Royal New Zealand Navy Discussions and Updates

recce.k1

Well-Known Member
Project Protector IPV issues etc

http://www.parliament.nz/en-NZ/PB/D...Murray-McCully-to-the-Minister-of-Defence.htm

4328 (2008). Hon Murray McCully to the Minister of Defence (12 May 2008): Has HMNZS Rotoiti been delivered to the Royal New Zealand Navy; if not, why not?

Hon Phil Goff (Minister of Defence) replied: Construction, fitting out and sea trials of Rotoiti have been completed. I am advised that the Navy is very happy with the ship and confident about its future performance. Before accepting Rotoiti into service, however, it is necessary to ensure that the ship as delivered meets all requirements of the contract and to gain final certification by Lloyd’s register. Surveys have been undertaken throughout the build process and are required in order for the ship to be certified as being in Class. Lloyds Register required an external sound system, an additional gyro compass, changes to the Bridge Equipment Room (the addition of ventilation dampers, fire detection and suppression systems), changes to the casting and installation of the ‘P’ or shaft brackets and changes to the insulation material. I am advised that Tenix is now awaiting certification of the seaboat system by Lloyds Register The original planned delivery date of the Rotoiti was 31 January 2007. I am advised that the ship is still planned to be delivered before any of the other Inshore Patrol Vessels and that the delays resulting from changes during construction have not been a cost to the project.
 

recce.k1

Well-Known Member
Ok agreed that the DNB is very tight but I think it is unrealistic to think that it will ever be moved.

Ok so how can we make it better?.
I guess if there's a will (and funding) there's a way!!!
That's some good suggestions there. Alas despite Devonport being cramped on land and close to residential housing now, as we have a small Navy and no pressing strategic reasons in the short term, I can't see the Govt wanting to invest elsewhere (although I share the sentiments of Lucasnz and Kiwirob that perhaps in the future for various reasons the issue will need to be addressed one day). Agree, extending the dry dock and expanding the wharves seem to be a cheaper and more practical solution in the short term. Frankly I'm still miffed at the lack of strategic vision for the Navy at the conclusion of WW2, eg the closure of the HMNZS Cook anti-submarine/patrol boat base at Shelly Bay in Wellington in about 1946 I think (the base was expanded during the war including new magazine and workshop facilities etc. The base was ideal as it was isolated from residential housing and pretty much still is even today but Defence (RNZAF) vacated the base in the 1990's and the Govt has put up the land for Treaty of Waitangi settlements with Wellington iwi (tribes)) and the reduction in patrol boat/minesweeping assets - all very cheap to buy, operate and maintain etc. Currently the Navy uses the commercial wharves, nothing unusal in that except what a waste of a once perfectly good facility etc (the wharf could have been extended seawards to accomodate a visiting Frigate etc). Link to Capital Defence website and history etc http://capitaldefence.orconhosting.net.nz/prfles/other/sbay1.htm

Mind you it seems some pollies are asking these questions on Devonports future again. There's a few awaiting answers at the moment, here's one of them:

http://www.parliament.nz/en-NZ/PB/D...8-Phil-Heatley-to-the-Minister-of-Defence.htm

4901 (2008). Phil Heatley to the Minister of Defence (21 May 2008):
What, if any, studies have been undertaken in the last decade to investigate the merits or otherwise of shifting the Royal New Zealand Navy naval base from Devonport, and what were the conclusions of each study?

Hon Phil Goff (Minister of Defence) replied: Reply due: 29 May 2008
 
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Sea Toby

New Member
Beam is the problem, with the step down sides not being vertical, there is not enough room to do much work alongside the ship, although the ship could fit the top of the drydock. The Endeavour barely fits inside. I suppose the dry dock could be widened a few meters, but doing so will cost a bit.

We are talking about one ship, which can easily travel to Australia for a drydock within a few days. A few days of travel is much more cheaper than widening the drydock a few meters. I would think the replacement replenishment oiler would also be too large for the Calliope drydock too.

Having said that, if the government had a large sum of money to spend, widening the Calliope drydock a few meters would be pleasing, but in the big scheme of things, not necessary. With the Long Term Development Plan widening the drydock would never get to the top of the page. The drydock is well sized to support the rest of the navy's ships.
 

