Europe and 5th generation aircraft

[guppy]

Hi,

Since you guys are on this subject, does anybody know if at the end of Operation Allied Force, was the Yugloslavic IADs still able to function? I heard somewhere that they were still functioning at a limited level and still playing cat and mouse games with allied forces. We are talking about single digit SAMs here. Never underestimate SAMs. They are as intent on killing you as you are on killing them.

cheers

guppy

 

[Feanor]

SEAD/DEAD, Logistics, EW and physics usually. I know they say these systems are mobile, but when you look at this at the system level you will see why the idea of Mobile SAMs, other than MANPADs and short ranged IR missiles in limited quantities is over exaggerated. SAMs by nature aren't that mobile even when on a nice mean looking TEL. There are issues like radar horizons, terrain features, spare tires, being able to keep up with modern tanks and APCs/IFVs, spare parts, SEAD/DEAD to think about. Even a same with a range of 90km doesn't really cover that much airspace. Without survivable external cuing and early warning these kinds of SAMs are very vulnerable. Think about it from a logistics and physics point of view. The kinds of terrain that favors land based SAMs also makes mech forces very vulnerable. Think about it. Remember, people are trying hard to kill you while you are advertising your precise location for hundreds of km. It has never worked. Not even in 1973 even of there was temporary success.


-DA

So you think the idea of a mobile SAM shield would not have worked? A TEL should easily be able to keep up with the mobile troops. I don't understand why you think that it would not be possible.

 

[DarthAmerica]

So you think the idea of a mobile SAM shield would not have worked? A TEL should easily be able to keep up with the mobile troops. I don't understand why you think that it would not be possible.

At one time, people thought charging trenches through arty and MG fire would work too. Millions of deaths later, we figured it out. I know some armies have integrated mobile SAMs into their doctrine, but the results have been disasters. The few jets they manage to shoot down are tactically insignificant in the grand scheme. It's one of those things that looks good on paper but in practice its not effective. SAMs are a logistically hungry asset. Logistics slows movement more than enemy fire. MANPADs I can understand. But the high consumption rates of RF SAMs and AAA, power requirements of radars, POL and maintenance required of TELs just doesn't lend itself readily IMV. These TELs don't have the same kind of mobility the Tanks and APCs do. Especially the larger TELs like the S-300. And RF SAMs and AAA betray their locations, and the location of the force they are protecting, anytime they operate. It's a contradiction.

Look at the highway of death in ODS. Were mobile sams and AAA which Iraq had in abundance able to protect the retreating Iraqis? No.

-DA

 

[DarthAmerica]

Hi,

Since you guys are on this subject, does anybody know if at the end of Operation Allied Force, was the Yugloslavic IADs still able to function? I heard somewhere that they were still functioning at a limited level and still playing cat and mouse games with allied forces. We are talking about single digit SAMs here. Never underestimate SAMs. They are as intent on killing you as you are on killing them.

cheers

guppy

No one is underestimating SAMs. However, when said SAMs manage to shoot down a grand total of 2 jets out of ~700 attempts it's pretty hard to make a case in their support. Granted the complicated things. They even managed to survive with only ~2 batteries out of 22 destroyed. But what good is that when your leadership is on trial at the end of it all, the infrastructure bombed to hell, your country is occupied and Kosovo is an independent nation?

Remember how people keep saying it's about systems? When your enemy has you beset on all sides, qualitative and quantitative advantages, your EOOB mapped and the luxury of the initiative you are ferked no matter what SAM and scheme you are running. Think about that. Gen. Clark could just wake up in total physical security, yawn and say, "I think I want to blow up the power station today", and have absolute assurance that said target will be in ruins by nightfall, do SAMs playing hide and seek really matter even if they shoot down two jets in 78 days?

-DA

 

[Feanor]

At one time, people thought charging trenches through arty and MG fire would work too. Millions of deaths later, we figured it out. I know some armies have integrated mobile SAMs into their doctrine, but the results have been disasters. The few jets they manage to shoot down are tactically insignificant in the grand scheme. It's one of those things that looks good on paper but in practice its not effective. SAMs are a logistically hungry asset. Logistics slows movement more than enemy fire. MANPADs I can understand. But the high consumption rates of RF SAMs and AAA, power requirements of radars, POL and maintenance required of TELs just doesn't lend itself readily IMV. These TELs don't have the same kind of mobility the Tanks and APCs do. Especially the larger TELs like the S-300. And RF SAMs and AAA betray their locations, and the location of the force they are protecting, anytime they operate. It's a contradiction.

