battlesign said:
1.A) According to the concepts Abe was outlining, if I understood correctly, then only 4 guns would be needed to support that number of troops. I.e. 2 guns per battalion in that threat environment.
I thought 2x guns per battalion was a little light for arty support (I was under the impression that usually it was one battery per battalion), but Abe is in a better position to know than me.
2) The interests that Australia has invested in Afghanistan would appear to be:
A) Alliance management (keeping Aus forefront of dependable allies and preserving the potential for American support in an Australian security issues)
Agreed, however how would increasing our deployed forces by 400% achieve this goal? Ultimately Washington maintains the Australian alliance because it is in Washington's geopolitical interest to do so. As was seen in Desert Storm not deploying every asset we are capable of to a US led war will not jeopardise or even significantly effect the alliance relationship. Australia is a valuable partner in the Asia Pacific region for other reasons than our ability to deploy token forces in coalition operations. Canberra is Washington's London in the pacific, close ties go far deeper than the level of our force commitment to a relatively minor war in South Asia.
Offcourse the alliance requires that we support the US, but I'm not sure any "brownie points" we get for treating Afghanistan like Vietnam will be worth the monetary and human cost.
B) US management (Preventing an isolationist/insular world view and outlook coupled with a steady retreat from the world stage as we emerge into a multipolar world) and
Again the reasons for US global strategy go far, far beyond Afghanistan or the GWOT.
Americas place in the world fundamentally rests on its global naval domination, it is the elementary driver of US foreign policy and the basic reason for its current prosperity. The USN holds the keys to the global trade system and therefore if anyone wants to participate has to, to some extent, play by the west's rules ( This is a major reason why the Western block outperformed the Soviet block economically). At the very least it prevents anyone else from applying their own set of rules. This mechanism has been the driver of globalisation and the tremendous generation of wealth in the west since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Therefore the US's global position is not only unrivalled in world history, it is extremely valuable. The US will not retreat into isolationism and give up all that because of any defeat in a regional war no matter the cost. Vietnam caused massive political instability, mentally scared millions of American servicemen, left half a million physically disfigured and 50,000 dead. Yet that defeat did nothing to alter the US's global strategy or posture, it didn't even change the policy of containment (all during a time where the world was truly multipolar not simply less unipolar). In fact I don't think total defeat in Afghanistan would even slightly shake US posture.
I don't see this as a realistic concern.
C) International security (read regional security - Pakistan and security of its nukes and democratic government hanging on by a thread against a fanatical militant opposition based in difficult to assail tribal lands)
First of all Pakistan is not holding on by a thread. The Taliban in Pakistan pose virtually no threat to the fundamental validity of the Pakistani state. There is no way in hell the Punjabi heartland would even consider joining or even tolerating a Pashtun insurgency gaining power in Pakistan. Without Punjabi support the Taliban taking over would be akin to Tasmanians invading Melbourne and then driving on to take Canberra. This is the reason why the Pakistani military has not only tolerated the existence of these groups for decades but even used them as proxies against India i.e. they only pose an asymmetric threat (as bloody as that is). These groups cannot stand in the face of the Pakistani military as we have seen in the recent offensives.
Secondly the NATO/ISAF presence in Afghanistan is the primary catalyst for current instability in Pakistan. Without western boots on the ground in Afghanistan this would not be a major problem in Pakistan's tribal areas. Thus increasing troop numbers in order to solve a problem that their deployment originally caused would seem to be an illogical course of action.
The fighting in Afghanistan is not so much about Pakistan as the fighting in Pakistan is about Afghanistan. These Pashtun groups have been living and effectively governing the tribal areas for decades, even fighting along side the Pakistani military in Kashmir. Its only when these areas have been used as a base of operations against ISAF forces that the Pakistani military and Pakistani Taliban have come to blows. If Afghanistan were to fall to the Taliban again the most likely outcome for Pakistan would be a return to pre 9/11(ish) relations with Kabul. Almost certainly the fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban would not be a catalyst for the collapse of the Pakistani state.
3) Afghanistan and Vietnam are similar in the interests we as Aust. have (if you swap Pakistan concerns for Domino theory).
I disagree. Even if you agree that fighting in Afghanistan is primarily about the security situation in Pakistan (which I don't) the very, very worst case scenario of the Pakistani state collapsing and a counter value nuclear attack on Australian soil by non state actors is not as serious as a global war with the opposing power block having basing and friendly states just 500km from our shores. One would mean a few thousand dead Australian civilians and the destruction of ~5km2 of a major Australian city (and is extremely unlikely), and the other would mean the possibility of high intensity nuclear warfare on Australian soil (only unlikely). Even if dooms-day happened in Pakistan it would not jeopardize Australia's fundamental security. The fall of South East Asia to the communist block most certainly would.
Greater consequences and a higher likelihood; hence the reason why we introduced conscription for Vietnam and have only deployed relatively small forces to Afghanistan.
If the Americans attach the wrong meaning and significance to the geopolitical setting then that is a different issue. In Vietnam they thought they were fighting communism when in reality they were primarily fighting Vietnamese nationalism. If the Americans can pull off an Iraq style political solution by turning militias into helpers then the Afghan militias may behave very differently from the Vietnamese counterparts.
I wasn't comparing Afghanistan to Vietnam on a tactical level, simply a geopolitical level.
In any case I don't think the US misunderstood their geopolitical- geostrategic goals in Vietnam more than they misjudged the Vietnamese strategic goals. Even if Hanoi's ultimate goals had little to do with communism a united (communist) Vietnam would still have joined the Sino-Soviet military, political and economic block; the precise outcome the US was trying to avoid.
4) Ozzy, you cannot claim that on the one hand there could potentially be the appearence of excess troop numbers encouraging the Dutch to withdraw forces and then on the other hand talk of the inability of larger numbers of troops to control the AOs outside of the population centers. Surely the fact of the latter serves the decrease the risk of the former?
I think you are confusing a political outcome with a military outcome. Obviously the Dutch government and population consider the current troop numbers adequate in view of what they are trying to achieve in Afghanistan, if not they would deploy more. At the political level practically every government contributing combat troops to Afghanistan is looking for the quickest and easiest way out without jeopardising their alliance relationships and international standing, simply because none (including the US) of their major interest are at stake in that conflict. Therefore if you are already committed beyond your initial obligation and your partner in your operational sector decides to deploy forces that would completely replace your own without adverse effect to the war effort, why wouldn't you take the opportunity to withdraw your forces? IMO the only reason the Dutch are staying is because no one else has stepped up to the plate and committed to replace their forces. The Dutch can leave with their reputation intact (they have contributed more than Australia up to this point), have done their part to preserve the alliance and can leave in the knowledge that the hole left by their forces will be quickly and willingly filled. Seems like a no brainer for a leader stuck in an unpopular war on another continent.
In any case doubling our forces in the theatre will do little to aid the security situation beyond the major populated areas in Oruzgan. A million deployed troops wouldn't solve the problem fundamentally. You will never have enough resources to secure the vast rural areas. In any case often ISAF forces are not welcome in rural areas. We have to reach a political solution village by village, valley by valley and in some cases deploying more troops will only hinder that process.