This is nothing but pure speculation and rumored based.
The Arjun Tank
- Thread starter Jade
- Start date
KBTM - Omsk heavy vehicles design buraue - was always in better economic state than the serial plant Omsktransmash. Russian state financed R&D in some degree even in the worst economic crisis years, while serial prduction was falen. In 2007 after bankrupcy of Omsktransmasg its shares were sold from auction and KBTM even bought them, so the design buraue is now the owner of what was remained from the serial plant (not much remained BTW).
Now the state decided to merge all state enterprizes in heavy armored vehicles sector around UralvagonZavod (UVZ). It's including all tank design buraues, KBTM and the oldest Russian tank-design house in San-Peterburg. In this new "UVZ corporation' Omsk's KBTM will specialized on special heavy armored vehicles design, which was the specialisation of KBTM in soviet time. Omsktransmash will not have independent serial tank production, but is a part of UVZ manufacturing chain. This merging is a strong fact now.
niteshkjain
New Member
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2008/07/25/stories/2008072550320800.htm
Give Arjun a fighting chance
Those of us who want to see India emerge as a nation that produces its own weapons to contemporary standards would be dismayed and even perturbed at reports that Arjun, the Main Battle Tank developed after three decades of sweat and toil, will be taken off production even before it started rolling out in decent numbers. Apparently, this proposal is because Arjun has failed to meet the expectations — never mind the moving goal posts were set by the Army itself all alo ng; and the Army is now looking for state-of-the-art requirements 20 years hence. This is a legitimate desire if there is no urgent need to replace the ageing fleet of T-55s and T-72s.
Going by past experience, even advanced countries take a decade or more to bring about truly path-breaking improvements in weapon platforms. After 13 years, T-95 is still a work in progress in Russia. If one has a measure of what is being attempted in shaping futuristic tanks, there are several areas — electro magnetic armour, unmanned turret, use of composites and lighter chassis, total missile launching facility and, more importantly, choosing invisibility over invincibility, all in their infancy in development.
Therefore, even those who are called upon to draw RFPs (Request For Proposal) will only be able to put together, as in old times, a mélange of promised and mostly untested systems, cut and pasted from glossy brochures from the aggressive arms merchants or a mere wish-list. We must consider our terrain and battle conditions and not opt for tanks just because they are from Russia or the US or appear exciting in a demo DVD.
Anyone who has followed the chequered history of Arjun’s development would most certainly confirm that the Army has been less than fair in its handling of issues arising out of inducting indigenous tanks and deploying them.
Under the teeth of opposition from the Army, though unarticulated in public, the then Defence Minister, Mr George Fernandes, authorised production of 124 numbers in March 2000 after satisfying himself that all production issues were settled and this batch of 124 could be delivered by 2003-2004, according to his statement in Parliament then.
Army’s Involvement In Development
(Thumbnail is attached below)
Army, as is its wont, was not impressed with Arjun even at this stage although on all parameters such as horse power, speed, suspension, mobility, rifled barrel, imagers and communication sets, it was way ahead of the Soviet tanks that the Army is besotted with. The irony is that, through the years, in the development era of Arjun, Generals of the calibre of Gen Shankar Roy Choudhuri, who later went on to become Rajya Sabha MP, were involved as Project Heads, Chairmen and Members of Steering Committees. The Vice-Chief of Army staff was always associated with every step of the decision-making.
Yet, after ostensibly being satisfied according to averments made in public at the highest levels of Chief Of Staff, the Army insisted on testing the equipment repeatedly almost every winter and every summer, in every desert and every mountain, making each piece produced a prototype. The DRDO was will-nilly forced to commit itself to such procedures as would have been unimaginable to be imposed on any foreign supplier.
Contrast this with the case of the T-72 or T-90. The Soviets or Russians sent a few tanks for testing and the Army made up its mind in a matter of less than two or three years on quantity and variants, convinced the civilian bureaucracy and ordered hundreds of them at one go. It is not that T-72s or T-90s functioned without any technical glitches in operation and maintenance. Even now, T90s are reportedly yet to overcome the problem of losing accuracy due to overheating, although they were cleared after due desert trials.
T72s have had their share of snags such as bursting of barrels, inconsistent accuracy, heating of engines, faulty ammunition loading and so on. Their communication sets are still primitive.
