Thanks for that. I suppose I will just have to bide my time. I had a look at the NZDF web site and while they have the Army and Airforce versions posted there, no Navy Today.:lul
Royal New Zealand Navy Discussions and Updates
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recce.k1
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RNZN lessons from East Timor deployment
Things have been a bit quiet on this topic. Let’s get some more discussion going! Whilst we could argue infinitum about how many fighting ships the RNZN should have but perhaps the correct answer should be whatever numbers of ships we have, their capabilities should be as up to date as our RAN equivalents for the reason that the two navies generally operate together around the region. Also as important are the auxiliary support ships. Whilst an invasion of NZ is unlikely now and into the foreseeable future, perhaps we ought to be considering the most likely situations in which the RNZN would deploy.
The last time the RNZN was deployed on a warlike footing was the East Timor intervention of 1999 (and then Op-EF undertaking interception and boarding missions in 2002/03). Apologies to those who already have the fascinating book Operation East Timor - The NZDF in East Timor 1999-2001 by John Crawford and Glyn Harper (ISBN 0 7900 0823 8) but seeing as the book was a limited run and is out of print now (I did check first), I’ll reproduce some of the sections on the RNZN naval operations as it brings up some of the issues that people in these forums here have commented about in the past (eg possible Indonesian submarine contact). It would be a shame for the writing in this book to disappear into the bowels of history without a wider appreciation of the role of the RNZN that most of us and the general public especially may not be aware of. Some important points IMO are:
* That the less glamorous tankers are also crucial assets - but do both the RNZN and RAN have enough? The RNZN’s sole tanker can be deployed for months accompanying one of the ANZAC’s throughout Asia, Pacific & the Indian Ocean etc. These vessels don’t cost a lot comparatively speaking, should the RNZN have two such vessels to handle 2 deployments simultaneously in the event of an emergency or if one ship is in dry dock? Should the RAN have more than 2 vessels to support their much larger fleet?
* That the RNZN escorting duties (of merchant and re-supply ships) and the need to provide an armed presence are just as crucial after “hostilities” end. In a future scenario one could conclude that once the RNZN ANZAC frigates are redeployed after the initial hostilities, perhaps the RNZN OPV’s could be deployed for escort duties (and justify people in this forum suggesting that at least the main canon be upgraded, add a suitable search radar and fire control system, and some sort of CIWS defensive system etc). Ditto fitting CIWS on the MRV or Tanker etc.
* That the ASW capabilities’ of the Frigate’s (sensors and weapons) are extremely important despite the last Govt sponsored Maritime Patrol Review of 2001 which dismissed the submarine threat to NZ (i.e. ignored the reality that the NZDF operates away from home waters and into sub infested areas around the A-P region).
* That the RNZN Seasprites’ don’t have dedicated ASW sensors (eg dipping sonars) are a serious capability gap (could the Seasprite handle these enhancements or would bigger helicopters be required eg MRH90 etc)?
* That the Frigates’s (often the object of criticism from NZ peace groups and some of the smaller left of centre political parties) played a crucial role in the beginning of the operation.
* Agree/disagree? Anything else etc?
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
The NZDF units prepare in Australia (pp 56-57)
The crisis in East Timor occurred at a time when the RNZN had only two frigates operational, HMNZS Te Kaha, the first of New Zealand's Anzac frigates, and HMNZS Canterbury, the elderly Leander-class frigate which was being used primarily as a training vessel. At the beginning of September Te Kaha and the replenishment tanker HMNZS Endeavour were off Malaysia, taking part in Exercise Stardex under the auspices of the Five Power Defence Arrangements. In the early hours of the morning of 8 September Te Kaha was withdrawn from the exercise and directed to sail as quickly as possible to the Darwin area. After refuelling from Endeavour, Te Kaha switched from her economical diesel engines to her gas turbine. During the passage to the Timor Sea she ran on her gas turbine for 67 hours and averaged 25 knots (25 nautical miles per hour). The crew used this time to practise damage control and other skills, and on 10 September went to Defence Watches, under which the ship is in a heightened state of readiness and is quickly able to go to Action Stations. As the frigate sailed through the Wetar Strait, north of Timor, in the early hours of 11 September her crew could see the fires raging in Dili, 40 kilometres away. South of Timor Te Kaha rendezvoused with the underway replenishment tanker HMAS Success, from which she received much needed supplies of fuel and food, including a large batch of freshly baked Anzac biscuits. After briefly patrolling with HMAS Darwin off East Timor's south coast, Te Kaha sailed for Darwin.
In response to an urgent Australian request, Endeavour returned to Singapore at the completion of Exercise Stardex. Here she quickly embarked aviation fuel required by ADF units on standby for operations in East Timor, as well as equipment left by Te Kaha and the Australian warships that had been pulled out of the exercise early. She sailed on 13 September, rendezvousing with Australian and other warships on patrol south of East Timor five days later. After transferring fuel and stores to Te Kaha and Success, Endeavour took up a position 50 miles off the eastern tip of Timor. Endeavour was a particularly valuable addition to the international force being assembled to intervene in East Timor, since the Royal Australian Navy had only one tanker, Success, operational at this time (HMAS Westralia was out of action because of an engine-room fire in 1998).
