World War II: Germany vs Britain (minus USA)
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The Luftwaffe was, arguably, a tactical, rather than a strategic airforce. Early on, it did rather well at supporting the troops on the ground, particularly when the Wehrmacht were engaging in manouevre warfare. Goring was impressed by, and wanted to impress Hitler with, sheer numbers. That seems to be why he had large numbers of light-medium bombers built, but had a grave deficiency in heavy bombers. Hence one reason why the German bombing campaign against England was not successful. They could not land sufficient tonnage on target.
Likewise, it is not correct to claim that the Wehrmacht had a technical superiority across the board. IIRC, they were still surprisingly dependent upon horse-drawn transport and railways. Nor were their tanks always superior in 1940. What they did have was a doctrine of obtaining and exploiting the initiative in manouevre warfare.
It has been argued that the Wehrmacht did not manage to take by direct attack, any large city that was strongly and determinedly defended. Perhaps this is incorrect, but the French surrendered Paris rather than see it destroyed. If they had defended it as, say, the Russians defended Stalingrad, the Poles, Warsaw,,, or even as their own armies defended Verdun, it is questionable whether the Germans would have had the ability or resources to attack in the East, let alone invade England.
Regards.......... Peter
Tactical
Germany's failure to invade Spain and close the Med down was a tactical mistake on the biggest scale early on. If this was done England would have been weaken badly by such a move. I always felt it was an oversight on Germany's part and never understood why such an important choke point wasn't taken. I wondered what kind of effects this would have on England's war needs between 1941 and 1943 if the Med was close?
Germany's failure to invade Spain and close the Med down was a tactical mistake on the biggest scale early on. If this was done England would have been weaken badly by such a move. I always felt it was an oversight on Germany's part and never understood why such an important choke point wasn't taken. I wondered what kind of effects this would have on England's war needs between 1941 and 1943 if the Med was close?
The German airforces superiority over the RAF was short lived, immediately following the Battle of Britain, RAF fighter, light, and heavy bombers were ranging across France, the Low Countries, and in the case of latter, in large numbers over Germany sowing the whirlwind that Bomber Harris promised Churchill! The total tonnage of bombs dropped on Germany by the RAF was huge compared to what the Germans achieved over Britain. The Lancaster alone could drop two-to-three times the tonnage of a US Flying Fortress, it's closest rival up until the deployment of the Super Fortress. Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons were shooting down more German fighters over France than they were losing in air-to air engagements, even before the US entered the war.
Some people here need to do some research!
Some people here need to do some research!
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How a greater degree of Axis control over the Med wopuld have affected WW2 is an interesting question. Whether it would have been best achieved by annexing Spain is another.
The problem with going through Spain is two-fold. It converts a "neutral ally" (if I may use that contradiction in terms) into an enemy, and it ties up divisions of garrison troops that were otherwise earmrked for Hitler's great gamble in the East. Operation Barbarossa. There is also the question as to whether the same result could have been achieved via the use of Frech possessions in Nth Africa. While Gibralter was a useful base for the Allies, it's doubtful in my view that it would have made a better airbase than could have been contructed in Algeria.
As you may have seen, there has been considerable discussion of the German strategy WRT the Med in this thread. Also mentioned has been Malta. My impression is that having dealt with France, Hitler had turned his attention East in more ways than one. IIRC The invasion of Crete was intended to be the start of an airborne/amphibian campaign sweeping through the Eastern Med to include Cyprus and Vichy-held Syria. This campaign, if succesful, would have materially assisted German plans to acquire oil-rich areas in the Miiddle-East, and also permitted them to threaten the Suez canal from both sides. With the Suez closed, it is doubtful that either Gibralter or Malta would have contributed greatly to the Allied war effort. OTOH, with the Suez open, the taking of those two bases by Germany would not have entirely closed off the Med to the Allies.
The German master-plan has been characterised as (1) Western Europe. (2) Eastern Europe. (3) Overseas. With this in view, it is easier to understand why Hitler did not make Nth Africa or the Mediterranean a priority. While the loss of the Suez would have been a costly inconvenience to Britain, it would not have advanced German aims in Eastern Europe very much, and Hitler was thinking in terms of land battles and territory (and resources) gained. At that time, the Suez did not lead anywhere that Hitler wanted to go.