The laser range finders had to be sent back to the manufacturer in bulk for rectification. Overall, all problems were satisfactorily resolved as everyone involved climbed the learning curve.
Parliamentary Committee Report
It was only a year ago, the 14th parliamentary report by the Ministry of Defence stated that, Arjun Tank Mark-II production will be taken up after the successful completion of the first order of 124 Arjun tanks. The same report stated that, “MBT Arjun is a 60-tonne class battle tank with state of the art opto-electronic power-packed control system, weapon management system and high performance suspension. It is a product unique in its class, specifically configured for the requirements of the Indian Army.
Unlike the T-90 tank, which was primarily built for Russian Armed Forces, adapted by the Indian Army for certain specific roles, this T-90 is a 50-tonne class vehicle which does not have some of the advanced features of MBT Arjun. But it is an improved system over T-72 tank.
However, it is important to know that MBT Arjun costs Rs 17.20 crore per system from the production line and is Rs 6-8 crore cheaper than its contemporary system in the West. It is understood that T-90 tank costs approximately Rs 12 crore and is yet to be indigenised.
MBT Arjun’s firing accuracy is far superior to the other two tanks. It has a second generation thermal imager and can engage targets at 2,500 meters. Its 1,400 hp engine ensures excellent mobility performance. It has capability to fire Laser Homing Anti Tank (LAHAT) missile from the barrel of the gun. Only T-90 tank has such capability. MBT Arjun has good export potential in the African countries due to its superior features vis-a-vis contemporary MBTs. (Table)
Arjun’s Woes
However, in May this year, in reply to a Parliament question, the Defence Minister informed that Arjun was found to have low accuracy, frequent break-down of power packs and problems with its gun barrel in the recent accelerated user-cum-reliability trials. The tanks also had problems of consistency, recorded failure of hydro-pneumatic suspension units and shearing of top rolls.
All Arjun’s problems except engine failure, were reported to have been resolved promptly. However, for engine failure, the Army field teams also have to bear some accountability as they are known to flog the vehicle at top speeds for long periods as the rides are smooth with superior hydro-pneumatic suspension compared to T-72s. This, in fact, prompted the suppliers Powerpack to install data loggers and automatic computer controls to prevent overheating.
This like the black box of an aircraft gave the complete log of the use of the vehicle but also regulated the speed on sensing overheating. It is learnt that results of close monitoring are being analysed and the engineers are confident that the problem can be fixed soon.
Continued lack Of Synergy
However, despite lofty exhortations from the Prime Minister downwards, what has been most difficult to achieve and standing in the way of making Arjun, a success is the lack of synergy between the user, on the one side, and the developer on the other.
Arjun is not treated with the same deference as other Russian tanks, either because there is reluctance to study and follow the manual of operations and maintenance provided by the producer or because they find it difficult to switch from the T-72 mode.
Although several recommendations of Dr Rama Rao Committee for revamping Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) are under serious consideration for implementation, the immediate need in the case of Arjun is to thwart any misguided attempts by the Army to throw the baby with the bath water. The time, effort and money spent on development of indigenous fighting equipment, including Arjun, should not be squandered away in pursuit of pipe-dreams on technology or mindless fascination for foreign equipment.
(The author is former Member, Ordnance Factories.)
Give Arjun a fighting chance
Those of us who want to see India emerge as a nation that produces its own weapons to contemporary standards would be dismayed and even perturbed at reports that Arjun, the Main Battle Tank developed after three decades of sweat and toil, will be taken off production even before it started rolling out in decent numbers. Apparently, this proposal is because Arjun has failed to meet the expectations — never mind the moving goal posts were set by the Army itself all alo ng; and the Army is now looking for state-of-the-art requirements 20 years hence. This is a legitimate desire if there is no urgent need to replace the ageing fleet of T-55s and T-72s.
Going by past experience, even advanced countries take a decade or more to bring about truly path-breaking improvements in weapon platforms. After 13 years, T-95 is still a work in progress in Russia. If one has a measure of what is being attempted in shaping futuristic tanks, there are several areas — electro magnetic armour, unmanned turret, use of composites and lighter chassis, total missile launching facility and, more importantly, choosing invisibility over invincibility, all in their infancy in development.
