Associate editor Cameron Stewart | December 29, 2007
AN unusual defence brief landed on the desk of Labor's Joel Fitzgibbon last July, when he was the Opposition spokesman for defence.
It was written not by Australian Defence Force chiefs but by the Submarine Institute of Australia, a body comprising some of the country's most decorated former submarine commanders.
The brief was on the future of the submarine fleet and it did not mince words. It began: "To retain an effective undersea warfare capability, planning needs to begin NOW on a future submarine."
A naval arms race in the region was gathering pace and Australia could not afford to be left behind, the submariners warned. "Significant investment is under way by regional nations to acquire or improve their submarine capability," they wrote.
"Modern western European technologies are being fielded in many of these capabilities. Both India and China are also acquiring European and Russian submarine technology of considerable sophistication. The emergence of regional powers armed with nuclear-powered submarines, and submarines with a strategic strike capability, are likely," the report said.
"In short, more countries will seek to practice underwater denial."
This last point was highlighted dramatically in September when Russian leader Vladimir Putin dropped into Jakarta en route to the APEC leaders summit in Australia and announced that Russia would sell two advanced Russian Kilo-class submarines to Indonesia, with hopes of selling eight more in the years ahead.
Fitzgibbon has emerged as Defence Minister in the Rudd Government and this week he took his first major decision: to start the planning process for the next generation of submarines to replace the navy's Collins-class fleet when it is retired in 2025.
The landmark move is a recognition of two key realities. The first is that the traditional maritime balance of power in our region is fast changing, with Australia's advantage being threatened by rapidly expanding navies across the region. The second reality is that the process of building the next generation of Royal Australian Navy submarines will be long, expensive and inevitably painful. Unless serious planning for this futuristic fleet begins now, there is little or no chance the new submarines will be ready to sail by 2025, when the six Collins-class boats will be obsolete.
"A lot of work needs to be done and they cannot afford to muck around," says Ross Babbage, chairman of the security think tank the Kokoda Foundation, which published a detailed report in April on future submarine requirements.
Fitzgibbon's decision has been welcomed by defence experts and also by the Coalition Opposition, which would have done the same thing if it had been returned to power.
The fact that there has not been a single dissenting voice for what will be the longest and most expensive defence project since Federation shows how far the defence debate has moved from the days when experts questioned the need for an indigenous submarine fleet. The success of the Collins-class boats and an increasingly uncertain strategic outlook have led to a bipartisan conviction that Australia cannot afford to lose its submarine capability.
"The bottom line is that no one these days seriously argues that we don't need a new generation of submarines after the Collins class are gone," says Neil James, executive director of the Australia Defence Association.
In fact, experts say Australia's need for submarines has never been greater.
"By 2025 there will be over 150 modern submarines in the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean regions, not counting those of our American allies and our own," says Peter Briggs, a former submarine commander and now president of the Submarine Institute of Australia.
Former Labor defence minister and Opposition leader Kim Beazley says Australia needs to consider doubling the present fleet in order to match the expansion in rival submarine capability in the region.
"I think we need to have up to 12 submarines because of the numbers of submarines being developed elsewhere," he tells Inquirer. Beazley also says more submarines are needed to counter a "glaring weakness" in Australia's anti-submarine warfare capabilities at a time when the navy will be producing "the best submarine targets in the region" with its new air warfare destroyers and amphibious landing ships.
In a study released this year, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute warned that the availability of off-the-shelf submarines from Russia and other countries had dramatically shortened the time it took for rival countries to develop a submarine capability.
"Sophisticated Russian and western European submarines are proliferating into the region, with Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore and South Korea all acquiring or planning to acquire modern conventional boats," the institute said. "The rising major powers of China and India are working to develop indigenous nuclear submarines in conjunction with acquiring sophisticated conventional submarines and weapons from abroad. China in particular has markedly increased the size and capability of its fleet over the last decade and continues to build on that progress.
"The upshot is that Australia will soon face a region that has a much greater capability to conduct submarine operations. In a contingency, submarines will be able to seriously threaten the operation of surface fleets and commercial trade."
But what capabilities will the next generation of Australian submarines need to counter such threats?
"We are talking about a much more complicated and demanding environment than we had when we were designing the Collins-class boats," says Babbage.
The Kokoda study estimates that the total cost of building a fully modernised next-generation submarine fleet in Adelaide could cost an unprecedented $25 billion. These figures are daunting for any government, much less one already saddled with a $15billion project to replace its frontline fighter jets and an $8 billion purchase of three air warfare destroyers. Not to mention the $6billion spent this year by the former defence minister, Opposition Leader Brendan Nelson, on F/A-18 Super Hornets, a purchase widely viewed as being driven by politics -- fear of criticism over a time gap between the obsolescence of our F-111s and the new fighters -- rather than strategic need.
