Ozzy Blizzard
New Member
That’s approaching Vietnam in scale. And you would need 2x batteries of 155's I would think (12x Guns).
Ozzy Blizzard
New Member
Do we really need to deploy MORE than is already there? The Dutch had an agreement with NATO that their presence in Oruzgan was not open ended, we all knew this was coming. Australian objective in the province is to fully train an ANA Brigade to take over local security, and a battalion battle-group would be sufficient to achieve that goal. Is it really worth an “escalation” over there?
Anyway if we deployed significantly more forces than was “needed” there is a possibility that the Dutch public would be MORE likely to call for a withdrawal of Dutch troops, because clearly they were not needed in Oruzgan. Anyway any more forces and the thing becomes unsustainable.
t68
Well-Known Member
Hang on i think you are getting a little ambitious here.
What is the objective here to train the new Afghanistan military or eliminate the Taliban?
It did not work in Vietnam what makes you think it’s going to work here, i believe the fundamental objective is to control the AO and train the new afghan military to take over. as was the case in Vietnam we had control of the AO but when we did leave the ARVN were not position of strength to take over the AO and left a vacuum of power left for the NVA to fill.
If we can get the kiwis involved i believe it should be made up something like this,
1x mechanised battalion
2x troop NZLAV
1x troop Abrams
1x field battery (use current 105 guns till m777 come on line)
1x NZ field battery
1x flight of tiger if it could be ready in time
6 x hornets with ground support staff (plus ADG)
1x field hospital
Plus what is currently deployed
battlensign
New Member
Yep, cause we are not currently winning.
It depends a little on whether you are talking purely about the question of need for O/Uruzgun or Afghanistan as a whole. We do know that there is less than half of the total troops needed for effective counter-insurgency warfare (which at 20 per 1000 pop. is between 6&700 000 security forces). Kandaks trained by Australian and Dutch forces have, if I remember correctly from Sen Est., in the past been taken and moved to Helmund province in order to support efforts there. It has also been said that OMLTs are too small and it is preferred that there be 'pairings' at company and battalion level. This would allow us to train a full brigade and become part a larger part of the strategy to train sufficient forces to allow us to make an exit later.
You have a point there on the politics. However, I would point out that so long as there is a taliban presence that is able to place IEDs everywhere then we clearly do not have the forces to sufficiently control the battlespace.
Potentially, though I was envisaging my suggested forces as (apart from the SOTG) the 'complete' Australian presence in the province - or at least the complete Army presence anyway, so this would not be 'in addition' to what was currently there.
Brett.
battlensign
New Member
At this stage we currently do not have dominant control of the AO (i.e. IEDs everywhere). The forces I was suggesting would be designed to both aggressively pursue the Taliban and train the Afghan N.A. Brigade. I am also not sure what you mean by 'mechanised battalion', what formation is this, because it certainly is not 5 or 7RAR with M113s........? In terms of sustainability I agree that the forces suggested are only viable if we are not in Timor, but otherwise would leave 1 Battalion in spare for other contingencies/still forming. BTW I did state that what I was detailing was the upper limit of what we could do ('I would be supprised if we could more in the field than:").
Brett.
Ozzy Blizzard
New Member
Well before we address those points I think we need to determine what Australia's (as opposed to the UK or US) geopolitical objectives are in Afghanistan, and whether the level of effort is proportionate to the importance of those goals.
Which would be:
1) Prevention of extremism spreading to South East Asia (unlikely)
2) Preservation and improvement of the US alliance (likely)
3) Prevention of any disruption of the international system (unlikely)
4) Prevention of terrorist attacks upon Australian citizens at home or abroad (likely)
Only one really infringes on Australia's fundamental security (option 1), and that outcome is unlikely even without Australian or international intervention in Afghanistan.
The force deployment levels you outlined (a brigade group) would be comparable to those levels reached in Vietnam. Thus is the defeat of the Taliban in South Asia comparable to the defeat of communism in South East Asia? Considering the threat a foreign power block and strategic competitor to the US having friendly nations in South East Asia posed I don’t think so.
