Moderated taiwan invasion war game

[corsair7772]

Again were going in circles, Gollevainen. I say to tphuang china doesnt have the PGMs yet and you say that to me and now should tphuang say that to you? No one here seems to get that all of us seem to be agreeing on the basic happenings of the wargame.

Also i havent the foggiest idea what made you think i said each missile launched destroys a tank. Could you quote the place in my post which says so?

Secondly, NO ONE here stated that china was capable of completing landings on Taiwan.

On the last point regarding the ballistic missiles I doubt their quality and their effectiveness but will not brush them away lightly because of chinas ability to mass them.

On the final note, please dont make assumptions from other peoples posts.

If this thing keeps on going like this, we can all recall the US factor and that pretty much resolves your victor for quite some time.

 

[Gollevainen]

Now corsair you've got me all wrong. I was talking in general and was in the last thread awnsering more to Tphuang than to you. Perhaps I should have quote tags to mark it more clearly but I tought there would be no need to those...

 

[tphuang]

I wasen't refering anyone's post, only to my past encourtements of this same issues in other forums and threads.

But Tphuang somewhat marketed my point by summarizing the counter-arguments. Yet they are made in the very same belive that I mentioned in my earlier posts and thus have very thin ground beneath.

Yeas China has fielded PMGs and its even testing its first generation of LACM. But thats the point, its just started to introduce them to its arsenal. Its ridicilous to say that china is different than it was in 2005 when actually its capacity in overall temrs is just begun to improve from the level that it was in 1995. Two years may be enough to reveal new systems to daylight and print the hihgly appraising salesprochyres but it's hardly makes the system incorporated to the branch using it or even worse incorporating the entire branch to the military. Introducing new military equipment can take years, even a decade to be fully able to use its potential and that is required to be able to use the weapon as the nice salesspeaches says.

War in real life isen't simple as you might think. Its not done by counting your PGM's and then counting the opponents tanks and then press the button and you destroy X ammount of those tanks...

I think my arguments have rarely been used actually. My point has never been that China will win the engagement or that pla has achieved necessary competence over their new equipments. It's rather to bring some new variables into the equation and show that the Chinese attack is not restricted to ballistic missiles as many people would believe. The fact that China is now openly revealing these new products show you that they are confident about the surface attack missiles and PGMs to a degree. I think land attack weapons that could be used against airbases, ship bases and communicaiton stations like KD-88, DH-10, YJ-91 and LS-500 must have reached a certain level of competence to be revealed on the news. I mean China is not the Russians, they don't need to advertise their new system, since the good ones get enough domestic order.

As for the launching platform, JH-7A has been introduced for a while now and will probably show to the world how good they are in Peace Mission 2007.

 

[Gollevainen]

Well I wasen't refering you Tphuang in my orginal post either, but mainly those vast numbers of fanboys that sadly populates these common military forums.

But your point is reasonable, yeas China or any other player that would try such a large scale manuvre would use all neccerical means to strike against the defenders military instalations.

My argument was that unlike others (and to be spesific, neither of you ) who belive that simply the fact that china posses PMGs or Cruise Missiles means the complete anhilation of all ROC military forces, the chinese development in these areas is still so new and fresh that it cannot by all the laws of practical life master their full potential which is neccerical if you wish to use any weaponsystem in its advertized performance.

But to strike on military bases and other instalations is not going to win the war even if your succes-rate would be phenomenal. But even the most experienced players in the modern type of multi-layer warfare have found it difficoult or even impossiple to whipe out/make ineffective the main land force units which is cruisal if you wish to invade anything. Some cases other variables made the land war almoust turkeyshot to the attacker, but in other cases the inability to affect the defenders landforces fighting power prevented the whole land scenario completely.
As Iv'e stated that the real level and capacity of Chinese ability to fight modern type of warfare in the attackers role is still beyond long road (They will get there however) Taiwan just cannot be taken by force if they decide to defend themselves.

 

[Falstaff]

Your statements are a true enrichment to this thread, Gollevainen (not that I'd have expected otherwise).

They especially put the ballistic missile thing into perspective. I never thought about it this way.

 

[crobato]

If your confident about the PLAAFs ability to mass large numbers of such weapons, with their required quality, with the right infrastructure to maintain, launch and give them targets and not lose the platforms carrying them prematurely and have enough accuracy to hit the right targets in a sustained effort, then i humble my assumptions. A VERY heavy investment would be needed by poor taiwan to counter such an effective system in manpower and infrastructure terms. Infact, even the US should be vary as it would encounter a threat far larger than the soviets.

The point is, do u have resources to back your claim besides high tech sites like sinodefence? The effectiveness of battle systems and entire armies is far shorter in war than on paper.

One thing of note. The way the PLA reveals things are not the way was the way the West tends to reveal a new project. In the West, a new weapons project is revealed in the concept phase to gain legislative funding. Due to the secrecy doctrines the PLA has, when a weapons system is finally revealed to the world, it is already working and operational. The only exceptions are export weapons projects the PLA has not approved and are trying to seek a foreign customer.

When the LS-6 glide bomb was first revealed to the world last November, there was a poster where it was shown underneath a J-8F. The unit numbers on the J-8F however, does not indicate that of a test plane, but that of a training regiment.

