weasel1962
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FOSM PLAN strategy and tactics
- Thread starter Truculent
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You need to start reading some of what the Russians say. They are quite concerned over China's influence over Siberia, and still have not gone over their own power decline.
No you are confusing a anti-US Taiwan centric doctrine to be the only thing the PLA is concentrated on, and failed to see that its really only one of the policy pillars among the many.
For example, note the PLA developments, a lot of which begs the question how you intend to transport them over the straits. For example, the PLA Marines remains to be a small force, about a single division at the most, highly motivated and trained but still seems inadequately equipped.
Note for example, the deployment of the ZTZ-99 tanks---all to a tank division in the north. Study the history of this tank and it was conceived as a counter to the Russian T-80, which the PLA spent time to study. Consider how the PLA exercises when they're not putting on a show for foreigners. For example, they are developing networking and small modularization with units, and they're doing that using elements in Xinjiang. Mission scenario, an attempted grab by foreign forces into Xinjiang to attempt to grab mines and refineries. Who are the most likely forces? Another example, mountain forces training in Tibet and Qinghai plateaus, also training on the hardened, networking concept, Mission scenario, forces from neighboring countries trying to take over the source of the seven rivers (seven of Asia's biggest rivers begin in Qinghai.)
This does not change the fact that Sagarika is most likely to be aimed at China, for the lack of other targets which India not to mention a few other missiles India is developing. Your answer failed to rebut that.
The Cold War example does not change the fundamental aspect that China and Russia still have deep suspicions over each other.
Excuse me? Chinese subs and bombers do not harass US forces with every exercise, and neither do the US do to the Chinese. Chinese bombers do not attempt to fly over US carrier groups for example, like the way the Russians do.
One incident---one that is likely to be the Song sub to be in the wrong time and place, rather than a deliberate tail of the Kitty Hawk---does not create a pattern of "activity against the US fleets". As a matter of fact, both sides are engaged in a level of dialog in order to work out issues and set up some protocols to prevent misunderstandings. Even after the Kitty Hawk Thanksgiving debacle, the two sides continued to have dialog.
Wrong, you are greatly overstating it with way too few incidents, given the number of years and the number of exercises being done every year by both sides.
http://www.sinodefence.com/navy/amphibious/type074_yuhai.asp
The PLA Navy deploys at least 10 Type 074 (NATO codename: Yuhai class, sometimes also referred to as Wuhu-A class) medium landing ships in its amphibious force. These ships were built by Wuhu Shipyard of Wuhu, Anhui Province between 1995 and 2000. These ships may serve as a successor to the ageing Type 079 (Yulian class) medium landing ships.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/yuhai.htm
Yuhai-class
Type 74
The first ship of the Yuhai-class Medium Landing Ship was completed in 1995 at Wuhu Shipyard. This new type of medium landing ship has been identified in service with the PLA Navy since 1995. Codenamed by Western analysts as Wuhu-A or Yuhai class, this new landing ship might be a successor to the Type 079 (Yulian class). The ship is capable of carrying 250 troops or 2 tanks. The armaments include two dual-14.5mm anti-aircraft machine guns.
At least 10 ships had been built by 2000. One ship was sold to Sri Lanka in December 1995. Of the 13 ships known to have been constructed, three are based in the North, four in the East, and six in the South Sea Fleet. According to Jane's Fighting Ships 2003-04, it is not clear whether construction is still taking place.
And you think it is the only the US that has nukes?
Moves that include a sudden resurgence of the carrier project, the building of the Yanwangs and the LHA hospital ships. The fact that the PLAAF choose the J-11B to finish rather than maximize sheer numbers by completing the rest of the Su-27SK contract, or just continue to buy Su-30MKKs endlessly. In doing so, the last J-11 regiment was formed in 2005, and not one has been added since for the last three years.
LOL. These articles are so generalized you can't figure which and what. The PLAAF has been training under ECM for some time.
