Pirates
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For forum members who are interested in the legal aspect of the case against the alleged Somali pirate, Abduwali Abdukhadir Muse, the WSJ has a law blog on the topic. Of particular interest to me is the similarity of the US piracy statue's text to that of Section 130B of the Singapore Penal Code. I set out both texts below for ease of comparison:
If you are more interested in the facts of the case rather than the law, please see this WSJ report previously posted and a BBC report on the same issue.
For those interested in the legal differences, keep in mind that unlike Singapore, the US has not ratified the 1982 Convention of the Law of the Sea (1982 UNCLOS). Rather, according to WSJ's US legal expert, the US has only ratified the earlier 1958 Law of the Sea treaty. U.S. Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck cited conflicting testimony that Muse's father gave about his children's ages during telephone testimony from Somalia and his own failure to testify about his age as reasons to find he could be treated by the courts as an adult. The WSJ has also posted a copy of the actual 'charge sheet' on the 5 charges in USA v Abduwali Abdukhadir Muse (which describes the incident in some detail). See this link for more details about Abduwali Abdukhadir Muse's search for a US lawyer.
If you are more interested in the facts of the case rather than the law, please see this WSJ report previously posted and a BBC report on the same issue.
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After surrendering, when he's safely locked up in the cells - and without trial, just at the discretion of the police? Are you going to try to get that law passed? That's what zoolander is advocating - and he seems to think it's a bit of a giggle, which disgusts me.
I am of the view deadly force should be used where the Pirates are a direct threat, however, pre-emptive strikes carry a degree of legal and moral risk as innocents may be hit. You don't want to turn piracy into a war of retribution and give the terrorist organsitions contol of a group that are only 'currently' interested in money.
The problem with allowing the attacks to proceed with minimal risk to the pirates and relying negotiated settlements is it emboldens the pirates and further destabalises the tenous political situation in Somalia. the money the pirates recieve as ransom gives them real political power and means the government has less of a chance (not that it is great at the moment) of become effective in controlling the country let alone the pirates.
At the end of the day the solution has to be developed within Somalia not on the seas and the current patrols are really only a holding measure. What the patrol may be able to achive is to make piracty much less attractive from a personal risk perspective (not that actually living in somalia is without persoanl risk). I accept that the weakness in my observation is that developing a government of sufficient strength and wiht sufficient popular support to achive these objectives would apper to be a very hard ask at the moment.
And to back up my last comment
http://www.lloydslistdcn.com.au/informaoz/LLDCN/index.jsp?
http://www.lloydslistdcn.com.au/informaoz/LLDCN/index.jsp?
In principal I have to agree with him
Why not?
If you have the capability to blockade the region trade wise, to prevent weapons and supplies from entering it, and then proceed to use overwhelming deadly force to strike selected targets without a commitment of ground troops to control the country, or rebuild it for that matter, you could quite effectively (after 3-5 years) make piracy a non-issue. If the retribution for piracy is the annihilation of the entire harbor that they come from, how much piracy will you have? Better yet... how many harbors will you have that can support pirates?
I'm not advocating this from a personal perspective. But from a strictly logical point of view. Assuming the country in question has the assets, and isn't worried about international opinion.
A complete trade blockade against any country hits the economy hard and one against a country which has during famines relied on international aid is deadly against the weakest elements of the society. Even a fertile country like Imperial Germany sufferd hundred of thousends of dead due to an (illegal) sea blockade.
IMHO this is worse than shooting suspected pirates out of hand, because it will kill many, many innocents.
A complete blockade is impractical, as well as immoral. The borders are long & porous. Ethnic Somalis are the majority population on both sides of all the land borders, & many are nomadic, moving freely across the borders.
A blockade would reduce trade in high-bulk, low-value goods - e.g. food - far more than trade in low-bulk, high-value good - e.g. guns & cash. That would kill huge numbers - but not the pirates, who have both guns & money, & can feed themselves as long there is any food in the country.
A blockade would reduce trade in high-bulk, low-value goods - e.g. food - far more than trade in low-bulk, high-value good - e.g. guns & cash. That would kill huge numbers - but not the pirates, who have both guns & money, & can feed themselves as long there is any food in the country.
