if you can find it mate.
Ahh, thanks for the information mate. Didn't know the significance of the ship design in the decision to procure Seasprites, it seems ridiculous that they'd go for them after the OPV was cancelled. The whole saga almost beggars belief.Weapon fit was to be (from front to back) a MK 2 57mm Bofors, 2XMk 36 SRBOC, 4 Harpoon missles, 8 Nulka decoys and a 25/30mm gun.
Good little ships, Whilst I have a soft spot for our PM with balls (Keating) he stuffed any chance of these ships getting up by telling off Mahathir :nutkick......Mahathir did deserve it though.
When the Malaysians selected the B+V MEKO over the Transfield (aka Tenix) OPC the RAN’s project was not cancelled (1998). The importance of Malaysia to the RAN’s acquisition of the OPC is hugely overplayed in ‘common knowledge’. The RAN still had a requirement for them but the Howard Government chose to just buy patrol boats to save a few hundred million (1999). This was against the Navy’s advice who still wanted the OPC and a later CN (Ritchie who oversaw introduction of the Armidale) expressed that the acquiring a non aviation capable ship to replace the Fremantle was the greatest regret of his period as chief. Before East Timor and 911 Howard cut Defence to the bone as fiercely as Keating and Hawke before him.The crazy thing is that the OPV'c where cancelled before the contract for the Sprog's was signed, so we could of / should of been operating S-70's MK2's off the ANZAC for a decade by now if military acquisitions actually made any sense.
Fair enough point on both the Harpoon/Penguins and 57mm/76mm as both make much more sense for our Navy. One very little "+" of the Sprog being canceled is that now the space on ANZAC's that was designated to hold the control surfaces (AKA "Wings") of the Penguins is no longer required for that purpose so we use it as a weights gym (we already had cardio).When the Malaysians selected the B+V MEKO over the Transfield (aka Tenix) OPC the RAN’s project was not cancelled (1998). The importance of Malaysia to the RAN’s acquisition of the OPC is hugely overplayed in ‘common knowledge’. The RAN still had a requirement for them but the Howard Government chose to just buy patrol boats to save a few hundred million (1999). This was against the Navy’s advice who still wanted the OPC and a later CN (Ritchie who oversaw introduction of the Armidale) expressed that the acquiring a non aviation capable ship to replace the Fremantle was the greatest regret of his period as chief. Before East Timor and 911 Howard cut Defence to the bone as fiercely as Keating and Hawke before him.
In RAN service the OPC wouldn’t have carried Harpoons because the Seasprites would have carried Penguins. Shipboard helos are much better than ship launched missiles for anti ship – much longer reach. Also the 76mm would have likely been fitted and the ship was designed for either. The fit out in the imagery was for the Malaysian requirement.
Ahh, interesting, thanks mate. I wonder how different things would have turned out had the Super Lynx been acquired instead, from what I've read it seems the Lynx/Sea Skua combination has a pretty good batting average in the ASuW role (though I don't know if the RAN was keen to go with Sea Skua).When the Malaysians selected the B+V MEKO over the Transfield (aka Tenix) OPC the RAN’s project was not cancelled (1998). The importance of Malaysia to the RAN’s acquisition of the OPC is hugely overplayed in ‘common knowledge’. The RAN still had a requirement for them but the Howard Government chose to just buy patrol boats to save a few hundred million (1999). This was against the Navy’s advice who still wanted the OPC and a later CN (Ritchie who oversaw introduction of the Armidale) expressed that the acquiring a non aviation capable ship to replace the Fremantle was the greatest regret of his period as chief. Before East Timor and 911 Howard cut Defence to the bone as fiercely as Keating and Hawke before him.
In RAN service the OPC wouldn’t have carried Harpoons because the Seasprites would have carried Penguins. Shipboard helos are much better than ship launched missiles for anti ship – much longer reach. Also the 76mm would have likely been fitted and the ship was designed for either. The fit out in the imagery was for the Malaysian requirement.
The Seasprite was fine, nothing seriously wrong with it, except the delay in developing the AFCS. The only problem was the bureaucracy changed the safety standards required while the project was underway.Ahh, interesting, thanks mate. I wonder how different things would have turned out had the Super Lynx been acquired instead, from what I've read it seems the Lynx/Sea Skua combination has a pretty good batting average in the ASuW role (though I don't know if the RAN was keen to go with Sea Skua).
