OpinionNoted
Banned Member
I agree it would be bad for everyone throwing nukes around,but indonesian nukes would be less of a threat to me than no australian nukes.
Past History - Australia's Bid for the Atomic Bomb.
- Thread starter gf0012-aust
- Start date
I agree it would be bad for everyone throwing nukes around,but indonesian nukes would be less of a threat to me than no australian nukes.
What guarantee? If Pyongyang decided to significantly up the ante against the south (and by extension the US) you can bet that the south will retalliate despite NorKor's nucs. Nucs do not guarantee anything.
As to your assertation that cost has nothing to do with it - that is rubbish. Even if we didn't build or develop any device and just used say the B61's provided by the US - security costs alone would be significant, as would ongoing maintenance, the need to have a nuclear 'chain of command' set up with all the attendant costs.
Given the fact that we face no credible threat of any sort (aside from indonesians plundering sea cucumber and asian long liners ripping into our fish stocks) let alone a threat that we cannot deal with using conventional forces, I see no need. The money is better spent on extra airframes, submarines or intel.
I must be dumb. What does the bolded statement mean?
Right...So everybody has nucs... MAD and we are all safe - is that how you see it? How do you see us using these nuclear weapons? If the Indonesians decide they want to occupy Christmas Island - do we nuke the island? Do we drop the A bomb on Jakarta? How many devices are we going to need here?
Indonesia has organisations like JI within it borders - are you not worried that with all our regional neighbours having nukes that one or 10 of the damned things may go missing? Whilst a nation may adhere to the principles of MAD a terrorist organisation would have no qualms whatsoever. I mean if a relatively stable country like Malaysia can lose a couple of Turmanski turbofans weighing a couple of tonnes each... what about some of the more "careless" nations in our region? What if they proliferate down to the Fiji level? What if we get a more beligerant version of Rambuka conducting a coup? Hmmm, decision, expell the Australian High Commissioner or set off a Nuke in Newcastle?
These risks are big, and possible. You show me the threat we are exposed to now or will be in the future that mean we must have nukes to defend our soil.
OpinionNoted
Banned Member
OpinionNoted
Banned Member
If the south had nukes the north would be able to do jack all.
The israelis managed a nuclear detterent with less resources at her disposal than australia.
I agree with extra subs and fighters,but it will reach the point where the cost of a nuke deterent is the cheaper option.
OpinionNoted
Banned Member
Sarcasm aside...what it means is that the proxies policy needs to fall into line with the great powers policy.
OpinionNoted, can you please start responding to posts with a single, large post rather than making a lot of posts in a row? If you want to respond to multiple posts, you can do this by clicking the multi-quote button next to the reply button. This will change the icon from a red "-" to a green "+". Just set all the posts to which to wish to respond to "+" and click reply, and it will include all of them in quotes in your response. A bit more effort, but it makes it a lot easier to read and keep track of the discussion. 
Cheers
Cheers
StevoJH
The Bunker Group
Just to shove my head into this little love fest.
From memory the death of the Australian Nuclear program had a little something to do with a submarine called HMS Dreadnaught and the wrangling that went on during negotiation over acquiring a reactor for her.
Most, if not all of the British Missile tests of the 1950's and 60's occurred at Woomera for a reason.
Plus, you can't tell me HIFAR was purely for research.
Someone was asking about methods Australia has available for uranium enrichment? The Silex process currently undergoing testing was developed in Australia.
From memory the death of the Australian Nuclear program had a little something to do with a submarine called HMS Dreadnaught and the wrangling that went on during negotiation over acquiring a reactor for her.
Most, if not all of the British Missile tests of the 1950's and 60's occurred at Woomera for a reason.
Plus, you can't tell me HIFAR was purely for research.
Someone was asking about methods Australia has available for uranium enrichment? The Silex process currently undergoing testing was developed in Australia.
OpinionNoted
Banned Member
In what circumstances an australian government sees the need too use nukes is neither within my or your grasp,so your above statement in regards to christmas island is nonsensical.
Nukes are in existence and they have been slowly spreading and that spread will inevitably continue.
The question of the security of other nations nukes in regards to in country rouge elements?...well im not going to be drawn into what ifs.
