Welcome to DT and I note that the other members have been rather gentle with you. I'm going to be more direct about what I think but hopefully ultimately more helpful by being harsher in my reply.
Please also feel free to post in the introduction section and tell us something about yourself.
firstly look at the terrain, its not really tank territory especially in the north which isnt as industrialized as the south
I would suggest that you read up some of the older tank related threads in DT and the use of tanks in the First Korean War because I have no wish to debunk your statements when you are evidently not shy about offering your opinion without prior reading (see below for key word search and a couple of links for suggested reading).
Kindly also note that both Waylander and DavidDCM are tankees and they will be able to tell you much more than me on of the topic of tanks.
secondly the will to fight the north are fanatical and arent fussed about casualties
The moment the North Korean units are combat ineffective because of casualties or if they cannot advance further because of overwhelming fire power that the US and S. Korean forces can bring to the fight - at that moment the N. Koreans will be concerned with casualties. However, the cost to stop any N. Korean advance (even with US help), will be horrendous for the S. Koreans.
whereas the south are a democracy and would no doubt sue for peace as soon as casualties mount,
American soldiers in Korea refer to the fighting on the peninsula between 1950 and 1953 as “the first Korean War.” The implicit assumption is that there will be a second. The Second Korean War (if it occurs) will be an existential fight for national survival for the S. Koreans. Planning for the Second Korean War is complex, deadly serious and deals with the issue of echelonment - so you should read up before comment.
In fact, the moment you have different echelons, the action-reaction dynamic changes and the second echelon forces can be used to gain the initiative. To use a boxing analogy, the first echelon forces is the left jab and the second echelon forces is the KO punch on the right. Combined-arms divisions and Corps of front first echelons create the penetration, and mechanized divisions/corps act as front mobile groups to exploit success into the depths of the defense. Attacking enemy rear areas is a key feature of any attack. This is so because the main fight must be with the second echelon, otherwise it will become a battle of attrition. If the opposition is strong, two divisions could leap frog each other in the scheme of maneuver.
For the Americans, the secret to winning is not in numbers alone. Mobility provides the means to mass in time and place arriving at a reasonably matched force ratio. The intelligent use of terrain and mobility maximizing one’s own capabilities will help minimize one’s own vulnerability. In the end, battles are won by four things:
(i) the courage of the soldiers/airmen (and conscript morale is always an uncertainty);
(ii) the quality of the leaders;
(iii) the excellence of the training; and
(iv) the right tactics.
That’s why in equipping and the training of S. Korean's army, they have ensured that force ratios come down into some reasonable proportions - something that the S. Korean Government, the US Government and their respective armed forces have put some serious thought into. If you are interested in a more in-depth look at comparative force structures, there's a 2006 look at '
The Asian Conventional Military Balance'. For me, the morale/courage of the troops on either side of the Korean divide will be an important consideration (and I can't presume to speak for the Koreans).
thirdly north korea has been building up for this war for 50 or so years the south has but not to the same extent all of north koreas war industry is underground or partially underground and alot of the infrastructure for the military is underground they also have the capability for a good defence in depth with there massive army and reserves and no doubt asymmetrical warfare ,
Then you have no idea of the size of the S. Korean Army and how prepared they are as a society for war compared to UK today (where you are from). The S. Korean armed forces are definitely not fanatical but they have fairly good capability and with about 680,000 active troops (and 3 million reservists) their numbers are not small.
the souths reserves on the other hand would take longer to muster.
I would suggest that you do not know what you are talking about. How long is long?
In 1973 Yom Kipper War, Israel needed 24 hours to mobilise her conscripts. Learning from that war, Israel can do it in much less time now. Today, Israeli mobilization would be measured in hours. The same would apply to conscript heavy countries like S. Korea and Singapore. I would expect that the S. Koreans can do so in the same manner and likely in the same time frame. It's all thought through as a process at the national level.
Due to security concerns I would not be able to post my country's actual response time for war mobilisation in a forum, but it would be faster than you can imagine.
fourthly the south on its own wouldn't have the capability of air supremacy due to the air denial the north can operate.
Do you know what Air Supremacy means? Why is Air Supremacy needed, when Air Superiority will suffice?
Depending on the methods used to conduct the strike, we may also desire to add in the element of air superiority within a specific block of airspace. An example would be, given the use of precision stand-off weapons, a desire to have air superiority within a block altitude of 15,000 feet above ground level to 50,000 feet, e.g. above AAA range but within SAM altitudes. The SAM threat is more manageable than AAA for S. Korea and the US because of the their combined ability to conduct SEAD. Let's also define some basic terms below for your benefit (see this
post on air-superiority-101):
(i) Air Parity / Air Denial = the lowest air power state where friendly aircraft can conduct air operations sufficient enough to deny the enemy air dominance while conducting those airpower activities necessary to halt an initial enemy advance, eg. during certain periods at the Battle of Britain in 1940, the UK was only able to achieve air parity over the sky above Britain
(ii) Air Superiority = three different ways to think about it: One, control of space, two, control of time, and finally, control of geography or a combination of those three. Depending on the commander’s intent and tasking, we can seek to attain air superiority over a specific area, eg. Allied air superiority during the Normandy Landings in June 1944
(iii) Air Supremacy = a degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference, eg. The Israeli air force achieved a very lopsided victory over the Syrian air force and their SAM units at Bekaa Valley in June 1982
(iv) Air Dominance = highest airpower state when the requisite effectiveness of airpower is achieved, eg. The Israeli air force achieved air dominance during the Six-day War of 1967 by destroying nearly the entire Egyptian and Jordanian air forces, and half the Syrians’ air force on the ground
Do you have any idea, how big is the S. Korean air force? Let me set out S. Korean's combat aircraft according to Dec 2009 Flight International figures (with 541 combat aircraft, the S. Koreans are ranked 9th in terms fighter fleet in the world). Let me list a few of the fighters in their inventory:
F-16C........... 118
F-16D............ 51
F-15K............ 39 (with 21 on order)
F-4D/RF-4C 135
F-5E............. 159
You would do well to start with some basic reading on air power, as follows:
After reading the above links, it would be clear that the N. Koreans are not structured to achieve air superiority against capable opponents with tertiary capabilities.
although the south has a far greater military in terms of technology air power and navy but alot of depends on chance and luck if the south hammers the north like gulf war one then the south would win, also we dont know the level of training the north has, fuel is the norths problem and i dont think they could sustain a mechanized offensive but i think there more infiltration in depth rather than a mechanized focus,
To avoid further embarrassment, read up this
Oct 2006 article by Robert D. Kaplan and also search for information on OPLAN 5027. May I suggest, reading before posting, as it would enhance the quality of your posts.
IMO, not only are the S. Koreans not keen on war between the two Koreas, both China and US are also not keen to get into a shooting war, given the level of interdependence. Except for the US, the other parties (Japan, China, N. Korea and S. Korea) are happy with the status quo of N. Korea as the buffer state. Washington and Seoul are going through the usual motions that follow a major North Korean provocation. There will be talk of closer military coordination; vows of a less restrictive "self-defense" policy and even consultations with China. But in the end, little will change. For me, the unknown, this time, is N. Korean motivation in engaging in this hostile act of sinking a S. Korean vessel.