I did computations on a PLAAF fighter pilot certificate that as of 2004, they were reaching as high as 185 hours a year. In 2006, based on a report of a pilot's crash, that the hours are up to 160 hours a year. In 2007, the PLAAF 1st Division commander told Gen. Pace who was visiting that their hours are 140. That definitely shows a pattern of decline.
That would be considered leisurely by Cold War standards. And don't tell me you can't use the Cold War as a standard. You should---because that is the period when sides are actively arming against each other.
Of all the people in this world, I know you know that I like to keep track of the PLAAF deployment to the last detail.
Your 500 aircraft a year is just plain BS.
Compared what? Compared to what many expected are a 50 plane a year rate? For each type?
Talk about tactical naivety. Taiwan's fighters would have problems reaching the main ESF surface ship bases and if they attempt to do so, they would be facing a massive SAM gauntlet.
There really is no reason to deploy the 051C in the ESF other than in the defense of the northern regions.
Man you are just running of proper replies.
You have not even figured out why China built nuclear subs in the first place. It had nothing to do with tactical or strategic imperatives. The Great Helmsman himself one day declared that for something befitting a nuclear power, China should have nuclear submarines.
You got to be nuts to have SSKs escorting CVs. Speed of CV over 33 knots. Speed of SSK --- 12 to 18 knots on average in surface. Underwater, up to 20 to 22 knots, but for only a duration of an hour.
Boy you really like to slow down your CV group don't you.
The US, NATO, the USSR/Russia have ruled out long long time ago, the feasibility of SSKs acting as CV escorts. Only nuclear subs and SSNs in particular with speeds up to just over 30kts, are used to escort CVs.
If the Indians are doing SSK coverage of their CVs, then their CV strategies are extremely questionable.
They would have to be around it for sure in order to enact a blockade strategy, first to interdict ROCN ships the moment they leave the port, and then make sure no supplies can come in. That's a brown water to littoral scenario, not really to the advantage of using 093s and 094s.
Maybe you should check some of the knowledgeable people making estimates of the Houbei production in the CDF, people that have more access to information from the mainland directly including leaks and squeals. Given that a lot of smaller yards, and including the main Dalian yard, is now pumping out Houbeis, the number can now range from 50 to 80. Given that previous generation of FACs were well over a hundred, its not unfeasible.
You have not presented an explanation considering that the Houbeis lack the sustainability and the multirole ability to support an invasion operation.
And how many WS-2s are there that can be used for a highly saturated artillery bombardment?
LGBs are expensive. Your lack of experience is showing. LGBs are not a replacement of direct fire or artillery fire in terms of sheer delivery and quantity, in terms of the need for saturation, and in terms of having a presence.
Again, don't mistake CAS as a replacement to actual artillery
You can do that while being in the ESF, whose bases are difficult for the ROCAF to reach with a payload, not to mention the concentration of air defenses there.
You can't seem to figure out that the two 051C are placed in the NSF for the simple purpose of providing defense for the northern region.
From many of these bases, its either, they don't have the range, or would require lots of heavy tanks, which reduces their payload and combat effectivity, and would seriously reduce their sortie rate.
Simply said, they're not optimal or even convenient. "Can" does not translate to a tactically acceptable or viable option.
No I am not. But I think you are making a mistake to assume they are myopic and one sided to a single strategy.
Schumacher
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So the discussion is still about whether PLA military developments are based on an 'anti-US Taiwan centric policy' ?
I wouldn't describe it as such but that's not to say Taiwan has stopped to be one of the top issues on their mind.
One way to look at it is that even if the Taiwan issue is resolved tomorrow, of most of the the major PLA projects now, nuke & non-nuke subs, next gen & big aircraft, carriers etc, I don't think there'll be much change to the pace of such developments.
Therefore, I'd describe PLA strategy as more of a general modernization & closing of gaps with other powers than Taiwan centric. Of course, these two goals are complementary in most senses.
I also think 'leisurely' is an appropriate term to describe PLA's development. One must not look only at the absolute improvements compared with their last gen of tech, which does make it look big/frantic.