Look at the highway of death in ODS. Were mobile sams and AAA which Iraq had in abundance able to protect the retreating Iraqis? No.

-DA

Again an inferior opponent, with inferior capabilities across the spectrum. When you talk about logistics, I can understand what you mean. But then again there are plenty of other weapon systems with large logistic problems (a certain M1A2 MBT comes to mind). Also if the mobile SAMs are datalinked to you AWACS, then they would only have to light up when hostile aircraft are approaching, meaning you'd be in the dark until it was too late.

I think the argument against the utility of SAMs also ignores the fact that a SAM network forces you to dedicate resources to overcoming it simply by being there.

EDIT: It limits CAS capabilities simply by existing. Granted it can't replace an air force, but then again we're back to the fact that all your arguments have rested on a first world nation (mainly USA) pounding away at some third world hell hole, which has no decent air force to speak of, but has SAMs.

 

[Fritz]

It worked for a grand total of 24-36hrs - at which point the Israelis compromised the entire SAM capability as well as that entire system as they debugged the system

Yes, 24-48 hours, and it was good ole infantry that did it all, israeli airforce played no other role then being target practise in sinai.
Just so noone believe i have any faith in un-supported AD,-it is crucial that it be supported by AWACs and fighters,-otherwise it will be on the recieving end of engagement. i.e target practise.

 

[Aussie Digger]

Hi,

Since you guys are on this subject, does anybody know if at the end of Operation Allied Force, was the Yugloslavic IADs still able to function? I heard somewhere that they were still functioning at a limited level and still playing cat and mouse games with allied forces. We are talking about single digit SAMs here. Never underestimate SAMs. They are as intent on killing you as you are on killing them.

cheers

guppy

If by function you mean, could some systems turn their radars (or other surveillance/targetting measures) on and fire a missile or 2?

I would say: yes.

If by function you mean: could they carry out their assigned task of providing air defence for the former Yugoslavia?

Most certainly not.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Yes, 24-48 hours, and it was good ole infantry that did it all, israeli airforce played no other role then being target practise in sinai.
Just so noone believe i have any faith in un-supported AD,-it is crucial that it be supported by AWACs and fighters,-otherwise it will be on the recieving end of engagement. i.e target practise.

er, no it didn't.

it was an israeli raiding team that managed to uplift a C2 system which was then cracked.

the egyptians made the mistake of overstretching their lines because the syrians were pleading with them to break the israeli lock on their lines. once the egyptians came out from under SAM cover they were pasted by the israeli airforce. the israeli air force was far from benign once the egyptian army moved across bar lev. in fact there are still egyptian commanders who blame the syrians for urging them unnecessarily (far be it for them to take responsibility for breaching the basics of GBAD coverage)

yom kippur and the bekaa valley is a text book event that is taught to armour, GBAD teams and TACAIR Officers in a number of militaries.

 

[Ozzy Blizzard]

It exists to provide cover to your ground forces and key installations for the duration of the conflict. That was my statement, do you disagree with it? Remember I'm not just talking about strategic positioned theater SAMs, I'm talking about the network as a whole. All aspects of it, from tac-SAMs with range of a dozen kilometers, and MANPADS, to theater SAMs, air defense fighters, and AWACS all data linked into a network. My main point was that teh IADS does not exist to indefinetly shield your inferior air force, infrastructure, and ground forces, from a numerically and technologically superior opponent who has time to conduct a lengthy air campaign to roll back you IADS.

No I don't disagree with that pretext. However the point i was making is that in a conflict between comparable powers the IADS does not need to be "rolled up" in manner reminiscent of the 90's air campaigns to achieve strategic effects. The IADS only needs to be penetrated to allow C4I installations to be neutralized before you start to have a significant effect on all other area's of the conflict. At that stage Tac-SAM's/point defense systems, MANPADS and AAA are much less relevant, because the enemy has been inhibited at the C2 level. Therefore the formations those tactical assets are protecting will be out-maneuvered, out-fought and decimated by other elements i.e. your ground formations.

