Will latest F-35 problems push Norway towards a European solution?

[swerve]

It's in '34 dollars because that's when the project ends.

Thanks!

Which figure is in 2034 USD? The figures I see are all for a specified year up to 2013, or in then-year dollars, either over the whole project or to completion. Then-year dollars are derived by calculating the average price level from the start year (2014, in the "to-completion" numbers) to the end of the project, & weighting it by spending in each year.

 

[Grand Danois]

Which figure is in 2034 USD? The figures I see are all for a specified year up to 2013, or in then-year dollars, either over the whole project or to completion. Then-year dollars are derived by calculating the average price level from the start year (2014, in the "to-completion" numbers) to the end of the project, & weighting it by spending in each year.

And AFAIK that makes up for the TY number in the "total" column. Right?

 

[swerve]

And AFAIK that makes up for the TY number in the "total" column. Right?

What do you mean, "makes up for"?

Then-year figures in the "total" column are over the life of the project, i.e. a weighted average of all the then-year figures from project start to project end. Money already spent is included as actual figures. Money as yet unspent is included as projected: money to be spent in 2009 at projected 2009 prices, 2010 at 2010 prices, & so on up to project end.

If you add up the annual 2007-2013 & "to completion" figures for "Total Proc Cost", for example, you see that they add up to the figure in the "Total" column. It is therefore clear that it includes money at every price level from 2007 onwards. The unit costs are derived by simply division. Divide the total Weapon System Cost by Wpn Sys Unit Cost (159224/90.3, in $mn) & you get 1763, i.e. the total Qty - planned USAF procurement.

"Then-year" figures are an artificial construct, sensitive both to assumptions about price levels, & (for the composite figures) to the amount spent in each year. Not very meaningful, & I wish the USA would stop using them, & restrict itself to actuals for past spending, & constant price for projections. IMO, then-year merely adds an additional uncertainty factor to projections.

 

[Grand Danois]

Yes... that would actually be different from how it is accounted for in the PSFD MoU, where TY USD is a normalisation concept making sure that everyone pays their share in purchasing power. I would have thought the same applies to USAF budget costing, i.e. expenditure FYnn is normalised to TY34 purchasing power.

I don't know which one of us are correct on this one. However that is in the minutae (edit: well, it seems you're correct on this one).

One thing is absolutely and brilliantly clear: the fly-away cost in the "total" column is *not* in 2007/8 purchasing power equivalents (FY2008 USD), but TY34 USD.

The Fly-away is 58-63 mn USD in 2008 USD at the moment.

 

[swerve]

"Then-year" is exactly what it says, & how it is defined - and I wish I could find the document I once saw where it was defined. It is the money actually spent, or expected to be spent, in the prices prevailing at the time it is spent. Conceptually, it's blindingly simple: real cash dollars. What it says in the budget at the time it's spent. What it says on the tin. It's there because of congressmen who say "Ah don't really get all this "constant price" figgerin' o' yorn. What in tarnation is that in cash dollars?".

If you're going to normalise to a single year, well . . . that's what the constant price (usually project start year) figure is for.

 

[simdude97]

One thing is absolutely and brilliantly clear: the fly-away cost in the "total" column is *not* in 2007/8 purchasing power equivalents (FY2008 USD), but TY34 USD.

Sorry for being so dense but I am trying to get a good understanding of this. I think what you are doing is inferring that the money is in then year dollars since the procurement program is planned to end in 2034. I see the logic I just don't think it makes any sense. Should the number not be an average cost over the entire procurement period? Is there some government accounting regulation published somewhere that states what you are inferring? At any rate, if correct then I would think that the inflation rate they are using may be a bit optimistic.

 

[Grand Danois]

Sorry for being so dense but I am trying to get a good understanding of this. I think what you are doing is inferring that the money is in then year dollars since the procurement program is planned to end in 2034. I see the logic I just don't think it makes any sense. Should the number not be an average cost over the entire procurement period? Is there some government accounting regulation published somewhere that states what you are inferring? At any rate, if correct then I would think that the inflation rate they are using may be a bit optimistic.

