No, no, no blockades of Somalia. It doesn't exactly have a booming import OR export economy, and you'd just make life harder on legitimate fishers. You'd do well to have
more, smaller ships giving you a quicker response time to pirate attacks. I say this because the necessary ground operations are so very unlikely, so it's just a matter of coping with the inevitable attacks.
If you then stopped paying the ransom, pirates would end up with a dangerous, unprofitable line of work as compared to the relatively safe, profitable line of work they have now. An improvement, I'd say.
I see that you have blogged on this topic and I would assume that you are interested in reading action plans to reduce the incidence of piracy in the Malacca and Singapore Straits. Some of the details were previously posted in the
Indonesian navy thread in DT. See also this Sept 2007 article by
Yoichiro Sato on SE Asian Receptiveness to Japanese Maritime Security Cooperation and this Fall 2005 article by
Catherine Zara Raymond on Piracy in Southeast Asia. The IMB believes that about five criminal syndicates – probably based in Indonesia and Malaysia – are responsible for most of the larger-scale hijackings in the Straits of Malacca. Catherine categories the types of piracy and even provides specific details, such as, the April 1998 hijacking of the Singaporean owned Petro Ranger. The Petro Ranger was was on its way from Singapore to Ho Chi Minh City. After it was hijacked, the ship's cargo was transhipped into two other tankers in the Gulf of Thailand and the ship’s name was painted over, renamed and re-flagged by fraud. The ship was sailed into port on China’s Hainan Island, where the pirates passed themselves off as the ship’s rightful crew.
According to the
International Maritime Bureau (IMB), just two attacks were reported in the Straits of Malacca, throughout 2008. In the first quarter of 2009, there was just one recorded attack in the Straits of Malacca (in contrast to IMB reporting of
pirate activity off Somalia). This was a dramatic reduction from the 28 and 38 attacks that were reported in 2003 and 2004 respectively.
In 2005, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore commenced a trilateral partnership of information sharing and co-ordinated patrols. These 3 states agreed to work together after declining offers from the United States to step up patrols in the area. A 2005 decision by the Lloyd's Joint War Committee to increase insurance rates for vessels transiting the Strait of Malacca also encouraged co-operative efforts by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore (and the
insurance rates has since come down).
These 3 countries commenced an intelligence-driven operation dubbed 'Gurita 2005', which granted
limited 'hot pursuit' rights to each country to follow criminal-carrying vessels across national littoral boundaries.
Further, Singapore's Minister for Defence
Teo Chee Hean provided further details of Singapore's efforts to deter both piracy and terrorism. Singapore’s maritime security measures include the creation of Accompanying Sea Security Teams (ASSeT), which are tasked with boarding and escorting vessels singled out through shipping data analysis in order to detect and deter any criminal activity onboard these vessels and ensure that the threat is minimised. In 2008,
Singapore forces escorted 1,900 merchant ships carrying sensitive cargo in the Strait of Singapore. Further, in the same year, accompanying sea security teams, comprising Singapore navy (RSN) and coast guard
armed sea marshals, boarded and accompanied 1,100 selected vessels using Singapore’s ports. The IMB reported that six pirate attacks were recorded off Singapore in 2008 - a comparatively low figure. According to Janes, one factor in this reduction is almost certainly the large size of the RSN's fleet in relation to its territorial waters.
In May 2006, the
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies published a paper on Safety and Security in Malacca and Singapore Straits. Contained within it is a 21 point action plan (a 40 page report), that provide an analysis of the geographic spread of pirate attacks and the types of merchant vessels that are particularly vulnerable. Some elements of this old action plan can potentially enrich your analysis of this topic. While the conditions in the Malacca and Singapore Straits are entirely different from Somalia (and there is a
RSIS commentary on the difference), you should read and think about the points raised in the 21 action plan set out below:
May 2006 21 Point Action Plan (link provided)
Institutional Arrangements And Capacity Building
1. Adopt a comprehensive approach to maritime security, safety and environmental protection in the Malacca and Singapore Straits.
2. Establish an inclusive approach to maritime security, safety and environmental protection in the Malacca and Singapore Straits that recognizes the interests of all stakeholders.