With arms proliferation such networks could appear over Algeria, and Libya within the forseeable future. Both signed large complex packages, and the Algerian one included iirc 8 S-300PMU2 and a number of Tors.

An IADS of that magnitude (Russian or PROC) is not going to appear in North Africa, even in the most nightmarish, worst case crystal ball gazing. The money and need are simply not there. Anyway 1 or 2 S-300 battalions with some point defense assets does not constitute an IADS.

Again an IADS may lose it's strategic elements, the bulk of it's theater SAMs and the more powerful radars, but still be able to form temporary local networks consisting of division level tac-SAMs datalinked to air defense fighters, and covered by SPAAGs and MANPADS at short range. This would not nearly be as effective as a strategic theater wide network, but is still possible. I don't see where we disagree, except that your scenario seems to involve the US military pounding away at some third world nation, where as I'm referecing a case where the opponents are of comparable strength.

I'm dealing with the same scenario and i think your missing my point.

I never disputed that. My whole point was, one more time, that an IADS can provide an effective way to contest air superiority.

There's little point in having a local, networked ADS in a conflict with anyone but a massive western power. In a conflict with a comparable power, if your IADS has been penetrated and your C4ISR capability has been impaired and the other guy's hasn't then in simple terms you're F$%*ed i.e. you are going to loose. The only time "contesting air superiority" in that manner is going to be a reasonable option is if you are facing a 90's esk asymmetric air campaign against a casualty averse enemy. Keeping some tactical capability is useless if you have been decimated on the strategic level. That is the point.

In most of them Israel had massive overmatch in capability, although not in numbers.

No they didn't before the mid 80's, not in numbers or technological sophistication. What the Israeli's had was superior tactical employment and superior strategic maneuver.

Yes an IADS network can be breached. Nothing any of you have said invalidates this, because all you've done is brought up empirical and theoretical examples of ways to overcome an IADS. I never said that it was invincible.

Then pray tell what is your point? That in a conflict between comparable powers an IADS can constitute a viable defense on its own, even when reduced to a tactical level? If that is your contention then I strongly disagree with it. If you can get to the jugular (C4I) even if it costs you relatively dearly, and you can effectively cut it, then the viability of the remnants of said IADS is practically irrelevant, simply because at a theater level he can not act or react in an organized manner.

Naturally. But if when you punch those holes, the enemy quickly relocates other assets to plug them, then you're back in the same situation. Another question is how many losses are you taking? And what are the enemies air superiority fighters doing during this conflict?

No your not back were you started. Even if the enemy re deploys assets to cover the hole after the package has hit its targets who cares. If your target was a communications node or C2I asset then your enemy can no longer command effectively and whatever other moves you are about to make (ground offensive, counter-offensive, air campaign, whatever) has a much larger chance of success. Even if the strike package took 20% casualties you hit something invaluable, the enemies ability to make decisions, react and lead.

In simple terms tactical viability is irrelevant if you have failed strategically, end a partially viable IADS with tactical elements that has been penetrated constitutes a strategic failure in a state on state conflict between comparable powers, even if you can inflict some serious casualties on the strike packages. Whats the moral of the story, that IADS are useless? No, of course not. But relying on an IADS alone without trying to penetrate your enemies is a recipe for failure.

 

[Fritz]

the egyptians made the mistake of overstretching their lines because the syrians were pleading with them to break the israeli lock on their lines. once the egyptians came out from under SAM cover they were pasted by the israeli airforce. the israeli air force was far from benign once the egyptian army moved across bar lev.

Fully agree on this, i read it before, the egyptian commander was so upset with the idea to leave the SAM coverage that he resigned. just couldnt find the site for it now.

 

[DarthAmerica]

Again an inferior opponent, with inferior capabilities across the spectrum. When you talk about logistics, I can understand what you mean. But then again there are plenty of other weapon systems with large logistic problems (a certain M1A2 MBT comes to mind). Also if the mobile SAMs are datalinked to you AWACS, then they would only have to light up when hostile aircraft are approaching, meaning you'd be in the dark until it was too late.

I think the argument against the utility of SAMs also ignores the fact that a SAM network forces you to dedicate resources to overcoming it simply by being there.

EDIT: It limits CAS capabilities simply by existing. Granted it can't replace an air force, but then again we're back to the fact that all your arguments have rested on a first world nation (mainly USA) pounding away at some third world hell hole, which has no decent air force to speak of, but has SAMs.