No, no, no blockades of Somalia. It doesn't exactly have a booming import OR export economy, and you'd just make life harder on legitimate fishers. You'd do well to have more, smaller ships giving you a quicker response time to pirate attacks. I say this because the necessary ground operations are so very unlikely, so it's just a matter of coping with the inevitable attacks.
If you then stopped paying the ransom, pirates would end up with a dangerous, unprofitable line of work as compared to the relatively safe, profitable line of work they have now. An improvement, I'd say.
If you then stopped paying the ransom, pirates would end up with a dangerous, unprofitable line of work as compared to the relatively safe, profitable line of work they have now. An improvement, I'd say.
I see that you have blogged on this topic and I would assume that you are interested in reading action plans to reduce the incidence of piracy in the Malacca and Singapore Straits. Some of the details were previously posted in the Indonesian navy thread in DT. See also this Sept 2007 article by Yoichiro Sato on SE Asian Receptiveness to Japanese Maritime Security Cooperation and this Fall 2005 article by Catherine Zara Raymond on Piracy in Southeast Asia. The IMB believes that about five criminal syndicates – probably based in Indonesia and Malaysia – are responsible for most of the larger-scale hijackings in the Straits of Malacca. Catherine categories the types of piracy and even provides specific details, such as, the April 1998 hijacking of the Singaporean owned Petro Ranger. The Petro Ranger was was on its way from Singapore to Ho Chi Minh City. After it was hijacked, the ship's cargo was transhipped into two other tankers in the Gulf of Thailand and the ship’s name was painted over, renamed and re-flagged by fraud. The ship was sailed into port on China’s Hainan Island, where the pirates passed themselves off as the ship’s rightful crew.
According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), just two attacks were reported in the Straits of Malacca, throughout 2008. In the first quarter of 2009, there was just one recorded attack in the Straits of Malacca (in contrast to IMB reporting of pirate activity off Somalia). This was a dramatic reduction from the 28 and 38 attacks that were reported in 2003 and 2004 respectively.
In 2005, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore commenced a trilateral partnership of information sharing and co-ordinated patrols. These 3 states agreed to work together after declining offers from the United States to step up patrols in the area. A 2005 decision by the Lloyd's Joint War Committee to increase insurance rates for vessels transiting the Strait of Malacca also encouraged co-operative efforts by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore (and the insurance rates has since come down). These 3 countries commenced an intelligence-driven operation dubbed 'Gurita 2005', which granted limited 'hot pursuit' rights to each country to follow criminal-carrying vessels across national littoral boundaries.
Further, Singapore's Minister for Defence Teo Chee Hean provided further details of Singapore's efforts to deter both piracy and terrorism. Singapore’s maritime security measures include the creation of Accompanying Sea Security Teams (ASSeT), which are tasked with boarding and escorting vessels singled out through shipping data analysis in order to detect and deter any criminal activity onboard these vessels and ensure that the threat is minimised. In 2008, Singapore forces escorted 1,900 merchant ships carrying sensitive cargo in the Strait of Singapore. Further, in the same year, accompanying sea security teams, comprising Singapore navy (RSN) and coast guard armed sea marshals, boarded and accompanied 1,100 selected vessels using Singapore’s ports. The IMB reported that six pirate attacks were recorded off Singapore in 2008 - a comparatively low figure. According to Janes, one factor in this reduction is almost certainly the large size of the RSN's fleet in relation to its territorial waters.
In May 2006, the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies published a paper on Safety and Security in Malacca and Singapore Straits. Contained within it is a 21 point action plan (a 40 page report), that provide an analysis of the geographic spread of pirate attacks and the types of merchant vessels that are particularly vulnerable. Some elements of this old action plan can potentially enrich your analysis of this topic. While the conditions in the Malacca and Singapore Straits are entirely different from Somalia (and there is a RSIS commentary on the difference), you should read and think about the points raised in the 21 action plan set out below:
Some participants of this thread have suggested that the USN's LCS high speed naval ship concept is applicable to naval patrols in relation to anti-piracy duties. Inherent in the LCS concept is the use of UAVs, like the Fire Scout (and we have seen the use of the ScanEagle by the USN) and USVs (the Singapore navy ship that is deployed, the RSS Resolution does use the Protector USV) and that the LCS is really a mother-ship to extend the range of these unmanned air and water vehicles. Further, the LCS concept provides for naval air with helicopter hanger and landing pad facilities which has proven to be tremendously useful in responding to merchant distress calls when under pirate attack (quick dispatch of a naval helicopter is an effective deterrent to a ongoing attempted boarding by pirates). The Danish navy vessel Absalon (6,300 tons at full load) does function as a mother-ship and has been deployed in the waters off Somalia. However, the Absalon class is a large and capable hybrid/multi-role command and support ship (capable of carrying special forces, small landing craft and helicopters) and not in the LCS class size.
