Per - Defence Projects Report
Reading between the lines it seems that the NZDF were not able to get defence officials and the cabinet to fund them better. This is suprising because a number of times in the requirements analysis section of this report, it seemed as if the cabinet default position was to give them slightly less than the lowest acceptable requirement. The LUH section has quite some variance between the 2003 version and the 2006 version over airframes. It seems that the 03 version was rather in depth and then the 06 version slanted to a more acceptable fiscal position. The best and final offer scenario came from a political decision and not an operational one. The NZDF got its MUH - but not enough.
When reading the report in terms of the MUH-LUH buy the benchmark position should be Option 5C. That is 10 medium utility aircraft (NH-90 TTH) and 10 training and light utility aircraft (AW-109). The report stated that 10 LUH was the effective and optimum mix to meet all key operational requirements, in tasks such as humanitarian aid and disaster relief operations, suitable for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance roles. Of which 4 would be available for training. The 5 bought by the Labour government were only for training. All the extra role stuff was for media spin. Option 5B of 9 MUH and 8 LUH was the baseline it seems. Even then option 5B may delay response for counter terrorism due to concurrent tasking and no allowance had been made for attrition. It seems we are now going to meet option 5B - well maybe. The 9th MUH in a box is that attrition airframe one could say. The report is not clear on this - whether it is 9 operational MUH of 8 with a spare to achieve the option 5B level. However I note that due to favourable FX conditions the total cost of the project is $84m less than the original $777m. This means that a further NH-90 is possible, which will mean that Option 5B would be definately achieved if that funding is allowed to complete the projects capability ojectives.
Without the extra 3 airframes been purchased it seems as if the LUH would not have been able to offer much more than training. Though we were going to get one further LUH the inadequacies of Option 3A would have remained. Five LUH would not meet level four capability requirements, would provide inadequate counter terrorism capability and have little capacity for other government agency support. Also with just 5 there would be higher operating costs per aircraft. With eight aircraft we can now at least enable pilot and aircrew training, provide limited capacity for deployments of short duration (in the Pacific), and enable a limited amount of tasking in support of the NZDF, the Government and other departments and agencies. However, the optimum purchase of 10 LUH's (5C) would be best as it would offer the NZDF the right amount of flexibility. Again 4 LUH training aircraft and the ability to deploy 3 aircraft at DLOC with rotations. What I would like to see is the NZDF work towards achieving option 5C. This would mean that a third tranch of 2 LUH and a second tranche of 2 NH-90 (one of which has current funding capacity within the project allocation) to be purchased.
As for the SeaSprite rumours. I have read some good arguments for and against continuing with the SH-2G on other boards. My thoughts are as follows. If Kaman can get the (I) model FAA'éd and if they are to be offered at an attractive deal, then I would go for it as solution for an interim period. This will allow for a number of issues to be resolved - namely the future frigate / Canterbury replacement. By then the RAN decision will be long settled, which would allow for good project referencing. The question then is how many? As I have indicated in a previous post that there is likely to be 7 vessels in the RNZN which have hanger-deck facilities. This would mean that 3 operational for 5 airframes that we have at present would need to be lifted. The current SH-2G(NZ)'s have done a decade of dogged service an need a LEP in a couple of years. It would seem that buying "new" (I)'s would require them to be put out to pasture or at least INST airframes / attrition parts. With 11 of the (I) models up for grabs it might seem that the number is too many for the NZDF needs. However two things are to be bought to mind. Firstly, that I agree with some views that the excess (I)'s would be sold by the vendor(s) (Kaman/OZ Govt who expect something for all their trouble) as a total package. Might be that if the NZDF want the (I) and they wanted 8 airframes, then the deal might fall over as Kaman would not be so happy to have odds and ends unsold, unless there was another buyer willing to split the purchase. Secondly, if the RNZN acquired all 11 it would give the NZDF something of a luxury that they have not experienced with ships or aircraft for decades - spare tasking and/or attrition capacity. They could keep 8 flying happily in support / training of the RNZN vessels as well keep 3 in Reserve whilst canabilising the older (NZ)'s if needed. If the NZDF decide to get something truly multi-role down the track - for instance a German MESHD to replace the Endeavour or a small LHD like the Endurance 160 / 14K tonne baby Mistral, then those "spare" SH-2(I)'s would be soon gainfully employed. The Endurance / Mistral would provide for an adequate ASW platform if embarking a couple of (I)'s as could a MESHD vessel as well.
BTW as an aside - my personal view is that if we were offered $150m for the Canterbury - deliverable in 36 months to say the Phillipines who have / may have 7 Billion Peso's to spend on a MRV then I would say do it and then get the MRV that we actaully need for the future along the lines of a Endurance 160. Unfortunately that wont happen. Reading the current Report and again having a look at the Coles Report quickly today - I cannot stop thinking that it was possibly the worst decision we made. Though the C-130 upgrade and F-16 MLU would be a close run thing. ( If we were to get the Phillipines to buy the Grey Ferry we could squeeze some of those 17 A-4K's which will need a new home in a few weeks - chuck them in as a suprise) :laugh
One thing further, since I am on a paragraph roll, is that the only thing that would worry me regarding a further Protector OPV to be used as the basis of a Littoral Warfare Support vessel would be that its archilles heal - its two engines are not isolated / protected from each other - would mean that that would have to be addressed. Also the puny 25mm upfront. OK for EZZ patrols but if the vessel were to get actually in the real littorals - anything larger than a 25mm onshore if say the vessel is operating close to shore, would put it under a great risk of being immobilised. Militia's or any other motely group with access to cheaper - old weaponry with a better range than 2500m and the stuff is out there, would be a problem. So it has to be able to cope with nutters with technicals. If those issues can be sorted then it might be a passible solution. Nevertheless, the Protector OPV is still a flawed vessel in many ways and I also have reservations whether we should build another vessel just because we have one of a type anyway. (That is why I am not convinced over us building a Canterbury based JSS type vessel.) A JSS type vessel yes indeed, but not to the extent of digging ourselves deeper into a hole. As Lucas says a module system is best and I also agree with him that a vessel that can also fufill some presence and projection would be a big plus. And yes a survey module in the RNZN as NIWA are not the most objective of agencies.
I think the NZDF will reduce to a depot size in Wellington other than Defence House. A place really to store and oganise for the frequent Ceremonials and such things as AR parade nights, which they will probably be forced to share with the Rockies.