It's almost like people aren't reading and understanding. Why would you question or compare the M1A2 logistics to mobile SAMs when the primary M1A2 users have demonstrated their ability to sustain that machine under extreme environments, against conventional foes and against irregular forces? And they didn't have to play hide and seek to do it. Do you understand the difference?

I can agree SAM networks take up resources. But it still only delays the inevitable if thats your only means of tangible resistance. And of course my argument is about the 1st world nations vs 3rd world. Do you really expect third world nations to challenge sophisticated IADs or to be even capable of harassing anyone other than a neighboring state in an equally dire state or worse from a military point of view? I already told you nations usually don't attack if they know they can't win BEFORE THE FIGHT. Sun Tzu said as much 1000's of years ago...

29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its
natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards.

30. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong
and to strike at what is weak.

31. Water shapes its course according to the nature
of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works
out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing.

32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape,
so in warfare there are no constant conditions.

33. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his
opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called
a heaven-born captain.

And also...

14. Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into
a position which makes defeat impossible, and does
not miss the moment for defeating the enemy.

15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist
only seeks battle after the victory has been won,
whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights
and afterwards looks for victory.

One must never forget...

11. We may take it then that an army without its
baggage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost;
without bases of supply it is lost.

Ok so in that spirit, why would the results of SAMs surprise you and why would you expect them to change? Especially with regard to the United States. Also according to those principles, why would European nations ever imagine bombing Russia again considering they can't establish the conditions for victory PRIOR to hostilities? These three quotes pretty much answer every question in this thread thus far.


-DA

 

[Chrom]

I can agree SAM networks take up resources. But it still only delays the inevitable if thats your only means of tangible resistance. And of course my argument is about the 1st world nations vs 3rd world. Do you really expect third world nations to challenge sophisticated IADs or to be even capable of harassing anyone other than a neighboring state in an equally dire state or worse from a military point of view? I already told you nations usually don't attack if they know they can't win BEFORE THE FIGHT. Sun Tzu said as much 1000's of years ago...


-DA

Ok, so what can you suggest for 3rd world country? (Or even for 1st world country, except USA ofc?) What should it buy for air defense? Any sane amount of Su-30/Mig-29/ F-15/ F-22 / X-wing fighters will be lost even faster and pose even less troubles for USAF. So, what are you suggestions?

It is completely pointless to judge SAM's (or any other systems for that matter) at the examples of extremely one-sided wars, were one side have great advantage.

Yes, we know, USAF is unbeatable. Can we please now discuss SAM's and aircrafts ? And they applicability outside "entire USAF vs damned evil dictators 30-years old SAM's?"

 

[guppy]

If by function you mean, could some systems turn their radars (or other surveillance/targetting measures) on and fire a missile or 2?

I would say: yes.

If by function you mean: could they carry out their assigned task of providing air defence for the former Yugoslavia?

Most certainly not.

Ah, but that means when given the chance, they would function. Which implies that SEAD coverage is almost always needed continuously unless you can DEAD them completely and their destruction is verified. This was proven rather difficult during OAF, despite the single digit "immobile" SAMs.

 

[DarthAmerica]

Ok, so what can you suggest for 3rd world country? (Or even for 1st world country, except USA ofc?) What should it buy for air defense? Any sane amount of Su-30/Mig-29/ F-15/ F-22 / X-wing fighters will be lost even faster and pose even less troubles for USAF. So, what are you suggestions?

It is completely pointless to judge SAM's (or any other systems for that matter) at the examples of extremely one-sided wars, were one side have great advantage.

Yes, we know, USAF is unbeatable. Can we please now discuss SAM's and aircrafts ? And they applicability outside "entire USAF vs damned evil dictators 30-years old SAM's?"

In general, because you are asking a very open ended question, if it's a "buyer" and not a maker of systems. It should focus on building reliable support and training for the systems it intends to employ. Then it needs to take a comprehensive look at the kinds of threats it will face. If those threats are the United States or another overwhelming power then it must logically not attempt to compete platform by platform since it will always get out systemed. In that case it needs to develop reliable, redundant and survivable nuclear weapons capabilities since that is the only thing that could deter Washington and even then only with very responsible controls.