ThePuss

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
To illustrate that double berthing is not the end of the world I am putting this link up for HMAS Cairns (4 Armidales, 4 LCH's, 2 survey ships (at 2550 tonnes not that much smaller than a ANZAC), and 4 survey cats are home ported here). You think Devonport is congested try this on for size!!!.

http://maps.google.com.au/?ie=UTF8&ll=-16.935556,145.777778&spn=0.006877,0.009356&t=h&z=17

Admitedly this photo is Fremantle era but it shows that even triple berthing is not that big of a deal. (to be fair the navy has leased the wharf to the south to accommodate the larger armadiales
 

Sea Toby

New Member
TV3 Article , also has an associated video clip on IPV delivery delays
http://www.tv3.co.nz/News/NationalN...tabid/423/articleID/57665/cat/64/Default.aspx

As to when the OPV arrives my Navy Mates just roll their eyes!!
I don't want to pity New Zealand politics, but when the defence minister is off working on a free trade agreement with China, the defence minister can't be watching the ship building program, can he/she? I see the problems as a lack of proper oversight than criminal mischief.
 

Rocco_NZ

New Member
I don't want to pity New Zealand politics, but when the defence minister is off working on a free trade agreement with China, the defence minister can't be watching the ship building program, can he/she? I see the problems as a lack of proper oversight than criminal mischief.
It's not the minister's job to oversee projects. The responsibility lies with the CDF and the SecDef. Frankly, if the minister had any guts, he would sack both of them. If the defence force thinks they can be trusted to run major comemrcial acquisition projects, they should be subject to commercial discliplines - like being sacked for non-performance. The Protector vessels are 90% commercial. It would have made more sense to outsource the project management to Marsk or Nedloyd, they at least have experience in ship ship acquisition more frequently than once a decade.
 

Sea Toby

New Member
The politicians don't know anything about building ships, they are too busy buying ships, and the navy don't know anything about building ships, they are too busy operating ships. The ship builder Tenix should know what it takes to win Lloyds approval, the government should have either an oversight committee or lord involved that gets things done at the ministry level, that is someone in charge. But alas, there appears to be no one in charge, thus, the problems.
 

StevoJH

The Bunker Group
The politicians don't know anything about building ships, they are too busy buying ships, and the navy don't know anything about building ships, they are too busy operating ships. The ship builder Tenix should know what it takes to win Lloyds approval, the government should have either an oversight committee or lord involved that gets things done at the ministry level, that is someone in charge. But alas, there appears to be no one in charge, thus, the problems.
I could be wrong here, but isnt Project Protector the first time where new zealand hasnt just purchased ships from a ship class already under construction?

For example the Leander class came from the Royal Navy, the ANZACs class were built along with the Australian ANZAC class. etc, etc.
 

Sea Toby

New Member
While its true New Zealand purchased new ships, its not like these ships were brand new designs. The MRV was based on a Merwede ferry design, the OPVs were based on a Akker design built for two other navies, and the IPVs were based on a Tenix design built for the Philippines. I don't think anyone thought these ships were of high technological risk.
 

recce.k1

Well-Known Member
Defence Expenditure: Budget Documents

Selected info of interest (eg "days at sea" matters etc) as discussed on these forums recently. From Vote Defence Force 2008/09 Main Estimates Performance Information available at http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/downloads/pd...-nzdf-2008-09-main-estimates-perform-info.pdf

Page 29/30: Military Hydrography, and Hydrographic Data Collection and Processing for LINZ (M22)
HMNZS RESOLUTION available to conduct military hydrography, and hydrographic tasks for LINZ under contract. The Deployable Hydrographic Support Unit (DHSU) available to conduct military hydrography either independently or in support of other NZDF force elements. The Hydrographic Business Unit available to support the collection and processing programmes.

Mission Availability and Planned Sea-Days for the year (1 July 2008-30 June 2009).
• HMNZS RESOLUTION will be mission available for 236 days during which 100 to 115 will be at sea. Of this total, 2,975 survey miles on hydrographic tasks will be on contract to LINZ.