With a new defence white paper due to be completed late next year, the submarine replacement project will be viewed with suspicion by rival services in the ADF. Some in the air force may fear the expensive new submarines will undermine their pitch for large numbers of Joint Strike Fighters, with a decision on the Lockheed JSF project due late next year. The army may feel it will compromise its push for more infantry. Even some elements of the navy are wary of submarines, fearing that they will suck up its allotment of resources, which might otherwise be channelled into surface ships.
If these disputes do arise, submarine advocates will be disadvantaged because there is no longer a submarine operations office in Canberra since it was relocated to the fleet base in Western Australia in 2000. This means that during the policy arm-wrestles that will take place in Canberra next year ahead of the defence white paper, there will no senior submariner at the table to argue their case.
But Fitzgibbon is a believer in the need for a strong submarine arm and is likely to be a staunch defender of the project.
"This project will need every bit of ministerial attention because it hasn't got the same public focus as the Joint Strike Fighter and air warfare destroyer projects have," says Beazley. "Generally speaking, the submarine fleet has been driven by politicians since the days of Alfred Deakin, who was the father of Australian submarines, acquiring two of them against the advice of his British advisers."
Fitzgibbon has promised that the new submarines will be built in Adelaide and, while he has not said so, the new boats will almost certainly be built by Collins-class maker the Australian Submarine Corporation.
The minister wants the design phase of the project to gain first-pass approval from cabinet's national security committee in 2011.
At this stage the Defence Department is keeping all options open for the new submarines, including the small possibility that the new boats will be nuclear-powered rather than diesel-powered like the Collins class.
Nuclear submarines would offer some strategic advantages over conventional submarines. They are much faster and can stay underwater indefinitely, allowing them to shadow deep ocean convoys around the clock.
However, the Collins do not shadow convoys like their US counterparts do. Instead, they spend much of their time close to shore, gathering intelligence: a task for which speed is largely irrelevant.
Conventional submarines such as the Collins are also quieter than their nuclear counterparts, making them better suited to shallow-water, close-shore operations.
They are also significantly cheaper to build at about one-third of the cost of a nuclear-powered boat. This cost factor, plus the fact that Australia does not have a nuclear industrial infrastructure to support a nuclear fleet, is likely to lead Defence to rule out a nuclear submarine early in its deliberations.
The Government will be anxious to avoid a repeat of the substantial problems that plagued the Collins-class boats in their early years when they were too noisy, leaky and had a faulty combat system.
Despite these problems, Labor says the new submarines will once again be built in Australia and will not be purchased ready-made off the shelf from another country.
Because no other country makes the type of conventional boats Australia wants, the new submarines will be a new class -- known in defence circles as an "orphan class" -- in the same way as the Collins.
Briggs believes lessons have been learned from the Collins experience that will help avert a repeat of such problems. Rather than try to reinvent the wheel, he says the Government should "evolve and migrate the Collins combat and ship control systems into the new submarine".
The Collins fleet, despite its troubled birth, has evolved to become one of the country's most important and most unheralded defence assets. It has had setbacks, most notably the near-loss of HMAS Dechaineux in 2003 when a burst seawater hose at deep diving depth came within 20 seconds of sinking the boat and its 55 crew.
That accident continues to limit the depth at which the Collins fleet can operate, diminishing its effectiveness.
But in war games with allies and in intelligence-gathering operations, the fleet has performed strongly.
Defence wants its new submarines to form the most lethal conventional fleet in the world, with the new boats being larger, faster and quieter than the Collins and with a greater array of firepower.
It is expected that the new boats will be capable of carrying long-range cruise missiles as well as short-range tactical land-strike missiles.
They are also likely to have minisubs attached to them that can travel remotely many kilometres from the mother submarine to search for enemy ships, gather intelligence or transport an SAS team.
The boats will also utilise the new generation of air-independent propulsion systems that allow the submarines to stay underwater longer, greatly increasing their operational effectiveness.
Early big-picture decisions on all these capabilities will need to be made in less than four years, before the 2011 cabinet deadline.
In 2014-15, the Government will be expected to give second-pass consideration to the project, resulting in contracts and the eventual construction of the submarines, with sea trials to begin in about 2022.
It sounds like a long time away, but the complexities of designing and building a new Australian submarine fleet which can maintain an edge over its regional rivals are daunting. "A great deal will need to happen quickly," says Babbage. And the clock has already started ticking.