Im also not going to try justify an australian nuke push in regards to being seen as a good global citizen.
Bonza..will multiquote from now on.
I think he was making the point that you need an ensured delivery system, ie one that can't be intercepted. Though I personally disagree, as unless you can guarantee an intercept you are risking the annihilation of entire cities.
I suppose however that basing one's nuclear deterrent on cruise missiles could potentially be dangerous if one wishes to deploy conventional cruise missiles as well, as it would be very difficult for an enemy to discriminate between nuclear and non-nuclear responses, thus risking escalation of a conflict. I believe the same factor has stood in the way of conventional loads for ICBMs such as Trident. Don't know if it would be as pronounced a risk with cruise missiles, but it's something to consider.
Personally I'd rather the region stay non-nuclear, as if Australia went nuclear I think Indonesia would follow shortly thereafter, which could in turn (and I say could because I don't understand the politics of the region enough to say for sure) prompt similar responses from Singapore and Malaysia. Perhaps if Australia was under direct threat from a large nuclear state I'd feel differently, but for as long as that isn't the case I think the regional tensions provoked by nuclear weapons would outweigh the benefits of having them. Just my opinion.
I can understand where you are coming from Bonza. But if Australia aquiring nuclear weapons would create an arms race, what countries would be next? Do you think the Indonesians have the capabilities (money, technology,resources) to build their own? Or would you expect them to buy them of another country, and if so, who? (I cant think of many (any) countries that would be too keen on selling the indos nukes).
I find it also quite unlikely that Singapore would go nuclear, as with Malaysia. I think right now we dont really have a need for them, but I don'tt think we should completely write it off. It is always a possibilty, and Australia does have the capabilties to build our own, and if need be, we certainly could. I think we should focus more on getting Australia to use nuclear power first though, before trying to aquire nuclear weapons. It is tough enough getting antis to talk about nuclear power, let alone nuclear weapons.
I honestly don't know how quickly Indonesia could produce a nuclear weapon - but I don't believe they'd be held up for lack of trying if Australia were to go nuclear. How the other countries in the region would feel about Australia and Indonesia moving towards nuclear weapons I don't know, but I doubt they'd take it well.The crux of the issue to me is that once the region starts down that road, it would be very hard indeed to turn around and come back.
Well, as I said if things were different, I might not feel the same way. If we were under threat from a nuclear-capable nation then yes, I could see the benefits outweighing the drawbacks. But without that threat, the side effect of potentially igniting an arms race in South East Asia is, to me, more substantial than the benefits.
See, without a clear threat I don't know how effective a nuclear capability would be in increasing Australia's regional security - right now Australia enjoys an overmatch along our Northern coast by virtue of conventional assets like JORN, a modern navy, substantial air combat capabilities, and sheer distance. If in the present circumstances Australia had nuclear weapons, along with the other major powers in the region, I would expect a decrease in security rather than an increase, because a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile (just for sake of example) has the potential to bypass that conventional overmatch.
Whether major regional powers have the capacity to obtain or produce a weapon capable of reaching Australia's centres of gravity is another question - but as I said above, perhaps it's better not to start down that path, as once it starts, it seems a very difficult thing to stop, and so the eventual deployment of such a weapon cannot be discounted.
I'm all for increased military spending in Australia - particularly in terms of the naval acquisitions (assuming crewing issues could be resolved). But I don't see the need for a nuclear capability at the present time.
Ananda
The Bunker Group
Like I said on my previous post in this thread:
In sense if we go back to that path, we're risking access to high tech and efficient commercial nuclear reactor that many politician in here already recognise as part of big answered for our energy consumption in the future.
Our research facility in Serpong do maintain limited nuclear enrichment technology..but it's for low grade fuel enrichment (can be confirmed by IAEA report and SIPRI data). Moving to nuclear weapons technology is not a thing that you can hide. Why risk that,knowing that Australia will always got nuclear umbrella from US anyway ?
Having nuclear deterent on our own, does not change the fact that the Nuclear Umbrella for Australia will always be there. Thus why us bother to build our own Nuclear detrence if the case only to counter potential nuke from Australia (which in turn will be US ones anyway).