Page 30: Note 1: Military hydrography under Employment Contexts (ECs) 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. (See details on ECs earlier in Part 2.1).*

Note 2: The ability for HMNZS RESOLUTION and the Deployable Hydrographic Support Unit (DHSU) to leverage opportunities to help achieve the OS20/20 Vision and also provide Output Expense Mine Countermeasures (MCM) and MCM Diving Forces products (predominantly Q route surveys) will continue to be explored, commensurate with this primary output expense tasking.

Page 32/33: Mine Countermeasures (MCM) and MCM Diving Forces (M22)
MCM Support Vessel (HMNZS MANAWANUI) and Operational Diving Team available for military tasks.

Mission Availability, Planned Sea-Days, and Diving Hours for the year (1 July 2008-30 June 2009).
• HMNZS MANAWANUI will be mission available for 236 days, of which 50 to 65 days will be at sea.
• HMNZS KAHU will be mission available for 236 days, of which 40 to 55 days will be at sea.
• The Diving Team will spend approximately 360 hours (target range 340-380 hours) on operational dive training and MCM readiness training in diving techniques for the disposal of mines and other explosive devices. (The diving hours refer to actual time in the water).

Page 34: Note 1: MCM operations under Employment Contexts (ECs) 1 and 2, and independent diving tasks under ECs 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. (See details on ECs earlier in Part 2.1).*

Note 2: When HMNZS MANAWANUI is deployed outside of New Zealand waters, HMNZS KAHU will undertake the tasks of MCM Support Vessel on the New Zealand station. When not deployed in this role, HMNZS KAHU will operate as part of the Naval Patrol Forces).

Page 37: Naval Combat Forces (M22)
Two frigates, each with embarked Seasprite helicopter, as required, available for military tasks. One frigate to be available for regional or collective security tasks and the second frigate to be available to deal with low-level security challenges in New Zealand or South Pacific waters. The Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) will assume the latter role once accepted into service.

Mission Availability and Planned Sea Days for the year (1 July 2008-30 June 2009).
• HMNZS TE KAHA will be mission available for 175 days, of which 90 to 110 days will be at sea.
• HMNZS TE MANA will be mission available for 200 days, of which 130 to 140 days will be at sea.

Page 38: Note 1: Maritime operations under Employment Contexts (ECs) 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. (See details on ECs earlier in Part 2.1).*

Note 3: Deployment Impact - consecutive deployments of the Naval Combat Force elements for six months, on similar missions, are likely to have an adverse impact on training.

Page 38/39: Naval Helicopter Forces (M22)
Three SH-2G(NZ) Seasprite helicopters available for military tasks - from a total fleet of five Seasprite helicopters.

Planned Seasprite Flying Hours for the year (1 July 2008-30 June 2009).
1,406 hours, made up as follows:
• For flying while embarked with force elements of the Navy, a total of 453 hours (target range 430-475 hours).
• For shore-based readiness training - a total of 953 hours (target range 905-1,000 hours).

Page 40: Note 1: Predominantly maritime operations under Employments Contexts (ECs) 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. (See details on ECs earlier in Part 2.1).

Note 2: The RNZAF is responsible for the training of RNZN Seasprite helicopter aircrew and the provision and training of Ship’s Flights maintenance personnel, for operational employment by the RNZN.

Page 40/41: Naval Patrol Forces (M22)
The OPVs, HMNZ Ships OTAGO and WELLINGTON, with embarked Seasprite or other helicopter/s as required, available for military tasks and MAO&T (Multi-Agency Operations and Tasks).

OPV Mission Availability and Planned Sea-Days for the year (1 July 2008-30 June 2009).
• HMNZS OTAGO will be mission available for 236 days, of which 110 to 125 days will be at sea.
• HMNZS WELLINGTON will be mission available for 236 days, of which 70 to 90 days will be at sea.

The IPVs, HMNZ Ships ROTOITI, HAWEA, PUKAKI and TAUPO, available for military tasks and MAO&T.

IPV Mission Availability and Planned Sea-Days for the year (1 July 2008-30 June 2009).
• HMNZS ROTOITI will be mission available for 235 days, of which 115 to 140 days will be at sea.
• HMNZS HAWEA will be mission available for 235 days, of which 105 to 125 days will be at sea.
• HMNZS PUKAKI will be available for 20 to 40 days at sea.
• HMNZS TAUPO will be available for 20 to 40 days at sea.

