The Soviet Tank Gamble

[FutureTank]

The poms have had a history of heavy 'infantry tanks stretching back to the Matilda, Churchill, Centurion. They did not need to copy the experiemce with the Tigers.

Matilda was a heavy tank by British standards, but was same weight as the T-34, but undergunned. Churchill was an infantry support tank, not a heavy tank. Centurion was however a 'universal' tank (redesignated from Cruiser) that in reality was the first British "medium tank" in the Panther "mould" that had also been referred to in the Panzertruppen as a 'universal tank'. The only reason that there was no "British Tiger" is because the UK was industrially exhausted.

What flawed understanding of soviet doctrine? The western cold war tanks were basically designed to counter a massed invasion of soviet tanks, thus mobility, especially for the pommy designs was accorded a lower priority than protection and firepower (the 120mm was then the largest fitted to a NATO tank).

Not at all. The British and Americans were convinced by the Germans that IF they had had enough Tigers and Panthers, they would have stopped the Red Army as they stopped the Allies in Normandy. Until early 1980s that was the basic understanding of tank warfare in NATO, and the designs went accordingly. Quite the contrary to lots of NATO heavy tanks sitting in hull down positions image, the actual doctrine was essentially that of the Wehrmacht with very minor national differences between the big four, and later three NATO tank users, and that is small combined armies groups based on battalion-brigade headquarters "pinching off" Soviet deep thrusts into West Germany. However, Germans never really "got" the Red Army's operational methods, which is why they lost in repeated Soviet offensives.

You are waffling here. Why is it a flaw to have a tank that weighs 20t more than the soviets? We have just gone over why the tanks have turned out the way they have. It's like saying that a Toyota Landcruiser is a flawed design because it weighs 1 tonne more than a Suzuki Jimny. The vehicles are different sizes - of course there will be different weights.

Not waffling. The premise is that the Soviet tanks have a flaw in ignoring crew survival and the NATO tanks don't. What I, perhaps clumsily, tried to point out is that placed in the Soviet doctrinal context the NATO tanks would also have a flaw, and that flaw would equal to about 20t of the design. If the Soviet designers were given different doctrinal contexts, maybe those of the IDF, they too would perhaps produce a 70t heavy tank with near-100% crew survival potential.

Really? From the first post in this thread, first, second and third lines:

"It occurs to me that Soviet designers emphasize somewhat on low-hulls. The principle here is that the tank's low profile should make it harder to hit. But looking back on the previous Gulf Wars, the gamble hasn't paid off. T-72s , T-62s..."

I didn't know that T72's were WWII designs... Must have just scraped into the Battle of Berlin.

Ignoring your sarcasm for a moment, I guess it depends what you see as modern. The T-72 belongs to the same generation of tanks as the M60A1, Leopard 1, and Chieftain, going into production in 1971. Aside from the low hull, I don't see very many significant differences in the design approach to crew survival. The M60 was a continued evolution of the M26/46. The Leopard was really a Panther design philosophy using 1960s technology, and Chieftain....well, the British have to be different by finally getting "their Tiger"
None of these tanks were present in the Gulf War. Moreover the low profile was not a significant factor in the defeat of the Iraqi armoured troops (see last quote).
Again, no flaw discernible.

And a crew of 18 in a German A7V. But that is irrelevant to this discussion.

I think its relevant since the fifth man was an assistant loader. It shows a different predisposition in general towards greater crew comfort, while not having a clue about doctrine. It was in fact the "American Tiger" designed sharing many M47/48 components, but intended to engage Soviet tanks at long range. Its elevation was 8 degrees, only three greater than its contemporary T-54, but no one claimed it flawed. Instead though...it went to be used by the Marines as an infantry support tank! The T-54 of course begun design during the war, and was intended to outrange the Tiger II. So, in 1957 they were surpassed by the US 65t design. I don't see a flaw here either.

But the principles are the same. You missed the point entirely. The engineer looks at the parameters and produces a transmission to meet the requirements. The soviet designers would have designed and selected their transmission with the weight class of vehicle in mind, the same as the western designers. The point was the transmission is designed to do the job regardless of it being designed for a motor scooter or MBT. Inferring that one will be stressed to a higher level to support your assertion that western tanks are overweight is wrong.

I can only base what I say on combat experiences of various designs. Both Soviet and German heavy tanks had transmission and other chassis issues, German tanks worse so than the Soviet. The IDF also had to do a lot of work on the M48s which was integrated into the M60 that should have been M48A7. However I accept that you are largely correct in the process of how transmissions are selected.

So, let me get this straight, gun out the front, but adding weight overhanging the turret at the back is going to have no counterbalancing effect? What drugs are you on? The only hazard that a bustle or any overhang for that matter brings is to act as a shot trap - ie deflecting the incoming round in toward the turret ring. What threat were you referring to?

Was that reference to drugs necessary?

The bustle is there to increase the load of the tank. Guess where most of the original 55 rounds for the 105mm gun went in the M1? Or the 42 rounds of the SEP version Australia bought? But wait, the bustle is AS vulnerable to penetration as the rest of the turret! Without some way of venting ammunition detonation (not "cook off") it would be deadly, so the "crew safety features" are actually sheer necessity in the design! And what of the Israelis? Well, they have a "dry turret" now because all the ammunition is back in the hull in the Merkava IV.
The hull is also where the Soviet tanks keep much of the ammunition, so again, no significant flaw in 30 year old design.

The gun does not need a counterbalance, and you well know it, since it has a recoil system like all ordnance pieces.

Given a certain slope gradient and the perpendicular position of the turret up-slope, the tank has a chance of toppling backwards. This was the problem with the Soviet KV-2 that was compounded by the inadequate recoil absolution for its much larger gun. Admittedly it is not a great worry, but in the heat of combat the driver may not be aware of the turret position and the gunner may not be aware of the hull orientation.

Are you serious or do you just like typing for the sake of it? Gee, thickest armour toward the most likely threat - why would a tank commander do that? Obviously you have not seen the way armour moves in bounds - they will nose up to a hull down firing position, then when given the word to move, will reverse into the dead ground (never straight over the top), then move forward at a different (usually lower)point of the ridge. The same technique for retreating in bounds.

Actually given the proposed gun depression, the location of the hull would be such that the depth of the elevation crest it is behind would be of far greater protection from returned fire than its own frontal armour. If you are suggesting that reversing [straight back]? into the dead ground is what you would do, than I would say that a much better solution is to approach the crest obliquely which not only allows the driver the option of reversion, but also going forward down the slope (never straight over the top). It is certainly a much faster way of getting out of the mortar fire. Backing up down a slope can be tricky sometimes.
This, is actually how the Soviet tankers do it, depressing their guns over the side which allows, depending on the model, up to 18 degrees of depression.

So if there isn't time to take pictures there must be heaps of after action reports about tanks that have just rolled wouldn't there? Tanks are used for training too - often times quite realistic training - yet I still don't see great numbers of tracked vehicles that have rolled onto their sides. About the only photos you will find in any numbers are shots of M113's that have gone end over end due to the driver grabbing the pivots too damn hard or at too high a speed. Again that is a specific well known issue relating to how that vehicle is operated and has little to do with the relative height of the Centre Of Gravity

I guess you will need to do a bit of research. Although prevalent during the Second World War, toppling tanks are found in wartime and peacetime since, even in training.

You could be right here - just the inability to admit when you are wrong, which, because you are still arguing the same dead point, just makes it look like you have certain agendas.

I'm quite happy to admit I'm wrong, when I am suitably convinced of it.

Did you forget that the septics were at a massive numerical inferiority in the Gulf War? They seemed to win pretty decisively there. Past 'losses' such as Vietnam were not lost because the yanks had superior technology rather than superior numbers that battle was lost because the politicians bottled out.

Did you forget that the 'septics' had integrated battlegroup networking while the Iraqis had even their tactical radios jammed? What about the fact that the Iraqi T-72s were firing 20 year old ammunition meant for the M60s? How about lack of combat leadership in many Iraqi armoured units? I could go on.
Again, there does not seem to be a Soviet tank design flaw, but the organisational flaw by the user.

However, you ask ANY 'septic' officer, from any Arm what the requisite superiority ratio is on the offensive, and he/she will tell you it is 3:1. As a matter of fact most won't even know why its 3:1, but they all know it. The Soviet Army prefers 6:1 local superiority in the breakthrough as this makes things a bit easier, roughly compatible to "hot knife through butter" when an offensive is conducted by an integrated combined arms force.

