@Feanor, I normally do not like to disagree with moderators. In this case, I humbly disagree with your point of view.
So you agree with Grand Danois' point that any budget and time slippage on the JSF program should be taken in it's proper perspective.
But it doesn't change the fact that the procurement system itself is generally broken when it comes to being on time and on cost.
In the next sentence, you make a general criticism of the US procurement system in general - the kind of statement that a typical irresponsible self serving politician would make from time to time. Please consider directing specific criticism to the JSF program only - otherwise, it becomes a meaningless hyperbole.
IMHO, you will need to demonstrate a better understanding of the USAF's military development and procurement risk model so that your comment will be seen by me as a fair comment.
The JSF in this case is benefiting from international cooperation, which makes it much harder to renegotiate for higher prices or more time and money.
Every fighter development program carries a certain amount of risk. You cannot remove the element of risk in developments, otherwise it would be pointless (and would produce a new product that is not a real advance). Further, the JSF is based on F-22 technology, which is an operational fighter.
Even today's very successful platforms (like the F-16s) carried a certain amount of risk and had initial teething problems post development, which resulted in certain risk mitigation mechanisms which have been institutionalized. Please consider reading a 2007 Rand note on the
alternate fighter engine program or better known as the the
Great Engine War (for the F-15s and F-16s to deal with the issue of contractor responsiveness), as a risk reduction mechanism that has been institutionalized by Congress against any immediate shortsightedness by the USAF procurement bureaucracy. Please see the
2008 CRS report on the F136 alternate engine report for the JSF and the
GE website on the Great Engine War, which is an example of risk reduction.
The current production base and risk management tools available to the USAF are very sophisticated. Further, the stability in elements of the USAF's procurement bureaucracy (in contrast to other countries) can be seen as a source of strength in of itself, depending on the perspective you adopt.
The JSF by virtue of its international cooperation model (and used with the F-16 development program of the past) gains the substantial benefit in terms of its scale and production scope (which reduces developmental risk by spreading it out over a large number of planes). You have reversed the argument against the flow of conventional logic and
I do not agree with your point of view.
Further, the F-35, unlike the F-22, has been designed from the outset for export. Allied participation in JSF program development, and sales stemming from program participation, have been actively pursued as a way to defray some of the cost of developing and producing the aircraft. Eight countries — Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, UK,
Turkey — have pledged about $4.5 billion to join in JSF development. In addition, all eight partner nations have signed the subsequent Production, Sustainment, and Follow-on Development (PSFD) Memorandum of Understanding stating their intentions to actually purchase the aircraft. Israel and Singapore have both signed letters of intent to become Security Cooperation Participation (SCP) nations in the JSF program and contributed $50 million.
International sales of F-35s could exceed 2,600.
Please see the March 2009 GAO report on the JSF for more details. The GAO report details the conclusions of the Pentagon’s Joint Estimating Team, which predicts that development will cost $5 billion more than projected – a total of $51.8 billion – and will not be completed until October 2016.
Please explain your point further to a person who deals with risk management issues in real life.