The KD-88 was predicted and rumored years ago. Only now the PLAAF is willing to reveal them. Well not really reveal them, more like a sneak peak. Its not the first domestic SLAM the PLAAF fielded. The first was the even bigger KD-63, which uses a modified H-6. The H-6H, as of 2005, is known to equip at least three PLAAF regiments, as indicated by their unit numbers. The KD-88 itself can equip at least three known JH-7A regiments and the two upgraded JH-7 regiments, also identified by their unit numbers. In addition to that, there are still five Su-30MKK/MK2 regiments out there that can use the Kh-59ME.

The LGB use is even more prolific. Since 2002 when the latest Q-5 variants were detected, there has been upgrades to turn the fleet of obsolete but cheap little attackers into LGB carriers. The word upgrade is not necessarily the correct word though; they were replaced by newer Q-5s with LTDs on the nose. The estimated number of known LGB capable Q-5s remains unknown wtihout more pictures being made available.

J-10s, J-11s and J-8s still seem to lack a comprehensive PGM suite though, but the introduction of satellite related datalinks on J-10s and JH-7As starting 2006 as revealed in photos, opens the possibilities that these aircraft is capable of dropping Beidou positioned bombs. The Beidou bombs work like JSOWs and JDAMs. They come in kits designed to modify existing dumb munitions. Given the training plane is a J-8F, that opens up the possibility that J-8F regiments can also be used to drop these bombs. Currently the Beidou accuracy is no less than 20m CEP, but that could go down as more advanced satellites are added into the network. Last April, the first of the second generation Beidou satellite has been launched, with another launch planned this year or early next year.

So for now, this is the current state of PLAAF indigineous PGM capability, not counting the Su-30s. The information is happening so rapidly that it needs to be updated every few months and so often, so keep your channels tuned wide open.

 

[weasel1962]

Re:

Actually I disagree with Gollevainen on a few aspects. No one would suggest that ROC forces can be completely destroyed (short of nuking the whole of Taiwan). However, I would suggest that the PLA has the abilitiy to degrade the ROC armed forces to an extent that will allow landings to be made (assuming no US intervention).

I would suggest examining the sortie rates conducted and total munitions expended by the US on Iraq during GW1. Comparing this to the ability of the Chinese to achieve those rates and I think the Chinese have the ability to achieve those rates. Note also that whilst the US weren't able to destroy the Iraqi army completely, they were able to degrade their abilities to successfully complete a limited mission (take back Kuwait). Taiwan's armed forces are approximately 1/3 to 1/4 of Iraq's armed forces capabilities on the ground and 1/2 their air capabilities.

The assumption taken by Gollevainen is that China must destroy the entire ROC armed forces before a successful amphibious landing can take place. That is fallacious (no offence intended) in the same vein as what happened in GW1.

In the same vein, US intervention will not be the entire 3000 aircraft of the USAF, USMC and USN flying to Taiwan's defence within 24 hours of conflict. The whole ROCAF will not be everywhere in the skies at any one time. Most of the "allied" airbases within reach of China are not on US soil ie requires foreign intervention which will take time. Naval assets such as CVs will also take time to consolidate. All these are factors that chinese planners will take into account and influence if possible.

On the other hand, being a "fanboy" myself, 1-2 sqns of F22s will wipe the entire PLAAF and PLAN singlehandedly esp when they don't have to cross the international dateline so war's not an option to the chinese. Why am I even on this thread?

 

[Transient]

I would suggest examining the sortie rates conducted and total munitions expended by the US on Iraq during GW1. Comparing this to the ability of the Chinese to achieve those rates and I think the Chinese have the ability to achieve those rates.

How certain can we be that China can achieve those mission rates when China has less training, almost zero actual experience in aerial campaigns, probably less capable C&C and mission capable rates for its aircraft compared to GW1 USAF? And does equal mission rates translate to equal combat effectiveness? It is almost amusing how some see the PLAAF equipped with GPS and LGB bombs and for them it means China has achieved the same effectiveness as the USAF. Having the same functional equivalents as some of the high profile equipment in USAF inventory doesn't mean that the PLAAF is capable of what the USAF can do. For example, what are the TLE figures the PLAAF can achieve? No point getting a GPS bomb that can hit to within 1cm if you can only get GPS coordinates of the target accurate to within 30m. Even back in GW1 the USAF had more C4ISR assets on hand and experience to handle targeting than the PLAAF has now.

Note also that whilst the US weren't able to destroy the Iraqi army completely, they were able to degrade their abilities to successfully complete a limited mission (take back Kuwait).

The PLA has to make a forced entry with a limited force and fight hugely outnumbered without certain air superiority and without guaranteed replenishment of supplies for that limited force. Laughable how some assume that the war is won the second the PLA lands on the beach. Assuming they could even land in the first place.

Taiwan's armed forces are approximately 1/3 to 1/4 of Iraq's armed forces capabilities on the ground and 1/2 their air capabilities.

By what metric did you arrive at those figures? The ROCAF has far more advanced equipment and C4I. The ROC army is more similarly equipped to Iraq's army in terms of equipment vintage (still superior in terms of C4I though) but they will enjoy overwhelming numerical superiority compared to PLA invaders. Ironical that they will face an outnumbered PLA which has historically relied on numbers to achieve tactical victories.

 

[Gollevainen]

well transient actually answered pretty well...

But I must also point out that its foolish to compare Iraq army into ROCA and more foolish to compare PLA into US.
And for the sortie rate, you can count on them yourself, and you will find out exactly how much modern attack planes PLA has, and how much of them are dual purpose fighters needed to keep the air dominance to allow such attacks.