Therefore if you deem the level of force deployed in Vietnam appropriate deploying a Brigade Group to Afghanistan seems excessive considering the conflicts geopolitical importance.
Tripling the force levels will not dramatically change that fact. Vast area's of the Afghan countryside are dominated by the Taliban, another battalion will not allow ISAF to truly dominate Oruzgan beyond the population centres.
The latest edition of ARMY NEWS has an article on the painting of the first of our Abrams with the AUSCAM paint scheme. It look's really good but it dose seem to rule out any of them heading over to "The Sand Pit".
See the image at The Soldiers Army : November 26th 2009, Page 1 - Defence Newspapers | The Soldiers Army
See the image at The Soldiers Army : November 26th 2009, Page 1 - Defence Newspapers | The Soldiers Army
If Australia intends committing more troops for the long haul, one of the primary factors influencing numbers will be attrition rates on both men and equipment. Regular infantry and supporting arms will suffer proportionally higher casualties than SF personnel, primarily because the latter are focused assets assigned to specific missions rather than the daily grind of exposed 'boots on the ground' duties. Plus equipment will suffer, are the Tigers hot and high ready and set-up for the conditions, plus are there enough aircrew / ground crew to support regular rotations? Will the Aus public tolerate a sharp spike in casualties, particularly incapacitating loss of limb injuries in addition to increased numbers of KIA's?
Sensibly the Aus military will also want to keep its troops in the field no more than 6-8 months before bringing them out for a minimum of 12-months, or ideally 24-months. This will allow time for R&R, promotion / trade courses, training (non-Afghan specific) and preemployment training (Afghan specific) for the next deployment. If you look at the UK for example, (which has 25 plus infantry battalions) 3 Para Battle Group is about to deploy on its third tour of Afghanistan. Aussie has less than 8 regular infantry battalions, so how are you going to rotate units through and still give them time out without causing high resignation rates due to increased family pressure?
battlensign
New Member
Where did all of these misconceptions come from.......?
1) The force list I posted was designed around the forces required if the Dutch leave and even I questioned the sustainability.....riksavage has a point on the force depletion aspects as well.
1.A) According to the concepts Abe was outlining, if I understood correctly, then only 4 guns would be needed to support that number of troops. I.e. 2 guns per battalion in that threat environment.
2) The interests that Australia has invested in Afghanistan would appear to be:
A) Alliance management (keeping Aus forefront of dependable allies and preserving the potential for American support in an Australian security issues)
B) US management (Preventing an isolationist/insular world view and outlook coupled with a steady retreat from the world stage as we emerge into a multipolar world) and
C) International security (read regional security - Pakistan and security of its nukes and democratic government hanging on by a thread against a fanatical militant opposition based in difficult to assail tribal lands)
3) Afghanistan and Vietnam are similar in the interests we as Aust. have (if you swap Pakistan concerns for Domino theory). If the Americans attach the wrong meaning and significance to the geopolitical setting then that is a different issue. In Vietnam they thought they were fighting communism when in reality they were primarily fighting Vietnamese nationalism. If the Americans can pull off an Iraq style political solution by turning militias into helpers then the Afghan militias may behave very differently from the Vietnamese counterparts.
4) Ozzy, you cannot claim that on the one hand there could potentially be the appearence of excess troop numbers encouraging the Dutch to withdraw forces and then on the other hand talk of the inability of larger numbers of troops to control the AOs outside of the population centers. Surely the fact of the latter serves the decrease the risk of the former?
Brett.
1) The force list I posted was designed around the forces required if the Dutch leave and even I questioned the sustainability.....riksavage has a point on the force depletion aspects as well.
1.A) According to the concepts Abe was outlining, if I understood correctly, then only 4 guns would be needed to support that number of troops. I.e. 2 guns per battalion in that threat environment.