 

[Marc 1]

The way this forum is designed it does not show the previous argument prior to a quote. You like that fact don't you as you often spear off at a tanget when quoting.

The suggestion is that the Soviet designs do not care about crew survival. However, the design of T-34 clearly was superior in ensuring crew survival because it prevented penetration of armour in a better way.
The design of the JS-3 turret further enhanced this crew protection with the then available technology and design philosophies.

This quote you are replying to was this exchange:

[COLOR="DeepSkyBlue"]Originally Posted by FutureTank
in the case of tanks, form follows doctrine, not function. The T-54 turret came from the JS-3 design concept.
I know it may be hard to believe, but while tanks in combat spend only a fraction of their time in concealment, they spend far more of their time manoeuvring, and they can come to grief more often than one would think when manoeuvring.

Semantics again. And doctrine determines function which influences form. Why is it in any way relevant to the conversation that the T54's turret came from the JS 3 concept? [/COLOR]

Where have I said anywhere in this exchange that soviet designs do not care about crew survival? I was questioning why you suddenly stuffed a factoid into the conversation. You quote then twist the conversation.

Maybe M1s spent a great deal of time stationary in combat, but not Soviet tanks, by and large.

Right, so all those emplaced tanks dug in behind berms that the Iraqis had in GW1 and 2 were not tanks of soviet origin? I guess I missed them running about all over the countryside... We are talking about how tanks are employed not what soviet doctrine was. Remember, soviet designs are used by a great many nations other than the russians. Where is your source for this claim that soviet tanks don't spend large amounts of time stationary.

Keep looking and you will find such photos from many different armed forces posted online. Just today I was reading that in the very first batch of M26s deployed to Europe, one collapsed a bridge and tumbled into the river below.

Again, this conversation was in rebuttal to your claims that MBT's frequently roll over. I fail to see how the stupidity of the crew or the senior commanders in route planning is the fault of the tank. The baqsic point may had escaped you but the tank did not roll over because of its high centre of gravity. Before you sart hammering away how a superior lighter soviet design wouldn't have collapsed the bridge in the first place, give me some evidence of that bridges load rating.

I have seen pictures of USMC M1 on its top, and a similar one for a Merkava. Stuff like that happens, though maybe not often now days, and not in Australia. In combat it happened far more often

There have been around 10,000 plus M1's produced and it has been in service since 1979. Over a thousand Merkava's produced too since 1979 - of course there will be some photos showing these vehicles on their lids in millions of track miles any vehicle can have incidents caused by operator stupidity. Incidentally, a bare photo does not explain how it happened that the tank was on its lid - enough explosive or a steep enough drop will see any vehicle inverted. My point was that these tanks are not inherently unstable as was your earlier contention. I'm sure I can find plenty of pictures showing soviet designs upside down.

Care to share why you think the Soviet tanks follow that 'flawed' design philosophy?

Re read my earlier posts - I have already made my point.

Oh really? You don't suppose German tank destroyers were any good in defence during the Second World War?

Again, you lead off on a tangent. The german tank destroyers were largely produced as a time and production expediency. Soviet tank production was many times greter than the production of the german types. There were very few scenarios where a tank destroyer was a better weapon than a conventional tank.

I don't want to be again accused of semantics, so did you really mean 'warfare', or tactical and operational postures?

You are fishing.

Yes, but you never served in Europe, did you?

Nor did you, so what makes you an expert in armoured warfare? I at least have served in a Mech Inf battalion and therefore probably have a better understanding of the employment of armour than you have gained from books/websites.

No, the US Army grossly underestimated the effectiveness of their own and Soviet Artillery for 40 years after the Second World War. This means that they battery would be firing twice as much ground burst HE rather than air burst to keep the tank commanders' heads down. Not that it matters since given the Soviets did understand the true effectiveness of the artillery, they would take measures not to encounter it. However, here again we have the supposed flaw in Soviet tank design, although it is the larger NATO tanks that would, statistically speaking, be more exposed to damage and therefore enforced crew dismounting due to being larger.

Again off on a tangent. Let me remind you of the original conversation:

FT: Nope, the US Army had to redo its data on artillery effectiveness after someone pointed out the difference between its modelling and that of the Soviet one which reckoned artillery was twice as effective. Turned out the Soviet model was correct.

Me: Oh right so it wasn't: "(something US Army only discovered in 1988)" The US army knew about the possibility of a mobility kill with artillery before 1988 except that they had underestimated it effectiveness. So what? Artillery was still going to be used against armoured formations if for no other reason that it keeps the crews buttoned down and buggers up their situational awareness. Employing 155's against armour was something I was taught in 1987. To paraphrase you, I'd have known what you meant if you had said what you really meant.

I particularly like this quote: Not that it matters since given the Soviets did understand the true effectiveness of the artillery, they would take measures not to encounter it. And you think that the western military forces don't mind being shelled? How do the soviets take measures to avoid artillery? IIRC only the US and Israeli's have operational systems that can defeat a limited number artillery rounds. A barrage by a regiment? No C- RAM will protect against say 6 rounds fired for effect.

As to your point about the western tanks having larger silhouettes and therefore being hit and disabled more than soviet tanks is not that significant in terms of an artillery barrage - its not as though we are comparing a Wiesel Mk 1 with an MBT. These days its unlikely that you'd be facing a conventional barrage - there is going to be a good chance of either copperhead style rounds being used or an autonomous bomblet that will perform a top attack using an EFP. In these cases size won't matter.

I hasten to remind you that the M1, Challenger and Leopard II all appeared after 1984 in any significant numbers in Europe. Their predecessors were not particularly superior in terms of crew survival to the Soviet models. They all took two decades do get from concept to field in which time Soviets deployed not only two generations of tanks, but two competitive models in one generation, introducing autoloaders and functional gun-launched AT missiles.

Don't know where you are heading with this or what this has to do with artillery effects on tanks, but I'll play. The only recent conflict of any size featuring western tanks vs soviet tanks of the 50/60's generation were the 6 day war or the Yom Kippur war. I can only find stats showing relative losses, and the arab forces lost 2 to 5 times as many tanks. Yom Kippur War - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia .

What does it prove that the soviets fielded twice as many models in the time the western forces introduced one? Maybe the soviets needed more models to try and play catch up. Maybe it was a state directed decision to ensure the factories were kept in production. It says nothing about the effectiveness of the tanks. Your point about the gun launched AT missle and autoloaders is not news. The US developed the M551 Shillelagh system in 1960's -it was not particularly successful - perhaps with further development it could have worked. Why did the americans not pursue the system - I'd guess because if you want amissile on an armed vehicle you can always fit an external launcher a-la M2/M3 Tow launcher. As to your point about autoloaders the AMX-13 used one back in 1953. The reason why autoloaders are a contentious selection is that a 3 crew tank has one less crew member to assist in maintaining the vehicle, and one person less that can be used to man radios/picquets. Autoloaders depending on their design can limit the number of different ammunition loadouts that can be carried or loaded

"If done correctly in the right soil conditions"? - no, seriously, you expect someone to jump out and start doing soil testing?

Of course not, I was merely pointing out that a tank mounted dozer blade cannot dig in rock.

Its not a "hull down" position, but a temporary anti-missile scrape.

Your assertation that tank dozers are only good to make a small bund for protection against ATGW's is wrong. I have watched a Leopard 1 MTD dig itself a scrape that was around twice the length of the hull and around 1.3m deep in around 15 mins. Bunds are unlikely to provide protection against ATGW's with top attack profiles anyway.

Believe it or not, the Soviet tankers also train to assume hull down positions. Its not like the European terrain is completely devoid of spots where a Soviet tank does not need to expose itself too much to fire. Nor is the terrain prevalent to allow ubiquitous hull down positions for NATO tanks. All crews are trained to look for most suitable positions.

I'm sure they are trained to assume hull down poisitions. However, and this is about the third time I've said it due to the design limitations of soviet designs their main armament cannot be depressed as far as western designs thus limiting the number of reverse slope positions that can be used. This means that the crew in the soviet tank either need to expose more of their vehicle or ignore positions that a western tank could use.