The MH-60R is a much better choice because it can be introduced without much development work and risk. RAN’s requirements for the FNACS [Future Naval Aviation Combat System] was for both close and distant ASuW configurations. Close would presumably use HMGs, Hellfire, etc and distant a stand off missile (Penguin, Harpoon, etc). If they had to chose then close would be the most pressing need. NFH90 is only being developed with Sea Marte ASM (similar to Penguin) and would need a development campaign to be integrated with Hellfire.On a related topic, how do you think things are stacking up between the NFH90 and the MH-60R? While they both have their pros and cons, the MH-60R seems like the safer bet to me (and I suppose it'd enable the RAN to share Hellfire stocks with the Army as I believe that's the Romeo's primary anti-surface weapon, don't know what's been integrated onto the NFH90 for that role), but then I'm not familiar enough with the requirements to really offer an informed view as to which would be the better option.
Agree the MH is the best option, which for all intensive purposes would be a straight swap (so to speak)The MH-60R is a much better choice because it can be introduced without much development work and risk. RAN’s requirements for the FNACS [Future Naval Aviation Combat System] was for both close and distant ASuW configurations. Close would presumably use HMGs, Hellfire, etc and distant a stand off missile (Penguin, Harpoon, etc). If they had to chose then close would be the most pressing need. NFH90 is only being developed with Sea Marte ASM (similar to Penguin) and would need a development campaign to be integrated with Hellfire.
People seem to forget that what naval helo's are most used for is to carry personnel (i,e boarding parties). The Romeo can carry....wait for it.... a GRAND total of ONE passenger. The logical choice for our future naval helicopter is the one that can carry a full boarding party without removing it's dipping sonar's and operator consoles (which that take up nearly all the very small cabin of a Romeo) The USN is big enough to operate the Sierra (Cargo/passenger) and the Romeos(Combat) but we do not have the luxuryAgree the MH is the best option, which for all intensive purposes would be a straight swap (so to speak)
With regards to the old OPC design, how much of that do you think will be reflected in the proposed OCV in the 09 White paper ? Have any legitimate designs been put forward yet ?
?? Not sure what you mean, isnt that the point of having the two types of helo ? the MRH-90 for personnel and the MH-60R for ASUW etc ? I think the combination of the two with the platforms on the way would have most situations covered ?People seem to forget that what naval helo's are most used for is to carry personnel (i,e boarding parties). The Romeo can carry....wait for it.... a GRAND total of ONE passenger. The logical choice for our future naval helicopter is the one that can carry a full boarding party without removing it's dipping sonar's and operator consoles (which that take up nearly all the very small cabin of a Romeo) The USN is big enough to operate the Sierra (Cargo/passenger) and the Romeos(Combat) but we do not have the luxury
Plus the fact that Romeo has a pathetic range and we need to reduce (a long stated requirement of the ADF) the number of Helo platforms we operate.
We should of bought Seahawks instead of Sea Sprites 15 years ago but not now, The naval version of the MRH-90 is the only logical choice now.
I strongly disagree that a major requirement of the Navy's future Helo will be Boarding Party insertion. In fact of all the jobs we require of ship's organic helos these days, BP insertion is close to, if not last on the list of priorities. Fast rope insertions of Naval BPs these days are very, very rare.People seem to forget that what naval helo's are most used for is to carry personnel (i,e boarding parties). The Romeo can carry....wait for it.... a GRAND total of ONE passenger. The logical choice for our future naval helicopter is the one that can carry a full boarding party without removing it's dipping sonar's and operator consoles (which that take up nearly all the very small cabin of a Romeo) The USN is big enough to operate the Sierra (Cargo/passenger) and the Romeos(Combat) but we do not have the luxury
Why?We should of bought Seahawks instead of Sea Sprites 15 years ago but not now, The naval version of the MRH-90 is the only logical choice now.
I strongly disagree that a major requirement of the Navy's future Helo will be Boarding Party insertion. In fact of all the jobs we require of ship's organic helos these days, BP insertion is close to, if not last on the list of priorities. Fast rope insertions of Naval BPs these days are very, very rare.
IF a fast rope serial is required, there will be absolutely no issue in having the ASW kit removed. And if you are that worried about the ASW threat that you cannot afford a 1 or 2 hour helo turnaround, then realistically you wont be worried about doing any unopposed boardings.
It is a non-issue.
Forget fast roping, what I am worried about is having a Helo providing overwatch on a boarding, I have faith that a proven MH-60R will be be there overhead, reliable and effective.
Can we rely on the 90 to be airborne to provide that cover to our BPs? It is not known.
Will the 90 give us the ASW capability we have been lacking for so long, that is not known.
Will the 90 provide us with the airborne ASuW capability that we need, again that is not known. Need I point out that the last unknown we put faith in here went by the name Seasprite.
Why?
MH-60R is not only proven and available right now, but for a ship deployed to the MEAO (or anywhere else), getting parts for a Romeo would be easy.
And have you seen how tight the MRH-90 fits onto an ANZAC flight deck and into a hangar? I worry about what kind of SHOLs we would have to work within, including pitch and roll during traversing. Cant use the capability if you cannot back the thing out of the hangar door in aything above SS2, nor launch it with the slightest deck movement.