Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

[gf0012-aust]

The German and Swedish navies have operated coastal boats for the Baltic requirement which you correctly point out are very far removed from RAN requirements as you can get. However the U212a/214 is based on the 209 boats which were mainstream boats for global export. At 1800t and 8000 mile range you are just not being honest calling these coastal boats (yes the armament is not huge at 12 rounds but hit probability is much higher with modern rounds.

My reference has been pointedly aimed at what our requirements are. 21nn's are just not suitable for deep blue sustained missions. If other navies seek to do so, then fine.

I am not critical of the Collins and Australian technical developments. The Upholders were OK boats but they biggest issue with them was they were build by a Navy that didn't love them and regarded them as 2nd class to SSNs, and offered them up as soon as cuts came.

No, they were also a flawed design, a legacy in reverse of the Gotland/Collins principle. Just as you can't upscale subs you cannot descale subs.

I spent 4 hrs in a conference in 1999 hearing about all the technical problems with Upholders and why the RAN would not buy them as a second squadron while Collins was under development. That class was a design disaster

The RAN view on AIP seems to fly in the face of all Navies the unique requirement argument is poor Japan is installing Sterling AIP on her boats.

Japans sea management and doctrine has determined that AIP is necessary. Quite frankly the way that the japanese operate has no relevance on what we do - in fact their primary goals are far different. I gather you don't understand what the primary mission of the Oyashios was?

You seem to be oblivious of all the RIMPACSs where the USN red teams failed to acquire and kill Collins assets due to bad assumptions on their part about non AIP vulnerability. Similarly outside of partial prosecution events and in larger training areas and events AIP was also not found to be viable for our mission sets. Associating what other navies do with what RAN should do is completey irrelevant

Again, it can be and often is irrelevant what other navies seek to do in their force structure, force development and platform needs. We manage 1/9th of the worlds oceans and do that with conventionals. No other nation that has conventionals has responsibility for such a broad (and different oceanic management conditions)

Outside of the US we have the largest subwarfare restricted training area in the world, we train and we also teach other navies in that "square".

We train regularly with over 26 other navies - far more than what other large conventional sub users do - and esp japan

The sub is principally about destroying less well defended assets, special operations (which is very coastal) are also useful as is anti submarine operations. It is natural in peacetime or the relative state we live in that the focus should be on prestige big targets,

Sorry thats just completely wrong.

a subs mission changes with the tactical and strategic requirement. they are the only asset in modern militaries which are regarded as being on a relative war footing.

their primary role until threat is elevated is ISR, the ISR for australia is long ranging and in years past included regular operarations up to the north eastern soviet archipelago - some of which has only been declared under 30 year provisions recently. Collins was designed around the lessons learned from our Oberons, from the canucks, from the UK and the US

 

[1805]

I am sure he can defend himself and I think this is a healthy debate which is a good thing. However I think there is a need for some real open minded thinking on naval strategy which recognise the successes of the past and the not so successful. I respect professional opinon but we shouldn't become so deferent that we can never question.

I the UK an unpopular government is unable to question the military leadership that is far from in the right all the time.

I prefer a Churchill that repeatedly sacked generals and I accept some innocent went with the guilty, rather than a Lloyd George who resented Haig did nothing at the time and then wrote bitter memoires which distorted the truth.

When the RN lost it's carriers in the 60's it lost it's direction and much of reason for existance, it hung on to SSN as a future, The SSN men controlled the development of the RN. Any challenge to this established view is not welcome, they often quote HMS Conquerer in teh Falklands and yet an Oberon could have performed as well. Cruise misslies fired from SSNs look like a wonder weapon very, Blarite the ideal PR weapon delivered by SSNs....not much use recently though. I also suspect Iran will have better air defences than Iraq.

ISR is a nice to have, the 209 in the ARA struck real fear in the RN.

