Vigilantism
New Member
Hello everyone.
I'm part of a small group that has been kicking around this topic for a few months, and we thought it may be time to air out the ideas and concepts in public.
Well, as public as the internet can be considered.
The topic came up after seeing news reports of the recent surge in pirate activity around the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. With the amount of countries affected, and the large amount of nations within distance of the problem, it's fairly easy to see how this would be a complex issue.
This upward trend in piracy is directly affecting regional nations by way of trade. Many of these nations GNP are dependant on marine trade, and in recent years charter rates and insurance rates have been skyrocketing.
With this direct correlation between piracy and national security established, one question arose: Where were these navies?
The answer was not unexpected. These navies, while doing their best, were ill-suited and underfunded for the task. True, Somalia, the country recognized as being a hotbed of pirate activity, has little to no naval presence.
Take an example country affected by the decrease in maritime security, Kenya. The port of Mombasa makes up a large amount of the commerce that goes through this country, with an oil refinery and cement industry dependant on the everyday security of this port. Business has already been negatively impacted, a trend that must be very difficult for this already challenged country.
What has their naval forces done to rectify the situation? Well, not much. Considering that the majority of this negative activity happens outside of their territorial waters, they would require quite an extensive purpose-built force. Unfortunatley, the Kenyan Navy only has four OPVs at their disposal, two of which are seldom used for unknown reasons(built to civillian specifications), and two which are getting long in the tooth and due for a refit(supposed to happen sometime soon by a spanish firm). Many sources have incorrectly reported two to four other patrol vessels, but this is incorrect - all four of these converted missile boats have been decomissioned. One OPV sits in Spain, waiting for a year now for final payment. Total cost of ship is estimated to be around 21 million. It is unknown what amount the final payment is.
It can be interpolated that this meager navy is overbudget, so one would not expect more funds from the government. Some may say that these regional countries should let NATO deal with the issue, but NATO has not been sucsessful in controlling the situation.
The question was raised, what could a Navy do to generate revenue, and why should it refrain from doing so.
Before I let you guys loose on that question, let's focus on the other sides of this situation.
International shipping companies are doing one of three things with the security issue: Most are simply eating the increased cost of doing buisness with the hope that the situation will rectify itself, while others are avoiding the trouble area altogether by accepting a 30% transit time increase by navigating around the cape instead of risking transiting the Suez. Still others are relying on military corporations to provide onboard security - a trend that most insurance companies have categorized as a risk. Nobody wants to insure a vessel that may have a running gunfight on it's decks.
Circumventing the problem area has proven to be expensive, and is not always effective. Consider that the infamous Sirus Star was not a SuezMax design - it had to navigate to the south yet was still taken. So far, evidence suggests that onboard security is only financially viable to those charging for the service.
Some companies have expressed interest in hiring escort vessels, even though private warships are technically illegal according to international laws. So far it seems that only Blackwater has attempted to break into this market with their MacArthur, which was previously used for training purposes.
The question at this point was whether these regional navies could offer escort services to vessels traveling outside of their territorial waters, and if were at all marketable. And if not, could a regional navy offer other services? For example, the Kenyan navy has some excellent divers, and a long history of deploying them on various missions. Could they offer training services? Any influx of capital towards these navies could help offset their operating costs, therefore allowing them to pursue additional security to their region.
Your thoughts?
(edited for formatting snafu[edit: and atrocious laptop grammar])
I'm part of a small group that has been kicking around this topic for a few months, and we thought it may be time to air out the ideas and concepts in public.
Well, as public as the internet can be considered.
The topic came up after seeing news reports of the recent surge in pirate activity around the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. With the amount of countries affected, and the large amount of nations within distance of the problem, it's fairly easy to see how this would be a complex issue.
This upward trend in piracy is directly affecting regional nations by way of trade. Many of these nations GNP are dependant on marine trade, and in recent years charter rates and insurance rates have been skyrocketing.
With this direct correlation between piracy and national security established, one question arose: Where were these navies?
The answer was not unexpected. These navies, while doing their best, were ill-suited and underfunded for the task. True, Somalia, the country recognized as being a hotbed of pirate activity, has little to no naval presence.
Take an example country affected by the decrease in maritime security, Kenya. The port of Mombasa makes up a large amount of the commerce that goes through this country, with an oil refinery and cement industry dependant on the everyday security of this port. Business has already been negatively impacted, a trend that must be very difficult for this already challenged country.
What has their naval forces done to rectify the situation? Well, not much. Considering that the majority of this negative activity happens outside of their territorial waters, they would require quite an extensive purpose-built force. Unfortunatley, the Kenyan Navy only has four OPVs at their disposal, two of which are seldom used for unknown reasons(built to civillian specifications), and two which are getting long in the tooth and due for a refit(supposed to happen sometime soon by a spanish firm). Many sources have incorrectly reported two to four other patrol vessels, but this is incorrect - all four of these converted missile boats have been decomissioned. One OPV sits in Spain, waiting for a year now for final payment. Total cost of ship is estimated to be around 21 million. It is unknown what amount the final payment is.
It can be interpolated that this meager navy is overbudget, so one would not expect more funds from the government. Some may say that these regional countries should let NATO deal with the issue, but NATO has not been sucsessful in controlling the situation.
The question was raised, what could a Navy do to generate revenue, and why should it refrain from doing so.
Before I let you guys loose on that question, let's focus on the other sides of this situation.
International shipping companies are doing one of three things with the security issue: Most are simply eating the increased cost of doing buisness with the hope that the situation will rectify itself, while others are avoiding the trouble area altogether by accepting a 30% transit time increase by navigating around the cape instead of risking transiting the Suez. Still others are relying on military corporations to provide onboard security - a trend that most insurance companies have categorized as a risk. Nobody wants to insure a vessel that may have a running gunfight on it's decks.
Circumventing the problem area has proven to be expensive, and is not always effective. Consider that the infamous Sirus Star was not a SuezMax design - it had to navigate to the south yet was still taken. So far, evidence suggests that onboard security is only financially viable to those charging for the service.
Some companies have expressed interest in hiring escort vessels, even though private warships are technically illegal according to international laws. So far it seems that only Blackwater has attempted to break into this market with their MacArthur, which was previously used for training purposes.
The question at this point was whether these regional navies could offer escort services to vessels traveling outside of their territorial waters, and if were at all marketable. And if not, could a regional navy offer other services? For example, the Kenyan navy has some excellent divers, and a long history of deploying them on various missions. Could they offer training services? Any influx of capital towards these navies could help offset their operating costs, therefore allowing them to pursue additional security to their region.
Your thoughts?
(edited for formatting snafu[edit: and atrocious laptop grammar])
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