I didn't say I think these crew survival measures are a bad idea. What I say is that their lack in Soviet tanks is not a design flaw. Even in the Merkava the crew survival philosophy was only brought home by the 1973 war, and was not implemented until 1979 I think, three years after T-80 entered production.

Here we go again twisting quotes without having a good look at what was written and why. Here's the original exchange:

Originally Posted by Marc 1
The latest western tank designs have made advances in crew survivability from surrounding stowed ammunition with water jackets to the use of blow off panels and armoured doors inside the turret bussle to increase crew survivability.

Originally Posted by FutureTank
Yes, but all that costs in added weight.

Me: So you don't think the added weight of crew survivability features such as water jackets around ammunition stowage, and armoured door/blowoff panels is a good idea... Strange that you have so little regard for crew - highly trained crew are irreplacable which is why nations that value the experience and lives of their crew have designed tanks like the Merkava.

You initially dismissed these crew survival measures as something that added weight - implying therefore that they were not necessary. Now you are saying that the soviet tanks NOT having crew survivabilty features is not a design flaw? I must have missed reading somewhere that the soviet designs are impenatrable by any means - that would be the only circumstance I can think of where you wouldn't want to provide crew protection where possible. Then you go on to provide excuses as to why soviet designs could not consider this. I think, and this is only from hazy memory, that the Chieftans had their ammunition stored in water jackets as long ago as the 60's. Soviets were not worried about crew survivability as much as ease of manufacture and quantity.

Maybe that was an overly spurious comment to make given lack of statistical evidence. However, based on bustle detonation, even with the blow out panels I think the turret fighting compartment would not be unaffected, which is what most people seem to assume.

OK, lets do this again:

Originally Posted by FutureTank
And what if the penetration is in the bustle? Believe me that the turret will achieve free flight in the result

Falstaff:Isn't that what the blow out panels are for?
Waylander: And a turret with a seperated ammo compartment is not going to fly.
The energy is going to get blown out of the blowout panels.
And that has been shown to work with the Abrams.

Originally Posted by FutureTank
And what if the penetration is in the bustle? Believe me that the turret will achieve free flight in the result

Me: Rubbish, see above.

Originally Posted by FutureTank
I think I have seen one penetration in the bustle from a sabot on an M1 and the turret did not fly off, but that proves very little since there was no ammunition detonation or even cook-off. Maybe that area in the bustle was empty.

Me: Seems to fly in the face of what you said before about any hit to the bussle resulting in a flying turret.

Show me in this entire exchange where anybody has stated that the tank can go on fighting after the blow off panels have done their bit to save the crew's life? The point is, and I've made it before a highly trained tank crew is irreplacable - a tank is easier to replace. Look at it this way seeing as you seem to have little regard for crew safety, think of all the parts of the tank that can be salvaged because the blow off panels have ensured the turret wasn't bblown clean off the vehicle.

That is however the least of the crew's problem. In the case of the M1 SEP, the surviving crew will be left in the midst of combat with, perhaps, six rounds in the hull. I suppose you know how long those last...

Right... so it's therefore your assertation that its better to have the crew killed and the turret physically made to fly that have the crew live and only have 6 rounds in the hull available to fight on with.nfloorl:

 

[Marc 1]

Nope. Firepower and protection are both matters of physics. Mobility was determined by the norms guided by doctrine in the Soviet Army that was the design bureaus' sole client. Organisational velocity if you will. What was considered though which was not a matter of science, was the industrial production capacity for a new design. That is where the T-64 came a cropper. The other 'big one' is of course the crews you keep talking about. The Soviet Army found that they just could not allocate enough conscripts to crew the more complex designs in the offing in the 60s, so they reduced the crew and increased the support personnel numbers. I can't remember who, but someone worked out that if the essential field support personnel are added to the tank's crew, then a Soviet 3-crew tank has a crew of 5, while the then new NATO tanks had crews of 7-8. And this just happens to describe the factors that Soviets think are important in considering a tank design, the 'big five': suitability for production, ease of crew and support personnel training, and combat characteristics you mentioned. Again there is no flaw because the Soviet Union was outproducing NATO in tanks, and because NATO designers were attempting to design catch-up models for two decades. Again, no flaw.

What a load of drivel. The soviet union with a largely conscript army could not find enough people to crew its tanks? Firepower and mobility are both matters of physics? Gee thats a useful statement - just a tad obvious I'd think. This would be a useful point to make if you expanded why you just stated the obvious to argue a point. Organisational velocity? What's that? That phrase doesn't link in any way to the sentence before or after it, it's drivel. Perhaps it's the speed the high command of an organisation achieves when fired from a cannon?

I particularly like this point: And this just happens to describe the factors that Soviets think are important in considering a tank design, the 'big five': suitability for production, ease of crew and support personnel training, and combat characteristics you mentioned. Again there is no flaw because the Soviet Union was outproducing NATO in tanks, So there is no flaw in Soviet tank designs because the Soviet Union was outproducing Nato?
So western tank designers are continually playing catch up are they? During Desert Storm the Iraqui's had quite a few tank engagements between the 500 T-72's they owned and the M1's and Challengers of the coalition. if these tanks were superior surely that would have offset any tactical disadvantage due to Iraqui ineptitude, yet in nearly every engagement the kill ratio was what 20 or 50 to one? Doesn't seem to support your point very well does it? Egypt for example has traditionally purchased soviet equipment. Recently it has purchased M1's tanks and Mig 29SMT's. If the current Russian designs were so superior why would the Egyptians who have no particular affiliation chose the Abrams over current Russian designs? Could it be that the better tank is a western design?

But I'm not rebutting. In what way did the Soviets compromise their designs? That they were "cramped/poorly insulated working conditions"?

You are being disingenuous again that is far from the only issue I have mentioned others.

As I understand it the T-54 was a comparative limousine tot he T-34/85, never mind the 76mm armed model. Sure the Americans went from crewing medium M4s to heavy M26s and their M46 redesigns.

Relevance?

I suspect that had the Soviet Army chosen to adopt the JS-3 as their point of MBT design origin they too would have had the volume to introduce all sorts of creature comforts. Are you saying that doing more with less in tank warfare is a flaw?

The Js-2 had a weight of 46 tonnes, I can only guess that the JS-3 was heavier compared to the T34-85 at 32 tonnes. That level of interior volume and armour has a cost in weight, so IF the soviets had pursued this line of tanks they too would have ended up with an equivalent weight to western designs. Where is the 'more with less' equation here?

When people start comparing "apples with apples", I will happily listen.

We are comparing MAIN BATTLE TANKS - it is apples with apples.

Which electronic equipment? You mean this?

Is it a flaw in the Soviet design that the French electronics don't function in Indian deserts?
Here India Army´s T-72 Upgrade Program - Project RHINO [Archive] - Military Photos is an article on the T-72 Indian upgrade planning c.2004. So you take a state-designed tank that had state enterprises design upgrade systems and subsytems for, and you try and fit systems and subsystems designed by non-state commercial enterprises that never intended their product to go into the T-72. What were those Soviet designers thinking of?
Where is the flaw in design here?

Where do we start - lack of a climate control system to the detriment of the crew and electronics. A space so constrained that it makes future upgrades difficult (technology does evolve) just for starters. There's a very good chance a western design would not have needed to be upgraded in the first place, and if it was necessary, upgrades seem to accomplished a fair bit easier and with more success.

 

[FutureTank]

The way this forum is designed it does not show the previous argument prior to a quote. You like that fact don't you as you often spear off at a tanget when quoting.

This quote you are replying to was this exchange:

[COLOR="DeepSkyBlue"]Originally Posted by FutureTank
in the case of tanks, form follows doctrine, not function. The T-54 turret came from the JS-3 design concept.
I know it may be hard to believe, but while tanks in combat spend only a fraction of their time in concealment, they spend far more of their time manoeuvring, and they can come to grief more often than one would think when manoeuvring.

Semantics again. And doctrine determines function which influences form. Why is it in any way relevant to the conversation that the T54's turret came from the JS 3 concept? [/COLOR]

Where have I said anywhere in this exchange that soviet designs do not care about crew survival? I was questioning why you suddenly stuffed a factoid into the conversation. You quote then twist the conversation.

It seems to me that you are trying to read my thoughts, rather than my replies.

The premise of this thread is that the Soviet tank designs are deficient in engineering that ensures greater survival of the crew. Its not a factoid that the shape of the T-54/55 production design borrowed much from the JS-3 turret design.

