Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

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battlensign

New Member
True, but the one which remains in service is itself to be replaced in the 2018-2020 timeframe with some other vessel. Unfortunately there has not been any real, reliable word as to what time of vessel that is to be.

Vessel types put forth have run the gamut from HSV to another Canberra-class LHD, with lots of options in between.

-Cheers
According to the Defence Capability Plan (DCP) 2009, the aqcuisition of a Strategic Sealift vessel is a matter for Government consideration "beyond 2019".

Brett.

PS. There are things that can be done to the LPAs to make them (or even one) useful in the interim - probablem is that it costs money.
 

StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
Well they do fit. I imagine this means the NH-90 is going to bemore popular

I would imagine as much commonality as possible with the regular fleet.

Honestly once we have our LHD I think all the fleet should have simular fitout in terms of navalisation.
 

icelord

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Good news I guess.
I wonder what the differences, if any, are there between army & navy versions of the helicopter? Marinised frame, floaties, etc.
Does anyone know?

rb
One has Navy Painted on the tail, the other has Army...thats pretty much the limits of it AFAIK. If i recall frame and all is based on MRH-90, not the NH-90 which is a seperate model of the same design.
 

blueorchid

Member
One has Navy Painted on the tail, the other has Army...thats pretty much the limits of it AFAIK. If i recall frame and all is based on MRH-90, not the NH-90 which is a seperate model of the same design.
They are MRH-90's, the Army and Navy aircraft will come out of the 46 order pool. The Navy gets it six first as they need to replace their Seakings pronto.
I gather that when the Navy MRH's are due for deep maintenance, they will be replace from the pool.

Cheers
 

1805

New Member
Yeah, but the demands of warfighting (emergency procedures, flooding etc) are going to require a significant crew no matter the amount of automation.

Collins crews aren't exactly huge now...





Hence my caveat. However, no force element in ADF is being expanded to such a significant degree, not even OTHER ASW and ASuW assets, so I truly wonder what this acquisition is REALLY about, because pure ASW and ASuW capability ain't it...

Whilst I don't doubt the significant utility of a submarine and don't actually even object to the size of this planned fleet in of itself, I do wonder whether A) we'll ever see it and B) about the capability that we will have to forgoe to pay for it...



I'd suggest the maritime equivalent of a "combined arms" force, would provide greater capability. This decision seems akin to Army suddenly deciding it needs a force of "hundreds of main battle tanks", or the airforce suddenly needing 200x JSF's when the rest of the force is being left at it's present, historically small size and with relatively limited overall capability...

Again, I am not at all aware of the data used to support the acquisition of such a capability and I may be speaking out of my arse, but such a large fleet has not in any realistic way, been justified publicly by defence and seems more like a political decision to me..

Such a large fleet requirement has never appeared in RAN's Plan Blue or other recent strategic documents and Government's only "policy" on this requirement is this:

"
The White Paper reaffirms the long-held view that the primary task of the ADF is to deter and defeat armed attacks against Australia.

To this end, the White Paper recognises that the aim of establishing sea and air control in our primary operating environment does not entail a purely defensive or reactive approach. Rather, we must be able to conduct proactive combat operations at a distance from our shores.

This demands a mix of intelligence, defensive and strike assets to ensure both deterrence and, if that were to fail, an ability to impose unacceptably high costs on any potential adversary. Put simply, we need to be able to take warfare to an adversary’s front door.

The White Paper identified the need for Australia to develop and maintain a force that has a capability advantage and can provide protection against strategic uncertainty.

Submarines are able to stop an adversary from deploying its’ fleet by maintaining sea denial. By imposing disproportionate costs on an adversary, submarines represent an asymmetric threat well suited to Australia’s defence.

The Rudd Government has announced its decision to acquire 12 next generation submarines. The future submarine builds on our experience with the Collins class, aims to offer greater range, endurance and payload."


Absolutely NO link whatsoever between the number of subs and potential deployment activities. At least with the JSF purchase it is clearly identifiable - 4x operational squadrons. Army is given strategic direction - a brigade and a battalion.