2) The interests that Australia has invested in Afghanistan would appear to be:
A) Alliance management (keeping Aus forefront of dependable allies and preserving the potential for American support in an Australian security issues)
B) US management (Preventing an isolationist/insular world view and outlook coupled with a steady retreat from the world stage as we emerge into a multipolar world) and
C) International security (read regional security - Pakistan and security of its nukes and democratic government hanging on by a thread against a fanatical militant opposition based in difficult to assail tribal lands)
3) Afghanistan and Vietnam are similar in the interests we as Aust. have (if you swap Pakistan concerns for Domino theory). If the Americans attach the wrong meaning and significance to the geopolitical setting then that is a different issue. In Vietnam they thought they were fighting communism when in reality they were primarily fighting Vietnamese nationalism. If the Americans can pull off an Iraq style political solution by turning militias into helpers then the Afghan militias may behave very differently from the Vietnamese counterparts.
4) Ozzy, you cannot claim that on the one hand there could potentially be the appearence of excess troop numbers encouraging the Dutch to withdraw forces and then on the other hand talk of the inability of larger numbers of troops to control the AOs outside of the population centers. Surely the fact of the latter serves the decrease the risk of the former?
Brett.
Ozzy Blizzard
New Member
I thought 2x guns per battalion was a little light for arty support (I was under the impression that usually it was one battery per battalion), but Abe is in a better position to know than me.battlesign said:
Agreed, however how would increasing our deployed forces by 400% achieve this goal? Ultimately Washington maintains the Australian alliance because it is in Washington's geopolitical interest to do so. As was seen in Desert Storm not deploying every asset we are capable of to a US led war will not jeopardise or even significantly effect the alliance relationship. Australia is a valuable partner in the Asia Pacific region for other reasons than our ability to deploy token forces in coalition operations. Canberra is Washington's London in the pacific, close ties go far deeper than the level of our force commitment to a relatively minor war in South Asia.
Offcourse the alliance requires that we support the US, but I'm not sure any "brownie points" we get for treating Afghanistan like Vietnam will be worth the monetary and human cost.
Again the reasons for US global strategy go far, far beyond Afghanistan or the GWOT.
Americas place in the world fundamentally rests on its global naval domination, it is the elementary driver of US foreign policy and the basic reason for its current prosperity. The USN holds the keys to the global trade system and therefore if anyone wants to participate has to, to some extent, play by the west's rules ( This is a major reason why the Western block outperformed the Soviet block economically). At the very least it prevents anyone else from applying their own set of rules. This mechanism has been the driver of globalisation and the tremendous generation of wealth in the west since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Therefore the US's global position is not only unrivalled in world history, it is extremely valuable. The US will not retreat into isolationism and give up all that because of any defeat in a regional war no matter the cost. Vietnam caused massive political instability, mentally scared millions of American servicemen, left half a million physically disfigured and 50,000 dead. Yet that defeat did nothing to alter the US's global strategy or posture, it didn't even change the policy of containment (all during a time where the world was truly multipolar not simply less unipolar). In fact I don't think total defeat in Afghanistan would even slightly shake US posture.
I don't see this as a realistic concern.
First of all Pakistan is not holding on by a thread. The Taliban in Pakistan pose virtually no threat to the fundamental validity of the Pakistani state. There is no way in hell the Punjabi heartland would even consider joining or even tolerating a Pashtun insurgency gaining power in Pakistan. Without Punjabi support the Taliban taking over would be akin to Tasmanians invading Melbourne and then driving on to take Canberra. This is the reason why the Pakistani military has not only tolerated the existence of these groups for decades but even used them as proxies against India i.e. they only pose an asymmetric threat (as bloody as that is). These groups cannot stand in the face of the Pakistani military as we have seen in the recent offensives.
Secondly the NATO/ISAF presence in Afghanistan is the primary catalyst for current instability in Pakistan. Without western boots on the ground in Afghanistan this would not be a major problem in Pakistan's tribal areas. Thus increasing troop numbers in order to solve a problem that their deployment originally caused would seem to be an illogical course of action.
The fighting in Afghanistan is not so much about Pakistan as the fighting in Pakistan is about Afghanistan. These Pashtun groups have been living and effectively governing the tribal areas for decades, even fighting along side the Pakistani military in Kashmir. Its only when these areas have been used as a base of operations against ISAF forces that the Pakistani military and Pakistani Taliban have come to blows. If Afghanistan were to fall to the Taliban again the most likely outcome for Pakistan would be a return to pre 9/11(ish) relations with Kabul. Almost certainly the fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban would not be a catalyst for the collapse of the Pakistani state.