Or so it seems to me.....
Peter
I agree with you but as I said , Göring's ability was only lying well to Hitler . He promised unrealistic operations then they had been wiped out by Ivan . The best example is Stalingrad
Thanks for informing by the way .
The Furher
Hitler was Germanys raise to power as well as its downfall, Hitlers generals were to scared to tell him of defeats or even suggest increasing the amount of defence needed. It was seen as treason to speak against Hitler and therefore they would executed, alot like Stalin.
Hitler was Germanys raise to power as well as its downfall, Hitlers generals were to scared to tell him of defeats or even suggest increasing the amount of defence needed. It was seen as treason to speak against Hitler and therefore they would executed, alot like Stalin.
I guess If we are going to leave the USA out of it, then we are also leaving Japan out of it? If so , then that frees up a lot of British and commonwealth forces deployed in the pacific.....So Russia from the north, and the rest on the south and western fronts....Would have bought germany some time, but thats all, im afraid, that germany still loses, then Russia takes japan at the end of WW2.
If so , then that frees up a lot of British and commonwealth forces deployed in the pacific.....So Russia from the north, and the rest on the south and western fronts....Would have bought germany some time, but thats all, im afraid, that germany still loses, then Russia takes japan at the end of WW2.windscorpion
New Member
You have to remember WW1 was still fairly fresh in a lot of people's minds (especially those who made the decisions a lot of whom probably served in the trenches), i read once an astonishing figure like 10% of able bodied males in France died in the war. Afterwards there were very strong pacifist movements in both France and Britain.
Its easy to say with hindsight decades later France and Britain should have attacked in 1939 but put yourself in the position of a leader who had lost so much of it's population in a horrific war 20 odd years previously.
What reason is there to assume that Paris was any less defensible than Stalingrad, or any of the other cities that gave the Germans so much trouble? The reality is that the German's spectacular successes in Poland and France up to that point, had been based on manouevre warfare in open country. It was not similarly succesful in built-up areas that were defended with determination. It's not even appliccable in built-up areas.
Yes, it is probable that the Germans could have surrounded Paris and starved the inhabitants (those who had not left in the first place) but the effort required may well also have cost them time and resources that were subsequently at a premium on the eastern front.
Therefore the idea that defending Paris would have been "futile" and "a token gesture" remain a matter of opinion, not easily supported by history.
Cheers........... Peter
windscorpion
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There was a strong pacifist movement in France in the 1930s, although by the start of the war it had dissipated somewhat. A lot of people, including politicians, said it would be preferable to be conquered than fight and die in another war. Add the blitzkrieg success and its fairly easy to see why the will to defend Paris to the death wouldn't have been there.
I fully agree with you.
I understand why the decision was made.
I merely disagree with the proposition that the fall of Paris would have been rapid and inevitable had the French been determined to defend it.
It's worth remembering that one of the attributes of Blitzkreig warfare is that it tends to leave your armoured spearheads somewhat unsupported by your major infantry formations. We've seen enough over the last couple of decades to know what happens to poorly supported armour in urban environments.
Respectfully.......... Peter
ca 1.4 million soldiers, plus 300K civilians, some of who would have been able-bodied men. From a population of just under 40 million, that's at least 10%. Germany lost about the same proportion, the UK rather less - but still several percent.
Even if it's a damn old post...
Even in May 1940, after mobilization, France had a nominal grand total of 72 semi-mobile divisions (plus around 20 in division-level fortress commands).
In September 1939, that would have been at most 30 semi-mobile divisions, although somewhat better equipped on average than 1940-standard divisions which of course saw mostly infantry activated in addition to those units already present.
Too lazy to actually look it up for a precise number, but there simply weren't 50 divisions in the entire army.
Still, France could at most have taken at most 15 divisions to attack in early September. And they did just that - 11 French divisions advanced into Saarland, stopping at the Siegfried line and withdrawing 6 weeks later. The plan in September for an all-out attack on the Siegfried line called for 40 (!) divisions, cancelled off by France after the French and British convened in the Supreme Allied War Council and "declared" the Phoney War.
The Siegfried line at the time was a fortification line defended by 13 infantry divisions and 2 tank brigades, only reduced when the Phoney War started, around mid-October. During the Phoney War, roughly half of those troops were shifted to Southern Poland.