In 3rd world vs 3rd world then it simply needs to build a system that is better than the next guys and master it so that if conflict breaks out it has most of the advantages. Otherwise don't make decisions that will lead to wars you can't win.

I you are seeing my point you will realize there isn't a magic buy this formula that solves defensive problems. More often than not what equipment you have is the least of the problems. This is why I say things like Europe could not currently project power into and defeat Russia in a conventional campaign now. That has nothing to to specifically with S-300s or Su-27s but because of the way the European defense system is organized. Sure they could bomb Russia with a few planes after flying through hundreds of miles of strategic depth over neutral countries but to what end? They don't have the mass or the logistics to sustain anything more than raids! Whatever damage they cause the Russians are self sufficient enough to repair or replace and the Russians actually have a system capable of delivering punishing retaliation that Europe would have to absorb.

Russians could respond by using long range bombers anywhere in Europe. They could choose to sink a major European warship as a sign of resolve and as a warning not to escalate further or they could behave irrationally and fire a nuclear weapon in an extreme example of their military capability. It's not that the two could not fight wars against each other. It's not that Su-27 or Eurofighter aren't 1st Class combat planes. It's just that neither could overwhelm and defeat the other in an offensive limited war with acceptable cost. Total war is just simply beyond the scope of the debate because it involves nuclear weapons with all the implied consequences.

-DA

 

[Feanor]

No I don't disagree with that pretext. However the point i was making is that in a conflict between comparable powers the IADS does not need to be "rolled up" in manner reminiscent of the 90's air campaigns to achieve strategic effects. The IADS only needs to be penetrated to allow C4I installations to be neutralized before you start to have a significant effect on all other area's of the conflict. At that stage Tac-SAM's/point defense systems, MANPADS and AAA are much less relevant, because the enemy has been inhibited at the C2 level. Therefore the formations those tactical assets are protecting will be out-maneuvered, out-fought and decimated by other elements i.e. your ground formations.

The casualty cost of breaching the network around key installations, where it will undoubtably be supported by his air force, AWACS and other elements. With all others equal, the defenders SAM network may prove to be the straw that breaks the camel's back.

An IADS of that magnitude (Russian or PROC) is not going to appear in North Africa, even in the most nightmarish, worst case crystal ball gazing. The money and need are simply not there. Anyway 1 or 2 S-300 battalions with some point defense assets does not constitute an IADS.

8 battallions.

There's little point in having a local, networked ADS in a conflict with anyone but a massive western power. In a conflict with a comparable power, if your IADS has been penetrated and your C4ISR capability has been impaired and the other guy's hasn't then in simple terms you're F$%*ed i.e. you are going to loose. The only time "contesting air superiority" in that manner is going to be a reasonable option is if you are facing a 90's esk asymmetric air campaign against a casualty averse enemy. Keeping some tactical capability is useless if you have been decimated on the strategic level. That is the point.

How is it useless, when it can be used to give at least limited additional protection to your troops? I don't understand. Are you operating on the assumption that having SAMs implies having an inferior air force?

Then pray tell what is your point? That in a conflict between comparable powers an IADS can constitute a viable defense on its own, even when reduced to a tactical level? If that is your contention then I strongly disagree with it. If you can get to the jugular (C4I) even if it costs you relatively dearly, and you can effectively cut it, then the viability of the remnants of said IADS is practically irrelevant, simply because at a theater level he can not act or react in an organized manner.

What stops the network from reforming itself? From maintaining redundant additional mobile command posts that can quickly replace the one you destroyed and pull up additional assets to plug the breach?

No your not back were you started. Even if the enemy re deploys assets to cover the hole after the package has hit its targets who cares. If your target was a communications node or C2I asset then your enemy can no longer command effectively and whatever other moves you are about to make (ground offensive, counter-offensive, air campaign, whatever) has a much larger chance of success. Even if the strike package took 20% casualties you hit something invaluable, the enemies ability to make decisions, react and lead.

Wait, are we talking about C2 nodes of the IADS or C2 nodes of the opponents forces in general?

In simple terms tactical viability is irrelevant if you have failed strategically, end a partially viable IADS with tactical elements that has been penetrated constitutes a strategic failure in a state on state conflict between comparable powers, even if you can inflict some serious casualties on the strike packages. Whats the moral of the story, that IADS are useless? No, of course not.

So..... you agree with my argument that IADS can be used to effectively protect your ground forces and C2 from enemy air raids?