See also post #256 in this thread on how the Sri Lanka navy deals with the Tamil Tiger's sea threat. At a common sense level, use of destroyers for a low level threat like pirates in small boats is over-kill. However, smaller patrol vessels have a problem of endurance at sea. Further, all the navies involved in the Somalia anti-piracy patrols are external to the region. In Singapore's case, the RSS Resolution (an Endurance Class vessel - 8,500 tons at full load) deployed as part of CTF-151 is really a small LPD (also capable of carrying special forces, small landing craft, helicopters, UAVs and USVs) and is appropriate given that the Singapore navy vessel is operating far from home - hence endurance and sustainability is an issue. Unlike the Absalon class and the LCS, the Endurance Class vessels of the Singapore navy are essentially transports, which means they are much slower (which limits their utility in certain naval roles).
However, as shown in the action plan quoted above, naval patrols (no matter how suitable the naval platforms may be) are only part of the solution and need to be supplemented/augmented by other on-shore and off-shore measures. There is a ISEAS view point called 'Hijackings at sea: How S-E Asia overcame scourge' (also previously posted), if you are interested.
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I don't think so, for several reasons.
It is overkill. It is disproportionate to the threat posed by pirates.
It would not have any legal basis.
The pirates are not tied to particular harbours. They can use any harbour or inlet along the coast. It would therefore be of limited effect.
The cost of such operations would be greater than the losses due to piracy.
Most of the casualties would be unconnected with piracy.
If warnings were issued to the population to leave, it would dispossess the local, but not the pirates, whose chief assets are their guns.
It's too late to wipe out the financiers & controllers, as many have already moved abroad - and in any case, many have never lived in the pirate ports.
I'm thinking of annihilating the support infrastructure for the piracy operations by targetting any port facilities that they use, regradless of the disproportionate collateral damage.
EDIT: While expensive initially, would it not pay for itself in the long run by ending the costs associated with piracy?
EDIT: While expensive initially, would it not pay for itself in the long run by ending the costs associated with piracy?
Sampanviking
Banned Member
For all the reasons Swerve has already listed, it would be a really bad idea.
You can add the following:
a) It would be justifying mass murder of guilty and innocents simply because there is a no Criminal Justice System to deal with these people and other countries are unwilling to use there own to deal with them (probably because even the worst Western Prison system is still more secure than freedom in Somalia! and under Human Rights/Political Asylum laws we would never be able to repatriate these people).
b) A serious risk of displacing these people into neighbouring areas and even countries, spreading instability.
c) Radicalisation of the population turning into Fast Boat Bourne Robbers into Fast Boat Bourne Bombers.
There is only one workable solution, support those that have the power in Somalia to restore order and a domestic criminal justice system and let them deal with the problem.
You can add the following:
a) It would be justifying mass murder of guilty and innocents simply because there is a no Criminal Justice System to deal with these people and other countries are unwilling to use there own to deal with them (probably because even the worst Western Prison system is still more secure than freedom in Somalia! and under Human Rights/Political Asylum laws we would never be able to repatriate these people).
b) A serious risk of displacing these people into neighbouring areas and even countries, spreading instability.
c) Radicalisation of the population turning into Fast Boat Bourne Robbers into Fast Boat Bourne Bombers.
There is only one workable solution, support those that have the power in Somalia to restore order and a domestic criminal justice system and let them deal with the problem.
What port facilities? Beaches on which they pull up their boats?
The "port facilities" consist of small towns & fishing villages. The "support infrastructure" is the civilian population of those places, who the pirates buy food, etc. from. Their boats can operate from any natural harbour, any inlet, or even an open beach. The hijacked ships are anchored offshore, not taken into ports, because the places they operate from lack the sort of harbours needed for large ships. Look up these places on Google Earth, & do image searches.
What you propose would kill many uninvolved people & leave survivors destitute - except the pirates, whose financiers are safely ensconced elsewhere.