 

[gf0012-aust]

However I think there is a need for some real open minded thinking on naval strategy which recognise the successes of the past and the not so successful.

The 2 specialty force elements that are not close minded are subs and specwarries. they are the ones that get more actual work and exposure than any other service elements

I respect professional opinon but we shouldn't become so deferent that we can never question.

Its not the questions, its the logic that counts.

I prefer a Churchill that repeatedly sacked generals and I accept some innocent went with the guilty, rather than a Lloyd George who resented Haig did nothing at the time and then wrote bitter memoires which distorted the truth.

Using Churchill as an example to Australians is not a good look.
3 examples.
gallipoli
greece
9th Division

When the RN lost it's carriers in the 60's it lost it's direction and much of reason for existance, it hung on to SSN as a future, The SSN men controlled the development of the RN. Any challenge to this established view is not welcome, they often quote HMS Conquerer in teh Falklands and yet an Oberon could have performed as well.

And this is an example which makes me question your background and/or technical comprehension.

None of the oberons were in a position to get to the specific locs in that theatre and effect an outcome. The nukes were the only ones able to reach the targets of opportunity, be able to effect a blockade, and be able to escalate kinetic effect if the argies elected to sally forth. A number of oberons were 3-5 days out when cessation of hostilities took place

Cruise misslies fired from SSNs look like a wonder weapon very, Blarite the ideal PR weapon delivered by SSNs....not much use recently though. I also suspect Iran will have better air defences than Iraq.

Cruise missiles are also designed to minimise manned losses as it means that you can target any static target not covered by Geneva, Berne and Vienna Conventions and in range.

Its a curious thing to say when the post analysis of GW1 and GW2 shows what effect they did have and what manned resources were saved and able to be used for other stages.

ISR is a nice to have, the 209 in the ARA struck real fear in the RN.

What? ISR is the principle operating vignette of any submarine prior to going to war - and then is still a major subset of its toolbox.

Its not a "nice to have" - its a major operational function of all subs in all navies. they do it before they are a specwarrie truck, they do it prior ro strangling sealanes. they do it concurrently prior to tracking targets, they concurrently do it prior to killing a target.

For navies that have extensive maritime territory, its a fundamental day to day tasking.

 

[the road runner]

Common sense would say that a 6000 ton boat is going to be a lot harder to hide than a 3000 ton boat. but maybe this is not really an issue?

I guess it depends where it is hiding,the Indian and Pacific are big oceans.
Really enjoying this topic/thread

Regards

 

[gf0012-aust]

I guess it depends where it is hiding,the Indian and Pacific are big oceans.
Really enjoying this topic/thread

Regards

It not about physical size.

Its about hull management, its about design integrity, its about vibration management, its about passive and active acoustic management, its about training.

there are 7000-8000 tonne subs that are acoustically a quantum leap "quieter" than 1500 tonne subs.

 

[StevoJH]

I guess it depends where it is hiding,the Indian and Pacific are big oceans.
Really enjoying this topic/thread

Regards

Wouldn't logic dictate that it is easier to acoustically silence a larger boat then a smaller one because there is more space to dissipate the sound within the boat, and more space to utilise for noise isolation.

 

[the road runner]

Wouldn't logic dictate that it is easier to acoustically silence a larger boat then a smaller one because there is more space to dissipate the sound within the boat, and more space to utilise for noise isolation.

I will take yours and gf words for it,as i am not an operator or i have not served.
I just read books,websites to get my info and i have to trust the Author is well educated on the matter.

Enjoying and learning alot from this discussion

Regards

 

[StevoJH]

i am not an operator or i have not served.

Neither am I. I'm just thinking that a larger submarine might create a bit more flow noise around the hull (?) but the larger size would allow the internals to be more isolated whether through additional insulation or though mounting more vibration/noise making systems on "sleds" to isolate them from the main hull.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Wouldn't logic dictate that it is easier to acoustically silence a larger boat then a smaller one because there is more space to dissipate the sound within the boat, and more space to utilise for noise isolation.

and we're on the way......