Page 42: Note 1: Maritime operations under Employment Contexts (ECs) 1, 2, and 3. (See details on ECs earlier in Part 2.1). Note: Subject to availability and the Government’s requirements, tasking of these vessels, the IPVs and particularly the OPVs, may take place in other ECs.*

Page 42/43: Naval Support Forces (M22)
HMNZS ENDEAVOUR and HMNZS CANTERBURY, each with embarked Seasprite helicopter/s, as required, available for military tasks.

Mission Availability and Planned Sea-Days for the year (1 July 2008-30 June 2009).
• HMNZS ENDEAVOUR will be available for 4 to 15 days at sea.
• HMNZS CANTERBURY will be mission available for 236 days, of which 120 to 140 days will be at sea.

Page 44: Note 1: Maritime logistic support and amphibious sealift operations under Employment Contexts (ECs) 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. (See details on ECs earlier in Part 2.1).*

Note 2: HMNZS CANTERBURY is also capable of embarking four NH-90 helicopters (to be acquired by the NZDF in the future).

* * * * * * * * * * * * * *
* EC's definition: From Part 2.1 - Page 14/15

Employment Contexts
Strategic guidance provides information on the circumstances in which the Government may choose to use military forces. The NZDF uses this guidance to develop geographically grouped Employment Contexts. Employment Contexts are descriptions of representative and illustrative security events for which there is a likelihood that a New Zealand Government would expect to make a military response should they occur. Employment Contexts are selected through assessment of New Zealand’s geo-strategic situation and international security trends. The Employment Contexts are chosen on the basis of their likelihood of occurrence in the near and longer terms and the consequences for New Zealand’s Defence Outcomes if the NZDF was unable to provide an appropriate response. Employment Contexts include high level Operational Concepts which, in turn, drive Services’ and joint Mission Essential Tasks (METs), that is, those tasks that the deployed forces must be able to perform. The METs drive the priorities for the Services’ and joint annual training activities and which determine the output parameters that need to be delivered in order to meet the Government’s requirements. The Employment Contexts also designate the anticipated time (known as the Response Time) available for the final preparation of force elements for their operational deployment; this affects the level of capability that must be maintained on an annual basis. Concepts for Operations and Contingency Plans can then be developed for relevant Employment Contexts. Current Employment Context Operational Concepts list the most likely force elements that would be involved in each security event. These force element lists are a guide only and are not exhaustive; each security event may require the addition or deletion of some force elements. Employment Contexts provide the detail that ensures the NZDF output quality dimension is consistent with defence policy. The Employment Contexts (ECs), which are covered in more detail in the NZDF Output Plan and other NZDF-internal documents, are as follows:

• EC 1 - Security Challenges and Defence Tasks in New Zealand and its environs:
− EC 1A - Illegal exploitation of marine resources within the New Zealand EEZ, and other low-level threats to New Zealand territorial sovereignty.
− EC 1B - Natural and manmade disasters.
− EC 1C - Support to the delivery and maintenance of essential services in exceptional circumstances, including the hosting of major events.
− EC 1D - Terrorist and Asymmetric Threats.
− EC 1E - Support for Antarctic presence.

• EC 2 - Security Challenges to New Zealand’s Interests in the South Pacific:
− EC 2A - Illegal exploitation of marine resources within South Pacific EEZs, and other low-level threats to South Pacific nations’ territorial sovereignty.
− EC 2B - Natural and manmade disasters.
− EC 2C - State failure or fragility leading to internal conflict and/or humanitarian crisis.
− EC 2D - Terrorist Threats.
− EC 2E - Challenges to legitimate governments, including civil war and secessionist conflict.

• EC 3 - Challenges to New Zealand and Australia Common Security Interests:
− EC 3A - Illegal exploitation of marine resources within Australia’s EEZ, and other low-level threats to Australia’s territorial sovereignty.
− EC 3B - Natural or manmade disasters.
− EC 3C - External aggression against Australia.
− EC 3D - Terrorist or Asymmetric Threats.