Where would those "fifty divisions" have come from please?
Even in May 1940, after mobilization, France had a nominal grand total of 72 semi-mobile divisions (plus around 20 in division-level fortress commands).
In September 1939, that would have been at most 30 semi-mobile divisions, although somewhat better equipped on average than 1940-standard divisions which of course saw mostly infantry activated in addition to those units already present.
Too lazy to actually look it up for a precise number, but there simply weren't 50 divisions in the entire army.
Still, France could at most have taken at most 15 divisions to attack in early September. And they did just that - 11 French divisions advanced into Saarland, stopping at the Siegfried line and withdrawing 6 weeks later. The plan in September for an all-out attack on the Siegfried line called for 40 (!) divisions, cancelled off by France after the French and British convened in the Supreme Allied War Council and "declared" the Phoney War.
The Siegfried line at the time was a fortification line defended by 13 infantry divisions and 2 tank brigades, only reduced when the Phoney War started, around mid-October. During the Phoney War, roughly half of those troops were shifted to Southern Poland.
If my sources are correct, this is wrong.
USSR paid in gold only for supplies ordered or acquired prior to the extension of the Lend-Lease program to the USSR in late 1941. The materials delivered to Russia under the Lend-Lease program were never fully paid for, and the remaining debt has subsequently been forgiven.
While Stalin has been quoted as saying that Lend-Lease was vital in keeping the USSR actively involved in the war, it was continued well after it is generally considered to have been militarily non-essential. Had the USSR found the cost particularly burdensome, it is not likely that the program would have continued as long as it did.
It is also worth considering the the US and Britain lost over 100 vessels and their crews and cargo.. Did the USSR ever pay for these?
Respectfully............ Peter
Germany was Allied to Russia at this point, an eastern front was but a twinkle in Hitlers eye, and didn't figure in French planing during the battle for France. The British had fled across the channel, and French mobile forces were in disarray. Paris could easily been cut of to rot on the vine, and please remember the war in France continued for at least another 6 weeks,
but the decisive fighting was over in days, there had been no plans to turn Paris into a fortress, any defense would have been a scratch defense. Stalingrad was only held because there was a supply route in, it would be like France holding the left bank of the seine along an extended Front, and being able to feed reinforcements into the battle, Ala the sacred way.
Planning for the Invasion of Russia didn't begin in earnest until after the the Battle of Britain. Even the invasion of Greece only delayed Operation Barbarossa by a month or so. To imagine a makeshift defense of Paris would have had much of a material effect on the Wehrmacht is fanasy.
Supported by history my eye.
I read a very interesting book by a British French Speaking Brigadier (written in the 50’s) who was attached to the French high-command in 1939, His letters back to Churchill (a close Friend) were pretty damning and he surmised early on that many of his French counterparts were still traumatised by their experiences in WWI and were totally obsessed with fixed defensive positions to protect France against attack. He rated the morale amongst senior French Officers as being both very low and defeatist in nature, they were not interested in taking offensive action. He also comments at length about the total lack of logistics planning, one example during the retreat West was he witnessed the destruction of large quantities of brand new French CHAR B tanks left to decay because the factory workers had been mobilised prior to hostilities breaking out.
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Almost everyone was guilty of that sort of stupidity, but the French were particularly bad at it, both because they were desperate to maximise the size of their army, from a relatively small population, & because they didn't have years of war to put it right.
BTW, some key workers were conscripted in the UK early in the war, & later discharged from the forces back into their old jobs, when the industrial planners (people like Harold Wilson) caught up. Those (e.g. my grandfather) who were in key jobs, didn't volunteer, & for whatever reason (in his case, medical - despite being prime age at 21, he was low medical category from a life-threatening illness in his teens) missed being called up before things were straightened out were safe for the duration.
BTW, some key workers were conscripted in the UK early in the war, & later discharged from the forces back into their old jobs, when the industrial planners (people like Harold Wilson) caught up. Those (e.g. my grandfather) who were in key jobs, didn't volunteer, & for whatever reason (in his case, medical - despite being prime age at 21, he was low medical category from a life-threatening illness in his teens) missed being called up before things were straightened out were safe for the duration.
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