Therefore, even those who are called upon to draw RFPs (Request For Proposal) will only be able to put together, as in old times, a mélange of promised and mostly untested systems, cut and pasted from glossy brochures from the aggressive arms merchants or a mere wish-list. We must consider our terrain and battle conditions and not opt for tanks just because they are from Russia or the US or appear exciting in a demo DVD.
Anyone who has followed the chequered history of Arjun’s development would most certainly confirm that the Army has been less than fair in its handling of issues arising out of inducting indigenous tanks and deploying them.
Under the teeth of opposition from the Army, though unarticulated in public, the then Defence Minister, Mr George Fernandes, authorised production of 124 numbers in March 2000 after satisfying himself that all production issues were settled and this batch of 124 could be delivered by 2003-2004, according to his statement in Parliament then.
Army’s Involvement In Development
(Thumbnail is attached below)
Army, as is its wont, was not impressed with Arjun even at this stage although on all parameters such as horse power, speed, suspension, mobility, rifled barrel, imagers and communication sets, it was way ahead of the Soviet tanks that the Army is besotted with. The irony is that, through the years, in the development era of Arjun, Generals of the calibre of Gen Shankar Roy Choudhuri, who later went on to become Rajya Sabha MP, were involved as Project Heads, Chairmen and Members of Steering Committees. The Vice-Chief of Army staff was always associated with every step of the decision-making.
Yet, after ostensibly being satisfied according to averments made in public at the highest levels of Chief Of Staff, the Army insisted on testing the equipment repeatedly almost every winter and every summer, in every desert and every mountain, making each piece produced a prototype. The DRDO was will-nilly forced to commit itself to such procedures as would have been unimaginable to be imposed on any foreign supplier.
Contrast this with the case of the T-72 or T-90. The Soviets or Russians sent a few tanks for testing and the Army made up its mind in a matter of less than two or three years on quantity and variants, convinced the civilian bureaucracy and ordered hundreds of them at one go. It is not that T-72s or T-90s functioned without any technical glitches in operation and maintenance. Even now, T90s are reportedly yet to overcome the problem of losing accuracy due to overheating, although they were cleared after due desert trials.
T72s have had their share of snags such as bursting of barrels, inconsistent accuracy, heating of engines, faulty ammunition loading and so on. Their communication sets are still primitive.
The laser range finders had to be sent back to the manufacturer in bulk for rectification. Overall, all problems were satisfactorily resolved as everyone involved climbed the learning curve.
Parliamentary Committee Report
It was only a year ago, the 14th parliamentary report by the Ministry of Defence stated that, Arjun Tank Mark-II production will be taken up after the successful completion of the first order of 124 Arjun tanks. The same report stated that, “MBT Arjun is a 60-tonne class battle tank with state of the art opto-electronic power-packed control system, weapon management system and high performance suspension. It is a product unique in its class, specifically configured for the requirements of the Indian Army.
Unlike the T-90 tank, which was primarily built for Russian Armed Forces, adapted by the Indian Army for certain specific roles, this T-90 is a 50-tonne class vehicle which does not have some of the advanced features of MBT Arjun. But it is an improved system over T-72 tank.
However, it is important to know that MBT Arjun costs Rs 17.20 crore per system from the production line and is Rs 6-8 crore cheaper than its contemporary system in the West. It is understood that T-90 tank costs approximately Rs 12 crore and is yet to be indigenised.
MBT Arjun’s firing accuracy is far superior to the other two tanks. It has a second generation thermal imager and can engage targets at 2,500 meters. Its 1,400 hp engine ensures excellent mobility performance. It has capability to fire Laser Homing Anti Tank (LAHAT) missile from the barrel of the gun. Only T-90 tank has such capability. MBT Arjun has good export potential in the African countries due to its superior features vis-a-vis contemporary MBTs. (Table)
Arjun’s Woes
However, in May this year, in reply to a Parliament question, the Defence Minister informed that Arjun was found to have low accuracy, frequent break-down of power packs and problems with its gun barrel in the recent accelerated user-cum-reliability trials. The tanks also had problems of consistency, recorded failure of hydro-pneumatic suspension units and shearing of top rolls.