Naval operations (pp 61-63)
Interfet's naval operations had begun well before 20 September. While Te Kaha was berthed in Darwin from 13 to 18 September, her commanding officer, Commander Ross Smith, was briefed on the situation in East Timor and on plans for the operation. The final steps were also taken to prepare the ship for action with, for instance, Te Kaha's torpedoes being moved from the magazine to the ship's torpedo tubes. On the evening of 18 September she sailed in company with the British destroyer HMS Glasgow. In concert with the frigates HMAS Adelaide and HMAS ANZAC, the powerful cruiser USS Mobile Bay and other warships, they escorted Success, the heavy lift ship Tobruk, the high-speed catamaran Jervis Bay and three Australian heavy landing craft towards East Timor. The following day Te Kaha received urgently needed fuel and spare parts from Endeavour. During 20 and 21 September Te Kaha undertook surveillance operations south of Timor and acted as the aircraft control unit, working closely with the RAAF Orion maritime patrol aircraft operating in the area. At one stage Te Kaha's Seasprite helicopter tracked an Indonesian submarine sailing on the surface along Timor's south coast.
During this period the Indonesian naval and air forces generally adopted an aloof stance, although on occasion they acted in a more threatening manner. Indonesian warships, for example, engaged in games of 'maritime chicken' with Interfet ships. And on one occasion, while Te Kaha was conducting surveillance operations off the south coast of Timor, two Indonesian Hawk fighter aircraft flew at high speed towards the Australian Orion she was working with. Te Kaha alerted the Orion, which turned away from the Indonesian aircraft. The inclusion of highly capable warships in the international coalition, in particular the Mobile Bay, with its outstanding long-range weapons, sensors, battle management and command capacity, provided confidence to all those involved in the operation during the tense initial period. The presence of RAAF fighters overhead also did much to inspire confidence among the first wave of Interfet forces.
During the night of 21/22 September Te Kaha closely escorted Endeavour through the Wetar Strait. Endeavour then entered Dili harbour and berthed alongside Success before transferring aviation fuel and diesel to her. Interfet was short of diesel, and Endeavour was therefore directed to sail to Cairns to pick up more supplies. Te Kaha, which had been on patrol off Dili, escorted Endeavour to the edge of the 100-mile zone around the port; within this zone all naval auxiliaries and chartered merchant ships carrying supplies and equipment for Interfet had to be escorted by warships.
Te Kaha spent the next two days escorting merchant ships into Dili. Her involvement in the Interfet operation ended on 24 September, when she began her passage to Singapore en route to join the Multinational Interception Force (MIF) in the Persian Gulf. The commitment to the MIF was a longstanding one of high priority. By this time the ADF felt that it had enough warships for the operation in East Timor, and Te Kaha was released on the basis that she would be replaced by Canterbury.
The naval component of Interfet had three major roles: presence, sea lift and guarding the sea lines of communications for the force. The deployment of a significant force of capable warships, combined with the operation of maritime patrol aircraft and strike aircraft, made it perfectly clear that the international coalition would brook no interference in the deployment of Interfet ground forces. The presence of warships off the East Timor coast was also a powerful deterrent, which helped the Interfet land forces to establish themselves and operate effectively. The support of naval replenishment ships was also vital, and the international force could not have been committed to East Timor without it. Naval ships, for example, provided Interfet with all its diesel and aviation fuel for the first three months of the deployment. Interfet warships escorted both naval replenishment ships and chartered merchant ships carrying supplies to East Timor; without the protection provided by the warships it is highly likely that many of the chartered merchant ships would not have agreed to sail to East Timor. Naval ships are also able to assist with reconstruction work, and they played an important role in this regard in East Timor. The RNZN made a substantial contribution in all these roles.
Endeavour (pp 74-75)
After taking on board urgently needed diesel in Cairns, Endeavour returned to Dili, via Darwin, at the beginning of October. In Darwin she embarked additional fuel, supplies of fresh and frozen foods, stores and a substantial amount of mail for Interfet personnel. There was a very serious shortage of fuel supplies in northern Australia, a problem compounded by what appeared to have been less than adequate planning, and this meant that in the early stages of the operation Endeavour's ability to carry substantial quantities of fuel was not fully utilised.
The fuel problem was part of a wider logistics problem facing the Interfet force at this time. The size of the effort required to keep Interfet supplied is indicated by the fact that on average the force consumed 30,000 litres a day of both diesel and aviation fuel. After passing fuel and stores to Success and other Interfet warships in the Dili area, Endeavour sailed for Singapore to pick up more fuel on 6 October. She returned to Dili ten days later, offloaded most of her fuel supplies, then sailed for Darwin, escorted by the French frigate Vendemaire. In Darwin, at her captain's instigation, she topped up the tanks of the Canadian replenishment ship HMCS Protecteur, which was due to take Success's place in Dili, before sailing for home on 20 October.
