TOM BURBAGE & GEN C.R. DAVIS
Rebuttal
PROGRAMME LEADERS RESPOND - BY TOM BURBAGE AND MAJ GEN CHARLES DAVIS
The great American humorist Will Rogers once said: "It ain't what people don't know that hurts 'em - it's what they do know that ain't so!"
It's not clear why the authors of the previous article chose to defile the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programme, other than their claim of expertise in legacy fighter performance and procurement. That expertise is largely irrelevant today because that game has changed.
It is clear that they do not understand the underlying requirements of the F-35 programme, the capabilities needed to meet those requirements or the real programmatic performance of the JSF team.
Fortunately, leaders throughout the tri-service, multinational partnership that will be tasked with making difficult acquisition decisions in the next few years do understand. While it is not our intent to challenge the authors' right to recount their personal opinions, it is important to put them in the context of facts.
Fact: F-35 unit costs have increased 38 per cent since the contract was awarded in 2001 (not 54 per cent). Fully 35 per cent of that increase is due to economic factors outside of the programme's control, including cost of raw materials, such as titanium and carbon fibre composites, and inflation factors. The average per-unit cost of the F-35 is USD77 million in future-year dollars on a programme expected to be in production through at least 2036.
Fact: It is true that the F-35 has barely begun its flight-test programme. We have two aircraft in flight test and one in ground test.
Over the next 18 months, 17 more ground- and flight-test vehicles will enter the programme.
Recognising this concurrency challenge, the F-35 programme broke with traditional programmes like the ones the authors are familiar with.
Very large investments were made in a vast and highly integrated laboratory system and a first-ever, full-fusion flying testbed. All F-35 sensors are flying today on surrogate test aircraft. The flight test for the F-35 is, for the first time, verification of projected performance and not discovery-oriented.
It is important to note that the F-35 flight-control software and avionics have performed flawlessly, contrary to the authors' assertion. A single electrical anomaly was discovered very early on in the first test aircraft and was related to manufacturing process control, not a technical shortcoming, proving the value of early test aircraft to reduce technical risks. In addition to the 19 developmental test aircraft, the F-35 is producing 20 fully instrumented, production-configured operational test aircraft. No programme in history has employed this many test vehicles.
Fact: On the F-35, the referenced 19 million Software Lines of Code (SLOC) span the aircraft, the logistics systems, flight and maintenance trainers, maintenance information system and flight-test instrumentation. So far 9 million of that total SLOC has been completed on cost and on schedule.
Fact: At peak production the F-35 programme will produce 231 jets annually: better than one per manufacturing day. In this year's budget the DoD funded a peak rate of 150 aircraft per year for the three US services. The additional aircraft will be built for the international partners, providing unprecedented economies of scale for all parties.
Fact: The 'dog' referred to by the authors is in fact a 'racehorse'. The take-off weight reference to 49,500 lb is true but misleading as the programme brings 'traditional external fuel' internal to the F-35 for stealth reasons. The F-35 carries 18,500 lb of internal fuel which, coupled with the very low drag that results from internal carriage of weapons in the stealth mode, allows unprecedented combat radius performance.
The high thrust-to-weight ratios of the lightweight fighter programme the authors remember did not include combat-range fuel, sensors or armament. Fighter performance demonstrated by fourth-generation aircraft in airshow manoeuvres is not relevant to performance in a combat loadout. Lightweight fighter dependence on energy management and manoeuvrability has little relevance in the threat environment for which the F-35 is being designed.
Fact: The F-35 has the most powerful single engine ever installed in a fighter, with thrust equivalent to both engines today in Eurofighter or F-18 E/F aircraft.
The conventional version of the F-35 has 9 g capability and matches the turn rates of the F-16 and F/A-18. More importantly, in a combat load, with internal carriage of 'external fuel, targeting sensor pods and weapons', the F-35's aerodynamic performance far exceeds all legacy aircraft equipped with a similar capability.
When the threat situation dictates that it is safe for legacy aircraft (like the ones the authors reference) to participate, the F-35 can carry ordnance on six external wing stations in addition to its four internal stations. External weapon clearance is part of our current test programme, contrary to the authors' claim. This racehorse can also enter the fight from any base. One of the F-35's many advantages is its ability to be stealthy whenever the situation dictates - a distinction that is absent in all fourth-generation fighters. Anyone who doubts the value of stealth need only look over the grotesquely lopsided victory-to-loss ratios of F-22s in mock combat exercises such as 'Red Flag' and 'Northern Edge'.
Fact: The F-35's data collection, integration and sharing capabilities will transform the battlespace of the future and will redefine the close air support mission. The reference to the F-117 incident in Serbia had far less to do with stealth than it did with the inability to share tactically important information. The F-35 is specifically designed to correct that deficiency.
In January the US will inaugurate a new president.
He will be required to rebuild frayed alliances and form new coalitions to deal with future conflicts.
He will see that one programme has been designed from the beginning to provide both the military and eco-industrial underpinnings to facilitate that need.
He will see why, for the first time, economies of commonality and scale are reversing the trends of the past. When a programme of the scale and truly transformational nature of the F-35 comes along, detractors often try to relate to the world we are leaving behind and not the world we are trying to change.
Their opinion is a valuable part of the checks and balances we employ.
We appreciate the chance to respond.
Tom Burbage is the Executive Vice President and General Manager, F-35 Program Integration
Major General Charles Davis is the Program Executive Officer for the F-35 Program.
Both men have extensive aircraft design and development, flight test and operational experience across a broad portfolio of leading-edge fighter programmes.