It doesn't make sense to me either, but that's what they do. Nope, I don't have a link at hand. Checked up on the concept of TY$, Swerve is right, and in this case when the $$$ is spent matters as well as inflation.

So what do you think the inflation rate is? Obviously you were aware that TY$ was involved...

Edit: found this:

Funding and Projected Costs
The Defense Department’s quarterly Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) of
December 31, 2005, estimated the JSF program at $276,458.9 million in current-year
dollars for 2,458 aircraft, which equates to a program unit acquisition cost (PUAC)
of $112.4 million per aircraft in then-year dollars (accounting for inflation). The
average procurement cost (APUC) (which does not include R&D or other “sunk”
costs) is estimated at $94.8 million per aircraft in then-year dollars.

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl30563.pdf

(CRS Report for Congress)

 

[swerve]

The past inflation rates, & assumptions up to 2013, can be found at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2009/hist.html - scroll down to section 10, Table 10.1—GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND DEFLATORS USED IN THE HISTORICAL TABLES: 1940–2013

I think that inflation after 2013 is assumed to be at a constant, rather low, rate - no more than 2%.

 

[simdude97]

So what do you think the inflation rate is? Obviously you were aware that TY$ was involved...

Well after you seemed so sure about TY dollars, the fact that LM is offering the A model for under 60 million to export customers. Well, what other answer could there be. It just would be nice if there was some link to an official statement that says so.

Two percent inflation is extremely optimistic. IMHO it will probably average out to 3.5-4.5%. Even at 90 million a pop why would you want to equip your airforce with anything else short of a Raptor though. You alos need to keep in mind that that price is for a fully developed multi role jet. Unlike all three of the Eurocanards the F-35i going to be fully mission ready. The AESA, the A2G and A2A suites, etc are all day one features.

 

[Mike_NZ]

Well after you seemed so sure about TY dollars, the fact that LM is offering the A model for under 60 million to export customers. Well, what other answer could there be. It just would be nice if there was some link to an official statement that says so.

Two percent inflation is extremely optimistic. IMHO it will probably average out to 3.5-4.5%. Even at 90 million a pop why would you want to equip your airforce with anything else short of a Raptor though. You alos need to keep in mind that that price is for a fully developed multi role jet. Unlike all three of the Eurocanards the F-35i going to be fully mission ready. The AESA, the A2G and A2A suites, etc are all day one features.

Yes, but when will this day one be??

 

[simdude97]

Yes, but when will this day one be??

2012 - 2014, but in the context of Norway and Denmark it is irrelevant since neither government seems to be in a rush Also keep in mind this date could have been moved up if it was not determined to get the F-36B out the door first.

 

[Vivendi]

Gripen Demo and risk of delays

http://www.tu.no/industri/article178424.ece

My rough translation:

- No problems
"The plane behaves like the other Gripen planes, with no issues. We have not had any teething problems like we often have when we test new planes" says Seidl [the test pilot].

He has now a total of seven flights with Gripen Demo, including the "virgin flight" 27. May. Saab plans to do additionally 40-60 test flights during 2008. So far a lot of the testing has focused on the engine.

I think this was published around 27 of August, which means 7 flights in 3 months.

Just a minor point I wanted to make: Whereas most people seem to focus on the delays and problems of the F-35 program is seems that people tend to forget that all R&D programs carry a certain risk, and this includes the Saab project. And Saab may have a potential problem which relates to the Norwegian tender:

The Norwegian DoD will decide by the end of this year. This means that within the next 3 - 3.5 months Saab must produce sufficient data to convince the Norwegian DoD that they can deliver on their promises. A multi-year project like F-35 can absorb several "4-week delays", however the Saab project cannot when seen in light of the Norwegian timelines.

So the first 3 months they did 7 test flights. The following 4 months they will do 40 - 60 test flights, using only one plane! not much room for errors! I actually think Saab should be at least as worried as LM regarding delays... granted the NG is "just" a major upgrade of an existing platform, still, considering the timelines, it seems a tough one.

If F-35 progress is considered shaky by the end of this year perhaps the Norwegian DoD should consider the third alternative: Delay the decision by one year (and perhaps bring Typhoon back in the competition?).