Between 16 September and 20 October Endeavour had travelled more than 13,000 nautical miles in direct support of the operation in East Timor, and spent only four days not underway. She had made a vital contribution to the success of the initial stages of the Interfet operation. Endeavour and HMAS Success were the only tankers available to Interfet until mid-October, and they were so vital to the operation that Interfet regarded them as two of the most likely targets for any attack. Endeavour reached Auckland at the end of October after a five-month deployment. Morale on board had been very good, since the whole crew was aware that the ship had a key part to play in Interfet. As her captain, Commander John Campbell, noted, when you are busy refuelling ships and transferring supplies by helicopter, 'the whole ship is just buzzing ...it is just an incredible feeling'.
Canterbury's Service (pp 101-106, note: edited to reduce space)
On 13 September 1999, HMNZS Canterbury was engaged in a training deployment off the eastern Australian coast when she was recalled to Auckland to prepare for her deployment to East Timor. She had a very fast passage across the Tasman, reaching Auckland on the evening of the 15th. There she embarked additional ammunition, a Seasprite helicopter, and other equipment and supplies required for her deployment. Her crew were given the additional vaccinations they needed for service in the East Timor area, and the frigate sailed on the evening of 17 September.
Because Canterbury was being operated with a smaller crew than the Leander-class frigates were originally designed for, some innovative arrangements were made to ensure that an appropriate number of the crew were always on duty. In addition, because she was operating as a training ship, Canterbury had a young and somewhat inexperienced crew. Despite this the frigate's commanding officer, Commander Warren Cummins, was confident that with the right training they would perform well. To assist with the work required to get the crew's training up to a high standard in areas such as damage control and boarding operations, a training team was embarked in Auckland. An intense and successful programme of training was undertaken during Canterbury's passage to Cairns, where the training team disembarked. After a brief stay in Cairns Canterbury sailed for Darwin, arriving on 25 September. On this leg of the journey she rendezvoused with Endeavour and received additional supplies and equipment from the tanker.
Canterbury's first task as part of the international force was to escort Tobruk from Darwin to Dili. They sailed on the evening of 27 September, and as they approached the easternmost tip of Timor and the entrance to the Wetar Strait the Allied warships were approached by several Indonesian warships. In order to protect Tobruk, which was carrying supplies and troops, the New Zealand frigate positioned itself between the Australian and Indonesian ships. The Indonesians seemed keen to identity and track the movements of Interfet ships, but none of their vessels came within 2000 metres of Canterbury. Tobruk sailed into Dili on 29 September, and the following day
Canterbury escorted her out of Dili and until she was clear of Timor.
During her service with Interfet, which ended in early December, Canterbury followed a routine of patrols off East Timor interspersed with brief visits to Darwin. For a substantial period she acted as the Dili guard ship. This involved protecting the area of sea and airspace off Dili harbour, and in the early stages of the operation acting as the air control ship for aircraft landing at Komoro Airport. During the initial period of operations around Timor, Canterbury had a total of ten incidents in which she detected unidentified aircraft. Some were definitely Indonesian aircraft, but others proved impossible to identify. In the early hours of 8 October, for example, 'two low flying and fast moving aircraft approached the ship from the coast of Timor without identification. Once again weapons crews stood to, however, without the assistance of daylight it proved impossible to identify the contacts' which increased their speed and flew off towards West Timor while still outside weapon range. Near the end of her deployment to East Timor, on 6 December, Canterbury and HMAS Sydney were off the Oecussi enclave when the New Zealand frigate 'detected an unidentified submarine contact'. This contact, which was maintained for a period of more than 30 minutes, 'appeared as a solid contact, neither a mammal nor biologic'. Contact with the suspected submarine was lost after Canterbury attempted to communicate with it. It is unclear whether or not this was a submarine, but the incident certainly reinforced Interfet's awareness of the need to be on guard.
Early in October Canterbury escorted the two Australian heavy landing craft carrying equipment and supplies for Victor Company and other Interfet elements being deployed to Suai. Canterbury escorted the landing craft part of the way to Suai, before handing over the duty to an Australian warship. In mid-October she escorted Tobruk, which was carrying supplies and equipment for the deployment of 1 RNZIR, all the way to Suai. The New Zealand frigate then spent several days as the Suai guard ship, covering the landing of equipment and supplies by Interfet ships. Commander Cummins had specifically asked that his ship be given this task because he felt it was important that the RNZN be directly involved in this significant New Zealand operation.
Canterbury's Seasprite helicopter proved extremely useful throughout her deployment, even though it was an interim model without any weapons (the RNZN was operating SH-2F model Seasprites until the more advanced SH-2G model entered service). During the initial stages of the frigate's operations around East Timor the Seasprite was used for surface surveillance, monitoring the movement of Indonesian ships and the state of isolated areas of East Timor. It was also frequently employed moving personnel and stores between ships or to and from the shore. Later the helicopter played a useful role in spotting small boats carrying East Timorese who had fled to West Timor or to other islands during the post-referendum violence. Canterbury encountered a number of such boats. In early November, for instance, she intercepted a small Dili-registered ferry carrying nineteen internally displaced persons (IDPs), which had broken down between Atambua Island and the mainland. Personnel from the frigate were able to repair the ferry's engine and alert the Interfet authorities to prepare reception arrangements for the boat once it reached shore. Often these people had practically no possessions with them; they had simply been 'bundled onto a ferry and sent back to Dili'.