The real support infrastructure of piracy is the information & financial network, & that is not in the miserable little places the pirates sail from.
Guys, the 2 March 2009 issue of FT has an article that is relevant to your discussion:
I've included a link for your further discussion.
"...According to crew members of the Vella Gulf, a US warship which spent months watching the Sirius Star and the Faina, another captured ship, children ran around the beach, bonfires were lit and the pirates’ associates brought four-wheel drive vehicles on to the sand.
The partygoers had come for their share of the $3m (€2.4m, £2.1m) ransom the owners paid to release the crude oil tanker, the largest vessel ever hijacked. Some of those present would have seized the ship in the first place and others would have supplied it with food, according to observers. More senior members of the pirate gang would also have received a cut....
...Yet the pirates’ business practices are effective primarily because of their simplicity. In a country where banking has ceased to function after more than a decade of chaos and in the wake of US anti-money laundering sanctions, everything is done by cash. Tens of thousands of $100 notes are airdropped as ransom payments and the cars, houses, televisions and wedding parties they fund are bought with cash.
The party shows how piracy has become embedded in Somalia’s complex society. One western military analyst says the pirates now employ “accountants” to divide up ransoms.
There are carefully worked out formulae determining how much is paid to everyone, from the lowliest guards to gang leaders. The pirates follow a code of conduct which proscribes, for example, the harming of crewmen, with fines for miscreants..."
The partygoers had come for their share of the $3m (€2.4m, £2.1m) ransom the owners paid to release the crude oil tanker, the largest vessel ever hijacked. Some of those present would have seized the ship in the first place and others would have supplied it with food, according to observers. More senior members of the pirate gang would also have received a cut....
...Yet the pirates’ business practices are effective primarily because of their simplicity. In a country where banking has ceased to function after more than a decade of chaos and in the wake of US anti-money laundering sanctions, everything is done by cash. Tens of thousands of $100 notes are airdropped as ransom payments and the cars, houses, televisions and wedding parties they fund are bought with cash.
The party shows how piracy has become embedded in Somalia’s complex society. One western military analyst says the pirates now employ “accountants” to divide up ransoms.
There are carefully worked out formulae determining how much is paid to everyone, from the lowliest guards to gang leaders. The pirates follow a code of conduct which proscribes, for example, the harming of crewmen, with fines for miscreants..."
I've included a link for your further discussion.
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Ananda
The Bunker Group
What you have bold OPSSG I think is the main issue in here...'everything paid by cash'...and everything in USD...
In my oppinion it's like cocaine cartel and heroin drug lord used to do in the 70's and 80's..before they begin to found and developed more sophisticatedmoney laundering techniques...
But this somali's crime lord I believe will by pass their money traficking problem..with more sophisticated laundering...
The articles also show increase on spending on cars, houses, consumption goods..which I believe will also come from suppliers under the crime/war lords...or their original money backers...It's seems this's one way to launder their money...they have to buy those goods even the hijacking supplies from somewhere...and whose supplying those somali's if not comming from their neighbours commercial chain ??
Follow the money trail I believe it will end up in srounding ports like Mombassa, Yemen..or even in Dubai..Then it will goes to several tax haven in the world...
It won'tbe easy..since no easy thing in dealling with money laundering...even sophisticated financial centers like Singapore, Hong Kong, London and even New York is not immune on this..
This is 'balck business' not much different with drug business...you have to tackle their money flow to the backers pockets...that's will hurt them most..
The sources posted by OPSSG show that how difficult it is to tackle the financial aspect. Labour is cheap in Somalia and the wider regions, the states weak and corrupt or even non-existent as in Somalia. The pirates and their backer seem to offer relative attractive payment to the interested and the helpers. The dirty money seems to become clean very fast with almost everybody on or close to the money trail having incentives taking a cut and almost nobody having incentives to disrupt it...
In my region smuggling was practically impossible to tackle, even if the states in question were strong. A wall of silence kept the police in the dark and a wide network of partners and popular support kept the well regarded smugglers usually very well supplied and supported. With increasing wealth and ever more open markets it gradually disappeared....
In my region smuggling was practically impossible to tackle, even if the states in question were strong. A wall of silence kept the police in the dark and a wide network of partners and popular support kept the well regarded smugglers usually very well supplied and supported. With increasing wealth and ever more open markets it gradually disappeared....
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