I prefer to look at them relative to their economic/financial growth. With such view, I do think PLA is developing gradually without much strains on their finances. More like in steps with the increases in budget brought upon naturally from the economic growths.
I wouldn't describe it as such but that's not to say Taiwan has stopped to be one of the top issues on their mind.
One way to look at it is that even if the Taiwan issue is resolved tomorrow, of most of the the major PLA projects now, nuke & non-nuke subs, next gen & big aircraft, carriers etc, I don't think there'll be much change to the pace of such developments.
Therefore, I'd describe PLA strategy as more of a general modernization & closing of gaps with other powers than Taiwan centric. Of course, these two goals are complementary in most senses.
I also think 'leisurely' is an appropriate term to describe PLA's development. One must not look only at the absolute improvements compared with their last gen of tech, which does make it look big/frantic.
I prefer to look at them relative to their economic/financial growth. With such view, I do think PLA is developing gradually without much strains on their finances. More like in steps with the increases in budget brought upon naturally from the economic growths.
On the other hand, most modern Russian equipment such as SU-34's and T-90's are concentrated to Far East. Moreover, as other MRD's are dismantled in Far East they're converted to defense units. China is the only country which can be realistically assumed to be a potential threat to Russian area.
On issue of annual flight hours, do you know what method does PLAAF use to count hours? Is that flight hours using operational types? Do flight hours include training flights? Besides, the simulator technology has taken leaps, so perhaps many aspects can be trained by simulators instead.
weasel1962
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weasel1962
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Which is why this discussion should have been moderated long ago. They are basically debating intent, something even the best intelligence folks in the world would never conclusively agree upon.
Regardless of intent, it doesn't hide the buildup of both SSKs and SSNs, it doesn't hide the build up of FACs, and it doesn't hide the buildup of a blue water force for both warfighting and peacemaking. It also doesn't hide the training we are seeing, joint service and considerations of the individual training. It doesn't hide the soft power influences into SE Asia littorals, nor the expansion of investment along the 'string of pearls' that is happening. It also doesn't hide the interest of China in Africa and South America, specific to resources from both.
We also have plenty of writings by PLAN officers that have nothing to do with policy but highlight a great deal in terms of strategic approach, thought, and tactical developments. Most importantly, the naval discussions of doctrine matter more than policy or intent, or any political rhetoric, yet somehow some of the doctrine discussions are dismissed.
The desire to determine intent is a futile effort that is outside the scope of the Naval strategy discussion, as intent is ultimately a policy (political) decision, not a military one.
weasel you realize in this thread you earlier scolded crobato for using official Chinese information regarding military information, and now you are quoting exactly that. If I was to share an opinion on the debate, it would be weasel believes he is absolutely right on every point, but I think his points only tell half the story, specifically the story that fits into his entire intent argument.
When one starts a naval strategy discussion from the position of policy, and outlines everything from that point, I believe the analysis is flawed. Doctrine has nothing to do with policy. Ironically weasel, you accused the String of Pearls author of the same thing you have done in this thread, fitting a predetermined conclusion.
crobato your analysis is interesting. Not sure I agree with all of it. For example, I think some of the points you make can be explained by threats other than Russia, which btw goes for weasel who makes the US the totality of PLAN strategy. I've found China more concerned over North Korea than Russia in the North, and the Northern fleet for example appears to be focused on Japan more than the US.
There are elements clearly designed to challenge the US, and doctrine says as much. However, it is worth noting the very existence of a hospital ship points towards a strategy outside the scope of Taiwan and the US. The PLAN clearly doesn't need a hospital ship for the Taiwan scenario, as the mainland is but a helicopters ride away.
So what do you want to say by showing all these figures?
Forget about the figures in the 90s. Coz at that time China was too poor.