But relying on an IADS alone without trying to penetrate your enemies is a recipe for failure.

I don't see where your assumption comes from that I'm advocating using an IADS instead of anything. I'm saying that an IADS needs to be used in addition to all other assets, and as such would give a critical advantage in several ways:

1) Tactical air defense capabilities to even advancing ground troops.
2) Strategic air space coverage.
3) Limitation of the opponents air force to act freely.
4) Point defense of key installations.

 

[Fritz]

So the example of the '73 War does not apply to what is being discussed here.

What was being discussed here was

Even without massive overmatch, a modern IADS can still be penitrated with devistateing effect. Just look at the arab/isreali conflics in the last century.

and since the '73 war is the only arab/israeli war where aircrafts has been confronted with a modern IAD, it is the only war that apply to what is being discussed here.
Furthermore, it is the only war where aircraft was confronted with IAD without massive overmatch.
In fact the wars that doesnt count is the wars that USA waged, because of the massive overmatch.
I believe that when two countries with similar equipment fight, IAD can be, and has been, lethal.
A third world attacking country dont have the equipment to pinpoint a sam battery from acceptable range, and will get shot down by the dozen.
A first world country can provide AWAC and fighter support to their IAD, and the attacking country will fare ill again, because the AWAC provide the surveillance so the attackers can again not pinpoint the silent sam battery in time.
The real drawback with IAD is that they cant bring the fight to the enemy, they just sit there and protect their turf, perhaps unused throughout the conflict.

 

[DarthAmerica]

What was being discussed here was
and since the '73 war is the only arab/israeli war where aircrafts has been confronted with a modern IAD, it is the only war that apply to what is being discussed here.
Furthermore, it is the only war where aircraft was confronted with IAD without massive overmatch.
In fact the wars that doesnt count is the wars that USA waged, because of the massive overmatch.
I believe that when two countries with similar equipment fight, IAD can be, and has been, lethal.

Why are people still posting like this? War is not some equipment contest where two similarly armed opponents stand toe to toe. Also, overmatch isn't just about equipment. 1973 is an abysmal representation of SAMs like all the other wars SAMs have been used in. Thus far SAMs vs Aircraft is a very lopsided score with aircraft far in the lead where the SAM reliant force is decimated in just about every case. That gap has widened even more today.

-DA

 

[gf0012-aust]

And they applicability outside "entire USAF vs damned evil dictators 30-years old SAM's?"

thats a slight misrepresentation

1. the iraqis were running fibre optic underground cables to their GBADS - ie IADS - in fact rendering their FCS as something to disable very very quickly, the decapitation and dislocation of their IADS was the primary task of the Specforces teams as well as the Ewarfare units. Hence, critical nodes were killed to cause overload on other parts of the network to cause saturation and instill battlefield stress on specific command points
2. The Iraqis had modified IR seekers from AAM's and placed them on SAM's. One of the fortunate "wins" of the early Specfor raids was that the stockpile of modified weapons were intercepted and seized before they could be used. There are photos published in Proceedings some 5 years ago. The mods demonstrated a degree of sophistication way beyond local Iraqi capability, in fact foreign military contractors involved in setting up the Iraqi IADS/GBADs were adamant that it could have only come from a knowledgeable integrator. The strong view was that they were getting an assist from russian/ukrainian or belorussian technicians. Either way, it demonstrated a degree of sophistication that people were wise not to dismiss - and that the work done by the ewarfare and specops community saved a significant number of lives.

The ease by which follow up decapitation and dislocation was effected should not be trivialised on the assumption that they were "third rate" - they were not, and Iraq was (like Spain in 36-37) seen as an ideal testing ground for "red/orange" team solutions.

 

[Ozzy Blizzard]

The casualty cost of breaching the network around key installations, where it will undoubtably be supported by his air force, AWACS and other elements. With all others equal, the defenders SAM network may prove to be the straw that breaks the camel's back.

Hang on, if a strike package has just penetrated your IADS and hit a C4I node, and taken 20% casualties to do so (very high casualty rate), look at the disparity in effect. The attacker has lost ~2 platforms. The defender has just lost his ability to communicate with his advanced formations just as a large offensive has been launched against him. Who has lost more? Do that 10 times and the attacker has lost 20 platforms, and if they are a comparable power to the AWAC's, fighter & S-300 equipped IADS defender they have 100+ platforms with comparable or better ISR capability (because they didn't spend all of their pennies on a defense centric IADS). They've taken 20% casualties, the defender's entire system (not just the IADS) can no longer function intelligently at a theater level. What that means is his formations in the field will be out-maneuvered, out-fought and slaughtered.