As a "veteran" of these cyperspace taiwanese invasion wars, My point has always been, that to enable the invasion, ROC needs to be moothballed in same extence as in your mentioned 1991 Gulf war, expecially when taking account the total incompetense in PLAs modern ways to transport its troops to the island. People forget that ROCA is still among the strongest armies that is out there, outside the super powers and we can all assume its pretty motivated to keep PLA back in its starting points.

 

[tphuang]

For example, what are the TLE figures the PLAAF can achieve? No point getting a GPS bomb that can hit to within 1cm if you can only get GPS coordinates of the target accurate to within 30m. Even back in GW1 the USAF had more C4ISR assets on hand and experience to handle targeting than the PLAAF has now.

This is not a problem if you consider two things:
1. Beidou 2 is supposed to be comparable in accuracy to GPS in areas around China.
2. The SAR and targetting pod on JH-7A is accurate enough that this shouldn't be a problem. Remember, KD-88 is not reliant on GPS ad neither are the LGBs.

The PLA has to make a forced entry with a limited force and fight hugely outnumbered without certain air superiority and without guaranteed replenishment of supplies for that limited force. Laughable how some assume that the war is won the second the PLA lands on the beach. Assuming they could even land in the first place.

achieving air superiority is not that hard once they destroy all the airbases.

 

[Transient]

This is not a problem if you consider two things:
1. Beidou 2 is supposed to be comparable in accuracy to GPS in areas around China.
2. The SAR and targetting pod on JH-7A is accurate enough that this shouldn't be a problem. Remember, KD-88 is not reliant on GPS ad neither are the LGBs.

TLE is not dependent on accuracy of GPS or Beidou 2. TLE depends very much on the geo-registration capability of the PLA. Have they demonstrated their capability at geo-registration? having satellites that can see a target is different from being able to generate the target coordinates for that target, least of all doing all the intricate stuff that targeting software like RainStorm does. Does China even have any equivalents for that? How many KD-88s have been produced anyway? How many can be use at any one time? Can the PLAAF fighters get close enough to employ thier LGBs at will in contested airspace?

achieving air superiority is not that hard once they destroy all the airbases.

nfloorl: How useful. Why didn't you say China will achieve air superiority once every pilot in Taiwan is assasinated. How are you going to do destroy all the airbases? Shutting down airbases is not as easy as shooting some SRBMs and the problem is solved. Airbases are hard to put out of action even with specialised munitions, least of all with inaccurate and limited number of SRBMs. Do not forget ROC's SAM system. They will be there to take up any slack. Of course some will also start pointing to SRBMs as if they are the be all and end all of any weapon system, but there are only limited launchers and limited number of inaccurate missiles. (Means you cannot do everything at the same time. Look at the numbers. Around 200 launchers means each wave sees only a maximum of 200 missiles going off the rails. Each is not very accurate, meaning that more than one missile will have to be assigned to each aimpoint. Each target complex requires multiple aimpoints. Do you see that the number of targets getting serviced at any one time is going down very fast from the ideal of 200 missiles = 200 targets destroyed?) Worst of all, China has very limited numbers of ISR assets available to pinpoint ROC's SAM site locations, and it has not demonstrated the capability to handle the time critical targeting required to prosecute the SAM sites.

Simply put, anybody who tries to argue that the PLA has the capability to stage an invasion of Taiwan and win is seriously out of touch with reality.

 

[tphuang]

TLE is not dependent on accuracy of GPS or Beidou 2. TLE depends very much on the geo-registration capability of the PLA. Have they demonstrated their capability at geo-registration? having satellites that can see a target is different from being able to generate the target coordinates for that target, least of all doing all the intricate stuff that targeting software like RainStorm does. Does China even have any equivalents for that? How many KD-88s have been produced anyway? How many can be use at any one time? Can the PLAAF fighters get close enough to employ thier LGBs at will in contested airspace?

Enough that it would be a huge problem to Taiwan. For generalization, we can assume that they have enough KD-88/YJ-91s for any kind of operations they have against Taiwan. (If they can produce 5000 HQ-9 missiles, I don't see why KD-88 procurement would be an issue) Each JH-7A can carry 4 KD-88s. A regiment can carry around 100. There are probably around 6 regiments of JH-7 series right now. As for Geo-registration, I would think developing a targetting software for that would be far easier than some of the other stuff that they've managed to develop. And I've worked with the software industry in China, let's just say I was very impressed.

nfloorl: How useful. Why didn't you say China will achieve air superiority once every pilot in Taiwan is assasinated. How are you going to do destroy all the airbases? Shutting down airbases is not as easy as shooting some SRBMs and the problem is solved. Airbases are hard to put out of action even with specialised munitions, least of all with inaccurate and limited number of SRBMs. Do not forget ROC's SAM system. They will be there to take up any slack. Of course some will also start pointing to SRBMs as if they are the be all and end all of any weapon system, but there are only limited launchers and limited number of inaccurate missiles. (Means you cannot do everything at the same time. Look at the numbers. Around 200 launchers means each wave sees only a maximum of 200 missiles going off the rails. Each is not very accurate, meaning that more than one missile will have to be assigned to each aimpoint. Each target complex requires multiple aimpoints. Do you see that the number of targets getting serviced at any one time is going down very fast from the ideal of 200 missiles = 200 targets destroyed?) Worst of all, China has very limited numbers of ISR assets available to pinpoint ROC's SAM site locations, and it has not demonstrated the capability to handle the time critical targeting required to prosecute the SAM sites.

Simply put, anybody who tries to argue that the PLA has the capability to stage an invasion of Taiwan and win is seriously out of touch with reality.