I mean even 100bnUSD is not enough for a country like China. Have you ever lived a life as a Chinese military solder or officer? Do you know with near 50bnUSD of defense budget even officers live a relatively poor lives compare to normal office workers in China.
weasel1962
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Not a matter of not respecting your views, I don't intend to give that impression. I just think you guys are very passionate in disagreement, and most of that disagreement is rooted in intent, which cannot be proven.
For the first part, you dismissed several of crobato's observations early most of which were based on official US Navy publications, specifically the wolf pack theory which is described in both the Undersea Warfare Mag article (an official publication of the US Navy) and the Office of Naval Intelligence report from 2007 (another official publication), but also the deliberate but slow blue water strategy which is supported by an increase production of logistics and other support ships that don't fit a Taiwan strategy. He cited a Chinese media source, which quotes Chinese Admirals discussing training for submarines, and you claimed the news reports aren't credible although it is through those same news sources we know the PLAN budget. I thought it was a bit dismissive.
In reading all of your rebuttals, they focus on the Taiwan centric strategy and is based primarily on your observations of that as intent for PLAN strategy. I don't specifically disagree with your observations of strategy, only that they exclude the possibility of a larger approach to PLAN utilization which is clearly being trained for and are rooted in doctrine beyond Taiwan. A few observations that imply the end of any singular coastal PLAN doctrine is near.
1) The increase in logistics support ships and operational training for UNREP.
2) The construction of nuclear powered submarines, which are expensive and unnecessary in a Taiwan anti-access/area denial strategy.
3) The increase in larger warships that choose endurance over speed.
4) The heavy increase of ECM and an apparent desire for poor weather conditions in operational training.
These observations are made not only in the 2007 Taiwan Defense Review Report, and some are in the 2007 US DoD report as well.
I think you make excellent points regarding a Taiwan scenario, and I think you have it right that the PLAN's first focus is the US Navy, but I don't believe (and there are signs supporting that belief) the PLAN strategy being limited only regards the Taiwan scenario. I also note doctrine changes within the PLAN that tends to highlight a shift to fleet activities that would be required for forward deployment operations, including the shift for limited blue water deployments of warships over the last few years. including last year as far as Great Britain. It appears there is a blue water strategy developing slow but steady to me,
As for what purpose, it should be noted resource considerations in Africa and South America. If there is further intention, I do not have enough information to speculate.
weasel1962
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And you have any idea what a few hundred ZTZ-99s would cost? Oh, but not just that, there is now enough ZTZ-99s to for an entire division. In addition, there are a few thousand ZTZ-96 and 96G, and a lot of it in the units to the north.
Read the above.
Tell me how you can deliver them to Taiwan via rails.
Tell me why would the PLA exercise in large scale tank warfare in a desert environment.
Don't anyone remember if Taiwan has a desert?
Why don't you explain to me Genius, how many nuclear powers that are close to India that would best require a mid ranged missile like this.
They are suspicious of China which is why they don't sell weapons that are considered strategic or state of the art. Every thing that has to be sold to China goes through the approval of the Russian General Staff.
If they are targeting the US, they need to try harder.
7 vessels you think that is a LOT? My god, SEVEN vessels.
If you are planning the largest amphibious landing operation since D-Day or Inchon by golly, you need more than SEVEN vessels.
Lets add the single 071, and the few Yuting IIs.
I'm sure the Jin class is considered a nuclear deterrent to all countries, including the US, but not the US alone. Russia, India, as well as anyone who can be a potential nuclear power.
I can call the photograph of a PLAAF pilot certificate---one who is assigned to the 2nd Division---evidence.
I can call the evidence of a Chinese newspaper reporting reporting a crash of a J-7 pilot---and called his 140 hours for the year, 90% of his yearly quota---to be evidence. That is quite specific.
I can call the PLAAF 1st Division commander talking to General Pace, evidence.
Now go find better evidence to support yourself.
Read the above.
Now find me a better source.
Actually I got that from Hui Tong's Chinese Military Aviation website long time ago. Of course the entries have changed since then to accomodate changes and updates.