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So let me paraphrase, you are adamant we need nukes, yet you have no idea how or when they could be used?
Every other hypothetical purchase I have seen on this board from aircaft carriers to reactivating the Iowa class BB's is justified by scenarios - and yet you offer none bar the fact that you believe owning nukes would not make us beholden to america's foreign policy?
Question - if we were not beholden to the US forign policy (not aligned as an ally) and equipped with nukes could it not be seen that we (as in Australia) could be considered a threat to the US? Non aligned nuclear countries tend to get grief in case you hadn't noticed.
We are closely aligned with the septics because we chose to be, and because we share broadly similar values and beliefs, not because we need to sit beneath mother USA's wing. Other nations chose not to closely align themselves with the US, and yet they are not being invaded on a weekly basis, and newsflash - not many of them have nukes either.
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The North Koreans are so desperate for hard currency and allies that any nation except South Korea would receive whatever aid in designing and manufacturing devices. I'm not saying it would be easy, but there are definately nations that would assist. I have heard that any decent physicist graduating from universities these days would have the theoritical knowledge to design a basic atomic device.
Why? The Indons and Malaysians have clashed militarily before - if the Indons get the bomb I'd think that the Malays would follow. And as the Singaporeans and Malays have always been suspicious of each other Singapore would follow suit. It becomes a chain reaction throughout the region.
To add to Marc 1's post (there are undercurrent of tension):
1. Since the independence of Singapore on 9 August 1965, there have been Malaysian politicians that have threatened to unilaterally cut-off water supplies to Singapore in violation of binding agreements /treaties (Singapore obtains up to 40% of our water from Malaysia). This is why Singapore aims to be self-sufficient in water by 2061 when Singapore's second water agreement with Malaysia expires. According to Professor Mauzy, in the last 50 years, there have been 37 violent conflicts between states involving water rights and access to water. International law has provided little help in the prevention or permanent resolution of these conflicts, although 200 other water-sharing treaties have been signed globally. For a more in-depth look, read this ISEAS paper.
2. Pedra Branca was a source of bilateral tension between Singapore and Malaysia since 21 December 1979 (when Malaysia unilaterally redrew their maps and claimed Pedra Branca as their territory) and these incidents of tension have been documented by Prof. S. Jayakumar and Prof. Tommy Koh in a 2009 book called "Pedra Branca: The Road to the World Court".
Just because the Singapore Government and the media outlets in Malaysia and Singapore do not play-up these Malaysian initiated incidents from 2000-2008 does not mean that it was not happening. The SAF needed to be prepared for the relevant contingency that may arise from Malaysian actions with the appropriate escalation options to deter them. Thankfully, on 23 May 2008, the ICJ, found that Singapore has sovereignty over Pedra Branca; that Malaysia has sovereignty over Middle Rocks; and that sovereignty over South Ledge belongs to the state in the territorial waters of which it is located.
3. On 17 March 1985 and on 21 December 1986, Palestinian terrorists set off more bombs at or around Faber House, along Orchard Road in Singapore. We believe the bombs were targeted at the Israeli embassy (then located at Faber House) but no one was killed. One of the Palestinian terrorists, Fuad Hassin al-Shara confessed to the bombings when he was captured by the Israelis in 1991. The 21 December 1986 bombing occurred slightly more than 1 month of the then Israeli President Chaim Herzog's visit to Singapore in November 1986. According to Tim Huxley (at page 45 of his book: 'Defending the Lion City'), a state visit by the Israeli President in Nov 1986 "triggered anti-Singapore demonstrations in Malaysia and political controversy lasting several months." Further, I note that Malaysia has diplomatic relations with the Palestinian Liberation Organization.