The pre-production T-54 retained a modified T-44 turret. It suggests to me that every effort was made in the design stage to produce the best crew survival optimised vehicle given technology of 1947. This was not done in either Centurion or the M46 at a later stage to the same degree.

 

[FutureTank]

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
Maybe M1s spent a great deal of time stationary in combat, but not Soviet tanks, by and large.
Right, so all those emplaced tanks dug in behind berms that the Iraqis had in GW1 and 2 were not tanks of soviet origin? I guess I missed them running about all over the countryside... We are talking about how tanks are employed not what soviet doctrine was. Remember, soviet designs are used by a great many nations other than the russians. Where is your source for this claim that soviet tanks don't spend large amounts of time stationary.

How tanks are employed by one state that purchases tanks from another state can not be used to invalidate the initial tank design specifications, or the suitability of the production model for the primary client. I note that Iran and Iraq used considerable amounts of sophisticated hardware in their war only to achieve operations based in attrition. Neither side was able, for various reasons, to capitalise on the systems they procured to achieve decisive victory. However, this did not invalidate those systems individually, or as part of the suit of systems in other armed forces.

Please note that at the Kursk Bulge the T-34s were also employed dug in, with considerable success despite ostensibly superior, if untried, technology. However, this was largely due to the wider operational factors which on balance were not available to the Iraqi Army. Similarly, the M1 tank was used in combat for the first time during GW1, but unlike the Wehrmacht, the US Army had a substantial amount of time to not only debug the design after production begun, but to even acclimatise it in the theatre!

Soviet doctrine, despite misinterpretation by some in the 1960s, is not about throwing thousands of tanks at the enemy, but about using combined arms groups in a dynamic manoeuvre oriented offensive.

For source on how much Soviet tanks were intended to spend stationary in combat based on their published doctrinal discussion up to the mid 1980s I recommend Simpkin's Red Armour where he worked out rather pedantically the times for up to the Tank Army level.

 

[FutureTank]

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
Keep looking and you will find such photos from many different armed forces posted online. Just today I was reading that in the very first batch of M26s deployed to Europe, one collapsed a bridge and tumbled into the river below.

Again, this conversation was in rebuttal to your claims that MBT's frequently roll over. I fail to see how the stupidity of the crew or the senior commanders in route planning is the fault of the tank. The basic point may had escaped you but the tank did not roll over because of its high centre of gravity. Before you sart hammering away how a superior lighter soviet design wouldn't have collapsed the bridge in the first place, give me some evidence of that bridges load rating.

My claim is that MBT's frequently rolled over in combat.

Soviet tanks also rolled over, and route planning had nothing to do with it. I am not going to go an look for the rating of a bridge collapsed by a Pershing during the Second World War. It goes to crew safety argument. The design of the T-34 included lowering the centre of gravity in part to prevent roll overs experienced by the models it was to replace. It may seem trivial to you now, but in the 1930s and 1940s this was not uncommon when operating off road.

If you think that roll overs are trivial, have a look at the Bradley driver's manual that had BIG RED WARNING on the first page about roll overs, and then check out the number of casualties sustained in Iraq from accidental BFV roll-overs. And no, I am not going to find that for you. Its online.
Sure its harder to roll a 70t M1 in peacetime, but it has been done by the more adventurous drivers. I have seen images of Soviet tanks rolled over also, including T-55 (in Germany), T-62 (in Afghanistan), and T-72 (in Belarussia). Its not something any armoured force likes to advertise, right?

You will be surprised at what happens with tanks in combat. I have an eye witness report of a T-34 that literally ran into and onto a Panther during combat.

 

[FutureTank]

Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
Oh really? You don't suppose German tank destroyers were any good in defence during the Second World War?

Again, you lead off on a tangent. The german tank destroyers were largely produced as a time and production expediency. Soviet tank production was many times greter than the production of the german types. There were very few scenarios where a tank destroyer was a better weapon than a conventional tank.

Not so. Marders I/2/3, maybe, but STuG design and Panzerjagers' was intended to work with the Panthers and Tigers, and they did very effectively as a team.
Soviets produced their own turretless tank destroyers to try and replicate this tactic, but with achieving lower profile in a tank it became obvious that tanks can replicate the tank/tank-destroyer team just as effectively, and more so, and the production of turretless tank-destroyers largely stopped in the Soviet Union.

However, I have to admit that I had never seen a source that argued the influence from tank-destroyer tactics on the post-war Soviet tank design. The Soviet doctrinal publications such as "Tank company on the defensive" do however significantly reflect the wartime tank/tank-destroyer teaming tactics within the company.
Of course that's to be expected since all such publications begin with "based on the experience in the Great Patriotic War"!

 

[Marc 1]

Matilda was a heavy tank by British standards, but was same weight as the T-34, but undergunned. Churchill was an infantry support tank, not a heavy tank. Centurion was however a 'universal' tank (redesignated from Cruiser) that in reality was the first British "medium tank" in the Panther "mould" that had also been referred to in the Panzertruppen as a 'universal tank'. The only reason that there was no "British Tiger" is because the UK was industrially exhausted.

Again evading my point - the poms did have a history of heavy tank production - the Matilda predated the T34 by a number of years and was considered a heavy tank in its day. Just because it was labeled an infantry tank doesn't change its characteristics. There was in fact a british 'Tiger' called the TOG 2. This design could have been further developed but was abandonned in favour of the Centurion which should have been a decent match for the Tiger, but arrived too late to see action in WW11.

Not at all. The British and Americans were convinced by the Germans that IF they had had enough Tigers and Panthers, they would have stopped the Red Army as they stopped the Allies in Normandy. Until early 1980s that was the basic understanding of tank warfare in NATO, and the designs went accordingly. Quite the contrary to lots of NATO heavy tanks sitting in hull down positions image, the actual doctrine was essentially that of the Wehrmacht with very minor national differences between the big four, and later three NATO tank users, and that is small combined armies groups based on battalion-brigade headquarters "pinching off" Soviet deep thrusts into West Germany. However, Germans never really "got" the Red Army's operational methods, which is why they lost in repeated Soviet offensives.

I forget which german general when asked by Hitler what sort of tank the general needed to stop the soviets replied T-34's. His somewhat ironic comments went unheeded and the rest is history. It wasn't the germans who never really 'got' the soviet tactics, it was Hitler who mandated such stupidities as not allowing withdrawl, not permitting his senior commanders any operational lattitude that was of great assistance to the soviets. The choice between cheap and plentiful or expensive and more capable was a simple choice for the west. Smaller standing armys had to look at quality over quantity, they had no choice. Unlike the USSR that could field an army as large as the politbureau demanded, western democracies need to satisfy voters, so maintaining an army the size of the eastern block countries was never going to happen.

Not waffling. The premise is that the Soviet tanks have a flaw in ignoring crew survival and the NATO tanks don't. What I, perhaps clumsily, tried to point out is that placed in the Soviet doctrinal context the NATO tanks would also have a flaw, and that flaw would equal to about 20t of the design. If the Soviet designers were given different doctrinal contexts, maybe those of the IDF, they too would perhaps produce a 70t heavy tank with near-100% crew survival potential.

Therefore we conclude that the soviet tanks were perfect for the then soviet doctrine. What of other 200+ countries that don't share this doctrine? NATO tanks do not have a 'flaw'. To have a tank with the technology of the day when their structures were originally designed (70's/80's) that offers the level of protection, mobility firepower and crew comfort (as well as the smaller facets such as limits on elevation depression etc) the vehicles happened to be around 20t more than soviet designs. Perhaps the next generation (such as FCS) will be much lighter than Soviet designs, according to your logic, this means that soviet designs have a design flaw.

Ignoring your sarcasm for a moment, I guess it depends what you see as modern. The T-72 belongs to the same generation of tanks as the M60A1, Leopard 1, and Chieftain, going into production in 1971. Aside from the low hull, I don't see very many significant differences in the design approach to crew survival. The M60 was a continued evolution of the M26/46. The Leopard was really a Panther design philosophy using 1960s technology, and Chieftain....well, the British have to be different by finally getting "their Tiger"
None of these tanks were present in the Gulf War. Moreover the low profile was not a significant factor in the defeat of the Iraqi armoured troops (see last quote).