With the subs - a lot of fluff and then "we are going to acquire 12x boats" IS the strategic direction that is publicly announced... I've no doubt that precise activities of the RAN submarine squadron IS classified. I've no problem with that. What I think should be releasable though, is WHY this many submarines is needed, when other RAN force elements groups and indeed ADF wide force element groups are NOT receiving such a massive enhancment.

The current Collins fleet of 6x is justified - 4x operational boats of varying readiness levels, providing 2x boats "fully" operational at any one time and 2x in varying degrees of maintenance / readiness is the operational requirement that has been publicly discussed.

A further 2x boats are provided to allow for a sustainment capability in the fleet over the longer term and to cater for deeper maintenance activities, though with a surge potential if needed for wartime activities. This has been discussed by defence.

Future submarines have no such strategic direction, publicly announced, which is why I firmly believe this decision is politically based, rather than operationally based.



So you can't see how a domestic nuclear power generation capability is relevant to nuclear powered submarines?

Where are the enriched uranium fuel rods, coming from perchance? Should our "strategically vital" submarine capability be totally reliant upon foreign powers?

Can a foreign power even legally export enriched uranium to Australia???

Personally I cannot envisage the circumstance that we would attempt to acquire a nuclear powered naval vessel, without the capability of refuelling same, domestically within Australia, hence my earlier point...
The RAN would be better of buying the best in class off the shelf boats available the U212a, they will then get the economies of scale. These boats are excellent at cost a 10th of an Astute
 

Bonza

Super Moderator
Staff member
The RAN would be better of buying the best in class off the shelf boats available the U212a, they will then get the economies of scale. These boats are excellent at cost a 10th of an Astute
Collins offers significant capability for the present day, and buying a current platform like a U212 variant doesn't make sense when you consider the future submarine is supposed to be appearing in the 2025-2030 timeframe. Despite rumours to the contrary, all official information points to the future submarine being conventional, not nuclear.
 

1805

New Member
I was using the 212a as an example, this is these are the first true fuel cell boats and the potential looks huge. I would like to see how they shape up to current SSNs
 

t68

Well-Known Member
Collins offers significant capability for the present day, and buying a current platform like a U212 variant doesn't make sense when you consider the future submarine is supposed to be appearing in the 2025-2030 timeframe. Despite rumours to the contrary, all official information points to the future submarine being conventional, not nuclear.

Evan tho i like the idea of Australia designing a new boat from scratch think it is a bit ambitious. The amount of money need to sink in it is huge for a one off boat unless we can get someone interested in buying them also.Who else require's a boat to the same spec as us?

I have never look into the R@D side of thing’s on what it take’s from paper to first of class build, maybe it is better to hook up with the American’s and hitch a ride with the successor to the Virginia class submarine or maybe a redesigned Virgina class ,how much money that would be i don’t know. Who knows it might be cheaper and have some extra money in the kitty for a third lhd and an extra AWD.
 

1805

New Member
Forget SSN it will not happen they are astonishingly expensive, like 10 times the cost of a SSK also I don't buy they argument they are any better. The USN has had a Swedish submarine HMS Gotland on lease with the crew for c3 years now and it has often torpedoed US Ships in exercies. These boats are the basis for the Collins. There is a natural size which works well for SSK about 1800t when you push this up you reduce overall performance/value. Look
the 212a up, this is the future of sub warfare, if the RAN had 12 of these, and some tenders to extend range, they can also act as support ships for FAC/Patrol craft, they would have an incredible stike force. Mind I look at the RAN and I'm very impressed with the value it gets. Its has a great balance of ships and with the new Carriers and if you get F35!!!
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Forget SSN it will not happen they are astonishingly expensive, like 10 times the cost of a SSK also I don't buy they argument they are any better. The USN has had a Swedish submarine HMS Gotland on lease with the crew for c3 years now and it has often torpedoed US Ships in exercies. These boats are the basis for the Collins. There is a natural size which works well for SSK about 1800t when you push this up you reduce overall performance/value. Look
the 212a up, this is the future of sub warfare, if the RAN had 12 of these, and some tenders to extend range, they can also act as support ships for FAC/Patrol craft, they would have an incredible stike force. Mind I look at the RAN and I'm very impressed with the value it gets. Its has a great balance of ships and with the new Carriers and if you get F35!!!
A few points to remember. The LHDs on order are not carriers, and will not be able to have the F-35A Lightning II's which are what is to be ordered, operate from them.