4. On 26 March 1991, four Pakistani terrorists, claiming to be members of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), hijacked SQ 117 from Subang Airport in Kuala Lumpur with 129 passengers and crew. On 27 March 1991, members of our Special Operations Force (SOF) stormed the plane, killing the four Pakistani hijackers and freeing all passengers and crew. Kindly note that Singapore only officially acknowledged that the SOF existed as unit in 1997, as such, all prior news releases attributed the action to Singapore's HQ Commandos formation. The late Ms Benazir Bhutto issued a denial of PPP's involvement. However, it should be noted that Asif Ali Zardori, the husband of the late Ms Bhutto and current President of Pakistan was included among several Pakistani prisoners whom the hijackers of SQ117 wanted released. However, this is not the only terrorist related activity that is linked to events occurring in Malaysian territory - RSIS has some details here. Please note that I'm not saying that the Malaysian Government has any thing to do with these events (rather that there are security events that occur on Malaysian soil and we need to work with their security agencies).
5. After the SQ117 hijack from Subang Airport in Kuala Lumpur on 26 March 1991 (instead of expressing sympathy, promising to tighten security or increasing security cooperation, as Malaysia had done with the US in the aftermath of Sept 11), the MAF under Dr Mahathir chose to conduct, an combined airborne assault exercise with Indonesia's TNI, codenamed Pukul Habis (Malay for 'Total Wipeout') on 9 August 1991, with a drop zone in southern Johor just 18km from Singapore. Singapore's response was measured and confident. We triggered an Open Mobilisation on the eve of Singapore's 26th National Day.
6. There have been a number of incidents where a decision made by the Malaysian government/armed forces that triggered mobilization in Singapore. According to a senior MAF officer, the MAF was put on alert in late 1998 as politicians argued over the status of the Customs, Immigration and Quarantine (CIQ) checkpoint. Military officials on both sides privately acknowledged that heightened military preparedness did occur. It indicated a tacit acknowledgement on the part of Malaysia's defence officials that they could not allow the CIQ issue to flare into a casus belli. In fact, we, as a country had to develop a system of rotational alertness levels to cope with the need for rapid mobilization in the event of a sudden outbreak of hostilities.
7. Given the past history of incidents of bilateral tension documented above, at a strategic level, the Singapore Government has decided that they cannot and will not rely on Malaysia to act in a manner that advances common interests. While the blame for this situation should be shared equally by politicians from both sides of the causeway, the Singapore Government is not in the driver's seat with regards to Malaysia-Singapore bilateral relations.
8. Therefore, despite the fact that Malaysia is Singapore's second largest trading partner after the EU, Singapore is working to reduce dependence on Malaysia, be it in the supply of fuel, food or water - both Water Agreements when they expire will not be renewed. For example, Singapore used to buy most of our pork, chicken and duck from Malaysia but that has significantly changed. A large portion of our imported fresh vegetable are still from Malaysia. However, today, countries like Indonesia and Australia have permanently replaced a significant number of Malaysian food suppliers to Singapore.
Therefore traditional Malaysian trade links and products sold to Singapore are being replaced permanently. For more info see this 2009 article, "Food consumption and expenditures in Singapore: implications to Malaysia’s agricultural exports" and this 2008 RSIS Commentary which deals with food safety and security for Singapore.
9. On a positive note, things have really changed in Malaysia under the current leadership of Prime Minister Najib Razak - so much so that in June 2009 Singapore's Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew made a 8-day visit to Malaysia and given access to whom he wanted to meet. In another example, Malaysian political leadership has moved from condemning the 2003 US led invasion of Iraq to volunteering to send 60 Malaysian troops/medical personnel to Afghanistan in support of ISAF efforts and even taking part in RIMPAC 2010 (along with other Asean countries like Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore). Thankfully, things have changed with Tun Abdul Razak as Malaysian PM. The 24 May 2010 joint statement by both Prime Ministers demonstrate the change. This agreement has been described as a new era and drew the following Malaysian reactions.
For more information on existing maritime boundary disputes read 'Naval Standoff Between Indonesia, Malaysia' in World Politics Review and this July 2009 article on 'Preventing Incidents at Sea' published in RSIS Commentaries.
Let me highlight 9 points below to demonstrate the trust deficit (and the current state of bilateral relations):
1. Since the independence of Singapore on 9 August 1965, there have been Malaysian politicians that have threatened to unilaterally cut-off water supplies to Singapore in violation of binding agreements /treaties (Singapore obtains up to 40% of our water from Malaysia). This is why Singapore aims to be self-sufficient in water by 2061 when Singapore's second water agreement with Malaysia expires. According to Professor Mauzy, in the last 50 years, there have been 37 violent conflicts between states involving water rights and access to water. International law has provided little help in the prevention or permanent resolution of these conflicts, although 200 other water-sharing treaties have been signed globally. For a more in-depth look, read this ISEAS paper.