For an elderly ship, Canterbury suffered few serious maintenance problems during her deployment, although problems with her air-conditioning system certainly made life more uncomfortable in the hot and humid conditions around Timor. The RNZAF detachment on board did a very good job of maintaining the Seasprite helicopter, and when a major service was required it was undertaken in Darwin with the assistance of a team sent from Whenuapai. This ensured that Canterbury was without its helicopter for as short a time as possible.
During early December Canterbury patrolled the coast between Suai and the border with West Timor, her close proximity 'providing presence and poise for the shore forces'. She then operated off the Oecussi enclave. This area of East Timor had been even more thoroughly devastated than Dili, and shore parties from Canterbury worked with personnel from Sydney on projects such as constructing temporary roofs for ruined buildings.
Canterbury completed her service with Interfet on 10 December 1999, at which time she was the longest-serving warship with the force. During a visit to the ship, the Maritime Commander Australia, Rear Admiral John Lord, made it clear how appreciative Australia was of Canterbury's work and of the rapid and substantial New Zealand contribution to Interfet. Canterbury finally returned to Auckland on 23 December.
Things have been a bit quiet on this topic. Let’s get some more discussion going! Whilst we could argue infinitum about how many fighting ships the RNZN should have but perhaps the correct answer should be whatever numbers of ships we have, their capabilities should be as up to date as our RAN equivalents for the reason that the two navies generally operate together around the region. Also as important are the auxiliary support ships. Whilst an invasion of NZ is unlikely now and into the foreseeable future, perhaps we ought to be considering the most likely situations in which the RNZN would deploy.
The last time the RNZN was deployed on a warlike footing was the East Timor intervention of 1999 (and then Op-EF undertaking interception and boarding missions in 2002/03). Apologies to those who already have the fascinating book Operation East Timor - The NZDF in East Timor 1999-2001 by John Crawford and Glyn Harper (ISBN 0 7900 0823 8) but seeing as the book was a limited run and is out of print now (I did check first), I’ll reproduce some of the sections on the RNZN naval operations as it brings up some of the issues that people in these forums here have commented about in the past (eg possible Indonesian submarine contact). It would be a shame for the writing in this book to disappear into the bowels of history without a wider appreciation of the role of the RNZN that most of us and the general public especially may not be aware of. Some important points IMO are:
* That the less glamorous tankers are also crucial assets - but do both the RNZN and RAN have enough? The RNZN’s sole tanker can be deployed for months accompanying one of the ANZAC’s throughout Asia, Pacific & the Indian Ocean etc. These vessels don’t cost a lot comparatively speaking, should the RNZN have two such vessels to handle 2 deployments simultaneously in the event of an emergency or if one ship is in dry dock? Should the RAN have more than 2 vessels to support their much larger fleet?
* That the RNZN escorting duties (of merchant and re-supply ships) and the need to provide an armed presence are just as crucial after “hostilities” end. In a future scenario one could conclude that once the RNZN ANZAC frigates are redeployed after the initial hostilities, perhaps the RNZN OPV’s could be deployed for escort duties (and justify people in this forum suggesting that at least the main canon be upgraded, add a suitable search radar and fire control system, and some sort of CIWS defensive system etc). Ditto fitting CIWS on the MRV or Tanker etc.
* That the ASW capabilities’ of the Frigate’s (sensors and weapons) are extremely important despite the last Govt sponsored Maritime Patrol Review of 2001 which dismissed the submarine threat to NZ (i.e. ignored the reality that the NZDF operates away from home waters and into sub infested areas around the A-P region).
* That the RNZN Seasprites’ don’t have dedicated ASW sensors (eg dipping sonars) are a serious capability gap (could the Seasprite handle these enhancements or would bigger helicopters be required eg MRH90 etc)?
* That the Frigates’s (often the object of criticism from NZ peace groups and some of the smaller left of centre political parties) played a crucial role in the beginning of the operation.
* Agree/disagree? Anything else etc?
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
The NZDF units prepare in Australia (pp 56-57)
The crisis in East Timor occurred at a time when the RNZN had only two frigates operational, HMNZS Te Kaha, the first of New Zealand's Anzac frigates, and HMNZS Canterbury, the elderly Leander-class frigate which was being used primarily as a training vessel. At the beginning of September Te Kaha and the replenishment tanker HMNZS Endeavour were off Malaysia, taking part in Exercise Stardex under the auspices of the Five Power Defence Arrangements. In the early hours of the morning of 8 September Te Kaha was withdrawn from the exercise and directed to sail as quickly as possible to the Darwin area. After refuelling from Endeavour, Te Kaha switched from her economical diesel engines to her gas turbine. During the passage to the Timor Sea she ran on her gas turbine for 67 hours and averaged 25 knots (25 nautical miles per hour). The crew used this time to practise damage control and other skills, and on 10 September went to Defence Watches, under which the ship is in a heightened state of readiness and is quickly able to go to Action Stations. As the frigate sailed through the Wetar Strait, north of Timor, in the early hours of 11 September her crew could see the fires raging in Dili, 40 kilometres away. South of Timor Te Kaha rendezvoused with the underway replenishment tanker HMAS Success, from which she received much needed supplies of fuel and food, including a large batch of freshly baked Anzac biscuits. After briefly patrolling with HMAS Darwin off East Timor's south coast, Te Kaha sailed for Darwin.