Yes, the USN has leased a Swedish sub and crew for use in ASW exercises. This was done because under certain conditions, diesel-electric submarines can constitute a difficult threat to opposing naval forces. Since the USN no longer operates diesel-electric subs, one (and a trained crew) was needed to act as an OpFor for the USN.

In terms of size/displacement, the RAN Collins-class subs are nearly twice the displacement of the 'natural' displacement. This is not surprising given that the Collins is a long-range, Pacific Ocean submarine, not one designed for operation in the relatively confined waters of the Baltic.

-Cheers
 

Bonza

Super Moderator
Staff member
Forget SSN it will not happen they are astonishingly expensive, like 10 times the cost of a SSK also I don't buy they argument they are any better. The USN has had a Swedish submarine HMS Gotland on lease with the crew for c3 years now and it has often torpedoed US Ships in exercies. These boats are the basis for the Collins. There is a natural size which works well for SSK about 1800t when you push this up you reduce overall performance/value. Look
the 212a up, this is the future of sub warfare, if the RAN had 12 of these, and some tenders to extend range, they can also act as support ships for FAC/Patrol craft, they would have an incredible stike force. Mind I look at the RAN and I'm very impressed with the value it gets. Its has a great balance of ships and with the new Carriers and if you get F35!!!
Why would we want a dozen 212s when we're designing a larger, more capable submarine ourselves?

And as far as reducing value and performance when you push a diesel design over 1800 tons, I think you need to take a long, hard look at designs like Collins and Oyashio before you say something like that... Collins is around 3000 tons, Oyashio somewhere above 2500 if I recall correctly and these are two of the most capable conventionals in the world.

The new Canberra-class isn't a carrier, and isn't going to be operating F-35. This was discussed at length earlier in this thread, I'd recommend reading back through it if you want to check out the discussion. :)
 

1805

New Member
It is a pity some will not be F35b's as this would be a great capability particularly as your ships will have ski ramps? I assume the RAAF stopped that, we have the same problem with the RAF. I agree it is an issue for the RAN the need for such great range, the Western veiw in SSK is they are coastal boats, and when navies have built otherwise they use as cheap SSN and they generally are (UK upholders, AUS Collins). For SSK designs you will soon have a choice of only Germany, Russia, Japan and maybe France/Sweden (but the Swedish yard is now owned by the German competition (The Dutch, UK, Italy have all stopped designing SSK). All the rest are building kits/licence production.
 
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Bonza

Super Moderator
Staff member
It is a pity some will not be F35b's as this would be a great capability particularly as your ships will have ski ramps? I assume the RAAF stopped that, we have the same problem with the RAF. I agree it is an issue for the RAN the need for such great range, the Western veiw in SSK is they are coastal boats, and when navies have built otherwise they use as cheap SSN and they generally are (UK upholders, AUS Collins). For SSK designs you will soon have a choice of only Germany, Russia, Japan and maybe France/Sweden (but the Swedish yard is now owned by the German competition (The Dutch, UK, Italy have all stopped designing SSK). All the rest are building kits/licence production.
The capability offered by F-35Bs operating from a Canberra is debatable, due to issues of space/fuel bunkerage/doctrine - but last time this debate got into full swing, things got pretty heated and the thread got locked. In the spirit of avoiding that happening again I'd recommend reading back through the thread as the issues got covered very comprehensively. :)

The Collins is classified as an SSG rather than an SSK from what I understand, as it is not a hunter killer but rather a conventional fleet submarine, same with the Oyashios I believe. Lots of information available in this very thread so it's definitely worth looking over.
 