All Arjun’s problems except engine failure, were reported to have been resolved promptly. However, for engine failure, the Army field teams also have to bear some accountability as they are known to flog the vehicle at top speeds for long periods as the rides are smooth with superior hydro-pneumatic suspension compared to T-72s. This, in fact, prompted the suppliers Powerpack to install data loggers and automatic computer controls to prevent overheating.
This like the black box of an aircraft gave the complete log of the use of the vehicle but also regulated the speed on sensing overheating. It is learnt that results of close monitoring are being analysed and the engineers are confident that the problem can be fixed soon.
Continued lack Of Synergy
However, despite lofty exhortations from the Prime Minister downwards, what has been most difficult to achieve and standing in the way of making Arjun, a success is the lack of synergy between the user, on the one side, and the developer on the other.
Arjun is not treated with the same deference as other Russian tanks, either because there is reluctance to study and follow the manual of operations and maintenance provided by the producer or because they find it difficult to switch from the T-72 mode.
Although several recommendations of Dr Rama Rao Committee for revamping Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) are under serious consideration for implementation, the immediate need in the case of Arjun is to thwart any misguided attempts by the Army to throw the baby with the bath water. The time, effort and money spent on development of indigenous fighting equipment, including Arjun, should not be squandered away in pursuit of pipe-dreams on technology or mindless fascination for foreign equipment.
(The author is former Member, Ordnance Factories.)
So we're looking at the formation of a United Tank Corporation. Chelyabinsk Tractor, UVZ and Omsk Transmash. Interesting. Does this mean that the T-80 line of tanks has a chance of coming back from the dead? Or is the UVZ KB the only one left active?
It means T-80 production line is verified dead. No tanks with gas-turbine engine are planned to produce in near future. The only limited modernisation of current T-80 fleet (as 3500 units) is following in Omsk. Maximum they will use some technologies of Black Eagle and solutions (AL) on the future Russian tank (based on T-95 'object 172') or Indian FMBT (if Indians are serious about cooperation).
If they do indeed decide to upgrade these T-80 models, then I would only assume that we will not see the T-95 any time soon, why waste the funds and resources.
It seems to be very limited upgrade - From T-80B/BM up-to T-80U only, without advanced IR cameras, and the rate was still very slow - 2007 it started with 15 or so tanks were upgraded. It means T-80s will fill 'low end' niche of the tank fleet and can be used for limited conflicts only. Such modernisation will not take much resources from T-95 program when comes.
The problem is that the manufacturing base for the UD's is in Ukraine, thus even maintenance and replacement for certain parts would be difficult. And of course the UD are few in number. From what I know only a handful of units had them (Kantemirskaya Gds, etc).
T-80UD are usefull for drivers' training too, till exhausting of their resource. Some rumors were about keeping their turrets for T-80B/BM upgrade. Till now some number were in the storage bases, like these:
niteshkjain
New Member
some new twist in arjun saga:
http://livefist.blogspot.com/2008/07/force-mags-prasun-k-sengupta-working-on.html
http://livefist.blogspot.com/2008/07/force-mags-prasun-k-sengupta-working-on.html
the important people who make the decision are obviously getting personal benefits out of the deals.
sometimes they get caught like in bofors case and in some other cases they dont get caught like in all russian deals.
i personally find it very strange that despite the dealys and inferior goods and the problems arrving out of them there is never any inquiry where russian equipment is involved.:unknown
Interesting read, but first of all a few more full-stops in his text would not be bad. An average sentence of him is like 10 lines long, that's quite hard to follow.
I read a few things the first time in that blog and I'd really like to know if all of these are true:
- Will the next batch of T-90 that India will receive really be T-90M instead of T-90S? What is the difference?
- Did India really have T-72M? I thought they had started with T-72M1 to begin with.
- Is Pakistan really planning to acquire T-84 tanks from Ukraine? That would seem strange regarding the fact that the Al Khalid production is going fine from what I've heard.
- Do they really want to upgrade their Type 85APII to Type 99 level?
What does he mean with "tank destroyer"? The BMP-T? That's a heavy APC/IFV hybrid creature thingy, but in no way a 'tank destroyer'. He even proposes the use of BMP-T as a recce/scout vehicle. That's a thing I want to have explained.