US marines were equipped with M60's during GW1. What was the ratio M60's to T- 72 in kills?But once again you are forgetting the origins of this quote which was you telling me this was not about modern tanks.

I think its relevant since the fifth man was an assistant loader. It shows a different predisposition in general towards greater crew comfort, while not having a clue about doctrine. It was in fact the "American Tiger" designed sharing many M47/48 components, but intended to engage Soviet tanks at long range. Its elevation was 8 degrees, only three greater than its contemporary T-54, but no one claimed it flawed. Instead though...it went to be used by the Marines as an infantry support tank! The T-54 of course begun design during the war, and was intended to outrange the Tiger II. So, in 1957 they were surpassed by the US 65t design. I don't see a flaw here either.

Again we need to see context here:

Originally Posted by FutureTank
Of course to do this, the design requires a very large turret ring, so to portray this as an advantage, the NATO designers claim the NATO tanks are more ergonomic, forgetting that tanks are not made to ensure a comfy ride. You really do not want to be tossed around the turret as the driver tries to frantically take evasive action. In a T-34 tankers would just grab onto the gun, or push against the walls to keep themselves steady.

Me:Try that in a modern tank and the stabilisation system will ensure that anyone hanging onto the main armament will be pulped as the gun elevates and depresses. Having riden in a Leopard cross country with stab engaged I was damn glad that there was a big metal guard to keep me from being thrown against the breach as it moved up and down. Its not about 'comfort' as you keep saying - its about trying to minimise crew fatigue levels - warfare is a 24hour business, and particularly during the type of blitzkreig assaults experienced by the armoured forces under Gudarian in 1940 and GW I and GWII, this is a major consideration. In some cases the only times the tankers got to dismount was to reload and refuel for days at a time.

Originally Posted by Marc 1
Also its not about steadying yourself whilst the tank scoots to another firing position, crew are not there to hang on for dear life, they will be using their optics, searching for threats/targets, firing the gun whilst on the move and loading the gun. Manhandling a 120mm round in the confines of a turret is difficult enough when stationary - space is not a 'luxury' with current crew numbers and techniques. Sure it is possible to eliminate the loader, but then you have the additional workload of other tasks placed onto the other 3 crew (an argument all by itself).

FT: There used to be a five man crew in a 120mm armed US Tank.

So originally you started telling people that space was a luxury and that thankers in T34's just hung on to the breach of the main armament. When it was pointed out to you that taking that kind of action in a moder tank will see you pulped by the stab system, and that the crew aren't there just to hang on anymore, you decide to tell people for no apparent reason that there was a US tank with a crew of 5? To what end? To then say the US didn't have a clue about doctrine? Who's doctrine? A crew of 5 was not unusual in an allied tank at the end of WW11 - instead of manning a hull mounted MG this crew member was used to assist loading. Once again you demonstrate that you cannot argue effectively, you switch topics and try to divert. Why not just admit you are wrong?

I can only base what I say on combat experiences of various designs. Both Soviet and German heavy tanks had transmission and other chassis issues, German tanks worse so than the Soviet. The IDF also had to do a lot of work on the M48s which was integrated into the M60 that should have been M48A7. However I accept that you are largely correct in the process of how transmissions are selected.

How magnanamous of you. Trying to obfuscate by the drivel about reliability levels of WW2 and Korean war designs has little relevance.

Was that reference to drugs necessary?

Pretty hard to take the high moral ground when you are seeking to mislead and misrepresent

The bustle is there to increase the load of the tank. Guess where most of the original 55 rounds for the 105mm gun went in the M1? Or the 42 rounds of the SEP version Australia bought? But wait, the bustle is AS vulnerable to penetration as the rest of the turret! Without some way of venting ammunition detonation (not "cook off") it would be deadly, so the "crew safety features" are actually sheer necessity in the design! And what of the Israelis? Well, they have a "dry turret" now because all the ammunition is back in the hull in the Merkava IV.
The hull is also where the Soviet tanks keep much of the ammunition, so again, no significant flaw in 30 year old design.

Again misrepresentation. I have never stated that the soviet designs are flawed due to their ammunition being stored in the hull. Just mounting the rounds in the hull is not sufficient, not all engagements occur with the tank hull down - I'm willing to bet there is also a significant shielding system around the Merkava's ammunition storage. The turret bustle is at the rear of the turret - given that the turret will normally face the expected threat that reduces the probability of a hit in this area significantly. If the bustle is penetrated it still protects the crew. Problem? No.

The gun does not need a counterbalance, and you well know it, since it has a recoil system like all ordnance pieces.

Yet again stop misquoting me. Here is what I have said:

Sounds like rubbish to me. If anything a bussle on a turret will help counterbalance the weight of the gun. There are certain limits anyway to using a cross slope as a hull down position - namely the gun depression limits. Normally a tank will approach a crest to achieve a hull down position by driving forward -thickest armour at the front of the vehicle, so cross slope positioning and the risk of the vehicle rolling over is not an issue.

Note I said counterbalances the turret, not the gun.

Given a certain slope gradient and the perpendicular position of the turret up-slope, the tank has a chance of toppling backwards. This was the problem with the Soviet KV-2 that was compounded by the inadequate recoil absolution for its much larger gun. Admittedly it is not a great worry, but in the heat of combat the driver may not be aware of the turret position and the gunner may not be aware of the hull orientation.

Sounds like a design and testing issue to me. This is what Google has to say about the KV2:

While impressive on paper, it had been designed as a slow-moving bunker-buster. It was less useful in the type of highly mobile, fluid warfare that developed in World War II. The turret was so heavy it was difficult to traverse on non-level terrain, and it was expensive to produce. Only about 250 KV-2s were made, all in 1940-41, making it one of the rarer Soviet tanks.

Ironically, more weight (you know that evil thing you keep harping about) may have provided a cure. But seriously if you are using this 3.65m tall monstrosity whose trunions seem to be about a meter higher than a modern MBT as an example of how unstable MBT's are you are clutching at straws.

Actually given the proposed gun depression, the location of the hull would be such that the depth of the elevation crest it is behind would be of far greater protection from returned fire than its own frontal armour.

Err, that's the idea of being hull down.

If you are suggesting that reversing [straight back]? into the dead ground is what you would do, than I would say that a much better solution is to approach the crest obliquely which not only allows the driver the option of reversion, but also going forward down the slope (never straight over the top).

Get out your pen and start rewriting tactics manuals for quite a few army's then, as this is not the usual way they operate. Think about it - if you aproach the crest at a say 45 degree angle and either go too far or find an enemy vehicle coming up the same crest from the other side, you are exposing your weaker side armour. Lets say you fire a shot and then move forward, even if you turn quickly the enemy will have an idea which side you are likely to appear around and train their weapons appropriately. Many MBT transmissions incorporate more than one reverse ratio to enable faster reversing.

I

t is certainly a much faster way of getting out of the mortar fire. Backing up down a slope can be tricky sometimes.
This, is actually how the Soviet tankers do it, depressing their guns over the side which allows, depending on the model, up to 18 degrees of depression.

Angles of depression I have been able to find: T54/55 -5 degrees, T62 -5 degrees T-64 ? T-72 -6 degrees T-80 -4 degrees. T-90 ? degrees. I cannot find 18 degrees - unless you are talking elevation which is of course the exact opposite and would prove that you really do have no idea. One of the main reasons that limits main armament depression in an MBT isn't necessarily the hull, but the fact that there is not enough height inside the turret to allow the breech to recoil. It is one of the main reasons why western tanks are higher. The trunions are usually placed higher in western tanks as well as this means less depression restrictions by the hull. This is not just 'handy' when firing from a reverse slope, but means the main armament is less likely to find its stops when trying to track a target whilst moving across rough ground.

Incidentally, unless the mortar fire is some form of anti armour round conventional fragmentation/HE rounds will have little effect.


I

I guess you will need to do a bit of research. Although prevalent during the Second World War, toppling tanks are found in wartime and peacetime since, even in training.

I'd better get a warning out to all tankies then. Strange that you hear about MRAPS rolling but not tanks. The armys of the world must have some huge shared conspiracy to keep the knowledge of these death traps to themselves eh?

I

I'm quite happy to admit I'm wrong, when I am suitably convinced of it.

I'm suitably convinced that you will never change your mind, so don't go looking for any further replies.