1805

New Member
I will leave the F35 debate. I don't think the future is the Kockums Stirling air independent propulsion (AIP) system (the Japanese have just installed), size and weapons numbers are not the sole factor is capability on Subs. A submarine is the orginal stealth technology, as soon as your are discovered you are dead meat. The fuel cell is the future a U212a can travel 2400 mile submerged at 4 knots (if you go much over 5 knot the noise gives you away) is virtually silent. its based on a great design that has developed over 30 years and has sold c50 boats globally. Watch over the next 20 years as Navies upgrade T209 with fuel cell section and buy new boats, Sweden is almost out of the game France will remain but.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
I will leave the F35 debate. I don't think the future is the Kockums Stirling air independent propulsion (AIP) system (the Japanese have just installed), size and weapons numbers are not the sole factor is capability on Subs. A submarine is the orginal stealth technology, as soon as your are discovered you are dead meat. The fuel cell is the future a U212a can travel 2400 mile submerged at 4 knots (if you go much over 5 knot the noise gives you away) is virtually silent. its based on a great design that has developed over 30 years and has sold c50 boats globally. Watch over the next 20 years as Navies upgrade T209 with fuel cell section and buy new boats, Sweden is almost out of the game France will remain but.
You're making some bold assumptions about subs and what their tactical imperative is.

time is against me for a detailed response but:


  • AIP is not the future
  • Fuel cells are not the future, I say that as someone who has attended numerous UDT and Fuel Cell conferences, and as one who has seen various UDT platforms using fuel cell concepts. Tech that I saw 4 years ago in military platforms still hasn't hit commercial capabilities and those systems are already being bypassed by other US developments (ONR and NAVSEA sponsored). In addition, fuel cells have a future with dismounts - I'm not convinced that they will be competitive as other tech under development, The efficiencies to drive the platform and drive the combat system suite are years away - and not competitive for blue long range conventionals.
  • Aust uses larger conventionals for a reason. Small 21nn sized subs are not suitable for the tactical imperative we seek
  • Navies won;t be upgrading to fuel cells, fuel cells will be part of the solution, but there is other tech which is already under review and which offers far greater opportunity across a number of operational and deployment vectors
  • Collins was the mule for Gotland - not the other way around. I worked on various parts of the Collins project at various points in time.
  • The USN didn't lease Gotland for the reasons you state. They were leased to look at how that sized sub with that particular management system would work in specific vignettes against atypical USN assets. The issue of "sinking" USN assets as a measure of capability is not a healthy way to pass judgement on any platform. These exercises are task scripted to generate speciic responses and to force outcomes, the issue of sinking is the same mistake that some make when discussing DACT events like Red Flag.
  • Finally, 21nn's aren't partiocularly suitable for what RAN wants at a combat delivery, systems and force integration level. eg its impossible to fit the common combat room into a 21nn. Thats just but one factor to consider - and one that is important
 

1805

New Member
I hope RAN subs never have to see action, and if they do I am sure they will account for themselves well. But the opposition they will face will be most likely to be U212a/214 designs. I know popularity is not a judge of quality, but on the other side the more you do of something the better you should be at it. On my count the U212a/212/214 has racked up 40 orders this decade alone from 8 countries.
 

t68

Well-Known Member
Any such increase in boats to ALSO involve nuclear power would require a similar increase in domestic nuke power generation capability, attempting to run nuclear powered subs without the domestic capability to support them, would be sheer folly.

The development of a local nuclear power industry even if politically acceptable, (which it is not) would be beyond the capability of Australia to develop in time for these boats, leaving conventionals as the only viable option, IMHO...



:(
I little intresting study being done ,

Asia unrest may spur Aussie nukes: study - Yahoo!7 News

I can't see anything happening about it any time soon.

A dramatic deterioration in Asian security could push Australia to acquire nuclear weapons, a strategy that it abandoned four decades ago, a new study says.

But Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) analyst Dr Rod Lyons says such a decision certainly isn't close nor is it inevitable.

He said the 2006 Switkowski report on nuclear power suggested it would take Australia at least 10 years and probably 15 to bring the first civil reactor into service.

"It's true that Australia might be able to conduct an emergency nuclear weapon construction effort in rather less time, especially if it were to focus on uranium enrichment to provide a uranium 235 bomb," he said.

"In that case, we wouldn't need to build a reactor. But enrichment is still a highly challenging exercise."