2. Pedra Branca was a source of bilateral tension between Singapore and Malaysia since 21 December 1979 (when Malaysia unilaterally redrew their maps and claimed Pedra Branca as their territory) and these incidents of tension have been documented by Prof. S. Jayakumar and Prof. Tommy Koh in a 2009 book called "Pedra Branca: The Road to the World Court".
(i) At page 46 of the book by Prof. Jayakumar and Prof. Koh, the two authors stated that:
(ii) Beyond the above incidents, it is also a matter of ICJ court record that Malaysia which had in the past arrested Singapore's fishing vessels to increase tensions, including through the use of physical violence against Singapore fishermen in the vicinity of Pedra Branca.
(iii) The incidents quoted above are a clear indication of hostile intent by the Malaysian Government as they try to create alert fatigue. The fact that incidents after 24 July 2003, made no legal sense at all (as that was the date both countries issued a joint notification to the Registrar of the ICJ, with regards to the agreement to adjudicate the dispute), is an indication of Malaysian hostility (which contributes to the bilateral trust deficit). Looking at the pattern of behaviour, it is clear that the Malaysians were potentially planning an incident if the ICJ ruling was unfavorable (but thankfully, UMNO were able to claim that the ICJ judgment was win-win).
"Of particular concern was a marked increase in the number of intrusions of Malaysian Government vessels in the waters around Pedra Branca. For example, from the period 1990-2000, there were some 64 incidents. However, in the next eight years from the period 2000-2008, there were a total of 563 recorded intrusions with the highest number of incidents (167) in 2007 alone. These Malaysian actions did not make any sense to us because the Court would take into account only the conduct and activities of both sides prior to the critical date."
(ii) Beyond the above incidents, it is also a matter of ICJ court record that Malaysia which had in the past arrested Singapore's fishing vessels to increase tensions, including through the use of physical violence against Singapore fishermen in the vicinity of Pedra Branca.
(iii) The incidents quoted above are a clear indication of hostile intent by the Malaysian Government as they try to create alert fatigue. The fact that incidents after 24 July 2003, made no legal sense at all (as that was the date both countries issued a joint notification to the Registrar of the ICJ, with regards to the agreement to adjudicate the dispute), is an indication of Malaysian hostility (which contributes to the bilateral trust deficit). Looking at the pattern of behaviour, it is clear that the Malaysians were potentially planning an incident if the ICJ ruling was unfavorable (but thankfully, UMNO were able to claim that the ICJ judgment was win-win).
Just because the Singapore Government and the media outlets in Malaysia and Singapore do not play-up these Malaysian initiated incidents from 2000-2008 does not mean that it was not happening. The SAF needed to be prepared for the relevant contingency that may arise from Malaysian actions with the appropriate escalation options to deter them. Thankfully, on 23 May 2008, the ICJ, found that Singapore has sovereignty over Pedra Branca; that Malaysia has sovereignty over Middle Rocks; and that sovereignty over South Ledge belongs to the state in the territorial waters of which it is located.
3. On 17 March 1985 and on 21 December 1986, Palestinian terrorists set off more bombs at or around Faber House, along Orchard Road in Singapore. We believe the bombs were targeted at the Israeli embassy (then located at Faber House) but no one was killed. One of the Palestinian terrorists, Fuad Hassin al-Shara confessed to the bombings when he was captured by the Israelis in 1991. The 21 December 1986 bombing occurred slightly more than 1 month of the then Israeli President Chaim Herzog's visit to Singapore in November 1986. According to Tim Huxley (at page 45 of his book: 'Defending the Lion City'), a state visit by the Israeli President in Nov 1986 "triggered anti-Singapore demonstrations in Malaysia and political controversy lasting several months." Further, I note that Malaysia has diplomatic relations with the Palestinian Liberation Organization.