China believes it has enough anti-radiation drones, EW planes and HARM to keep Taiwanese radar offline for the early hours of the war. And the main instrument against the ground targets during this time would be KD-88, YJ-91, DH-10 and the PGMs (Which would be LS-6, FT series and the LGBs) launched by most likely JH-7A. China has plenty of ISR assets that's only growing yearly, you can check http://cnair.top81.cn/y-8x_sh-5_a-50i.htm

Actually for Taiwan, even JH-7A's radar is good enough. JH-7A can detect bridges on yellow river from 380 km away. Either way, it's good enough that it can make good use of KD-88's range (which is outside of the engagement envelope of any ground based SAM)

 

[weasel1962]

Re:

How certain can we be that China can achieve those mission rates when China has less training, almost zero actual experience in aerial campaigns, probably less capable C&C and mission capable rates for its aircraft compared to GW1 USAF?

I believe Gollevainen has already answered this. Sortie rates are actually dependent on the number of aircraft factoring in refuel and rearm rates which in itself is influenced by distance to target. Off the top of my head, GW1 had about 1000 allied aircraft achieving some 30,000 sorties over a 1 month period. Distance to targets was a lot further for US aircraft flying from fewer airbases. I do not doubt that China can achieve the same or even higher number of sortie rates (since China does have significantly more aircraft).

And does equal mission rates translate to equal combat effectiveness? It is almost amusing how some see the PLAAF equipped with GPS and LGB bombs and for them it means China has achieved the same effectiveness as the USAF.

Of course not. I believe China's ability is suspect just like the most of us. Sure 1 PLAAF aircraft shot down during mission is still 1 sortie. However, do note that GA missions in GW1 were predominantly unguided and successful sortie rates were also reduced due to fog of war (id of target). Only a fraction (something like 10% were guided). I would estimate that the introduction of the PGMs into China would similarly replicate that ratio. However, it would take a fool to think that a 500lb PLAAF bomb hitting a target would not cause almost the same damage as a 500lb USAF bomb (even taking into account misfires). Missing an airfield by a few metres from its middle will still disable the airfield. Fool too to think that just because PGMs are Chinese that they will not be effective.

The PLA has to make a forced entry with a limited force and fight hugely outnumbered without certain air superiority and without guaranteed replenishment of supplies for that limited force. Laughable how some assume that the war is won the second the PLA lands on the beach. Assuming they could even land in the first place.

lol. That's an assumption isn't it. That China cannot gain air superiority (even temporary) or replenish its supplies. Reminisent of the 50s attitude that B-29s could finish the job in Korea.

Notwithstanding 1,000 aircraft, it still took some time for the USAF to assert air superiority over Iraqi airspace. The assumption that the ROCAF can assert air superiority over the Taiwan straits immediately is living in cloud cuckoo land. In most wars, it will take time to mission plan, base and conduct counter-air operations. Dynamically, the USAF can achieve air superiority over the Taiwan straits eventually. The question is how long.

China WILL hold temporary air superiority over the Taiwan straits when ROC air bases are suppressed. US air bases in Okinawa, Japan mainland and South Korea etc will not be in play immediately (hence the revised Japan constitution to allow Japan to participate in the war assuming US intervention).

Suppressing ROC airbases is not difficult to achieve with standoff PGMs. Having a few hundred SRBMs pockmarking the airfields will ensure that most of the ROCAF will not be flying. Keeping it suppressed is a debatable issue. All 300 ROC aircraft will not be in the air at any one time and the ROC can ill afford to keep them flying continuously. The ROCAF can't keep too many planes on the runway either in case of surprise attacks. The PLA has studied GW1 extensively and will no doubt note the impact of cruise missiles. There is also a huge difference between 600 J6 and Q5s with 600 Sukhois/J10s/JH7s attacking.

Further, whilst I make certain assumptions, everyone has unwittingly done so as well. The "China will fail" crowd also assumes that the ROC, a mainly conscript army can fight as well as the US army in a battle. The networking of the ROC army has still a long way to go (though its on its way). There are numerous examples of how conscript armies fight ranging from Israel (as the most effective) to Argentina (one of the least).

The entire ROC army will be concentrated on 1 island and is still a very big island. The PLA landing on the shores will have the advantage of local superiority depending on the deployment of the army. A successful landing may have significant impact on the will of the ROC army to fight. All these are variables. How much the chinese can land will be a factor that will influence Chinese thinking on whether to start a war. If it deems that it can land sufficient quantities of troops, war will be a reality.

By what metric did you arrive at those figures? The ROCAF has far more advanced equipment and C4I. The ROC army is more similarly equipped to Iraq's army in terms of equipment vintage (still superior in terms of C4I though) but they will enjoy overwhelming numerical superiority compared to PLA invaders. Ironical that they will face an outnumbered PLA which has historically relied on numbers to achieve tactical victories.

AND the Iraqis did not possess advanced equipment and C4I? C4I works only if you have functioning radars and satellites. The Iraqis had a multitude of radars (albeit no satellites) that took 1 month to degrade. Oh, I forgot, the Chinese do not possess Anti satellite abilities and even if they did, would not be able to shoot down satellites ... Also, Russian anti radiation missiles always miss and the US streets are paved with cheese. lol.

The ROC armed forces is not a monolithic organisation. It will acquire new technologies in batches (hence not every unit will be equally effective) and will need time to integrate. The failure to pass key budgets have affected the ability of the ROC to deal with the Chinese threat. The bulk of the ROC armed forces are conscript. Those are facts. That US intervention will eventually be victorious is not in doubt. The only question is what price to pay.

