Actually they have since 1994. Russia and China signed a de-targeting agreement at the same time the Russians signed with the US.
The russian "threat" to China is still as real as the Iranian threat is to US.
But have they removed or deactivated missiles and warheads? Russia's SSBN fleet has the least decommissionings in all its services follow its nuclear missile arm. The targeting can be done quickly enough. In the long term, Russia's resurgent nationalism is worrisome, given its language, and reeks of analogies with another country back in the thirties. There is deep resentment in the power and population vacuum they are leaving in Siberia, which are being filled up with Chinese. Simply said the PRC just don't trust the Russians enough, and the Russians vice versa, even on the surface they tried to cooperate. A large portion of both countries arsenals are in IRBMs and still remain so, and the most likely usage of such missiles are in fact, each other.
I think you mistake the media to be the Government.
Who else do you think why they would need to reach out with the Sagarika? Pakistan, which is right on the border?
Yup, an amphibious force can apply to an invasion of Mongolia. lol.
Explains nothing. You are looking at two incidents over a period of time, which during the time, had numerous exercises. The USN and the PLAN conducts exercises at least 3 to 4 times in the area
each year. Considering how much both are at sea, how close they are, its remarkable you only have one real incident, considering how many "encounters" the Soviet Union had with the USN. The Han circling Guam does not mean much, they did it in international waters. You don't have things like H-6 bombers being sent out to shadow US fleets like the Russians attempted to do with their Tu-95s as recently as just last month over the Nimitz group in the Pacific.
Which countries build amphibious vessels for any other use than amphibious landings?
Other than Taiwan, as mentioned, I'm sure defending Hainan is probably the most urgent agenda for the amphibious vessels.
Sure, one can argue that the amphibious vessels are for defensive purposes which is exactly what the PLAN says. Of course, one forgets that a military operation against Taiwan is exactly termed as a defensive operation. Please, none of us are that naive.
Excuse me, but you only have ONE LPD. They are not building four, or five, or six all at once. One LPD is hardly any use in any invasion. Maybe only with a small island like the Spratleys but that would be overkill.
I agree with that to the exception that violent means has never been disavowed (remember the chinese legislation governing use of force against breakaway states?).
And somehow you want to take that legislation as proof that China abandoned the use of peaceful means for reunification?
Actually it does. The PLA has consistently stated that a strong military gives credibility to any diplomatic efforts. I would post links but you'd probably just dismiss them like you have the others.
Which is exactly why they are pursuing a post Taiwan doctrine with power projection in mind.
The difference is that the US tends to have a lot enemies than China. You can be sure the Zumwalt is produced with China somewhere in the equation. So is the F22.
And I'm sure what China produces has the US in the equation but the point remains the US is not the only one. China is surrounded by "frenemies".
If one looks at the perspective of Chinese acquisition, I think arguing that it is for a Darfur mission is a bit far-fetched.
And how many LSTs have China built so far just in the last decade alone? Add in the Yunshu and the Yutings. The new twin hulled Yubeis. The continued negotiations for the Zubrs. Its not like you don't know this.
And if you really want to answer the question yourself, the greatest portion are made behind 2000, and are in fact, aging faster than the rate of new ships (Yuting II) that could replace them. The Yuhai is far from new, production ended in 2000.
The Zubr does not appear to be in discussion anymore.
And that conveniently ignores the value of the Jins in a US nuclear response over a Taiwan straits issue.
Which conveniently ignores that China has made a policy they will not have a first strike option.
Nope, it is you who have been discounting every move of China and the PLAN towards an anti-US taiwan centric strategy.
No---what you have discounted is that the moves of the PLAAF/PLANAF/PLAN after HJT took over---has begin to show a post Taiwan scenario.
The make-up of the PLAN, PLAAF and PLA is exactly the make-up consistent with tackling a modern adversary such as the US and Taiwan over the Taiwan straits. Reduced obsolete army requirements. Improving air assault and amphibious capabilities. Improving air superiority and anti ship capabilities.
What you are saying does not discount for example, that PLAAF air training, after peaking around 2003 and 2004, began to head down to a rather leisurely pace by 2007.
Compared to the way the PLAAF was rushing things before 2004, today, they are taking its time, adopting J-10s, J-11Bs and JH-7As at a rather leisurely pace of one regiment each year for each of the different type.
Precisely because the PLAN recognises that technology is a force multiplier. They have studied how the US dismantled technological inferior though numerically superior armies and wish to avoid such an outcome.