I disagree. Even if you agree that fighting in Afghanistan is primarily about the security situation in Pakistan (which I don't) the very, very worst case scenario of the Pakistani state collapsing and a counter value nuclear attack on Australian soil by non state actors is not as serious as a global war with the opposing power block having basing and friendly states just 500km from our shores. One would mean a few thousand dead Australian civilians and the destruction of ~5km2 of a major Australian city (and is extremely unlikely), and the other would mean the possibility of high intensity nuclear warfare on Australian soil (only unlikely). Even if dooms-day happened in Pakistan it would not jeopardize Australia's fundamental security. The fall of South East Asia to the communist block most certainly would.
Greater consequences and a higher likelihood; hence the reason why we introduced conscription for Vietnam and have only deployed relatively small forces to Afghanistan.
I wasn't comparing Afghanistan to Vietnam on a tactical level, simply a geopolitical level.
In any case I don't think the US misunderstood their geopolitical- geostrategic goals in Vietnam more than they misjudged the Vietnamese strategic goals. Even if Hanoi's ultimate goals had little to do with communism a united (communist) Vietnam would still have joined the Sino-Soviet military, political and economic block; the precise outcome the US was trying to avoid.
I think you are confusing a political outcome with a military outcome. Obviously the Dutch government and population consider the current troop numbers adequate in view of what they are trying to achieve in Afghanistan, if not they would deploy more. At the political level practically every government contributing combat troops to Afghanistan is looking for the quickest and easiest way out without jeopardising their alliance relationships and international standing, simply because none (including the US) of their major interest are at stake in that conflict. Therefore if you are already committed beyond your initial obligation and your partner in your operational sector decides to deploy forces that would completely replace your own without adverse effect to the war effort, why wouldn't you take the opportunity to withdraw your forces? IMO the only reason the Dutch are staying is because no one else has stepped up to the plate and committed to replace their forces. The Dutch can leave with their reputation intact (they have contributed more than Australia up to this point), have done their part to preserve the alliance and can leave in the knowledge that the hole left by their forces will be quickly and willingly filled. Seems like a no brainer for a leader stuck in an unpopular war on another continent.
In any case doubling our forces in the theatre will do little to aid the security situation beyond the major populated areas in Oruzgan. A million deployed troops wouldn't solve the problem fundamentally. You will never have enough resources to secure the vast rural areas. In any case often ISAF forces are not welcome in rural areas. We have to reach a political solution village by village, valley by valley and in some cases deploying more troops will only hinder that process.
Thank you, that was a pleasure to read. An erudite posting is a pleasant change from some of the fanboi stuff that graces these pages.
rb
it usually WAS 1xArty battery to support an infantry battalion. i.e. A Btry 8/12 provided air mobile/para battery in support of 3 RAR Bn group.
In the UK, 7 Royal Horse Artillery Regt supported the para Brigade.
In the UK, 7 Royal Horse Artillery Regt supported the para Brigade.
t68
Well-Known Member
With upgraded m113as4 coming off the production line now and it is already obsolete in higher intensity conflict arena, i think it is the time to look at an AFV for the ADF.
With the cost in mind for which we payed out for the upgraded APC should we consider keep it in service longer than the planned withdraw date and having a light/heavy cavalry units for the time’s when an AFV is not required ie Somalia/East Timor when the lighter m113 might suffice.
This brings the question that we will have 4 different types of armour is it to much?
Abrams MBT
Bradley/Warrior or what ever we choose
Auslav
M113as4
Bushmaster if you want to count it.
I have a question regarding how the AFV is used in the British Infantry/warrior thread as of this time there are no replies
The typical Aussie infantry section is 8 men with Bradley/warrior you generally have 3 crew plus 6/7 pax in rear kited out. How does this affect the choice of AFV to choose from?
If we went down the same route as the purchase of Abrams and rebuilt some Bradley AFV would it be feasible to do a stretch version so you could put a complete Aussie section in it?
It was designed to keep up with Abrams.
This would also entail expanding the Army again to have the extra cav units, or would this make the Army to armoured centric.