3. Strengthen the IMO-sponsored meeting process to provide a regular forum for dialogue between stakeholders on security, safety and environmental protection arrangements in the Straits.
4. Assist port administrations to build their capacity to suppress armed robbery against ships and other forms of maritime crime within anchorages and port approaches.
5. Develop guidelines for the employment of Private Security Companies (PSCs) in providing security for vessels transiting the Straits.
Risk Assessment and Reduction
6. Conduct more accurate analysis and assessments of the risks of piracy and armed robbery against ships.
7. Use the analysis of piracy and armed robbery against ships to inform assessments about the risks of maritime terrorism.
8. Develop cooperative arrangements, including agreed guidelines, for protecting vessels most at risk of hijacking.
9. Develop contingency arrangements for managing a major incident involving a cruise liner or passenger ferry in the Malacca and Singapore Straits.
10. Introduce measures to control the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in areas adjacent to the Straits.
Regime Building
11. Investigate a regime for burden sharing and recovering the costs of providing security, safety and environmental protection in the Malacca and Singapore Straits.
12. Strengthen arrangements for maritime search and rescue (SAR) in the Malacca and Singapore Straits.
13. Link these to the cooperative arrangements for maritime security and consequence management.
14. Encourage all littoral and adjacent countries to ratify the SAR and SUA Conventions.
15. Establish Joint Cooperation Zones where cooperative arrangements for safety and security might apply, which might include territorial seas or archipelagic waters of littoral countries.
16. Implement the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) as soon as possible.
Operational Cooperation
17. Improve cooperation between the maritime security forces of littoral countries to provide prompt responses to incidents in the Straits.
18. Develop Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to cover joint patrolling by maritime security forces, including entry into territorial seas, archipelagic and internal waters.
19. Develop Guidelines for the involvement of non-littoral countries for providing security in the Malacca Straits.
20. Foster a programme of multilateral and multi-agency security exercises in the Malacca and Singapore Straits and their approaches.
21. Provide international assistance for Indonesia in establishing a coastal radar network similar to that being established by Malaysia.
Some participants of this thread have suggested that the USN's
LCS high speed naval ship concept is applicable to naval patrols in relation to anti-piracy duties. Inherent in the LCS concept is the use of UAVs, like the Fire Scout (and we have seen the use of the ScanEagle by the USN) and USVs (the Singapore navy ship that is deployed, the RSS Resolution does use the Protector USV) and that the LCS is really a mother-ship to extend the range of these unmanned air and water vehicles. Further, the LCS concept provides for naval air with helicopter hanger and landing pad facilities which has proven to be tremendously useful in responding to merchant distress calls when under pirate attack (quick dispatch of a naval helicopter is an effective deterrent to a ongoing attempted boarding by pirates). The Danish navy vessel Absalon (6,300 tons at full load) does function as a mother-ship and has been deployed in the waters off Somalia. However, the
Absalon class is a large and capable hybrid/multi-role command and support ship (capable of carrying special forces, small landing craft and helicopters) and not in the LCS class size.
See also
post #256 in this thread on how the Sri Lanka navy deals with the Tamil Tiger's sea threat. At a common sense level, use of destroyers for a low level threat like pirates in small boats is over-kill. However, smaller patrol vessels have a problem of endurance at sea. Further, all the navies involved in the Somalia anti-piracy patrols are external to the region. In Singapore's case, the RSS Resolution (an
Endurance Class vessel - 8,500 tons at full load) deployed as part of
CTF-151 is really a small LPD (also capable of carrying special forces, small landing craft, helicopters, UAVs and USVs) and
is appropriate given that the Singapore navy vessel is operating far from home - hence endurance and sustainability is an issue. Unlike the Absalon class and the LCS, the Endurance Class vessels of the Singapore navy are essentially transports, which means they are much slower (which limits their utility in certain naval roles).
However, as shown in the action plan quoted above, naval patrols (no matter how suitable the naval platforms may be) are
only part of the solution and need to be supplemented/augmented by other on-shore and off-shore measures. There is a ISEAS view point called '
Hijackings at sea: How S-E Asia overcame scourge' (also previously posted), if you are interested.