Yup. They stopped acquiring J-11 kits in 2004, and finished the last regiment by May of 2005. In 2006, the last few planes were finished. Aside from J-11B prototypes, they only started building again late last year in 2007 order to complete the first J-11B regiment for 2008.
Shenyang AC hasn't done much in 2006-2007, except for finishing J-11B development and building about a regiment or two of J-8F. That's quite a slack compared to prior to 2004 when they were running full production of J-11s and J-8Fs at the same time.
After filling a regiment of J-10s in 2004, Chengdu literally stopped in 2005, only to continue again from mid to late 2006. Since then they are only filling a regiment of J-10s a year, and this year their quota is to fill the 1st Division regiment in Chifeng. I don't really expect them to build more J-10s after that. The rest of CAC's production are F-7s for export.
Oh please. The F-16s are not stationed in Taipei but in the southern tip of Taiwan. I dont' remember these F-16s to be Harpoon capable either. And if loaded with Harpoons, I kind of doubt they can go 700-800km. You should check instead the IDF which can carry the HF-2.
Their Jin subs are aimed at Russia, US and whoever has a nuclear capability. That does not change.
Prove that Kilos can achieve 25 knots underwater. All the references show up to 20 knots underwater. Even then at 20 knots, it can only be sustained for a short time or so.
You seem to have no understanding what being able to sustain means.
I know I am right about the SSKs escorting. SSKs would only be useful for a scout ahead role.
It does not distract that China's Shangs are much better than the Yuans for escorting the Varyag. Both the UK, US, France and USSR, use their SSNs to escort their carriers. A US CVBG typically has two SSNs underneath.
I don't have too, all you need to do is look at the examples of other nations.
Again, you have no idea there is a difference between littoral and blue water warfare. The SSKs are more convenient and quieter to operate in the waters nearer, shallower and closer to Taiwan's shoreline than the nuclear subs.
Really where?
Hmmvw's post.
"
QUOTE(foxmulder_ms @ Jan 1 2008, 02:25 AM) *
really nice pictures. so the total number of 022 could have reached 40s?"
I'd double that. I think if my calculation is correct there were close to 40 boats built in 2007 alone (15-17 built at Huangpu Shipyard, 4 each from Jiangnan and Hudong-Zhonghua, 2 from a satellite site of JN-Qiuxin, 4-6 from Xijiang, 4-6 at Dalian). They are only the known locations, there are maybe another 20-30 yards that are capable of produce this boat."
Why don't you actually read that stuff eh?
I am not claiming that they don't have the range. They should, the AMD cats they are based from are said to be able to go 300 miles.
But what you seem to not have is the comprehension of being multirole and to support an invasion operation.
Do they have the artillery capability? Do they have the AA capability? Not unless you think that capability is covered by a single AK-630 cannon that has a range up to 4 to 6km.
Where is their mine clearing capability? Where is their ASW capability?
The ability for the Houbeis to mount a limited offense---one only against ships---does not change the fact that the Houbeis are basically a high tech FAC, and FACs are patrol craft, which means mainly for defense.
Now go read again the CDF thread, and notice they're now being built in Dalian and lots of other smaller shipyards. Why don't the PLAN give the same attention to the Yuhais and Yutings?
Considering China's massive shipbuilding capacity (now leading the world in orders), amphibious ships are only taking up a minutely tiny fraction of that production.
Firing 2 or 3 WS-2s can be hardly be considered artillery support. The problem of super large MLRS is their inability to provide low cost massive saturation fire support. How many WS-2s you have to expend to produce massive saturation?
It is 17k to 19k and why don't you compare how much artillery shells you can get for 19k.
Do you ever realize that there is a reason why PGMs only amount to a fraction of the total munitions expended in Desert Storm?
I can use a fork in support for a Taiwan conflict but it does not mean I designed this fork just for the Taiwan conflict. You seem to have a problem with basic comprehension.
The fact that the 051C are located in the NSF to provide air protection in that area shows that their nature is primarily a defensive one.