 

[StingrayOZ]

Think of cars, large cars are quiet often (not always) quieter on the inside. Being small does not have to mean, being quiet. Compare an S class and a A class merc. Different ends of the market yes, but the additional frontal area of an S class and volume is offset by additional insulation, design, bushes, aerodynamics etc. Small cars are not always more aerodynamic either. Think radar. B2 can be stealthier than a F-15.

Weapon, acoustic, sonar systems I think have progressed beyond the point where the physical smallness of a submarine is overtly important (for Australian designs).

We would benefit much more from greater room for weapons, systems, hull improvements, power, sensors, range (surface and subsurface) from a larger hull.

I think we are looking at a fairly conventional sub with proven technologies (diesel and batteries) but with incremental improvements in each of those, but ~5,000-6,000t. Dismounts will also be intergral to its design as these will nodoubt play a larger role. Electronic mast of course, crew # I think would be simular, but in a larger boat accomodation would be slightly roomier.

 

[StevoJH]

and we're on the way......

Have I mentioned that as volume increases the ratio of surface area to volume decreases yet?

 

[gf0012-aust]

Being small does not have to mean, being quiet.

Its a common misconception that smaller subs must be quieter. acoustic mitigation is not based on size, its about physical noise and vibration management and acoustic distribution.

Have I mentioned that as volume increases the ratio of surface area to volume decreases yet?

No more comments from me on hull management issues.

 

[Beagle]

Sorry to go back a bit but this needs correction.....

Although RAN subs have never been involved directly in a war where they have sunk an enemy ship, they have seen plenty of "use". The incidences are numerous, and they are doing front line stuff every day that risks equipment and lives.

Sorry mate but I don't want any misconceptions (even though you were talking about moden events). Our subs have been invovled in combat and when I read this I thought I would take the opportunity to highlight the bravery of AE2 during the first world war. It sneked through the mine fields with the moorings scrapping on the side of the submerged hull and made it into the Sea of Marmara. Its actions running amok allowed the ANZAC day landings to go ahead.

 

[StevoJH]

No more comments from me on hull management issues.

My apologies for straying too far into areas that you can't talk about. Think I might go look through that list of cars you posted on the other site....

 

[1805]

The 2 specialty force elements that are not close minded are subs and specwarries. they are the ones that get more actual work and exposure than any other service elements



Its not the questions, its the logic that counts.



Using Churchill as an example to Australians is not a good look.
3 examples.
gallipoli
greece
9th Division



And this is an example which makes me question your background and/or technical comprehension.

None of the oberons were in a position to get to the specific locs in that theatre and effect an outcome. The nukes were the only ones able to reach the targets of opportunity, be able to effect a blockade, and be able to escalate kinetic effect if the argies elected to sally forth. A number of oberons were 3-5 days out when cessation of hostilities took place



Cruise missiles are also designed to minimise manned losses as it means that you can target any static target not covered by Geneva, Berne and Vienna Conventions and in range.

Its a curious thing to say when the post analysis of GW1 and GW2 shows what effect they did have and what manned resources were saved and able to be used for other stages.




What? ISR is the principle operating vignette of any submarine prior to going to war - and then is still a major subset of its toolbox.

Its not a "nice to have" - its a major operational function of all subs in all navies. they do it before they are a specwarrie truck, they do it prior ro strangling sealanes. they do it concurrently prior to tracking targets, they concurrently do it prior to killing a target.

For navies that have extensive maritime territory, its a fundamental day to day tasking.