With the cost in mind for which we payed out for the upgraded APC should we consider keep it in service longer than the planned withdraw date and having a light/heavy cavalry units for the time’s when an AFV is not required ie Somalia/East Timor when the lighter m113 might suffice.
This brings the question that we will have 4 different types of armour is it to much?
Abrams MBT
Bradley/Warrior or what ever we choose
Auslav
M113as4
Bushmaster if you want to count it.
I have a question regarding how the AFV is used in the British Infantry/warrior thread as of this time there are no replies
The typical Aussie infantry section is 8 men with Bradley/warrior you generally have 3 crew plus 6/7 pax in rear kited out. How does this affect the choice of AFV to choose from?
If we went down the same route as the purchase of Abrams and rebuilt some Bradley AFV would it be feasible to do a stretch version so you could put a complete Aussie section in it?
It was designed to keep up with Abrams.
This would also entail expanding the Army again to have the extra cav units, or would this make the Army to armoured centric.
the road runner
Active Member
There is the BAE CV90 Family of vehicles.
Combat Vehicle 90 Family - BAE Systems
Also the Rheinmetal Puma IFV
Rheinmetall AG - Germany's biggest procurement project: the Puma IFV is ready to pounce
Both of the Above vehicles are Tracked vehicles,there are also wheeled AFV/IFV
Boxer family of AFV
Boxer (Armoured Fighting Vehicle - VisWiki)
Just to name a few.......
As for Australia needing a IFV,i would assume we will eventually get a small number to compliment our Abrams,approx 100 units.All specualtion on my behalf.
Regards
And IIRC both have been out of production for some time.
ASCOD (Spain/Austria), CV90 (Sweden), Dardo (Italy), Bionix II (Singapore), K21 (S. Korea) & Puma (Germany) are on the market. CV90 has sold to Denmark, Norway, Finland, Netherlands & Switzerland. The others have sold only to their home armed forces, so far.
There's also the Israeli Namer, if you want the most heavily armoured IFV in the world.
Yeah, cause the Israelis are more then keen to share their IFV with the rest of the world
. They wouldnt even share their gunners shielded dome on APCs with Aus, so getting their number one IFV should be easy as...
You do realise that a substantial number of israeli e-systems are shared with and/or purchased by Oz from the israelis?Yeah, cause the Israelis are more then keen to share their IFV with the rest of the world
those systems are of far more use than the Namer....
A
Aussie Digger
Guest
The standard Australian infantry section is 9 men at present.
In an IFV, you would need a driver, a gunner and a crew commander mirroring the crew of an ASLAV-25 vehicle. This would leave a gun group and an assault group of 3x men each.
The difference between a light infantry section of 9 and a mechanised infantry section is the scouts. Without increasing the manning complement of the section, the scout positions are replaced by driver and gunner functions.
However Army is testing and trialling new structures under it's Infantry 2012 initiative. 2RAR is trialling this and the results haven't been finalised as yet, but it seems likely Army's bqsic section strength will remain roughly the same, with perhaps overall platoon sizes changing due to the need to operate heavier weapon systems at a platoon rather than battalion level.
For instance the incorporation of a lightweight mortar system (60mm or similar) into platoon structures has aldeady been recommended...
How this would work in a mechanised battalion that already operates a significantly increased firepower capability remains to be seen..
In an IFV, you would need a driver, a gunner and a crew commander mirroring the crew of an ASLAV-25 vehicle. This would leave a gun group and an assault group of 3x men each.
The difference between a light infantry section of 9 and a mechanised infantry section is the scouts. Without increasing the manning complement of the section, the scout positions are replaced by driver and gunner functions.
However Army is testing and trialling new structures under it's Infantry 2012 initiative. 2RAR is trialling this and the results haven't been finalised as yet, but it seems likely Army's bqsic section strength will remain roughly the same, with perhaps overall platoon sizes changing due to the need to operate heavier weapon systems at a platoon rather than battalion level.
For instance the incorporation of a lightweight mortar system (60mm or similar) into platoon structures has aldeady been recommended...
How this would work in a mechanised battalion that already operates a significantly increased firepower capability remains to be seen..