All in all the guy is a bit overenthusiastic about the Arjun. He's totally bashing the T-90 as if it was a piece of crap, and praises the Arjun a little too much for my taste.
Finally two mistakes:
The Chinese tank that the Pakistanis bought is called "Type 85APII" and not "Type 85IIIAP".
Calling the new Japanese MBT a "derivative" of the Type 90 is just wrong. The two have hardly anything in common.
I read a few things the first time in that blog and I'd really like to know if all of these are true:
- Will the next batch of T-90 that India will receive really be T-90M instead of T-90S? What is the difference?
- Did India really have T-72M? I thought they had started with T-72M1 to begin with.
- Is Pakistan really planning to acquire T-84 tanks from Ukraine? That would seem strange regarding the fact that the Al Khalid production is going fine from what I've heard.
- Do they really want to upgrade their Type 85APII to Type 99 level?
What does he mean with "tank destroyer"? The BMP-T? That's a heavy APC/IFV hybrid creature thingy, but in no way a 'tank destroyer'. He even proposes the use of BMP-T as a recce/scout vehicle. That's a thing I want to have explained.
All in all the guy is a bit overenthusiastic about the Arjun. He's totally bashing the T-90 as if it was a piece of crap, and praises the Arjun a little too much for my taste.
Finally two mistakes:
The Chinese tank that the Pakistanis bought is called "Type 85APII" and not "Type 85IIIAP".
Calling the new Japanese MBT a "derivative" of the Type 90 is just wrong. The two have hardly anything in common.
A Russian T-90M first appeared in 1999, the M designation was used for the all welded turret design, it is no different than the Indian T-90S version as far as turret design, and I know that you know this but the T-90S designation is used for export version.
Yes - India was one of the largest manufacturers of the T-72, their base version is compared to a T-72M1 but as you know are being upgraded to Ajeya status.
He seems to be confused on the Pakistan purchase of T-80UDs, most likely getting hung up on the fact that some of them have the all welded turret design like the T-84. Pakistan is upgrading their Type 85s to a more potent level, can they get it to a Al Khalid or Type 98/99 standard remains to be seen.
And he is totally off base with the BMPT, maybe he is looking at the Kornet missile launcher having the capability to launch anti armor rounds. I still believe that Russia will use these for urban assualt and the Kornet launchers will be loaded up with Thermoboric warheads.
Is that you Extern holding the video camera.
The Tamanskaya and Kantemirskaya Gds. were armed with T-80UD's. Do you have any info on them being re-armed? I know they began receiving T-90A's, but iirc only a total of 93 T-90A's were delivered up until this year. And only another 62 are coming this year (two battallion sets).
Tamanskaya and Kantemirovsakaya will fully equiped with T-90A till the end of 2010 if I remember right. It's like 400 tanks. 2005-31 tank, 2006-31, 2007-31, 2008 - 62. It means 2009-2010 they must to produce 250 tanks. It's very possible for UVZ. As I calculated above, the financial plans suppose 150-250 tanks a year for Russian forces in near future.
Is that you Extern holding the video camera.
What is this?
Open base day from a unit in russia?
I have been to one in East Berlin when I was a child. Great fun!!!
BTW, I thought that the designation T-90S remains unimportant if it is a newer one with a welded turret or an older one.
Algeria also receives T-90SA with the A only indicating that they are for Algeria while the Indian are just no named T-90SI because their were the first customer.
Open base day from a unit in russia?
I have been to one in East Berlin when I was a child. Great fun!!!
BTW, I thought that the designation T-90S remains unimportant if it is a newer one with a welded turret or an older one.
Algeria also receives T-90SA with the A only indicating that they are for Algeria while the Indian are just no named T-90SI because their were the first customer.
I was told the T-90S designation is for export version, never heard of India`s using a I designation along with the S.What is this?
Open base day from a unit in russia?
I have been to one in East Berlin when I was a child. Great fun!!!
BTW, I thought that the designation T-90S remains unimportant if it is a newer one with a welded turret or an older one.
Algeria also receives T-90SA with the A only indicating that they are for Algeria while the Indian are just no named T-90SI because their were the first customer.
Algerian T-90SA is a upgrade to the Indian version in two area`s, countermeasures and ERA package.