Today National released its Defence, Trade and Foreign Policy Discussion Document. There is nothing new in it for us as most of it has found itself on to this thread over the last two months. I suppose the 50% of Foreign Aid to the Pacific Islands is the only thing new. I believe that this a particularly good policy point. What the discussion document does not discuss – not that I would expect it to - is a full regional strategic projection of defence issues and potential events over the next 20 years that will have some bearing on NZ Defence and Foreign Policy over that time frame. I thought I would briefly collate a few of these potential security issues that aren’t contained within the discussion document (Or given much detail by MFAT/NZDF for that matter) so as to put perspective into our Defence and Security Planning and provide some food for thought. At the end of the day it is these points that really are the fundamental projections that security and strategic analysts make in their forward assessments so as to plan defence capability and expenditure. If/When National puts up its Defence White Paper it will need to address fully and frankly its options, contingencies and responsibilities. It is also our responsibility to make them aware that the next decade will be very different to the current one and that they wont be able to get away with a one dimensional approach to defence and security as is the case at present.
Potential Threats, Scenarios and Security Issues in Asia Pacific Region Post 2010.
1) The possible rise of an ambitious, nationalist, resource hungry China into a "full" Superpower within a decade and accordingly the growing arms race in Asia to counter China’s growing power and influence. New Zealand and Australia will need to watch the development of China’s blue water navy capability based around a CSG and it’s significance in altering the Western and Southern Pacific balance of power. The question of when not if China starts to project her power towards Taiwan.
2) The centuries old rivalries and increased tension between ‘embarrassed’ Japan itching to ‘normalise’ itself by breaking free of Article 9 Constitutional constraints and its other North Asian neighbours who are challenging her current Asian dominance and questioning her level of contrition over its colonial conquests and exploitation between 1895 and 1945. (Currently the Jimen Party (LDP) is in power with only just recently Fukuda being installed at the helm. Fukuda is slightly less hard-line then the previous Shinzo Abe though this will be in the interim as it is possible that Minshuto (Democrats) will take the lower house in next years elections and therefore the Government. This might mean the heat has been slightly taken out of this issue in the short term. But with Taro Aso (an ardent nationalist) waiting in the wings to take over the LDP with backing from the former Kamei and Hashimoto factions the Article 9 issue will pop up on the agenda in due course as will the LDP supremacy.)
3) The Korean Peninsula instability. A more independent and confident South and a paranoiac, armed and starving north. The repercussions of change in the North Korean dynasty? The repercussions of the US 8th Army withdrawing to the ‘outer ring’ islands such as Guam, Saipan - if popular anti-Americanism and/or nationalism rises in the South?
4) The possible flashpoint in the South China Sea due to potential oil and gas exploration fields around the Senkaku Islands which are claimed as sovereign territory by China, Japan, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Also into that mix the Spratley’s, the Sakhalin’s, Dokto, the Parasols and other disputed Islands in the Asian region in which countries have their national prestige at stake as well resource and/or geopolitical significance.
5) The continuing rise of Islamic fundamentalism throughout the whole of South Asia which could lead to a least one “islamofacist” state and the domino effect of instability in its neighbours. Of concern is the potential break up of Indonesia into a number of antagonistic states based on religious, ethnic and ideological rivalries. West Papua seems one of the most likely candidates for the first rush of trouble and again the domino effect is relevant.
6) The emergence of resource starved industrial economies looking South into the Pacific towards soft targets to environmentally plunder. In consideration of the New Zealand aspect to this we would have to proceed towards the protection and security of our EEZ + dependencies if alleged deep sea mineral deposits around the Kermadec’s and oil and gas fields in the Southern Basin and Northland Block are realised. The rapid depletion of fish stocks around the whole Asian coastline from over-fishing and the need for these nations to go further field into the Southern Ocean, Central South Pacific and NZEEZ to feed their huge and ever wealthier domestic populations.
7) The question of whether long term the US, Singapore and Australia will alone be able to provide the geo-political security, maintain peace, economic stability, deterrent, and promote democratic value systems through this future period of time and change. Whether those three countries in particular will be willing to continue pro-active engagement and protection of, with, and for NZ though the reciprocation of such engagement and protection remains unbalanced.
8) The ongoing instability of Pacific Island nations and the capability of New Zealand to respond in a meaningful way. New Zealand’s loss of direct and positive influence over our nearest South Pacific Island neighbours. The loss of NZ sovereignty through repetitive and flagrant breaches by third party nations into its EZZ and Territorial Dependencies.
9) Possible Players on the fringe. India’s rapidly expansion into a nation with strategic and economic might. This is seen in its current pursuit of an expeditionary naval and air capability, which will lead to three carrier strike groups in operation by 2018. Russia re-emerging from the post Cold War era. Will we see its increased military confidence in terms of an interest in the Pacific?
10) The possible reduction and retrenchment in the involvement of the United States military in the wider region as it tires of the task of strategically and fiscally. Will the US turn politically inward after the costly and mixed success of the Bush era in Defence and Foreign Policy terms?
11) Nothing will happen. Everything will be honky dory. Everyone will behave perfectly well with love, peace, mutual understanding and respect. (Yeah Right)
The questions are - Which of the above is likely to happen? What would be the repercussions for New Zealand if/when it did? What would be the baseline defence capability to mitigate that event and protect New Zealand from that event? How would that work? What is the required transformation to get us from the present circumstances to dealing with the above potentialities.