They don't disperse their naval assets in fear of the ROCAF reach or because of the ROCAF reach. As a matter of fact, some of the ESF sub bases can be reached, as well as bases used by the littoral vessels and amphibious ships. Now whether the ROCAF pilots are trained to do antishipping runs are another matter.
The PLAN disperses its vessels in order to protect the entire coastline from north to south. What many dont' consider is China's own history, the "Century of Humiliation" starting from British gunboats going up the Pearl River, is a catalytic factor in the way China arms now and the way China seeks to protect itself.
And which "bases" are you talking about?
There is a lot of runaways and airports closer to Taiwan yes?
But which ones can logistically support J-10s and J-11s?
Don't you think these regiments should try to do some exercises in these bases? Furthermore it is important that they learn to fly the airspace corridor between Fujian and the Straits?
You cannot just put on the hours and claim you got the training needed. You need to put the hours into the specific roles required. They need to put these hours in that very airspace. Crews and technicians must and should learn to do their operations in those forward bases. They also need to fly over the water, and fly over the water at night. Other than the PLANAF, I am not sure how many PLAAF units can fly and navigate over water right now. The PLAAF certainly has a lot of homework to do, but they are not in a rush, or acting like it. They are conservatively and methodically doing things step by step.
weasel1962
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Oh please do your research on the proportion of dumb bombs and PGMs used in Desert Storm.
http://www.ausairpower.net/Analysis-ODS-Perspective-92.html
"In terms of tonnage dropped, however, the LGBs accounted for a small fraction of the total. Certainly the bulk of the battlefield missions were flown with conventional demolition bombs, which are regardless still most useful for hitting area targets and dispersed targets, albeit with much lower P[k] (kill probability) per weapon in comparison with guided bombs."
Go tell me how many WS-2 a single TEL can launch and how many can you use to effect a wide area saturation.
As for misquoting, go find me your reference that a Kilo can do 25 knots underwater.
And I find it deeply ironic you are claiming that I misquoted when it was you who was caught flatfooted---with actual post text--to misquote the things being said in the CDF.
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weasel1962
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The text you gave failed to mention that it was one particular aircraft that was delivering the unguided munitions, and this plane is also guided munitions capable---the B-52. So what were the B-52's doing? They were carpet bombing.
You don't seem to understand the concept of saturation, whether its by artillery , MLRS or bomber. PGMs assume you have knowledge already of what to hit. In saturation, you simply mark out an entire zone, and destroy everything completely in that zone. That is not something a relatively expensive PGM is suited for. That is something lots of cheap munitions is best used for. This is not surgical work. This is scourged earth.
The WS-2 is already a semi SSM and it does not produce the saturated fire a smaller MLRS, with much shorter range but with a lot more rockets can produce.
You also seem to have a problem with pilot hours. In every airforce in the world, it actually varies year by year, and its not a constant. Even the USAF had times when it would dip, and then rise, comparable to a chart on stocks.
So just because 2007 might have 140 hours, does not mean all the years before are 140 hours. There appears to be a shallow down ward trend, though that may be reflected that the pilots may be getting more simulator time or studying tactics in the classroom. We don't exactly know.
It does not really matter what the Kilo's maximum speed is. The facts remain that any SSK cannot sustain the speed it requires to maintain the cruise speed of an CV. During the Cold War and still today, the subs that either hunt for CVs, or escort CVs, have been nuclear. For China, the 093 would have been far more complimentary to a PLAN carrier than a Song or a Yuan.
I have never concluded that the Houbeis won't be used against Taiwan. You don't seem to understand fine points here, and you're just going black to white without understanding the shades of grey. The Houbeis can be used against Taiwan, but they're not an optimal system to support an invasion. They cannot for example, loiter around and maintain a position, like a larger ship can do. Its use against Taiwan seems more secondary, compared to the primary goal of defending China's coasts. This is not to mention that some of the locations for the Houbies in the NSF and SSF are quite inconvenient for use in a Taiwan scenario.