4. On 26 March 1991, four Pakistani terrorists, claiming to be members of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), hijacked SQ 117 from Subang Airport in Kuala Lumpur with 129 passengers and crew. On 27 March 1991, members of our Special Operations Force (SOF) stormed the plane, killing the four Pakistani hijackers and freeing all passengers and crew. Kindly note that Singapore only officially acknowledged that the SOF existed as unit in 1997, as such, all prior news releases attributed the action to Singapore's HQ Commandos formation. The late Ms Benazir Bhutto issued a denial of PPP's involvement. However, it should be noted that Asif Ali Zardori, the husband of the late Ms Bhutto and current President of Pakistan was included among several Pakistani prisoners whom the hijackers of SQ117 wanted released. However, this is not the only terrorist related activity that is linked to events occurring in Malaysian territory - RSIS has some details here. Please note that I'm not saying that the Malaysian Government has any thing to do with these events (rather that there are security events that occur on Malaysian soil and we need to work with their security agencies).
5. After the SQ117 hijack from Subang Airport in Kuala Lumpur on 26 March 1991 (instead of expressing sympathy, promising to tighten security or increasing security cooperation, as Malaysia had done with the US in the aftermath of Sept 11), the MAF under Dr Mahathir chose to conduct, an combined airborne assault exercise with Indonesia's TNI, codenamed Pukul Habis (Malay for 'Total Wipeout') on 9 August 1991, with a drop zone in southern Johor just 18km from Singapore. Singapore's response was measured and confident. We triggered an Open Mobilisation on the eve of Singapore's 26th National Day.
6. There have been a number of incidents where a decision made by the Malaysian government/armed forces that triggered mobilization in Singapore. According to a senior MAF officer, the MAF was put on alert in late 1998 as politicians argued over the status of the Customs, Immigration and Quarantine (CIQ) checkpoint. Military officials on both sides privately acknowledged that heightened military preparedness did occur. It indicated a tacit acknowledgement on the part of Malaysia's defence officials that they could not allow the CIQ issue to flare into a casus belli. In fact, we, as a country had to develop a system of rotational alertness levels to cope with the need for rapid mobilization in the event of a sudden outbreak of hostilities.
7. Given the past history of incidents of bilateral tension documented above, at a strategic level, the Singapore Government has decided that they cannot and will not rely on Malaysia to act in a manner that advances common interests. While the blame for this situation should be shared equally by politicians from both sides of the causeway, the Singapore Government is not in the driver's seat with regards to Malaysia-Singapore bilateral relations.
8. Therefore, despite the fact that Malaysia is Singapore's second largest trading partner after the EU, Singapore is working to reduce dependence on Malaysia, be it in the supply of fuel, food or water - both Water Agreements when they expire will not be renewed. For example, Singapore used to buy most of our pork, chicken and duck from Malaysia but that has significantly changed. A large portion of our imported fresh vegetable are still from Malaysia. However, today, countries like Indonesia and Australia have permanently replaced a significant number of Malaysian food suppliers to Singapore.
(i) In the case of pork, it a major dietary component of the Chinese who make up 75 percent of the population. However, Singapore has totally banned Malaysian pork products since 1999 (upon the discovery of the Nipah virus). Currently, pork products in Singapore are largely from Australia, China, France, Netherlands, Canada, and Denmark. BTW, presently, Indonesian island of Pulau Bulan supplies about 23% of fresh pork to Singapore and 25% of pork sold in Singapore is imported from Australia. To give an idea of the scale of swine imports, in 2008, Indonesia exported 29,000 tons of live swine to Singapore.
(ii) With AVA in concern with Avian Influenza or its subtype- H5N1, imports of poultry from Malaysia have decreased as much as 98% from 2,035 tonnes in 1999 to 50 tonnes in 2006.
(ii) With AVA in concern with Avian Influenza or its subtype- H5N1, imports of poultry from Malaysia have decreased as much as 98% from 2,035 tonnes in 1999 to 50 tonnes in 2006.
Therefore traditional Malaysian trade links and products sold to Singapore are being replaced permanently. For more info see this 2009 article, "Food consumption and expenditures in Singapore: implications to Malaysia’s agricultural exports" and this 2008 RSIS Commentary which deals with food safety and security for Singapore.