I think when one looks at the longer term, it is a fallacy to think the chinese aren't patient enough to construct a military that is sufficiently strong to carry out its objectives. Everyone of these points to a build-up.
Which they owe to their history of having been constantly invaded, and their announcement that they will match their military capability with their economy.
Precisely because Taiwan has the ability to knock out ships that is in close proximity to its coastlines with aircraft, coastal SSMs and navy vessels.
I have highlighted before the possibility that China may endeavour a 2 prong assault taking a defended amphibious convoy approach instead of a previously thought haphazard '000 landing ships approach. Note how Shanghai is now heavily defended by SA-10s.
Shanghai is also the HQ for the PLAN ESF. The range of the SA-10 from Shanghai is not enough for Taiwan. There are also SA-10s in each of the major Chinese city along the coast, especially at Beijing. What you don't see is having the SA-10s massively concentrated around Fujian province.
Nope, as mentioned, the SSNs are more likely to be deployed in open ocean against the USN rather than the Taiwanese navy.
The SSBNs will endeavour to deploy in a position that can cover US targets.
None of what you say directly relates to a Taiwan invasion context. SSNs tend to operate best as lone wolves rather than wolf packs. Their usage alone forces a different context in doctrine and operation compared to the usage of SSKs. SSKs in wolf packs are in a much better position to serve as a wide area sea denial assets, which is much more useful in a Taiwan invasive context. SSNs are not resource efficient in this context, the cost of one can already buy you a flotilla of SSKs.
SSNs have a more general purpose in mind, which is the one point I am trying to make. True, it should have the USN in mind, but its not the only thing in the equation. They are what you need to hunt down SSGNs and SSBNs, protect your SSBNs, and provide escort to your CVBGs,. SSKs can't do that.
Positioning nuclear subs in the NSF is hardly convenient for open ocean at all because of the geographic barriers that present in the form of Korea and Japan. For these to break out into the open ocean they have to break through Japanese territorial waters. And given their bases, its quite a long reach to Taiwan.
Positioning nuclear subs in the SSF is more logical, since it won't be as bared. But it does lengthen the transit and response time to Taiwan and the open ocean.
The stealthy Houbeis are more likely to be survivable in a Taiwan straits environment than the Luzhous or other DDGs can. It is a recognition of ROC's ability to take out naval assets quickly with harpoons, mavericks, hellfires etc. I can see the Houbeis contesting ROCN naval assets in hostile EW waters and its never too much.
The Houbeis are purely antishipping, and there is not enough surface ships in the ROCN that you can kill. They cannot provide air cover, artillery, and ASW work for an invasive fleet. Neither can they sit and stand there in a sustained patrol because they lack the fuel for that.
The Houbeis are basically sea born interceptors.
I think we all know where the Ludas will head in the future.
And so, who is going to provide beach head artillery and MLRS support then?
Navalised SA-10 armed Luzhous. Jiangweis with AAW cover. Anti-ship H-6s, JH-7s, J-10s and Su-30s aren't that old. In fact, we're seeing a lot more construction and the introduction of new tech today than at any time in the last 2 decades. LGBs, anti-satellite missiles, networking, self production of aircraft etc.
Defense expenditure has reached new heights which even the chinese Govt has acknowledged (though they question the pace in comparison to the US). Momentum in the Hu Jintao era is even faster than the Jiang Zemin era.
And if you notice both SA-10 armed Luzhous are in the NSF, very far from Taiwan of all places.
The first J-10 deployment is in Yunnan province. Go check a map and tell me which country is that the closest to. The second J-10 deployment is in Nanjing. Close enough to Taiwan, but its not directly opposite to it either. The third deployment is in a base well west of Hong Kong, north of the Vietnam border.
And their fourth J-10 deployment? All the way to the north in Shenyang. Much closer to North Korea.
The first J-10 trials group is still operating north of Beijing for its
air defense.
J-11s are distributed in China all over, they made sure that every Military Region Command has one. They are not as one is to believe, just heavily concentrated along the Straits. There seems to be more J-11s north of the Yangtze rather than the south. And two groups are in the western side of China in all places.
A good number of JH-7s and Su-30 are located in the Nanjing-Shanghai zone. these can reach Taiwan for sure, but these are not facing Taiwan directly, and still positioned north enough to be able to flexibly deal with a northern threat.
The PLAAF's latest jet, the souped up and indigenized J-11B are now being located where? Far from the straits of Taiwan, they are north of Shenyang, where its all chilly, in direct range of North Korea, Mongolia and even Russia. And notice that all at the same time, they are also converting a regiment into J-10s in Shenyang also?