 

[Transient]

Enough that it would be a huge problem to Taiwan. For generalization, we can assume that they have enough KD-88/YJ-91s for any kind of operations they have against Taiwan. (If they can produce 5000 HQ-9 missiles, I don't see why KD-88 procurement would be an issue)

On what basis can we assume that just because 5000 HQ-9s are made, sufficient numbers of KD-88 can be procured? One can as easily speculate that 5000 HQ-9s and other procurements have squeezed money from KD-88 procurement funding as one can assume that enough money is available for PLA to buy everything it wants.

As for Geo-registration, I would think developing a targetting software for that would be far easier than some of the other stuff that they've managed to develop. And I've worked with the software industry in China, let's just say I was very impressed.

Geo-registration is as much a function of the capability of the sensor doing the detection as that of software capabilities. Just because China has a good software industry doesn't necessarily translate to having a good geo-registration capability.

China believes it has enough anti-radiation drones, EW planes and HARM to keep Taiwanese radar offline for the early hours of the war.

Everybody believes 'something'. Believing in something doesn't turn it into reality.

And the main instrument against the ground targets during this time would be KD-88, YJ-91, DH-10 and the PGMs (Which would be LS-6, FT series and the LGBs) launched by most likely JH-7A. China has plenty of ISR assets that's only growing yearly, you can check http://cnair.top81.cn/y-8x_sh-5_a-50i.htm

Those few are plenty? And what true capability do they have with those pretty equipment? Having those equipemt in no way indicates that China is capable of the time-critical targeting required to hit targets like SAMs. Enthusiasts see equipment and equate that with capability. The thing is China has ZERO experience base and very little training experience from which they can absorb through foreign sources. I think this is an often ignored point. The ROCAF F-16 squadron has enjoyed the benefit of Red Flag which allows it to train with the best under conditions of greatest possible fidelity with real war conditions. This allows them to bring that experience back to ROCAF. The PLA enjoys little such luxury as a result of its extreme desire for secrecy and thus isolation from joint training. This advantage is not visible and is thus given little importance, yet it may be oe of the most crucial advantages the ROCAF has.

Actually for Taiwan, even JH-7A's radar is good enough. JH-7A can detect bridges on yellow river from 380 km away. Either way, it's good enough that it can make good use of KD-88's range (which is outside of the engagement envelope of any ground based SAM)

Detection is not equal to achieving a targeting solution. Has there been evidence that the JH-7A is capable of on-board targeting for the KD-88?

 

[Transient]

I believe Gollevainen has already answered this. Sortie rates are actually dependent on the number of aircraft factoring in refuel and rearm rates which in itself is influenced by distance to target. Off the top of my head, GW1 had about 1000 allied aircraft achieving some 30,000 sorties over a 1 month period. Distance to targets was a lot further for US aircraft flying from fewer airbases. I do not doubt that China can achieve the same or even higher number of sortie rates (since China does have significantly more aircraft).

You miss two important factors. C&C and aircraft availability rates. With most of the PLAAF's aircraft of Soviet origin, availability is not likely to be of the same level as that for Western aircraft. C&C also is another limiting factor. Aircraft deconfliction etc all come under C&C. When was the last time China demonstrated the ability to control "600 J6 and Q5s with 600 Sukhois/J10s/JH7s attacking" aircraft in the air at one time? By saying that China has more aircraft and thus can generate more sorties you are clearly demonstrating that you do not understand the limitations imposed by practical considerations.

Of course not. I believe China's ability is suspect just like the most of us. Sure 1 PLAAF aircraft shot down during mission is still 1 sortie. However, do note that GA missions in GW1 were predominantly unguided and successful sortie rates were also reduced due to fog of war (id of target). Only a fraction (something like 10% were guided). I would estimate that the introduction of the PGMs into China would similarly replicate that ratio. However, it would take a fool to think that a 500lb PLAAF bomb hitting a target would not cause almost the same damage as a 500lb USAF bomb (even taking into account misfires). Missing an airfield by a few metres from its middle will still disable the airfield. Fool too to think that just because PGMs are Chinese that they will not be effective.

It seems that your ignorance has caused you to misunderstand what I said on GPS/LGB bombs with respect to effectiveness of the air force as a whole. Many here, including you, see a GPS bomb and equate that with effectiveness on the scale of the USAF. What you don't understand is that the bomb is just the last actor in a long sequence of events that has to take place, before the bomb ever gets dropped. The US has a capable ISR network to find and geo-locate the targets, it has the experience, procedure and hardware to allow for time-critical targeting, and that allows the guided bombs to be used to greater effectiveness than the PLA which lacks such a ISR network and has not demonstrated any such capabilities.

lol. That's an assumption isn't it. That China cannot gain air superiority (even temporary) or replenish its supplies. Reminisent of the 50s attitude that B-29s could finish the job in Korea.

With regards to replenishemt of supplies, that's not an assumption. That's an observation in line with mainstream analysts and others who actually have experience with the military and are aware of the problems of logistics.

For air superiority, I have made no assumption that Taiwan will achieve air superiority. All I said was that China will not be able to achieve it. Taking that position does not mean that I believe Taiwan can achieve air superiority. I believe some PLAAF strikes can get through, but those will be the minority. This is because even if the airbases were fully shut down temporarily, do not forget that the SAM network is still in place. And it is unlikely that they can all be shut down, for the reasons I explained earlier.