• EC 4 - Security Challenges to New Zealand’s Interests in the Asia-Pacific Region:
− EC 4A - Aggression to alter maritime boundaries or seize resources, or threats to freedom of navigation.
− EC 4B - Natural or manmade disasters.
− EC 4C - State failure or fragility leading to internal conflict and/or humanitarian crisis.
− EC 4D - Terrorist Threats.
− EC 4E - Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation.
− EC 4F - Inter-State conflict.
− EC 4G - Acts of piracy and people smuggling.

• EC 5 - Security Challenges to New Zealand’s Interests in Global Peace and Security:
− EC 5A - Aggression to alter maritime boundaries or seize resources, or threats to freedom of navigation.
− EC 5B - Unresolved conflict or conflict resolution process where protagonists have sought third party resolution assistance.
− EC 5C - State failure or fragility leading to internal conflict and/or humanitarian crisis.
− EC 5D - Terrorist Threats.
− EC 5E - WMD proliferation.
− EC 5F - Contravention of international norms that triggers a multi-national response.
− EC 5G - Major breakdown in international security leading to wide-scale war.
 

recce.k1

Well-Known Member
NZDF Torpedo replacement

http://www.stuff.co.nz/dominionpost/4598570a6479.html
New torpedoes may cost navy $100m
HANK SCHOUTEN - The Dominion Post | Friday, 27 June 2008

The navy has begun the hunt for new anti-submarine torpedoes, with a budget of up to $100 million.

This is on top of the estimated $500 million needed to upgrade self defence systems on the two Anzac class frigates and $60 million now being spent modernising the ships' machinery, including engines, generators, gearboxes and air-conditioning systems, and a $25 million upgrade of its computer-controlled Phalanx Gatling guns.

The navy's present store of United States-built MK46 Mod 2 torpedoes are so old they are being taken out of service in most countries and Australia is planning to close the support facility that maintains New Zealand's stocks.

Navy director of capability requirements Commander Gordon Stamp said recommendations were expected to be put to the Government next year.

The number of torpedoes in its inventory is classified but it is understood that it has 60 to 80 of the old torpedoes – three ship sets of 16 to 20 with another 15 to 20 that can be dropped by the P3 Orion aircraft.

Mr Stamp said the torpedoes were at least 20 years old, needed to be checked and serviced every five years, and the closure of the Australian support facility meant they would have to be replaced by 2014.

New Zealand can choose to buy new United States, British or European torpedoes. However, the choice is likely to be influenced by Australia's decision to buy French- Italian-designed Eurotorp MU90s.

They are being assembled in Australia. A problem emerged recently with that country's $780 million torpedo project, however. Australia is fitting them to its warships, but they may not be able to get them to work properly on Orion aircraft because of the difficulty of integrating electronic systems.
The planned closure of the Australian support facility for the NZ Mk46's puts into context the LTDP statement Point 21: "The current Mark 46 Mod 2 torpedo will not be supportable beyond about 2008/9. A replacement will need to be in service before the current torpedoes become unsupportable". (Eg if NZ's Mk46's have a final service in Australia in 2009, they will have another 5 years life left in them, hence need to be replaced by or before 2014. That's my reading of the situation).

Why these things take so long to sort is odd, the Dominion newspaper reported on a French Frigate visit to Wellington in 2002/2003 whereby the French hinted that NZ would be following the Aussies lead and selecting the MU90.

Although perhaps good things come to those who wait, if there are issues surrounding P-3/MU90 integration, I wonder if the NZDF may also consider the new Lockheed Martin "High Altitude ASW Weapons Concept (HAAWC)" for the RNZAF P-3K's?

Anyway HMAS Toowoomba has successfully fired the RAN's first MU90 a few days ago http://www.defence.gov.au/DefenceBlog/2008/0623_0629.htm. No doubt the NZDF/MoD took a close interest. However also see DT RAN thread page 93, interesting reading, also about the RAAF AP-3C and RAN helo torp options, I wonder if the NZ Seasprite torp replacement may cause headaches assumming these new generation torp types haven't been integrated into that (almost) orphan type?
 