In response to an urgent Australian request, Endeavour returned to Singapore at the completion of Exercise Stardex. Here she quickly embarked aviation fuel required by ADF units on standby for operations in East Timor, as well as equipment left by Te Kaha and the Australian warships that had been pulled out of the exercise early. She sailed on 13 September, rendezvousing with Australian and other warships on patrol south of East Timor five days later. After transferring fuel and stores to Te Kaha and Success, Endeavour took up a position 50 miles off the eastern tip of Timor. Endeavour was a particularly valuable addition to the international force being assembled to intervene in East Timor, since the Royal Australian Navy had only one tanker, Success, operational at this time (HMAS Westralia was out of action because of an engine-room fire in 1998).
Naval operations (pp 61-63)
Interfet's naval operations had begun well before 20 September. While Te Kaha was berthed in Darwin from 13 to 18 September, her commanding officer, Commander Ross Smith, was briefed on the situation in East Timor and on plans for the operation. The final steps were also taken to prepare the ship for action with, for instance, Te Kaha's torpedoes being moved from the magazine to the ship's torpedo tubes. On the evening of 18 September she sailed in company with the British destroyer HMS Glasgow. In concert with the frigates HMAS Adelaide and HMAS ANZAC, the powerful cruiser USS Mobile Bay and other warships, they escorted Success, the heavy lift ship Tobruk, the high-speed catamaran Jervis Bay and three Australian heavy landing craft towards East Timor. The following day Te Kaha received urgently needed fuel and spare parts from Endeavour. During 20 and 21 September Te Kaha undertook surveillance operations south of Timor and acted as the aircraft control unit, working closely with the RAAF Orion maritime patrol aircraft operating in the area. At one stage Te Kaha's Seasprite helicopter tracked an Indonesian submarine sailing on the surface along Timor's south coast.
During this period the Indonesian naval and air forces generally adopted an aloof stance, although on occasion they acted in a more threatening manner. Indonesian warships, for example, engaged in games of 'maritime chicken' with Interfet ships. And on one occasion, while Te Kaha was conducting surveillance operations off the south coast of Timor, two Indonesian Hawk fighter aircraft flew at high speed towards the Australian Orion she was working with. Te Kaha alerted the Orion, which turned away from the Indonesian aircraft. The inclusion of highly capable warships in the international coalition, in particular the Mobile Bay, with its outstanding long-range weapons, sensors, battle management and command capacity, provided confidence to all those involved in the operation during the tense initial period. The presence of RAAF fighters overhead also did much to inspire confidence among the first wave of Interfet forces.
During the night of 21/22 September Te Kaha closely escorted Endeavour through the Wetar Strait. Endeavour then entered Dili harbour and berthed alongside Success before transferring aviation fuel and diesel to her. Interfet was short of diesel, and Endeavour was therefore directed to sail to Cairns to pick up more supplies. Te Kaha, which had been on patrol off Dili, escorted Endeavour to the edge of the 100-mile zone around the port; within this zone all naval auxiliaries and chartered merchant ships carrying supplies and equipment for Interfet had to be escorted by warships.
Te Kaha spent the next two days escorting merchant ships into Dili. Her involvement in the Interfet operation ended on 24 September, when she began her passage to Singapore en route to join the Multinational Interception Force (MIF) in the Persian Gulf. The commitment to the MIF was a longstanding one of high priority. By this time the ADF felt that it had enough warships for the operation in East Timor, and Te Kaha was released on the basis that she would be replaced by Canterbury.
The naval component of Interfet had three major roles: presence, sea lift and guarding the sea lines of communications for the force. The deployment of a significant force of capable warships, combined with the operation of maritime patrol aircraft and strike aircraft, made it perfectly clear that the international coalition would brook no interference in the deployment of Interfet ground forces. The presence of warships off the East Timor coast was also a powerful deterrent, which helped the Interfet land forces to establish themselves and operate effectively. The support of naval replenishment ships was also vital, and the international force could not have been committed to East Timor without it. Naval ships, for example, provided Interfet with all its diesel and aviation fuel for the first three months of the deployment. Interfet warships escorted both naval replenishment ships and chartered merchant ships carrying supplies to East Timor; without the protection provided by the warships it is highly likely that many of the chartered merchant ships would not have agreed to sail to East Timor. Naval ships are also able to assist with reconstruction work, and they played an important role in this regard in East Timor. The RNZN made a substantial contribution in all these roles.