Suppressing ROC airbases is not difficult to achieve with standoff PGMs. Having a few hundred SRBMs pockmarking the airfields will ensure that most of the ROCAF will not be flying. Keeping it suppressed is a debatable issue. All 300 ROC aircraft will not be in the air at any one time and the ROC can ill afford to keep them flying continuously. The ROCAF can't keep too many planes on the runway either in case of surprise attacks. The PLA has studied GW1 extensively and will no doubt note the impact of cruise missiles. There is also a huge difference between 600 J6 and Q5s with 600 Sukhois/J10s/JH7s attacking.

Obviously you have not understood and appreciated the consequences of SRBM inaccuracy and limited launcher numbers.

The entire ROC army will be concentrated on 1 island and is still a very big island. The PLA landing on the shores will have the advantage of local superiority depending on the deployment of the army. A successful landing may have significant impact on the will of the ROC army to fight. All these are variables. How much the chinese can land will be a factor that will influence Chinese thinking on whether to start a war.

If you did any research at all, you would have noticed that the number of possible landing zones is very limited. This means that these sites can be heavily defended. China's inexperience with amphibuous warfare also means that any landing force will have likely take a long time to reorganise as a fighting force on the beach and to build up the iron mountain on shore, assuming they managed to get a foothold on the beach. This will give more than enough time for ROCA reinforcements to arrive. In fact, with Taiwan's E-2C force giving early warning of an incoming amphib fleet, displacement of troops to react to the threat can occur before the landing has even begun. Taiwan's helicopter force also gives a very rapid 'fire-brigade' response force to back up any opposition to the landing force.

If it deems that it can land sufficient quantities of troops, war will be a reality.

Then by your own admission China cannot land sufficient troop numbers yet.

AND the Iraqis did not possess advanced equipment and C4I?

No they did not. They had impressive equipment that fooled people like you, but their lack of advanced C4I did them in.

C4I works only if you have functioning radars and satellites.

What makes you think PLAAF is able to eradicate the ROC's radars and C4I so easily? Yes, I know, you are going to bring out KH-31P and YJ-91. But what makes you think the network is not going to be resilient enough to absorb some losses and keep functioning? Did it also not occur to you that the resources diverted to handling the AD system means resources taken away from the ground support effort?

The Iraqis had a multitude of radars (albeit no satellites) that took 1 month to degrade. Oh, I forgot, the Chinese do not possess Anti satellite abilities and even if they did, would not be able to shoot down satellites ...

There. It took the US one month to degrade Iraq's AD system which was more primitive than the ROC's. Yet the PLAAF which is more primitive than the USAF of GW1 can do it easily in a span of a few hours.

It will acquire new technologies in batches (hence not every unit will be equally effective) and will need time to integrate.

Amazing. Somehow this applies to Taiwan but not to China, going from the way people here bring out China's new toys and talk as if they are a mature part of China's fighting force. :unknown

 

[crobato]

No training? From a doctrinal point of view, the PLAAF already has one teacher, the same teacher accused of allegedly teaching techs to China---Israel. Many of the training methods the PLAAF uses, like bombing faithfully recreated mock bases and SAM sites in the desert for practice, is uncanningly similar to methods used by the Israelis.

Zero experience base? Starting from 2001, the PLAAF had Su-30MKKs to practice with, to form their core experience in the use of PGMs. albeit using ARMs and TV guided weapons first, then LGBs with JH-7s and Q-5s. The PLAAF started dissimilar combat training since the time they first had Su-27s. Even though they have little experience of exercising with other nations, there is no lack of DACT and Blue Flag-Red Flag training among different Military Region commands. Among the results of DACT was the creating of dedicated Aggressor units attached with Flight Test and Training Center, which also forms, experiments and educates new tactics, such as the use of PGMs and ARH missiles like the PL-12. The FTTC are among the first to acquire the latest jets like the Su-30MKK and the J-10, and train in the use of weapons like the PL-12 and the LS-6.

As for targeting with the KD-88, which KD-88 are you talking about? Targeting via optical means isn't a very hard technology to develop. The Chinese experience of using SLAM type weapons started with the Kh-59ME on the Su-30MKK, although the first TV type weapon they developed was the C-701 antiship missile which they sold to Iran but never deployed by the PLA. Subsequently, China was quick to develop various optical seeker heads which were shown in Zhuhai and other defense expos. It would only take two and two together to logically extrapolate that such heads are destined to be mated with the YJ-83 airframe to create a domestic Kh-59ME equivalent.

By no means even the KD-88 and the JH-7A weren't the first to achieve this in China. The much larger KD-63 beat the KD-88 to the finish line, mated to a new H-6 version, the H-6H. A video shows H-6H crewmen training using a TV "man in the loop" system, where the missile seeker provides a IIR image of the target area for the weapons officer to identify the target for the missile. The JH-7A should have TV channels in order to support not just the KD-88 but also the C-701 and TV guided munitions. Plus FLIR pods and others. Again, similar to the Su-30MKK. The FLIR/LT pod is to be used with LGBs.

On the passive KD-88, the JH-7A is captured using an associative pod, which can be a rangefinding radar receiver with an extended datalink. With ARMs and EO weapons, you don't need exact target coordinates. You need a way point to indicate a target zone. Once the missile gets there, its onboard seeker will do the rest.