V

 

[Grand Danois]

IR-profile of exhaust from a very powerful F135/F136 engine will not be invisible, no matter radar absorbing material on the vings and fuselage.

My prev reply to this was a bit short. Found a good link on the naval forces board which explains how to reduce the signature of the exhaust plume. Note that the engine is masked in a similar way. In addition, fuel is used as a thermal sink, with excess heat being burned off or exchanged with the surrounding air using massive heat exchangers.

http://www.wrdavis.com/DRES.html

This makes the F-35 much harder to detect with IRST than a jet that does not feature such masking. At bvr range we're talking single pixel segment bloom - i.e. the average temperature of that pixel.

 

[Vivendi]

Opinions on

Hi,

I came across the following just now:

http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=4370&StartRow=1&ListRows=10&appendURL=&Orderby=D.DateLastUpdated&ProgramID=37&from_page=index.cfm

Joint Strike Fighter: The Latest Hotspot in the U.S. Defense Meltdown

While its illusion as an "affordable" multi-role fighter-bomber is alive and well in Washington D.C., the F-35 "Joint Strike Fighter" is already a disaster, and the bad news has barely begun to roll in. Internationally recognized combat aircraft designer Pierre Sprey and Straus Military Reform Project Director Winslow Wheeler summarize the many failures in a new opinion piece that appears in the Sept. 10, 2008 issue of Janes Defence Weekly and is reproduced below.



"Joint Strike Fighter: The Latest Hotspot in the U.S. Defense Meltdown"

by Pierre M. Sprey and Winslow T. Wheeler

Politicians in the US are papering over serious problems in the country?s armed forces. Equating exposure of flaws with failure to 'support the troops', Congress, the presidential candidates and think-tank pundits repeatedly
dub the US armed forces “the best in the world”. Behind this vapid rhetoric, a meltdown – decades in the making – is occurring.
The collapse is occurring in all the armed forces, but it is most obvious in the US Air Force (USAF). There, despite a much needed change in leadership, nothing is being done to reverse he deplorable situation the air force has put itself into.
The USAF's annual budget is now in excess of USD150 billion: well above what it averaged during the Cold War. Despite the plentiful dollars, the USAF?s inventory of tactical aircraft is smaller today than it has ever been since the end of the Second World War. At the same time, the
shrunken inventory is older, on average, than it has been ever before.
Since George W Bush came to office in 2001, the air force has received a major budget 'plus up', supposedly to address its problems. In January 2001 a projection of its budgets showed USD850 billion for 2001 to 2009. It actually received USD1,059 billion – not counting the additional billions (more than USD80 billion) it also received to fund its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
With the ?plus up? of more than USD200 billion, the air force actually made its inventory troubles worse: from 2001 to today, tactical aircraft numbers shrank by about 100 aircraft and their average age increased from 15 years to 20, according to the Congressional Budget Office.

Not to worry, the air force and its politicians assert, the solution is in hand; it is called the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter. It will do all three tactical missions: air-to-ground bombing, air-to-air combat and specialised close air support for ground troops – and there will be tailored
variants for the air force, navy and marines. Most importantly, it will be ?affordable? and, thus, the US can buy it in such large numbers that it will resolve all those shrinking and ageing problems.