Endeavour (pp 74-75)
After taking on board urgently needed diesel in Cairns, Endeavour returned to Dili, via Darwin, at the beginning of October. In Darwin she embarked additional fuel, supplies of fresh and frozen foods, stores and a substantial amount of mail for Interfet personnel. There was a very serious shortage of fuel supplies in northern Australia, a problem compounded by what appeared to have been less than adequate planning, and this meant that in the early stages of the operation Endeavour's ability to carry substantial quantities of fuel was not fully utilised.
The fuel problem was part of a wider logistics problem facing the Interfet force at this time. The size of the effort required to keep Interfet supplied is indicated by the fact that on average the force consumed 30,000 litres a day of both diesel and aviation fuel. After passing fuel and stores to Success and other Interfet warships in the Dili area, Endeavour sailed for Singapore to pick up more fuel on 6 October. She returned to Dili ten days later, offloaded most of her fuel supplies, then sailed for Darwin, escorted by the French frigate Vendemaire. In Darwin, at her captain's instigation, she topped up the tanks of the Canadian replenishment ship HMCS Protecteur, which was due to take Success's place in Dili, before sailing for home on 20 October.
Between 16 September and 20 October Endeavour had travelled more than 13,000 nautical miles in direct support of the operation in East Timor, and spent only four days not underway. She had made a vital contribution to the success of the initial stages of the Interfet operation. Endeavour and HMAS Success were the only tankers available to Interfet until mid-October, and they were so vital to the operation that Interfet regarded them as two of the most likely targets for any attack. Endeavour reached Auckland at the end of October after a five-month deployment. Morale on board had been very good, since the whole crew was aware that the ship had a key part to play in Interfet. As her captain, Commander John Campbell, noted, when you are busy refuelling ships and transferring supplies by helicopter, 'the whole ship is just buzzing ...it is just an incredible feeling'.
Canterbury's Service (pp 101-106, note: edited to reduce space)
On 13 September 1999, HMNZS Canterbury was engaged in a training deployment off the eastern Australian coast when she was recalled to Auckland to prepare for her deployment to East Timor. She had a very fast passage across the Tasman, reaching Auckland on the evening of the 15th. There she embarked additional ammunition, a Seasprite helicopter, and other equipment and supplies required for her deployment. Her crew were given the additional vaccinations they needed for service in the East Timor area, and the frigate sailed on the evening of 17 September.
Because Canterbury was being operated with a smaller crew than the Leander-class frigates were originally designed for, some innovative arrangements were made to ensure that an appropriate number of the crew were always on duty. In addition, because she was operating as a training ship, Canterbury had a young and somewhat inexperienced crew. Despite this the frigate's commanding officer, Commander Warren Cummins, was confident that with the right training they would perform well. To assist with the work required to get the crew's training up to a high standard in areas such as damage control and boarding operations, a training team was embarked in Auckland. An intense and successful programme of training was undertaken during Canterbury's passage to Cairns, where the training team disembarked. After a brief stay in Cairns Canterbury sailed for Darwin, arriving on 25 September. On this leg of the journey she rendezvoused with Endeavour and received additional supplies and equipment from the tanker.
Canterbury's first task as part of the international force was to escort Tobruk from Darwin to Dili. They sailed on the evening of 27 September, and as they approached the easternmost tip of Timor and the entrance to the Wetar Strait the Allied warships were approached by several Indonesian warships. In order to protect Tobruk, which was carrying supplies and troops, the New Zealand frigate positioned itself between the Australian and Indonesian ships. The Indonesians seemed keen to identity and track the movements of Interfet ships, but none of their vessels came within 2000 metres of Canterbury. Tobruk sailed into Dili on 29 September, and the following day
Canterbury escorted her out of Dili and until she was clear of Timor.
During her service with Interfet, which ended in early December, Canterbury followed a routine of patrols off East Timor interspersed with brief visits to Darwin. For a substantial period she acted as the Dili guard ship. This involved protecting the area of sea and airspace off Dili harbour, and in the early stages of the operation acting as the air control ship for aircraft landing at Komoro Airport. During the initial period of operations around Timor, Canterbury had a total of ten incidents in which she detected unidentified aircraft. Some were definitely Indonesian aircraft, but others proved impossible to identify. In the early hours of 8 October, for example, 'two low flying and fast moving aircraft approached the ship from the coast of Timor without identification. Once again weapons crews stood to, however, without the assistance of daylight it proved impossible to identify the contacts' which increased their speed and flew off towards West Timor while still outside weapon range. Near the end of her deployment to East Timor, on 6 December, Canterbury and HMAS Sydney were off the Oecussi enclave when the New Zealand frigate 'detected an unidentified submarine contact'. This contact, which was maintained for a period of more than 30 minutes, 'appeared as a solid contact, neither a mammal nor biologic'. Contact with the suspected submarine was lost after Canterbury attempted to communicate with it. It is unclear whether or not this was a submarine, but the incident certainly reinforced Interfet's awareness of the need to be on guard.
