The history of Navy is irrelevent. 100 years ago the only weapons was a cannon. Now they use helicopters and missiles, realistically we can only use the last 20 years when it comes to creating future doctrine.
Both the Falklands and Gulf Wars demonstrated that numbers of hulls are important. If the RN had had all of their assets packed into only a handful of 20,000 ton ships they would not have been able to carry out the multitude of duties required of the surface fleet during the Falklands campaign. Also the loss of any one ship would have been catastrophic. As it was the British had to commit 54 merchant ships and 21 fleet auxilaries to support the 51 warships involved. Those support ships needed escorts and many of the warships were tied up with this role. Other warships were needed to fullfill British naval commitments elsewhere. A coastguard type would not have been able to provide this and no small patrol boat would have been able to operate in the South Atlantic. Numbers of warships were important.
The world's leading navies all seem to consider that defence in depth is important. Why do you think that the USN provides such a strong screen for its carriers rather than putting AEGIS and long range missile systems on their carriers and sailing them with no escort? Helos by themselves can't provide the ASW screen needed by a carrier or an amphibious ship. Destroyers, frigates and submarines are still needed.
If you only need a 1000 ton ship then you dont need helicopters, ship to ship missiles, AEGIS, F-35B's or amphib landing capabilities. You can send the coast guard or a patrol boat instead.
There are clearly some tasks that can be handled better by a corvette, a frigate or a destroyer than by a patrol boat, but which do not require a 20,000 ton ship! A small number of large ships can just not be in all the places required during a major conflict at sea.
You dont really need need 1000 ton ships. You are either at war or at peace. If your at war you'd need the 20,000 tone ship, helo's and F-35B's to kill the enemy. If you are at peace you need nothing other than basic patrol boats.
It would be an incredible waste of resources to send 20,000 ton ships to do the task currently being performed adequately by frigates and destroyers on station in the Gulf. Having a larger ship to support a number of frigates and/or destroyers, on the other hand, is highly desirable.
This is why a Navy should consist of a high-low mix. Or a High mix only with the low being provided by a coast guard like company.
During war time you are usually only at war in the one area so having fewer high end ships wont be a problem as long as all of them are in the battle zone.
I agree that a navy needs a high/low mix. Your assumption that a navy only needs to plan for involvement in one war zone at a time is a dangerous gamble IMHO.
Remeber its the crew that costs money. You can have all the equipment on the ship it doesn't mean the crew have to man all the fancy features.
I consider it a waste to spend billions on something like AEGIS and then not to man it because your 20,000 ton ship has to operate in an area not requiring it when a smaller ship could do the job.
Shallow draft and port access was not a problem in the Guld War or the Falkens. Large 20,000+ ton ships didn't have any problems.
There were certainly situations in the Second Gulf War where large ships could not have performed the tasks carried out by destroyers and frigates. ‘Five Inch Friday’ for example.
In the Falklands War the carriers were kept as far away from Argentinean airbases as possible. Destroyers and frigates had to expose themselves to danger in providing close support to the landing ships whilst the carriers stood well out to sea to conduct air operations. A few large ships having to combine the roles of carrier, amphibious ship, air defence ship and ASW vessel, would not have been able to carry out all the roles needed. Numbers were important. In the Fitzroy landing the RN was unwilling to expose the valuable assault ships
Fearless and
Intrepid to the risk of operating in the exposed area because the loss of a large sophisticated ship would have had catastrophic consequences to the operation, both politically and operationally. Consequently they sent in, with inadequate escort, the cheaper, more expendable and inadequately armed LSLs, two of which were severely damaged and one of which was sunk. If there had only been a few expensive, sophisticated ships available the landing could not have been attempted. This was a demonstration that there are times when numbers of 'expendable' ships are required. The inability to provide adequate protection for the LSLs resulted from 'penny pinching' in the failure to properly arm them and the lack of escorts and aircraft to support them. More ships were needed, not fewer.
Throughout your post you have made sweeping claims that are contrary to practically everything I have read about operations in The Falklands and Gulf Wars. You have made a series of assertations that fly in the face of what naval planners throughout the world believe. This would be fair enough if you supplied evidence to back up your claims. If you are going to make such comments I believe that you have an obligation to provide such evidence to back up what you say.
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