I

Did you forget that the 'septics' had integrated battlegroup networking while the Iraqis had even their tactical radios jammed? What about the fact that the Iraqi T-72s were firing 20 year old ammunition meant for the M60s? How about lack of combat leadership in many Iraqi armoured units? I could go on.
Again, there does not seem to be a Soviet tank design flaw, but the organisational flaw by the user.

You'll have to explain how you fire ammunition intended for a rifled 105mm gun from a 125mm smoothbore. Go ahead, make all the excuses you want - the stories are legion about how the poor bloody Iraqi tankers could not even see the yanks and poms with their night vision gear and were being picked off en masse.

I

However, you ask ANY 'septic' officer, from any Arm what the requisite superiority ratio is on the offensive, and he/she will tell you it is 3:1. As a matter of fact most won't even know why its 3:1, but they all know it. The Soviet Army prefers 6:1 local superiority in the breakthrough as this makes things a bit easier, roughly compatible to "hot knife through butter" when an offensive is conducted by an integrated combined arms force.

What has this got to do with the price of fish? here's a little tip, some of us do know about these ratio's, after all we don't just sit around polishing brass and boots - for officers there is actually a module on Tactics that if you fail will end your career. If you like I can still quote for you artillery planning ranges of both the RAG and the DAG (that should excite you - they were after all based on soviet weapons and doctrine when I leaned them 21 years ago). But I fail to see what this has to do with the discussion.

 

[FutureTank]

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
I don't want to be again accused of semantics, so did you really mean 'warfare', or tactical and operational postures?

You are fishing.


Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
Yes, but you never served in Europe, did you?

Nor did you, so what makes you an expert in armoured warfare? I at least have served in a Mech Inf battalion and therefore probably have a better understanding of the employment of armour than you have gained from books/websites.

And I can say that you are being evasive and speculative.

What makes you think that someone who has never served in combat in a European theatre during the Cold War has greater understanding of tank design than someone who has never served in a mechanised infantry unit in Australia?

In 1986 an Artillery officer was able to show that most Armor officer who did serve in Europe missed the point of Soviet armoured operations for the better part of three decades, and all he did was pretty much read books. What followed was the most significant doctrinal rewrite in the US Army history.

Not that I don't respect your experience, but how is that relevant to the premise that the Soviet tank designs are flawed?

 

[Marc 1]

My claim is that MBT's frequently rolled over in combat.

If you think that roll overs are trivial, have a look at the Bradley driver's manual that had BIG RED WARNING on the first page about roll overs, and then check out the number of casualties sustained in Iraq from accidental BFV roll-overs. And no, I am not going to find that for you. Its online.
.

Sincewhen is a BFV an MBT? Keep clutching for those straws, the world is laughing

 

[Abraham Gubler]

My claim is that MBT's frequently rolled over in combat.

And do you know why? It has very little to the reason a conventional car will roll over on a road ie high centre of gravity and sharp corner driving.

Tanks roll over because of two reasons. Most often it is because they are driving cross country and get onto too much side slope and slip over...

The other reason is they are driving too fast for tracked vehicles. Tracks interact with the vehicle in a very different way to wheels. When traveling very fast (>60-80 kph) a tracked vehicle can be flipped by introducing too much of a differential between one track's speed and the other. Usually caused by a applying the turn control too rapidly or one track hitting an obstacle.

As to the argument about Soviet tank design vs Western tank design... The Soviet tank industry was geared towards production of numbers above all else. Something like reducing the internal volume of a T-64 so it will have comparable armour, mobility and firepower to a western tank at 66% of the weight enabled a 50% increase in production compared to a tank similar to a western design. This was a very good thing to do in the Soviet philosophy.

That this reduction in volume resulted in the trade away of being able to depress the gun turret and the use of highly combustible gun propellant stored in the crew compartment - both significant reductions in survivability - was something the Soviets were willing to accept. The Swedes made a similar trade away in the design of the S-Tank but they chose to lose the fire on the move capability. There is significant parametric, analytic and combat evidence to suggest that the Swedes made the right choice.

Interestingly Morozov (the T-64's designer) wanted to replace the T-64 with the Object 450 (aka Prospective, T-74, NST) a crew in hull, external gun vehicle. By removing the turret all together the Soviet's would have kept down internal volume but without the limitations of the T-64's compact turret (no depression, crew and propellant mix). But by the 1970s the Russians were very conservative and turned down the T-74 because of fears of replicating the T-64 introduction to service disaster.

 

[Marc 1]

What makes you think that someone who has never served in combat in a European theatre during the Cold War has greater understanding of tank design than someone who has never served in a mechanised infantry unit in Australia?

Err, that would be everybody then, as nobody has ever served in combat in a European theatre during the cold war. The enemy I studied was the Kamarian Armed forces. They co-incidentally were equipped almost exclusively with soviet weapons and used largely soviet tactics, despite being based on an island that I've never seen before just south of the Indonesian archipeligo. So despite never having been in Europe, I know a little about how the soviet forces operate, their equipment and their tactics. My knowledge is old, outdated and rusty, someone like Waylander could probably set both of us right on many points. But I do know that much of what you spout is wrong, and worse that rather than admitting that, you attempt to twist words, meanings and deflect rather than admit it.

 

[FutureTank]

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
No, the US Army grossly underestimated the effectiveness of their own and Soviet Artillery for 40 years after the Second World War. This means that they battery would be firing twice as much ground burst HE rather than air burst to keep the tank commanders' heads down. Not that it matters since given the Soviets did understand the true effectiveness of the artillery, they would take measures not to encounter it. However, here again we have the supposed flaw in Soviet tank design, although it is the larger NATO tanks that would, statistically speaking, be more exposed to damage and therefore enforced crew dismounting due to being larger.

Again off on a tangent. Let me remind you of the original conversation:

FT: Nope, the US Army had to redo its data on artillery effectiveness after someone pointed out the difference between its modelling and that of the Soviet one which reckoned artillery was twice as effective. Turned out the Soviet model was correct.

Me: Oh right so it wasn't: "(something US Army only discovered in 1988)" The US army knew about the possibility of a mobility kill with artillery before 1988 except that they had underestimated it effectiveness. So what? Artillery was still going to be used against armoured formations if for no other reason that it keeps the crews buttoned down and buggers up their situational awareness. Employing 155's against armour was something I was taught in 1987. To paraphrase you, I'd have known what you meant if you had said what you really meant.

I particularly like this quote: Not that it matters since given the Soviets did understand the true effectiveness of the artillery, they would take measures not to encounter it. And you think that the western military forces don't mind being shelled? How do the soviets take measures to avoid artillery? IIRC only the US and Israeli's have operational systems that can defeat a limited number artillery rounds. A barrage by a regiment? No C- RAM will protect against say 6 rounds fired for effect.

As to your point about the western tanks having larger silhouettes and therefore being hit and disabled more than soviet tanks is not that significant in terms of an artillery barrage - its not as though we are comparing a Wiesel Mk 1 with an MBT. These days its unlikely that you'd be facing a conventional barrage - there is going to be a good chance of either copperhead style rounds being used or an autonomous bomblet that will perform a top attack using an EFP. In these cases size won't matter.

For the purpose of this thread's premise we are discussing Soviet tank survivability, i.e. any designs to the late 1980s.

As a matter of fact the tactical approach to enemy artillery in the 60s and 70s by the NATO tanks was to button up and wait it out. They were expected to come out of it with minor external damage unless the crew was extremely unlucky to suffer a direct hit. Artillery fires on actual units are difficult to simulate in peacetime, and the questioning of the artillery data in the US Army only begun after considerable persuasion by the Israelis in the 1970s. It is my understanding that this effectively halted the XM1 project for several years. The data verification did not become public until 1988, but was probably available in the final stages of M1 and Bradley design phases c.1978/9. I'm only speculating here, but it coincides with the late Brigadier Simpkin's invitation to several times visit the United States, and the commencement of research into the Soviet operational art as a stand-alone intensive project by the US Staff College. The argument probably went something like, if we got artillery data wrong, what else?

Not only do Soviet tanks have lower profile, but they have significantly lower surface area susceptible to frag/debris damage than NATO tanks where typical artillery burst (155mm) is concerned.