The new DoD report does not change or contradict my conclusions. Notice the word "contain". It has not changed that containing Taiwan is a primary goal but remember, it also has added that this time China is now extending its reach beyond a Taiwan context.
Also I think you read too much into articles and speeches that want to present surface appearances. The thing you keep in mind most of all is the Art of War. Don't always think that what is said is what is being done, and things that are being done won't be said either. The Chinese leadership is obliged to give lip service on the Taiwan issue with some mandatory threats here and there. So what nothing new. The other side will give lip service on the independence issue. So what nothing new. Common street wisdom has long understood, that both China and Taiwan won't do anything rash, and with both their economies heavily in bed with each other, it will be business as usual as always. So there is a sense of confidence that China can look beyond the Taiwan issue into more larger geopolitical concerns, most importantly, in trying to secure mineral and fuel resources for its growing economy.
You don't seem to understand the concept of saturation, whether its by artillery , MLRS or bomber. PGMs assume you have knowledge already of what to hit. In saturation, you simply mark out an entire zone, and destroy everything completely in that zone. That is not something a relatively expensive PGM is suited for. That is something lots of cheap munitions is best used for. This is not surgical work. This is scourged earth.
The WS-2 is already a semi SSM and it does not produce the saturated fire a smaller MLRS, with much shorter range but with a lot more rockets can produce.
You also seem to have a problem with pilot hours. In every airforce in the world, it actually varies year by year, and its not a constant. Even the USAF had times when it would dip, and then rise, comparable to a chart on stocks.
So just because 2007 might have 140 hours, does not mean all the years before are 140 hours. There appears to be a shallow down ward trend, though that may be reflected that the pilots may be getting more simulator time or studying tactics in the classroom. We don't exactly know.
It does not really matter what the Kilo's maximum speed is. The facts remain that any SSK cannot sustain the speed it requires to maintain the cruise speed of an CV. During the Cold War and still today, the subs that either hunt for CVs, or escort CVs, have been nuclear. For China, the 093 would have been far more complimentary to a PLAN carrier than a Song or a Yuan.
I have never concluded that the Houbeis won't be used against Taiwan. You don't seem to understand fine points here, and you're just going black to white without understanding the shades of grey. The Houbeis can be used against Taiwan, but they're not an optimal system to support an invasion. They cannot for example, loiter around and maintain a position, like a larger ship can do. Its use against Taiwan seems more secondary, compared to the primary goal of defending China's coasts. This is not to mention that some of the locations for the Houbies in the NSF and SSF are quite inconvenient for use in a Taiwan scenario.
The new DoD report does not change or contradict my conclusions. Notice the word "contain". It has not changed that containing Taiwan is a primary goal but remember, it also has added that this time China is now extending its reach beyond a Taiwan context.
Also I think you read too much into articles and speeches that want to present surface appearances. The thing you keep in mind most of all is the Art of War. Don't always think that what is said is what is being done, and things that are being done won't be said either. The Chinese leadership is obliged to give lip service on the Taiwan issue with some mandatory threats here and there. So what nothing new. The other side will give lip service on the independence issue. So what nothing new. Common street wisdom has long understood, that both China and Taiwan won't do anything rash, and with both their economies heavily in bed with each other, it will be business as usual as always. So there is a sense of confidence that China can look beyond the Taiwan issue into more larger geopolitical concerns, most importantly, in trying to secure mineral and fuel resources for its growing economy.
weasel1962
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weasel1962
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In a twist of irony I have spent the last two days at an ewarfare symposium - we were comparing how we were going to deal with the russians in germany during the cold war compared to the new "threat".
needless to say, internet information even about the cold war scenarios is absolute rubbish - even the recently "self disclosed" statements about how it was supposed to pan out bear no relationship to what would have happened
needless to say, internet information even about the cold war scenarios is absolute rubbish - even the recently "self disclosed" statements about how it was supposed to pan out bear no relationship to what would have happened