Early in October Canterbury escorted the two Australian heavy landing craft carrying equipment and supplies for Victor Company and other Interfet elements being deployed to Suai. Canterbury escorted the landing craft part of the way to Suai, before handing over the duty to an Australian warship. In mid-October she escorted Tobruk, which was carrying supplies and equipment for the deployment of 1 RNZIR, all the way to Suai. The New Zealand frigate then spent several days as the Suai guard ship, covering the landing of equipment and supplies by Interfet ships. Commander Cummins had specifically asked that his ship be given this task because he felt it was important that the RNZN be directly involved in this significant New Zealand operation.
Canterbury's Seasprite helicopter proved extremely useful throughout her deployment, even though it was an interim model without any weapons (the RNZN was operating SH-2F model Seasprites until the more advanced SH-2G model entered service). During the initial stages of the frigate's operations around East Timor the Seasprite was used for surface surveillance, monitoring the movement of Indonesian ships and the state of isolated areas of East Timor. It was also frequently employed moving personnel and stores between ships or to and from the shore. Later the helicopter played a useful role in spotting small boats carrying East Timorese who had fled to West Timor or to other islands during the post-referendum violence. Canterbury encountered a number of such boats. In early November, for instance, she intercepted a small Dili-registered ferry carrying nineteen internally displaced persons (IDPs), which had broken down between Atambua Island and the mainland. Personnel from the frigate were able to repair the ferry's engine and alert the Interfet authorities to prepare reception arrangements for the boat once it reached shore. Often these people had practically no possessions with them; they had simply been 'bundled onto a ferry and sent back to Dili'.
For an elderly ship, Canterbury suffered few serious maintenance problems during her deployment, although problems with her air-conditioning system certainly made life more uncomfortable in the hot and humid conditions around Timor. The RNZAF detachment on board did a very good job of maintaining the Seasprite helicopter, and when a major service was required it was undertaken in Darwin with the assistance of a team sent from Whenuapai. This ensured that Canterbury was without its helicopter for as short a time as possible.
During early December Canterbury patrolled the coast between Suai and the border with West Timor, her close proximity 'providing presence and poise for the shore forces'. She then operated off the Oecussi enclave. This area of East Timor had been even more thoroughly devastated than Dili, and shore parties from Canterbury worked with personnel from Sydney on projects such as constructing temporary roofs for ruined buildings.
Canterbury completed her service with Interfet on 10 December 1999, at which time she was the longest-serving warship with the force. During a visit to the ship, the Maritime Commander Australia, Rear Admiral John Lord, made it clear how appreciative Australia was of Canterbury's work and of the rapid and substantial New Zealand contribution to Interfet. Canterbury finally returned to Auckland on 23 December.
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Andy in West Oz
New Member
Very informative post, thanks! Hard to believe this all happened almost eight years ago. Doesn't seem that long.
Found the references to submarines interesting.
Found the references to submarines interesting.
Stuart Mackey
New Member
Indeed. I think the ET deployments underscore the everpresent need for an adequete logistics chain and vessels that are properly equipped, regardless of over overall numbers.
If you were to ask members of the public what they remember about East Timor, I think you'd find that the navy would not rate in terms of the forces been deployed.
The whole operation was good for the reputation of the NZDF, but the navy performed its duties away from the spotlight. Unless the navy promotes itself more (i.e media on ships) then it will struggle long term to get the equipment needed.
I agree with Stuart also about the need for an accurate logistics chain and ships fitted for the role intended.
The whole operation was good for the reputation of the NZDF, but the navy performed its duties away from the spotlight. Unless the navy promotes itself more (i.e media on ships) then it will struggle long term to get the equipment needed.
I agree with Stuart also about the need for an accurate logistics chain and ships fitted for the role intended.
I totally agree.
As an example, it always amazes me that the biggest city in the country looks straight across the harbour at the navy base, yet generally knows very little about it (if anything at all).
Despite having an outstanding PR Officer and magazine, navy PR as a whole seems (to me) to be more 'reactive' than 'proactive.' Even though I'm in the RNZN, I haven't seen any proactive profile-raising PR. For example, the "Snotties" doco last year, and this year's arrival of Canterbury , have been prime media grabbing occasions (and recruitmnent goldmines) that IMO somehow don't seem to have been fully exploited. Secondly, there's also a lot of good material around the base and the intranet (good photos of ships/deployments like TeK in Antarctica, news, etc) that have never made it into the public eye. Thirdly, the navy base must be one of the biggest employers in the Auckland region, but how many navy uniforms do you see around town? None. Thus, profile = none.
My $0.02 anyway.
Speaking of uniforms the RNZN really needs to update the JR's uniform. For starters lose the bell bottoms. I know they know sew the collar into the JR's jacket, but why even have a collar. As an old Warrant Officer said to us once "Nelson's dead, the navy should get over him".
On another note stuff is reporting that its taken 5 years to repair a Seasprite and that finding spares are a problem. See the full article here...
http://www.stuff.co.nz/4195177a10.html
This doesn't say much for Kaman's ability to deliver on its promises.
Perhaps Australia should sell its Seasprites to NZ for spare parts!
Seems like a win/win situation to me. The RAN would be well rid of them and could buy something else and NZ would be able to keep its Seasprites operational. Tas
recce.k1
Well-Known Member
Would be interesting to hear the RAN perspective, e.g. more ships deployed, more encounters etc. Would also be interesting to hear the Indonesian perspective too (wondering how this would all play out).