Soviet tank units had, and Russian units retain, organic artillery for providing counter-battery fire. In NATO this allocation is at brigade level, where as in the WP forces this was at regimental level. However, you are suggesting that there is not much a tank unit can do about damage if hit by artillery, and you are right about that. There is very little that can be done about damage or direct hits from artillery in so far as tank design is concerned though. Moving out of the fire at top speed is advisable, but until the advent of the last generation of NATO tanks the Soviet designs were significantly faster. This is the reason the M551 was used in OPFOR training, because it was the only armoured vehicle to approach the speed of the T-72 off road.

 

[FutureTank]

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
I hasten to remind you that the M1, Challenger and Leopard II all appeared after 1984 in any significant numbers in Europe. Their predecessors were not particularly superior in terms of crew survival to the Soviet models. They all took two decades do get from concept to field in which time Soviets deployed not only two generations of tanks, but two competitive models in one generation, introducing autoloaders and functional gun-launched AT missiles.

Don't know where you are heading with this or what this has to do with artillery effects on tanks, but I'll play. The only recent conflict of any size featuring western tanks vs soviet tanks of the 50/60's generation were the 6 day war or the Yom Kippur war. I can only find stats showing relative losses, and the arab forces lost 2 to 5 times as many tanks. Yom Kippur War - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia .

What does it prove that the soviets fielded twice as many models in the time the western forces introduced one? Maybe the soviets needed more models to try and play catch up. Maybe it was a state directed decision to ensure the factories were kept in production. It says nothing about the effectiveness of the tanks. Your point about the gun launched AT missle and autoloaders is not news. The US developed the M551 Shillelagh system in 1960's -it was not particularly successful - perhaps with further development it could have worked. Why did the americans not pursue the system - I'd guess because if you want amissile on an armed vehicle you can always fit an external launcher a-la M2/M3 Tow launcher. As to your point about autoloaders the AMX-13 used one back in 1953. The reason why autoloaders are a contentious selection is that a 3 crew tank has one less crew member to assist in maintaining the vehicle, and one person less that can be used to man radios/picquets. Autoloaders depending on their design can limit the number of different ammunition loadouts that can be carried or loaded

The point is that the last generation of NATO tanks is the one with most significant advances in crew survivability engineering philosophy included in designs. It took 20 years, and Israeli combat experience to force this philosophy on NATO designers.

The NATO designers were playing catch-up because in every case it took two decades to bring these designs into field service.

The Soviet designers had nothing to catch-up to because the Leopard 1 was a very conventional design that used conventional armour and a conventional gun designed at the end of the Second World War. The US design had been incremental from M26, and the Chieftain was likewise a conventional heavy tank, with the larger gun as expected. These were in line with 0 doctrinal development impact on design specifications. The only noticeable departure from predecessors was the noticeable trend towards more convex turret shapes...like in the T-55.

On the other hand Soviet designers sought to introduce technologies with the T-64/T-72 that would be called 'value added features' in the commercial sector, seeking to enhance combat performance within own doctrinal context and independently of development, or lack there of, in the West. The composite armour, larger gun, autoloader and missile in the load, and compact engine/transmission arrangement all were innovative approaches to solving specific design requirement problems of crew survival in 1964. Not only that, but they were willing to support competitive designs in the process, and in production, this being the final of the 'big five' factors that tested the design. NATO tanks are never tested by limited production.

The M551 Shillelagh platform was a waste of taxpayers' money. If the Cavalry didn't find use for a 152mm flachette round in Vietnam, it would go down in history as the most confused tank design ever by anyone. A light tank, supporting leg infantry with 20 rounds and 9 missiles, intended to be deployed far from its logistic support? Sometimes one has to ask, what were they thinking?

The AMX-13 will stand as a testament to great innovative designers that worked on it. That France could produce the design immediately after the war, and export it so widely in the 50s and 60s is a testament to the recognition of the model's performance as a combat vehicle for its time.

Your points about the autoloaders are of course valid.

 

[FutureTank]

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
Its not a "hull down" position, but a temporary anti-missile scrape.

Your assertation that tank dozers are only good to make a small bund for protection against ATGW's is wrong. I have watched a Leopard 1 MTD dig itself a scrape that was around twice the length of the hull and around 1.3m deep in around 15 mins. Bunds are unlikely to provide protection against ATGW's with top attack profiles anyway.

I was referring to the KMT mine ploughs http://data4.primeportal.net/ce/carrey/kmt_mine_plough/images/kmt_mine_plough_04_of_32.jpg that can also be used to create fast scrapes, not entrenching dozer blades which are usually used by the combat engineer vehicles.

 

[FutureTank]

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
Believe it or not, the Soviet tankers also train to assume hull down positions. Its not like the European terrain is completely devoid of spots where a Soviet tank does not need to expose itself too much to fire. Nor is the terrain prevalent to allow ubiquitous hull down positions for NATO tanks. All crews are trained to look for most suitable positions.

I'm sure they are trained to assume hull down poisitions. However, and this is about the third time I've said it due to the design limitations of soviet designs their main armament cannot be depressed as far as western designs thus limiting the number of reverse slope positions that can be used. This means that the crew in the soviet tank either need to expose more of their vehicle or ignore positions that a western tank could use.

I didn't say I think these crew survival measures are a bad idea. What I say is that their lack in Soviet tanks is not a design flaw. Even in the Merkava the crew survival philosophy was only brought home by the 1973 war, and was not implemented until 1979 I think, three years after T-80 entered production.

Here we go again twisting quotes without having a good look at what was written and why. Here's the original exchange:

Originally Posted by Marc 1
The latest western tank designs have made advances in crew survivability from surrounding stowed ammunition with water jackets to the use of blow off panels and armoured doors inside the turret bussle to increase crew survivability.

Originally Posted by FutureTank
Yes, but all that costs in added weight.

Me: So you don't think the added weight of crew survivability features such as water jackets around ammunition stowage, and armoured door/blowoff panels is a good idea... Strange that you have so little regard for crew - highly trained crew are irreplacable which is why nations that value the experience and lives of their crew have designed tanks like the Merkava.

You initially dismissed these crew survival measures as something that added weight - implying therefore that they were not necessary. Now you are saying that the soviet tanks NOT having crew survivabilty features is not a design flaw? I must have missed reading somewhere that the soviet designs are impenatrable by any means - that would be the only circumstance I can think of where you wouldn't want to provide crew protection where possible. Then you go on to provide excuses as to why soviet designs could not consider this. I think, and this is only from hazy memory, that the Chieftans had their ammunition stored in water jackets as long ago as the 60's. Soviets were not worried about crew survivability as much as ease of manufacture and quantity.

This is a silly discussion!
Of course Soviet designers are concerned with crew survivability because a dead crew does not fight!

What I am saying is that there were different solutions to achieving crew survivability.
One was to enhance the fighting characteristics of the tank by innovative design features WHILE maintaining essentially same design volume and weight of a medium tank.
Another is to substantially increase the volume and weight of the vehicle to accommodate crew survivability features. This increase by default due to adopted design philosophy allowed more armour, and mandated larger powerpack in a heavy tank.

Given that the last generation NATO tanks have same physical size weapon as the T-64, everything else amounts to extra 20t of predominantly armour. To me this spells a rather obvious lack of engineering creativity. Somehow, others read this as a "flaw" in Soviet designs!

 

[FutureTank]

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
Maybe that was an overly spurious comment to make given lack of statistical evidence. However, based on bustle detonation, even with the blow out panels I think the turret fighting compartment would not be unaffected, which is what most people seem to assume.
OK, lets do this again:

Originally Posted by FutureTank
And what if the penetration is in the bustle? Believe me that the turret will achieve free flight in the result

Falstaff:Isn't that what the blow out panels are for?
Waylander: And a turret with a seperated ammo compartment is not going to fly.
The energy is going to get blown out of the blowout panels.
And that has been shown to work with the Abrams.

Originally Posted by FutureTank
And what if the penetration is in the bustle? Believe me that the turret will achieve free flight in the result

Me: Rubbish, see above.

Originally Posted by FutureTank
I think I have seen one penetration in the bustle from a sabot on an M1 and the turret did not fly off, but that proves very little since there was no ammunition detonation or even cook-off. Maybe that area in the bustle was empty.

Me: Seems to fly in the face of what you said before about any hit to the bussle resulting in a flying turret.