Baloney. When the first official cost and quantity estimate for the F-35 showed up on Capitol Hill in 2001, the Department of Defense (DoD) predicted 2,866 units for USD226 billion. That is a not inconsiderable USD79 million for each aircraft. The latest official estimate is for a
smaller number of aircraft (2,456) to cost more (USD299 billion). That represents a 54 per cent increase in the per-unit cost to USD122 million, and the deliveries will be two years late. The Government Accountability Office reported in March that the US can expect the costs to increase some more – perhaps by as much as USD38 billion – with deliveries likely to be delayed again, perhaps by another year. That is just the start of the rest of the bad news. The price increases and schedule delays cited above are for currently known problems. Unfortunately,
the F-35 has barely begun its flight-test programme, which means more problems are likely to be discovered – perhaps even more serious than the serious engine, flight control, electrical and avionics glitches found thus far.
Take the F-22 experience; it was in a similarly early stage of flight testing in 1998. Its programme unit cost was then USD184 million per aircraft but it climbed to a breathtaking USD355 million by 2008. Considering that the F-35 is even more complex (19 million lines of
computer code compared to 4 million, and three separate service versions compared to one), the horrifying prospect of the F-35?s unit cost doubling is not outlandish. The last tri-service, tri-mission ?fighter? the US built, the F-111,
tripled in cost before being cut back to barely half the number originally contemplated. The DoD currently plans to spend more than USD10 billion to produce fewer than 100 F-35s per year at peak production. USAF leaders
would like to increase the production rate and add in a few more F-22s. That plan is irresponsibly unaffordable (which contributed to the recent departure of the Secretary of the Air Force and the Air Force Chief of Staff). The unaffordability will become even more
obvious when the unavoidable F-35 cost increases emerge. The inevitable reaction, just as in past programmes, will be a slashing of annual production, the opposite of the increase the air force needs to address its
inventory problems. The DoD fix is simple: test the F-35 less and buy more copies before the testing is completed. Two test aircraft and hundreds of flight-test hours have been eliminated from the programme, and there is now a plan to produce more than 500 copies before the emasculated testing is finished. This approach will not fix
the programme but it will help paper over the problems and make the F-35 more cancellationproof in the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill.

It gets even worse. Even without new problems, the F-35 is a ?dog?. If one accepts every performance promise the DoD currently makes for the aircraft, the F-35 will be:
? Overweight and underpowered: at 49,500 lb
(22,450kg) air-to-air take-off weight with an
engine rated at 42,000 lb of thrust, it will be a significant step backward in thrust-to-weight ratio for a new fighter.
? At that weight and with just 460 sq ft (43 m2) of wing area for the air force and Marine Corps variants, it will have a ?wing-loading? of 108 lb per square foot. Fighters need large wings relative to their weight to enable them to manoeuvre and survive. The F-35 is actually less manoeuvrable than the appallingly vulnerable F-105
?Lead Sled? that got wiped out over North Vietnam in the Indochina War.
? With a payload of only two 2,000 lb bombs in its bomb bay – far less than US Vietnam-era fighters – the F-35 is hardly a first-class bomber either. With more bombs carried under its wings, the F-35 instantly becomes ?non-stealthy? and the DoD does not plan to seriously test it in this configuration for years.
? As a ?close air support? attack aircraft to help US troops engaged in combat, the F-35 is a nonstarter. It is too fast to see the tactical targets it is shooting at; too delicate and flammable to withstand ground fire; and it lacks the payload and especially the endurance to loiter usefully over US forces for sustained periods as they manoeuvre on the ground. Specialised for this role, the air force?s existing A-10s are far superior. However, what, the advocates will protest, of the F-35?s two most prized features: its ?stealth? and its advanced avionics? What the USAF will not tell you is that ?stealthy? aircraft are quite detectable by radar; it is simply a question of the type of radar and its angle relative to the aircraft. Ask the pilots of the two ?stealthy? F-117s that the Serbs successfully
attacked with radar missiles in the 1999 Kosovo air war. As for the highly complex electronics to attack targets in the air, the F-35, like the F-22 before it, has mortgaged its success on a hypothetical vision of ultra-long range, radar-based air-to-air combat that has fallen on its face many times in real air war. The F-35?s air-to-ground electronics promise little more than slicker command and control for the use of existing munitions.


The immediate questions for the F-35 are: how much more will it cost and how many additional problems will compromise its already mediocre performance? We will only know when a complete and rigorous test schedule –
not currently planned – is finished. The F-35 is a bad deal that shows every sign of turning into a disaster as big as the F-111 fiasco of the 1960s.

It seems to me that many of the statements above contradicts what I have read other places regarding the F-35 (unit price, A2A capabilities, stealth, etc. etc.) I am surprised Janes is printing something like the above. What is CDI? And who are the authors? Do they know something that the rest of the world don't know about this program?

Anybody who is more knowledgable than me who cares to comment?


Vivendi

 

[Grand Danois]

For starters: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fighter_mafia.