 

[tphuang]

On what basis can we assume that just because 5000 HQ-9s are made, sufficient numbers of KD-88 can be procured? One can as easily speculate that 5000 HQ-9s and other procurements have squeezed money from KD-88 procurement funding as one can assume that enough money is available for PLA to buy everything it wants.

through their other purchases, like for example, they purchased over 1000 R-77 and over 2000 R-27s in the recent years, despite the fact that they are only equipping them for the Russian made flankers. KD-88 right now is a far more important missile to China. China is purchasing whatever is needed for this conflict. And in any conflict, China has the advantage of being able to replenish its own missiles through domestic plants.

Geo-registration is as much a function of the capability of the sensor doing the detection as that of software capabilities. Just because China has a good software industry doesn't necessarily translate to having a good geo-registration capability.

Well, I didn't get into the sensor part, because I think with the recent satellites that they've been launching and since they've been observing the targets they need to hit (I'm sure Taiwan and USA has been doing the same), that they know the location they want to target. Look, why would they even bother developing SGBs if they can't use it in action?

Everybody believes 'something'. Believing in something doesn't turn it into reality.

A major unknown here is the quality and quantity of their anti-radiation drone. Now, even if we take that out of equation, the amount of anti-radiation missiles they have with the YJ-91 + KD-88 combination would pose an interesting challenge for Taiwanese air defense radars.

Those few are plenty? And what true capability do they have with those pretty equipment? Having those equipemt in no way indicates that China is capable of the time-critical targeting required to hit targets like SAMs. Enthusiasts see equipment and equate that with capability. The thing is China has ZERO experience base and very little training experience from which they can absorb through foreign sources. I think this is an often ignored point. The ROCAF F-16 squadron has enjoyed the benefit of Red Flag which allows it to train with the best under conditions of greatest possible fidelity with real war conditions. This allows them to bring that experience back to ROCAF. The PLA enjoys little such luxury as a result of its extreme desire for secrecy and thus isolation from joint training. This advantage is not visible and is thus given little importance, yet it may be oe of the most crucial advantages the ROCAF has.

How many do you need?
And of course, just what I expect, more on the quality in training. Well, it's not going to matter much if their airbase get destroyed.

Detection is not equal to achieving a targeting solution. Has there been evidence that the JH-7A is capable of on-board targeting for the KD-88?

Actually, Crobato would give a far better than I can here. I believe MKK uses a targetting pod that has 1m resolution. I think a similar pod is equipped on JH-7A. JH-7A radar's SAR is said to be far more clearer than that of MKK. One variant of KD-88 seems to be using a EO (or IIR) seeker that requires man in the loop to confirm the target. So, I don't think they would deploy KD-88 with JH-7A if it can't target.

From a recent JDW article, I don't necessarily agree with everything, but you can find the video and make your own judgement.

A video produced to celebrate the recent
achievements of the China Flight
Test Establishment (CFTE) reveals
a wealth of evidence for new Chinese
weaponsprogrammesandthepaceof
weapons systems development by the People's
Liberation ArmyAir Force (PLAAF).
The official footage, which has now appeared
on the internet, shows an entirely new class of
air-to-surface missiles, airborne launch trials
of the Kh-31 high-speed anti-radiation missile
(ARM) and the PL-12 active radar beyond-visual-
range air-to-air missile (BVRAAM) , heavy
air-to-surface loads for the Chengdu J-10 and
Shenyang J-11B fighters, plus extensive test and
development activity with virtually every frontline
combat aircraft in Chinese service.
Most intriguing is a new missile design
believed to be designated KD-88.A few blurred
images of a weapon labelled KD-88 have been
seen prior to this but the CFTE film shows two
distinct versions being trialled by Xian JH-7A
attack aircraft. The missile is roughly 3.5 m long
and powered by a small turbojet/turbofan engine
with an underslung intake. Two different seeker
types are fitted – one appears to be electro-optical
(EO, potentially an imaging infrared seeker)
while the other is either an active radar seeker or
a passive RF-homing seeker for the defence suppression
mission.
JH-7As carry the KD-88 together with an
unidentified pod under its centre fuselage. This
pod is tipped with two di-electric fairings pointing
to its use as an emitter locator to cue anARM
version of the KD-88. However, it may also
function asadatalink to provide man-in-the-loop
guidance over extended ranges for the EO-seeker
KD-88 variant.
Also shown alongside the two KD-88 weapons
is what appears to be an air-launched YJ-8K
(C-801) anti-ship missile fitted with a new turbojet
engine. This is not the same as the much larger
C-802K weapon.
Another important development is the launch
of what is almost certainly a Chinese-built
Kh-31P (AS-17 %Krypton&) ramjet-powered
ARM by a JH-7. China is believed to have
launched a national programme to build Kh-
31s that was so extensive it consumed most of
the industrial resources at the missile's Russian
designers and developers, leaving the original
manufacturers (Soyuz-Turayevo and Zvezda-
Strela) unable to continue production in Russia.
Several test launches of the PL-12 (SD-10)
BVRAAM are shown, all using the Shenyang
J-11B (licence-built Su-27SK). The PL-12 is
now in operational service on both the J-11B
and the J-10, marking a major achievement for
China&smissile industry.
J-11Bs and J-10s are also shown carrying (and
in some cases delivering) sizeable bomb loads,
proving that they are true multirole aircraft. The
emergence of the JH-7A as both a precisionguided
munitions carrier and now a platform for
standoff weapons is significant. Furthermore,
with the Kh-31P (local designation YJ-91) and
perhaps an ARM version of the KD-88 the JH-
7A is functioning as a dedicated suppression of
enemy air defences (SEAD) aircraft–an entirely
new capability for the PLAAF.