Australia flirted with the nuclear weapon option up until the late 1960s, with a 1968 cabinet paper costing a bomb program at what now seems a modest $150 million. Signing the non-proliferation treaty in 1970 closed off that option.

Dr Lyons said for Australia to swing back to a course it abandoned in the late 1960s would mean a huge - and reluctant - change in strategic policy.

"That course would be taken only with extreme reluctance and it's certainly not one that Australian governments have done much to prepare for over recent decades," he said.

Dr Lyons said Australian policies now aimed to achieve regional nuclear order as much as possible by establishing a benign strategic environment and by stressing non-proliferation, arms control and peaceful exploitation of nuclear technologies.

But should the regional approach change, with a rising prevalence of the technologies that could lead to nuclear weapons, Australia might need a different approach.

Dr Lyons said a number of scenarios could lead to a more worrying Asian nuclear order.

One is a weakening of US nuclear capabilities and loss of confidence in US nuclear deterrence. In such an environment, nations such as Japan, Korea or even Burma could develop nuclear weapons.

A revisionist great power could also arise. Much of the momentum towards an Australian nuclear weapon arose in the 1950s in response to communist China.

And the existing non-proliferation regime could collapse.

Dr Lyons said none of these scenarios were likely, but any would heighten the sense of regional nuclear disorder.

In such a climate, Australia might opt for what's termed "nuclear hedging" - maintaining, or appearing to maintain, capabilities to acquire nuclear weapons in a relatively short time, ranging from a few weeks to a few years.

On that basis Australia now has no semblance of a hedging strategy, lacking any enrichment, weapon design or missile capability. However Australia does produce a large amount of the world's uranium.

"Nuclear hedging is a strategy with remarkably long legs: it can be pursued at a modest tempo over decades," he said.

"It typically involves no hasty, expensive strategic programs, but the gradual accretion of expertise and systems."

On that basis, both Sweden and Japan could develop nuclear weapons within a few years.

Dr Lyons said Australia would have good advance warning of changing strategic circumstances, although developing the necessary capabilities could still take 20 years or more.
 
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gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
I hope RAN subs never have to see action, and if they do I am sure they will account for themselves well. But the opposition they will face will be most likely to be U212a/214 designs. I know popularity is not a judge of quality, but on the other side the more you do of something the better you should be at it. On my count the U212a/212/214 has racked up 40 orders this decade alone from 8 countries.
I'm going to to deliberately oversimplify this. It's not the "brand" that counts

It's training
It's doctrine
It's training
It's location
It's training
It's fitout
It's training
It's technology
It's training
It's the actual threat in context
It's training

The red threat in 2020+ is going to be a far different tech set than it is today. In fact some of the future doctrine that will legacy from th energing techsets is completely left of field in a number of are. The future ASW techsets are going through similar "quantrum leap" changes.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
I little intresting study being done ,

Asia unrest may spur Aussie nukes: study - Yahoo!7 News

I can't see anything happening about it any time soon.
I was at a briefing approx 4 weeks ago where various industry "seniors" were point blank told that we would not be getting nukes.

it would require a massive and I repeat MASSIVE change in our threat matrix and regional political circumstances, a massive change in our alliance circumstances for us to even remotely begin to consider nuke powered subs.

Even the opposition which is pro-nuke can't see that horse running the race.

if we're looking at nuke power then you have to look at it from a tactical and strategic (as well as political) analysis. The imperatives to use nuke power aren't enough IMO to initiate massive changes to force support, force structure, security modelling across the entire development base etc.....

there is emergent propulsion techset that offers some of the functionality that is the province of current nukes. Hence why AIP (which RAN did look at 15 years ago) won't "fly" either.

Bear in mind that in exercises, red skimmers hunting Collins assumed they had the advantage in pressing against a diesel and yet were outmanouvred and eventually/ultimately failed to kill the sub.

It's more about training than it is about technology. It's about exploiting opportunity coupled with technology etc....
 

hairyman

Active Member
From what I have read, the government has stated that the propulsion systems it is looking at are more modern that AIP. I know it wont be nuclear, but what it will be I have no idea. Does anybody have any ideas, or is it hush hush?
 
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