Show me in this entire exchange where anybody has stated that the tank can go on fighting after the blow off panels have done their bit to save the crew's life? The point is, and I've made it before a highly trained tank crew is irreplacable - a tank is easier to replace. Look at it this way seeing as you seem to have little regard for crew safety, think of all the parts of the tank that can be salvaged because the blow off panels have ensured the turret wasn't bblown clean off the vehicle.

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
That is however the least of the crew's problem. In the case of the M1 SEP, the surviving crew will be left in the midst of combat with, perhaps, six rounds in the hull. I suppose you know how long those last...

Right... so it's therefore your assertation that its better to have the crew killed and the turret physically made to fly that have the crew live and only have 6 rounds in the hull available to fight on with.

Firstly there is no guarantee that the blow-off panels will contain all ammunition detonation under every bustle penetration scenario, and bustle penetration is just one possibility.
The bustle penetration represents a very small percentage of hit probability even from the side aspect, and at the average engagement range of 1,200m with modern tank ammunition sadly the issue of crew survival is academic, and based mostly on luck. Mostly the crew has to attempt and not get hit.

Reducing the number of crew to 3 reduces casualties by 25% even before combat starts.

Secondly, if you think that the enemy tank crew will be satisfied with one round hit on a last generation NATO tank, you are ill informed about tank gunnery. Unless that turret is spewing flame from the crew access, it is very likely to receive another two or three rounds within seconds. This is particularly true when the shooter knows about the 'safety feature' of the enemy tank that requires firing at least another round 'for good measure'.

Here is another news flash: tank crews die at prodigious rate in armoured combat. The armour is a bit deceptive as a visual assurance of survival. Even in an "infantry war" like Vietnam, the "highest loss-rate for any MOS was 11E (Armor Crewman) 27% KIA"

From the Strategypage forum

"Casualties amoung the crews were in excess of 100%." Casualties for the Israelis were horrific. Over 50% of all tankers and 70% of armor officers in the IDF became casualties during the war. The Barak Brigade officer casualties amounted to all officers in the original unit and reinforcements, except the brigade S-2 and the chaplain. The brigade commander and S-3 were killed outright during the battle. Sources: Post war briefings at FT Knox (when I was in AOB) and War of Atonement by Herzog.

IDF tanks were Pattons and Centurions, so there3 was not much thinking about crew survival in NATO during the design and development of those tanks also it seems.

My assertion is therefore that it is better to design a tank which is balanced and meets many different service requirements, including crew survival. In terms of Soviet tanks designed in the 1950s-1970s, I think they are just fine. When the Russian designers come up with a new model, we can compare it to the 1980s NATO designs, shall we?

 

[Abraham Gubler]

IDF tanks were Pattons and Centurions, so there3 was not much thinking about crew survival in NATO during the design and development of those tanks also it seems.

A classic example of why you are so very wrong Greg. If you try and reduce battlefield results down to such a simplistic determination you are likely to be wrong. That you do so to support your preconceived conclusions guarantees you are wrong.

Israeli tank crew casualties in the '73 war had a lot more to do with the tactical situation than comparative tank design. Tanks outnumbered and surrounded of even the most robust design tend to result in high levels of casualties.

There was also a high proportion of tanks hit by HEAT warheads and subsequent hydraulic fires. Not something that tank designers were well aware of before '73. After '73 considerable effort was put into defeating HEAT warheads and reducing the danger of hydraulic fires.

Certainly in '73 the most vulnerable tank in the world to HEAT fires was the T-64 and the T-72. While western tank designers learnt from the experience the Soviets didn't.

My assertion is therefore that it is better to design a tank which is balanced and meets many different service requirements, including crew survival. In terms of Soviet tanks designed in the 1950s-1970s, I think they are just fine. When the Russian designers come up with a new model, we can compare it to the 1980s NATO designs, shall we?

More foolishness. For one the M1, Challenger, Merkava and Leopard II were all designed in the 1970s. For two the Soviets designed many tanks in the 1980s. It was their decision to focus on the T-80 and T-90, block improvements of the T-64 and T-72 rather than build the clean sheet design like the T-74. That they did so shows how much concern they had for 'balanced' tank design.

As to the assertion that the T-64, T-72 and their derivatives are somehow more balanced than western tanks. That is equally misguided. The only advantage in any performance figure is they are cheaper to build requiring less materials and labour. Even the fuel consumption advantage of the T-64 and T-72 was squandered by the Soviets in their first echelon tank at their demise; the T-80.

You continue to post more and more counter-knowledge. It may be you perverted world view but much of it is baseless. That you can be shown to be wrong at every turn and never catch a breath says it all...

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Given that the last generation NATO tanks have same physical size weapon as the T-64, everything else amounts to extra 20t of predominantly armour. To me this spells a rather obvious lack of engineering creativity. Somehow, others read this as a "flaw" in Soviet designs!

This is completely wrong. Trying to posit flawed data to support your view point is incredibly dishonest. Though I would imagine you have no actual idea what the physical size of a T-64 actually is?

The T-64 family have internal volumes of around 11 cubic metres. Western tanks like the M1, Leopard 2 and Challenger have an internal volume of around 18 cubic metres. The T-64 is 60% of the physical size. The only engineering creativity the Soviets have shown is to sacrifice capability: gun depression and ammunition compartmentalisation. That the Swedes were able to cut size by the same regard and keep low gun depression and complete ammunition compartmentalisation shows just who was being creative.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

The M551 Shillelagh platform was a waste of taxpayers' money. If the Cavalry didn't find use for a 152mm flachette round in Vietnam, it would go down in history as the most confused tank design ever by anyone. A light tank, supporting leg infantry with 20 rounds and 9 missiles, intended to be deployed far from its logistic support? Sometimes one has to ask, what were they thinking?

It’s a well known fact what "they were thinking". The US Army had designed the world's best airborne tank of the 1950s. The T92 light tank. Then the Soviets unveiled the PT-76 amphibious tank and the US Congress demanded the future US Army light tank be amphibious. So the T92 was sent to the museum and the M551 developed. Copying the Soviets is not a good idea...

This is the reason the M551 was used in OPFOR training, because it was the only armoured vehicle to approach the speed of the T-72 off road.

So very wrong! The M551 was used for OPFOR because it was the cheapest tracked vehicle in US Army storage.

As a matter of fact the tactical approach to enemy artillery in the 60s and 70s by the NATO tanks was to button up and wait it out. They were expected to come out of it with minor external damage unless the crew was extremely unlucky to suffer a direct hit. Artillery fires on actual units are difficult to simulate in peacetime, and the questioning of the artillery data in the US Army only begun after considerable persuasion by the Israelis in the 1970s. It is my understanding that this effectively halted the XM1 project for several years. The data verification did not become public until 1988, but was probably available in the final stages of M1 and Bradley design phases c.1978/9. I'm only speculating here, but it coincides with the late Brigadier Simpkin's invitation to several times visit the United States, and the commencement of research into the Soviet operational art as a stand-alone intensive project by the US Staff College. The argument probably went something like, if we got artillery data wrong, what else?

So very, very wrong. The effects of artillery splinters were a well known factor for Western tank designers. People like Brig. Richard Simpkin (who was not an artillery officer; Royal Tank Regiment) raised a lot of awareness of the concentrations of Soviet artillery destruction norms that would lead to statistical destruction of NATO tanks via direct hits (ie they would shoot enough rounds into an area occupied by a tank unit that at least one round would fall into each of the square meterages occupied by a tank).

It is important to place this effect into the conext which was moving form a nuclear battlefield expected in the 50s and 60s into there being a first stage conventional fight for West Germany. In the presence of direct nuclear attack laying low was the best countermeasure. Though the same dispersion, operational movement to concentration that protect against nuclear targeting also protected against high concentration artillery fires.

Not only do Soviet tanks have lower profile, but they have significantly lower surface area susceptible to frag/debris damage than NATO tanks where typical artillery burst (155mm) is concerned.

Not correct in the slightest. Soviet efforts to reduce volume were focused on the vertical dimension not the horizontal. The Sovet tank has roughly the same surface area exposed to top attack as a Western tank. The standard Western 155mm shell for anti-tank use is the M483 DPICM shell (cluster round) which attacks from the top. The M483 was introduced into service in 1975. NATO tanks on the defensive would also fight from two step turret down, hull down fighting positions which would only expose the top to attack during bombardment (compared to advance to contact Soviet tank formations).