Yes, and dare I say it but the other regional potential hotspot is West Papua. UN/NZ/Aus etc are very relucant to get drawn into this. Maybe we never ever will. But what if the time comes when the BBC or CNN sneak in, report on events and we do get drawn in as the political winds shift? Geographically speaking, it's a much greater area to protect & patrol than ET ever was as we all know. Hope the govt is thinking about potential scenarios. Bit worried about the increasing sub threat in that area. No reason why one couldn't take out the supply ships when in transit and unescorted. Unless we had more hulls available eg OPV's with helos, both fitted with better detection and weapon systems etc, to provide support away from the ANZAC's who will be in the hotzones.
(Alternatively, dare I suggest it, what if PNG broke down and Indonesia decided to move in order to quell any instability? Hopefully this possibilty is ridiculous and the Aussies out there will put this straight. Diplomatically I take it alot of things happen behind the scenes to prevent such "misunderstandings". Not unless perhaps a PNG govt that is more hostile to Aus gets in and invites the other side over)?
Yes, I suppose the Navy don't want the media on board when on operations? Not in a confined area anyway I suppose. Perhaps the Navy needs to take one producer or director on board (i.e. not a film crew, in your face etc) in such times and they can write up a script to make up one of those reinactment type docos after the fact. At least that way it would make more interesting public viewing as all the incidents could be compressed into one or two programmes etc.
By chance I happened to be watching Country Calendar in 2000? and they showed the TeK in the Antarctic. I was blown away, it was so interesting but who would have known to be watching a rural farming type programme to see the Navy on a southern ocean fishing patrol? Despite all the stories you hear about international poachers operating down there.
Shame about the lack of uniforms worn, where I am in balmy palmy the Army are quite happy to walk around in camo and the Air Force, either their two tone blue (with jersey, not formal jacket, or else a black or dark blue bomber jacket, quite stylee) or camos again. Mind you as Lucasnz says, who the heck would want to wear the JR uniform in public? I suppose wearing the grey baggy overalls isn't allowed and probably not appropriate. They say one needs to take pride in your uniform but this takes the cake. Quite liked the khaki the USN wear (and what the Air Force used to wear as their summer dress) but the Navy needs to update. How about something dark grey and with a black jacket or jersey? People might think the Navy are the All Blacks! (Otherwise some teens today wear that urban grey/blue/black/white camo designer wear. Maybe the Navy might look appealing to them if the Navy wore a two toned grey/black camo outfit both on and off ship, similar to the current NZDF desert fatigues design)? I'm no expert but NZ has alot of talented designers, maybe the Navy needs to get some in? Got to get rid of that ratings/officer uniform distinction i.e. the informal garb needs be something good enough for all ranks to wear.
I thought the NZDF needed to always have 3 Seasprites fully operational? Must be a credit again to the support crews if they are with one less complete helo around.
Kaman - makes you wonder doesn't it? But it's interesting they have been advertising their SH2's in the NZ Pacific Wings mag over the last year or two. The way the ad was written it suggests they were interested in submitting a troop carrying version of the SH2 at the time NZ was looking at its MUH replacement options (the NH90 got the go-ahead in July 2006), Kaman's wording was subtle but along the lines of proven technology and compatibility etc. Unless there is more to this eg NZ didn't think it needed some spares but realised it did later once the production run stopped etc.This doesn't say much for Kaman's ability to deliver on its promises.
Perhaps Australia should sell its Seasprites to NZ for spare parts!
Often wondered whether NZ should buy the RAN Seasprites if Brendan Nelson managed to ditch the project. On the plus side would be commonality of type for support and also an opportunity to increase numbers. On the down side would be the incompatible flight deck and NZ wearing the cost to complete the updates. I somehow doubt this will happen though. Good to see at least Mr Mapp acknowledging the problem (and the orphan issue). Trickey one this one, NZ may be hesitant to buy a 6th airframe of the NZ avionics fitout type because of the uncertain future. Although at least publically, NZ is happy with its Seasprites. But what to do if the RAN replace their Seasprites within a few years once they rationalise helo types?
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Nighthawknz
New Member
Whats the update of the Inshore Patrols Vessels... ?
They're the same style as the army DPMs and, as I understand, the fabric has the same fire retardant treatment as the GPSCs.They didn't last long. Oh well back to the future.
Are they based on RN issue or the old issue that melted in the heat of a fire.
Still getting used to them!
Investigator
New Member
Comments deleted.
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There are currently two active threads dealing with general discussion of the NZDF. Unless you are just wondering if "extra several hundrends of millions of dollars" spent on the RNZN would be worthwhile, such a general question would be more appropriate in either this thread or that thread.
-Preceptor
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
Out of curiousity, do you consider there to be anything short of an invasion that would constitute a potential threat the NZDF might be called upon to meet? Or perhaps this would be best continued in one of the general NZDF threads instead.
And just wanted to make sure, you think NZ would have been better served if it had gotten 3 frigates instead of just two, correct?
-Cheers