Sorry guys, but I'd hate to be accused of trying to mislead...
The relevant exerpt is in red, you can make of the garbage (both his and mine) before and after what you will:
Edit: Incidentally the purple text I doubt. This bloke was a LtCol during Desert Storm, so I'm not sure how he was able to brief people on his activities during desert storm when he was a major.
Re: how I think
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Marc 1: Gee what a can't win situation but if they do have the advantage of ground they have lost the initiative. Crumbs, why did the poms and Europeans even bother trying to defend? If the outcome was so clear cut why didn't the soviets just roll across the border? It can't have been for nuclear reasons as the soviets had the only real anti ABM system operational around Moscow and more warheads than NATO.
FT: Its good for domestic politics if the public believes they have a viable Army, that's why. It also removes significant numbers from the unemployment pool, aids development, serves civil defence purposes, etc.
Had Australia suffered the sort of losses the Soviets did in the Second World War, you may have understood why the Soviets never attacked, but I guess it was not in your Army education content. The Soviet STRATEGIC posture was defensive since 1954. Its just that their operational doctrine, HAD IT COME TO WAR, would have been offensive. The best offensive is a quick offensive, because after that it becomes attrition. Only attritional warfare requires tank designs that ensure crew survival so they can get into the next tank. Attritional warfare is a far deadlier option in warfare than the offensive. NATO didn't even use the term 'operational' in their doctrinal texts until 1960s, and the US Army officers still had to be explained what it means in the 1980s
I'm getting weary of spelling out the basics to you.
Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank
However, not one NATO ... (text omitted) force securing initiative by means of the offensive.
Marc 1: Of course they can't guarantee the ground advantage. But being the defender the NATO forces are going to use natural obstacles and ground to their best advantage - be stupid not to.
FT: Did you miss out on your military history courses? On the offensive the point is to destroy the enemy's capability to conduct combat by destroying their logistics. Defended positions are left behind to be dealt with by the artillery and air support. This is what happened for the last three years of combat on the Eastern Front. When Montgomery tried to fight his way into the teeth of such a defensive position during the Normandy breakout, he lost so many tanks they had to scrape armoured course finishing classes for tankers to replace crews in UK and Canada. There were Canadian infantry units that had 50% losses sustained in hours of combat. Red Army learned this in 1941/42. The Soviet military liaison officer with 21AG HQ who SAID SO, but since he was only a "Russian" no one listened to him.
And I repeat, securing ground advantage involves FINDING SUITABLE GROUND. What do you do when no suitable ground advantage can be found?
Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank
Securing initiative is at the very core of 20th century military thought, and tanks...(text omitted) Cavalry as armour is the Arm of decision, not waiting.
Marc1: What is that all about? On the one hand you praise the cavalry/armour as being the arm to gain initiative, no argement there the term we used to use was 'shock action' IIRC. Then try to discredit infantry because they are nowhere as mobile?
The only combat arm that can sieze and hold ground regardless of season, weather or terrain is infantry. That is a fact. At the end of the day, grunts win battles. But this is a pointless discussion because all modern armies are combined arms teams individual corps are not used in isolation.
FT: I really do not comprehend what it is they teach in the Australian Army if I have to explain this to you. The role of infantry in mobile warfare is NOT to "sieze and hold ground". That was true in the Napoleonic Era! The role of infantry, and the entire combined arms group, is to to get to the enemy Presidential Palace and blow the president's brains out with the biggest gun they have. The role of infantry in such an operation is to support armour ON THE MOVE. The only time they stop is to refuel and load up. They fight, eat, sleep and shit on the move. Period. And, they do it wherever the tank goes. Can you assure me that a wheeled vehicle, even an 8x8, can go everywhere a tank goes? One of the major modifications to the M1 was to allow faster refuelling because even seconds matter. Israelis claim that because of the Merkava design they can rearm a tank in under 10 minutes even with exhausted crews. In fact the support people just shove it through the back, allowing the crew extra few minutes of rest
Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank
The issue of this tank design effectiveness, based on analysis of the 1991 Gulf... (text omitted) You may be more privileged in having access to this information.
Marc1: No, not privy to anything more than you can find except a briefing from an Australian Army engineer LtCol who was resonsible for the breaches in the minefields/obstacles that 3 US divisions used. I don't know about it being 'interestingly quiet'. If I were a tanker, I wouldn't be releasing a book boasting about standing off 3km away in the total dark and plinking Iraqi tanks that couldn't even see you. And when the Iraqi's did get a shot that many of the shots didn't penetrate. Yeah, be a great book - in the same way that strangling kittens is not really seen as socially acceptable. On the Abrams wiki page it lists 20 tanks disabled/destroyed during GW1. Possibly one M1 was disabled due to Iraqi MBT fire.
M1 Abrams - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
FT
: I was at his briefing before he made LTCOL. The number of engineer battalions was more than doubled over usual divisional OOB under his command if the memory serves me right. You mentioned the MANY tank engagements, and now you are talking about one shot? There is such a thing as statistical analysis. I'm sure it was conducted, so I am curious why it had not been released if it would sound so great. Maybe because direct comparison between Latest 1991 M1 upgrade and unmodified Iraqi T-72 would not look so good, what with all the other factors thrown in? What was that you were saying about twisting, deflecting, and obfuscating the discussion?
Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank
Abraham Goubler (whom I will not reply due to his lack of civility) is of course right in that the force has no choice but to fight regardless of it facing medium or heavy opponent.
Marc1: And he is correct. Don't blame the yanks for bringing a gun to a knife fight.
FT: lol That's the best joke I have heard in a long time. Until 1979 the yanks brought a nuclear warhead to a gun fight After that they brought a double-handed sword to a knife fight
Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank
But, here is what was said in the Soviet Union at the time before the 1991 Gulf War
(Heaps deleted)
this dynamism was seen to be displayed by the Iraqi command!
Marc1: Even so, for the Iraqi tankers including the much vaunted and supposedly well equipped and lead Republican Guards to have maybe knocked out one Abrams that cannot be just the US advantages listed by the soviets. They have a vested interest in making excuses for their product because they obviously want to sell more of them.
FT: Yes, but ultimately an Iraqi officer had to give orders. Soviets only sent training personnel to train the trainers with the initial batch of deliveries of every piece of technology. That was during the Iran-Iraq War. So what is the Soviet fault in designing the T-72, that they failed to foresee incompetence on the level of an entire military structure of the client?
FutureTank said:
The Soviet doctrine at the time was in
Quote:
Seizing the initiative at the .... (text omitted) strategic considerations in Iraq not making that decision.
Marc1: But Saddam didn't, so its a moot point.
FT: The Soviet Union never attacked NATO either, so the whole discussion is a moot point, but neither you, nor the dozens of people like you over the years admit this. So who is twisting, deflecting, and obfuscating?
Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank
All this is called a "wider perspective" which the premise of this thread, as many similar threads on many other forums, lacks.
Marc1: What wider perspective? Go and reread the question asked by Tavarisch. He asked the question and it has been answered. If you think explaining that the soviets value surprise is part of the answer, or that surprise surprise a soviet general is making excuses for the poor performance of the tanks supplied to Iraq is necessary then go ahead, bring then up, but don't expect these points are going to change the basic truth that soviet tanks were designed to a price, for a specific type of offensive manouvre warfare and are generally inferior IMO to the latest generation of NATO MBT's.
FT: I think that you are neither reading the original [two] questions, nor your own answers! Soviet tanks were designed during a certain period of history. After that the modifications one can make to them are limited by design. It is therefore a given that any western tanks that were designed AFTER the Soviet designs went into production would be superior. AND, because they have more room inside, more modifications and upgrades are possible. However, with miniaturisation in electronics this proved to be unnecessary.
I think you have a problem with understanding that a tank is a complex system, and its design is guided by balancing many influences, and a single answer will not suffice
Tovarisch's two questions are predicated on the "hull-down" hang up, notably he says Sure, they could prepare a position on a slope in minutes with the built in dozers for the T-72s (and it's cousins after the T-64). But it probably takes the enemy less time to charge their tanks over that slope while they get things sorted out. but this is tactical illiteracy! One does not start to prepare a hull-down position with the enemy approaching in sight, and within minutes of overrun!
His second question is based in logistical illiteracy that My suggestion would be to widen the hull to allow a larger auto-loader carousel OR dump the carousel idea completely and use a bustle mounted loader instead, as the Ukrainians have done with their shiny new Oplots. The last thing one wants to do is not have the extra ammo at all, the carousel only has 28 rounds, maybe good for short-term ops but what about those week long ones? Aside from widening the hull would require drastic changes to national rail infrastructure, what tank ONLY uses their original load for a week in combat involving other tanks? Even in the infantry support role a tank is likely to go through its load in a couple of days. You should inform Tovarisch how many DU rounds alone the US tanks went through in the 100 hours of Desert Storm
Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank
Where tanks are concerned, in 1992 Soviet/Russian view was that
Quote:
"Tanks are an endangered species when the other side enjoys control of the air." Quality beats quantity, but there still has to be enough of it to matter.
All this is really old news.
Marc1: Waffle. That has been the case since tankbuster Hurricanes roamed the skies over the wester desert or the Stuka and Henschel's over the eastern front. Now with LGB's and any aircraft that can carry or designate can go 'tank plinking'.
FT: But there still had to be enough of such aircraft to matter. If there were enough aircraft, why make tanks? Stalin said that the Red Army needed Schturmoviks more than air itself, but did not order the tank production to slow down The A-10 went into service three years before M1. Maybe the M1 was a waste of time?
Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank
As it happens I do like Soviet tank designs. They show elegance of thought, innovation, balance, economy and a strong fit to the doctrinal principles under which the force which uses them will operate.
Marc1: So, the soviet designs work well for soviet doctrine - that's a given. What is also a given is that they also were employed in large numbers because the soviet union believed in the doctrine quantity over quality. That's not a philosophy that washes well in the west or even probably in modern Russia. Even China is going away from quantity to quality.
FT: No, its not that they believed in quality over quantity, but in speed over protection. Quantity was imposed by the virtue of strategic and operational planning. Quantity only mattered in local tactical breakthroughs, and every level of ground force organisation was to be afforded a chance at achieving this, and that required quantity
Times change, and so do strategic planning considerations, and their influence on engineering design of military systems
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