9. On a positive note, things have really changed in Malaysia under the current leadership of Prime Minister Najib Razak - so much so that in June 2009 Singapore's Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew made a 8-day visit to Malaysia and given access to whom he wanted to meet. In another example, Malaysian political leadership has moved from condemning the 2003 US led invasion of Iraq to volunteering to send 60 Malaysian troops/medical personnel to Afghanistan in support of ISAF efforts and even taking part in RIMPAC 2010 (along with other Asean countries like Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore). Thankfully, things have changed with Tun Abdul Razak as Malaysian PM. The 24 May 2010 joint statement by both Prime Ministers demonstrate the change. This agreement has been described as a new era and drew the following Malaysian reactions.
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TaranisAttack
Banned Member
Ahh this old chestnut!
The thing that amazes me everytime it comes up if the speed with which people declare their country can produce a nuke. Typically, they try to argue that being an advanced country automatically comes with a nuclear weapon capability, but this is clearly not the case much like being a first world nation does not make you capable of making an indigenous fighter jet, jet engine, aircraft carrier or SSN and the knowledge to make these is a lot more accessible. Getting back to the timescale, the times tend to be a figure which they feel would allow them to develop it in the period running up to the war, and so is based not on the time required but rather on the time in which their country would need to have completed development. The epic speed is of course attributed to "war economies", which I have come to refer to as magic fairy dust, which forumers can use to make their impossible dreams, possible.
In reality though, when you break it down, and look at what is needed to be done, what can be done in parallel and what cannot, the real relevant capabilities that exist already and consider little things too like simply bringing the engineers and scientists together reality shows it takes several years at least and that assumes the country is a fair way towards the nuke already.
The final point I'd like to make is testing. A nuke will need a test, after which subsequent development stages would need to be carried out. This is blatant red flag to the enemy. As several posters have pointed out, if Australia needs a nuke to fight a war, then its most likely because their enemy has got a nuke themselves. The enemy could wait around for Australia to aquire the capabilities to flatten their cities or they could attack Australian facilities first on the grounds that Australia is trying to obtain nukes to be hostile.
With regard to cruise missiles ect, certainly they can be nuclear armed, most flying things can be, its just a warhead like any other really. The problem is developing a small enough warhead to fit the missile!
The thing that amazes me everytime it comes up if the speed with which people declare their country can produce a nuke. Typically, they try to argue that being an advanced country automatically comes with a nuclear weapon capability, but this is clearly not the case much like being a first world nation does not make you capable of making an indigenous fighter jet, jet engine, aircraft carrier or SSN and the knowledge to make these is a lot more accessible. Getting back to the timescale, the times tend to be a figure which they feel would allow them to develop it in the period running up to the war, and so is based not on the time required but rather on the time in which their country would need to have completed development. The epic speed is of course attributed to "war economies", which I have come to refer to as magic fairy dust, which forumers can use to make their impossible dreams, possible.
In reality though, when you break it down, and look at what is needed to be done, what can be done in parallel and what cannot, the real relevant capabilities that exist already and consider little things too like simply bringing the engineers and scientists together reality shows it takes several years at least and that assumes the country is a fair way towards the nuke already.
The final point I'd like to make is testing. A nuke will need a test, after which subsequent development stages would need to be carried out. This is blatant red flag to the enemy. As several posters have pointed out, if Australia needs a nuke to fight a war, then its most likely because their enemy has got a nuke themselves. The enemy could wait around for Australia to aquire the capabilities to flatten their cities or they could attack Australian facilities first on the grounds that Australia is trying to obtain nukes to be hostile.
With regard to cruise missiles ect, certainly they can be nuclear armed, most flying things can be, its just a warhead like any other really. The problem is developing a small enough warhead to fit the missile!
With regard to the UK, the SSBNs are independent in their ability to carry out a nuclear strike, they do not require any codes of any form as the "keys" are onboard in two separately controlled safes (WSO and senior officers IIRC). This system was chosen precisely because it would be very difficult for us to provide a system of sending the codes post attack. The US by constrast has a fleet of doomsday planes and a control centre under a mountain, these are clearly to expensive for us to do.