Note the last pararaph.

Btw, here's a good find on BVR and WVR A2A combat:

Bill Sweetman: Fighter Tactics

 

[Grand Danois]

First of all, the LM offer was NOK 19.5 bn. for the planes and NOK 12.5 bn. for a 20 year service and maintainance agreement. The two offers vary in their content and definitions and thus are not directly comparable. Both are binding offers.

I'm sorry it seems I missed this. Are you saying that LM made a 32 bn NOK (5.67 bn USD) 20 year life-cycle-cost binding offer?

This offer would be roughly equivalent in content with regard to procurement of airframes and maintenance to the 4.2 bn USD 20 year LCC binding offer by SAAB, but not with regard to offset/best value options...(?)

 

[rjmaz1]

Anybody who is more knowledgable than me who cares to comment?

1. Regarding cost the F-22's price tripled because production was cut to a QUARTER of the original number. So that example shouldn't be used to describe potential costs increases to the F-35.
2. Secondly the air to air performance and agility of the F-35. The F-35's wing loading is the same as the latest F-16 model. The F-16 is still quite agile in the heavier versions. This completely forgets the F-35 will kill you from a distance without having to dogfight at all.
3. Thirdly the close air support role of the F-35. The F-35 will fly at medium altitude opposed to low altitude like the A-10. This means the F-35 can fly more effeciently. It also means the F-35 can see the target for longer even though its flying faster. The ability to take ground fire is no longer as important at these higher altitudes. Such a comparison is stupid as the role has changed completely.
4. The bombing capability. "Only two 2,000lb bombs" Well thats all the F-117 carried and it decimated Iraq with only a couple dozen aircraft. Imagine a thousand F-117's during the gulf war the country as thats what the USAF will potentially have. Not to mention the F-35 will be able to carry a dozen smaller SDB's internally. Thats a lot of targets destroyed.

I can not believe such a magazine would print something so incorrect.

 

[swerve]

1. Regarding cost the F-22's price tripled because production was cut to a QUARTER of the original number. So that example shouldn't be used to describe potential costs increases to the F-35.

1. 
   Cutting production doesn't increase overall price, it decreases it. It increases unit price. Building 4 times as many F-22s wouldn't cut unit price by two-thirds: it would probably cut programme unit cost by about one-third, or a bit more if significant volume production savings were achieved. It would also increase the overall programme cost by at least 150%.*
   
   If the unit price of the F-22 has tripled from the original estimates, most of the increase must have been increases in costs independent of the numbers.
   
   *These figures are approximate because I'm relying on memory for the unit acquisition & development costs.

 

[energo]

Originally Posted by energo
First of all, the LM offer was NOK 19.5 bn. for the planes and NOK 12.5 bn. for a 20 year service and maintainance agreement. The two offers vary in their content and definitions and thus are not directly comparable. Both are binding offers.

Grand Danois:
I'm sorry it seems I missed this. Are you saying that LM made a 32 bn NOK (5.67 bn USD) 20 year life-cycle-cost binding offer?

This offer would be roughly equivalent in content with regard to procurement of airframes and maintenance to the 4.2 bn USD 20 year LCC binding offer by SAAB, but not with regard to offset/best value options...(?)

My sincerest apologies, I seem to have made a type there. The unit price was NOK 17.5 bn - not 19.5 bn - and 12.5 bn for the LCC.

Yes, the LM offer was binding, but with some usual reservations for unforeseen factors like increased cost of labor, raw materials, inflation etc.


Regards,
B. Bolsøy
Oslo

 

[Grand Danois]

Thanks... that would make it 5.3 bn USD 20 year LCC for 48 F-35. This is not TCO of course (which include crew salaries and fuel). And it's unknown if the 5-10% discount (= 0.4 bn USD) is included or not (I would think it is). Using the info from the Danish & Norwegian offers, I gather that:

F-35A (including vendor stuff only)

Recurring Fly-Away - 58-63 mn USD per unit
Unit Procurement Cost - 75-83 mn USD
20 year life-cycle cost - c. 110 mn USD per unit

How does this sound as ballpark numbers?