8 battallions.

I believe you said 8 batteries, 3~4 batteries per battalion thats ~2 battalions.

How is it useless, when it can be used to give at least limited additional protection to your troops?

Thats the difference between tactical effects and strategic effects. On a tactical level it might do some good, but by that point you've lost on a strategic level i.e. your C4I infrastructure is toast. The point isn't to do your best, its to win, and by that point you've lost.

I don't understand. Are you operating on the assumption that having SAMs implies having an inferior air force?

I'm operating on the assumption that if you've invested that heavily in your IADS you are either at a competitive disadvantage in the air or your defense centric anyway. Look at the US, how dense is their IADS? How many PATRIOT batteries are operational night now in CONUS? You know why inferior powers have superior IADS, because the US have invested heavily in offensive capability.

What stops the network from reforming itself? From maintaining redundant additional mobile command posts that can quickly replace the one you destroyed and pull up additional assets to plug the breach?

There is a major point your missing, and its what i meant by a dis-jointed view of modern warfare. Its not air force vs IADS, its entire war-fighting system vs entire war-fighting system. Even if mobile AD command posts take up some of the slack (which would be easy pray considering their EM footprint), you have impaired the whole war-fighting system at the head. That will have strategic effects i.e. on every other aspect of the conflict. The loss of 15% of the attackers AF order of battle (huge, worst case losses) will have moderate tactical effects in this type of scenario, at best.

Wait, are we talking about C2 nodes of the IADS or C2 nodes of the opponents forces in general?

Both!

So..... you agree with my argument that IADS can be used to effectively protect your ground forces and C2 from enemy air raids?

No, not on their own, unless your other military arms aggressively win the conflict.

I'm not saying SAM's are sh%t and anyone who buys them are idiots, that would mean the majority of the planets armed forces. I'm saying that the money is much better invested in assets that will actually win you air superiority over the other guy. IADS like all other forms of defensive fortifications do not constitute a war-fighting strategy on their own.

I don't see where your assumption comes from that I'm advocating using an IADS instead of anything. I'm saying that an IADS needs to be used in addition to all other assets, and as such would give a critical advantage in several ways:

1) Tactical air defense capabilities to even advancing ground troops.
2) Strategic air space coverage.
3) Limitation of the opponents air force to act freely.
4) Point defense of key installations.

Again this is a defense centric view. What should be limiting the opponents air forces freedom of action should be your air force hitting their C4I & logistical infrastructure and destroying them on the ground or over their airfields. Same with every other parameter. Sure some sort of GBAD is needed, even for an air power as capable as the US. But GBAD should only be intended to handle leaker's that survived your fighters & strikers.

Again, usually nations that invest heavily in the biggest, baddest, scariest IADS are usually at a competitive disadvantage in the air, and they usually loose. Look at the Israeli's, outnumbered and surrounded by hostile states did they invest heavily in defensive AD systems? No, they made sure they had the assets, people and tactical doctrine needed to take the initiative when the time came. It was their numerically superior enemies who invested heavily in GBAD, and it was their numerically superior enemies who lost.

The principle of offense.

 

[Fritz]

Why are people still posting like this? War is not some equipment contest where two similarly armed opponents stand toe to toe. Also, overmatch isn't just about equipment. 1973 is an abysmal representation of SAMs

Ok, i just thought israeli/arab conflict was the worst possible example to prove SAM useless, the rest kind of just went along. SAMs doesnt really pose a danger to someone able to pinpoint them, but it takes several sorties to neutralize them before a strike can go ahead and destroy that airfield behind them.
For AD, AWAC and fighters is what counts. SAMs prevent you from taking out that airfield without effort tho, it delays OPFOR operations enough to use every last aircraft in defence, while at the same time cause frictions to OPFOR planning, logistics/tankers, and operations.
Btw, the combination of AWAC, fighters, and SAMs is still really tricky to take on simultaniously. In particular the ultra high speed SA-N-6 missiles are nearly impossible to out-run.