You are taking me litterally which if my fault for being careless. Yes ISR is an important role for sub in peacetime and wartime. But warships are built for use in war and the primary role of a sub is to attack less well defended assets. I question some of the need for such long range subs for Australia, surely primarly role must be national defence, followed by some power projection. but is it really necessary to cover the whole Pacific? My original point was that buy a standard or customised proven platform and you have the choice to build more. 12 boats is a lot a greater home market than Germany, Spain, Sweden and France all current builders and exporters. If Australia chose to design it's own boats to a commercially attractive size, with a competitive labour market she could have a very successful industrial capability which maybe more strategically useful. Defence procurement is about choices and compromises, but there are very few counties that can afford/or want 4000t boats

 

[gf0012-aust]

Defence procurement is about choices and compromises, but there are very few counties that can afford/or want 4000t boats

I am not going to discuss the tactical and strategic reasons why Aust seeks to have long range capability.

Smaller subs are fine for other countries, assuming that there is a value for govt, or a value for the ADF based on sheer availability and cost has minimal relevance to tactical imperatives

we don't have a need or desire to sell this capability to other countries, although we do sell or have transferred some discrete capability to close allies. we're not in the business of selling subs, we're in the business of getting the capability we need at whatever approp process is avail. there are probably only three other countries with similar needs, and that does not mean that we would make all capability available anyway.

In the first instance no decision has been made about anything but powerplant, but the sub is designed to deal with our strategic threats as forecast and estimated for the next 30-45 years.

You have still misunderstood what a subs role is, you're looking at it purely from the kinetic level and that is completely and palpably incorrect. Even when hot, they are highly focussed on ISR as they act as a forward "picket" and sensor element of the force and/or HW majeur.

My contribution to this particular topic is stopping as of now.

 

[hairyman]

Just a slight change to the topic. Ie, time frame. Any chance that if we go ahead with the plan to build 12 submarines, that the first will be commissioned before the 1st Collins is due to be decommissioned, thereby increasing our fleet size to 7? Or is Collins in such a state that it would be decommissioned earlier if possible?:

 

[LancasterBomber]

Again, not really relevent to 'primary' propulsion solutions but what about redundancy measures aka system backup propulsion in the event you flood engines/lose batteries. Or perhaps it could be a supplemental propulsion solution once a cruising speed was achieved (I really have no idea of this kind of stuff so go easy).

Could you not use electrolytic oxygen generators (EOGs) to fuel biological matter encased in propulsion related systems to maintain a modest cruising speed sparing your fuel/batteries for mission critical/operational/tactical usage (i.e for rapid accelerations).

Regardless of its degree of appropriateness (I admit it is pretty pie in the sky stuff and early days) to the Collins MarkII project (Sea 1000) it is an area of real interest to me.

[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=33eRZDZ9wWg"]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=33eRZDZ9wWg[/ame]

Argonne Scientists Use Bacteria to Power Simple Machines

We still have a long way to go in the development cycle so I do hope those involved dont get completely married to their design ideas (yes be realistic about what is achievable but remember we have at least two more cycles of moores law to play out before we must lay down the ink on plans.

Buying "off the shelf" is below us now (in this particular area). It would represent a regression of national security IMO. We are building on our submariner history, culture and operational expertise to continue on the journey to putting our most strategically important military assets on a sustainable path - a mature submariner eco-system. As we have learnt from Collins Mark I - its not just about the hardware...

 

[gf0012-aust]

As we have learnt from Collins Mark I - its not just about the hardware...

It's been made pretty clear occupationally and at a number of future sub "events" I've been to in the last few months that the future sub project is a national interest project.

that means build at home - and it's also looking beyond our prev partners to others (and that thankfully would be the US as they have pulled both Collins and the Astutes out of the messes that they were languishing in)

 

[KiwiRob]

Using Churchill as an example to Australians is not a good look.
3 examples.
gallipoli
greece
9th Division

Ok I get the reference to Chuirchill and Gallipoli (not that I really understand why we make such a big deal out of it, more Kiwis and Aussies died on the Western Front, more Poms died at Gallipoli than ANZACs).

But I don't understand why he's at fault for Greece and the 9th Division?