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Sea Toby

New Member
I don't see how the MU90 torpedoes could have an integration problem with any helicopter or aircraft. I thought light weight torpedoes were fire or drop and forget.

New Zealand does have other options, but it would probably be best to follow the Australians.
 

recce.k1

Well-Known Member
I don't see how the MU90 torpedoes could have an integration problem with any helicopter or aircraft. I thought light weight torpedoes were fire or drop and forget.

New Zealand does have other options, but it would probably be best to follow the Australians.
Did some initial homework.

From http://www.kamanaero.com/images/PDFs/Seasprite.pdf it says "The SH-2G can carry two MK-46 torpedoes; two AGM-119 Penguin or two AGM-65 Maverick air-to-surface missiles; two MK-11 depth charges; flares for self-protection; 7.62 mm or 12.7 mm door-mounted machine guns". No mention of MU90, however unsure of date of publication of the Kaman PDF.

From http://www.armada.ch/06-2/article-full.cfm (acknowledgement to Tatra for the link) it says "The SH-2G(E) is used with dipping sonar in the ASW role, while the Australian and New Zealand versions appear to be more concerned with ASuW, armed with the Kongsberg AGM-119B Penguin and Raytheon AGM-65D Maverick respectively. The SH-2G(A) is also cleared for the 304-kg EuroTorp MU/90 Impact torpedo". Presumably the word "cleared" is the same as "certified" etc?
 

Sea Toby

New Member
I think you are making mountains out of mole hills. I have a rifle that can shoot a long 22 shell or a short 22 shell, it can even shoot a mini 22 shell. Since there is no link for guidance, it don't matter. As long as a torpedo has the same dimensions, I don't think guidance matters with torpedoes either. A torpedo is not a guided missile. A torpedo has its own search functions without the aid of a ship or helicopter.
 

alexsa

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
I think you are making mountains out of mole hills. I have a rifle that can shoot a long 22 shell or a short 22 shell, it can even shoot a mini 22 shell. Since there is no link for guidance, it don't matter. As long as a torpedo has the same dimensions, I don't think guidance matters with torpedoes either. A torpedo is not a guided missile. A torpedo has its own search functions without the aid of a ship or helicopter.
The weapon has a range of seach options that need to be set. The purpsoe of the intergration is to allow the ship or air craft combat systems to set these options.
 

recce.k1

Well-Known Member
I'm still wondering whether the RAN SH-2G(A) was ever certified for MU90 firing, seeing they didn't pass the initial flying certification let alone get to the weapons testing stages etc? I somehow doubt it.

However I accept it's not likely to a be a big issue to have Kaman certify the MU90 or whatever the replacement torp is for the RNZN Seasprites, despite NZ might perhaps be the guinea pig and may have to share development costs?
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
I found this information at the MU90 website:http://cms.isn.ch/public/docs/doc_10449_259_en.pdf

On page 96, ships that will be supported included the Anzac class frigates among others. The Kaman Seasprite helicopter was among the helicopters that will be supported.

Thus I don't think there is ANYTHING New Zealand has to worry about with the MU90.
There are a couple of issues about the article referenced though. For starters, the article is ~4 years old, therefore not the most up to date. Secondly the article states, on page 8 of the article, first line/paragraph torpedo presetting and launching systems have been developed and are presently or will be short time in service aboard the following platforms: It does mention that one of the manufacturors with an aircraft expected to see service was Kaman. No mention if the integration was ever actually completed, especially since the Oz Seasprite was cancelled amidst system integration issues.

-Cheers
 

MrConservative

Super Moderator
Staff member
And into the mix we must add the NHF-90 with the MU90. We all know the problems of the SH-2(G) in RNZN service. It is an orphan after all. We can only really manage to get two of the five sort of flying with some sort of regularity. 60 G's an hour to operate.... So if Recce has it right, we could get away without replacing the current mk46's until 2014 if we get them serviced asap. It Would seem about then it might be the time to introduce the NHF-90 and the MU90 then?

(We could take the Seasprites in 2014 and park them next to the A-4's and the Macchi's at Blenhiem) http://www.defencetalk.com/forums/images/smilies/lol2.gif
:eek:nfloorl:
 
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