 

[weasel1962]

Re:

You miss two important factors. C&C and aircraft availability rates. With most of the PLAAF's aircraft of Soviet origin, availability is not likely to be of the same level as that for Western aircraft. C&C also is another limiting factor. Aircraft deconfliction etc all come under C&C. When was the last time China demonstrated the ability to control "600 J6 and Q5s with 600 Sukhois/J10s/JH7s attacking" aircraft in the air at one time? By saying that China has more aircraft and thus can generate more sorties you are clearly demonstrating that you do not understand the limitations imposed by practical considerations.

Nope, I did not miss that. I agree that China has not demonstrated the ability to C&C 1000 aircraft in the air at one time. The assumption being that as a consequence it can't. Not having a major exercise on that scale is more an issue of not wanting to scare anybody with such a large scale exercise.

The fact that the former soviet union never executed 1000 aircraft operations never meant that they could not.

Air traffic controllers are already managing significant numbers of aircraft in the air. Whilst I agree that this is not demonstrative, I think it is a fallacy to assume that China would consequently never have more than a few planes in the air at any one time.

It seems that your ignorance has caused you to misunderstand what I said on GPS/LGB bombs with respect to effectiveness of the air force as a whole. Many here, including you, see a GPS bomb and equate that with effectiveness on the scale of the USAF. What you don't understand is that the bomb is just the last actor in a long sequence of events that has to take place, before the bomb ever gets dropped. The US has a capable ISR network to find and geo-locate the targets, it has the experience, procedure and hardware to allow for time-critical targeting, and that allows the guided bombs to be used to greater effectiveness than the PLA which lacks such a ISR network and has not demonstrated any such capabilities.

And what you don't understand is that the ROC still relies heavily on fixed infrastructure which are surveyed by China many times over. I-hawk sites, airfields, radars are not exactly in secret locations. The US has been advising the ROC to go mobile for almost 2 decades already. The latest mobile FPS radar was rejected on the basis that any radar emissions is going to be pretty obvious to the chinese.

With regards to replenishemt of supplies, that's not an assumption. That's an observation in line with mainstream analysts and others who actually have experience with the military and are aware of the problems of logistics.

Of course, the assumption that the USAF sinks every single ship in the Taiwan straits. Have you seen the size of the Chinese merchant fleet? We're not talking about just LSTs here.

For air superiority, I have made no assumption that Taiwan will achieve air superiority. All I said was that China will not be able to achieve it. Taking that position does not mean that I believe Taiwan can achieve air superiority. I believe some PLAAF strikes can get through, but those will be the minority. This is because even if the airbases were fully shut down temporarily, do not forget that the SAM network is still in place. And it is unlikely that they can all be shut down, for the reasons I explained earlier.

Again an assumption. What makes anyone think PLAAF strikes can't get through in the majority. To interdict aircraft missions, you need aircraft in the air. The ultimate assumption is that Taiwan can get sufficient aircraft in the air to stop PLAAF raids with sukhois defending.

Obviously you have not understood and appreciated the consequences of SRBM inaccuracy and limited launcher numbers.

Obviously you have no idea what GPS guidance can do for SRBMs and how many launchers china does have vis a vis the number of airfields taiwan has. We're not talking scuds here going 200 miles offcourse.

If you did any research at all, you would have noticed that the number of possible landing zones is very limited. This means that these sites can be heavily defended. China's inexperience with amphibuous warfare also means that any landing force will have likely take a long time to reorganise as a fighting force on the beach and to build up the iron mountain on shore, assuming they managed to get a foothold on the beach. This will give more than enough time for ROCA reinforcements to arrive. In fact, with Taiwan's E-2C force giving early warning of an incoming amphib fleet, displacement of troops to react to the threat can occur before the landing has even begun. Taiwan's helicopter force also gives a very rapid 'fire-brigade' response force to back up any opposition to the landing force.

Absolutely, every landing site will be heavily defended by 200 group armies with artillery that will obliterate every single landing zone. Of course china never practices amphibious landings as well. China doesn't have helicopters either that can land air mobile troops in areas which doesn't have to be beaches. IL 76s will only air drop onto heavily defended beaches. lol.

Then by your own admission China cannot land sufficient troop numbers yet.

What does one define as sufficient troop number. 200 Mi17s can ferry 4000 troops every 4 hours in a number of waves. How many helicopters does China have? The assumption being that ships are the only way to transport troops?

No they did not. They had impressive equipment that fooled people like you, but their lack of advanced C4I did them in.

Nope, USAF ARM effectiveness and reputation did the Iraqis in. The Iraqis IADS forced the US aircraft to conduct ground attacks from medium altitudes. Read the unclassified reports (I think on GAO website).

What makes you think PLAAF is able to eradicate the ROC's radars and C4I so easily? Yes, I know, you are going to bring out KH-31P and YJ-91. But what makes you think the network is not going to be resilient enough to absorb some losses and keep functioning? Did it also not occur to you that the resources diverted to handling the AD system means resources taken away from the ground support effort?

Nope, I have no such illusions. What I do think is that the PLAAF can degrade ROC coverage and has sufficient capability to reduce air coverage over a sector that will enable landing operations to take place.

I have no doubt that like US planners, Chinese air planners will go down a roster on what are the targets to hit. Dynamically, it will take time.

There. It took the US one month to degrade Iraq's AD system which was more primitive than the ROC's. Yet the PLAAF which is more primitive than the USAF of GW1 can do it easily in a span of a few hours.

There you go with your assumptions again. I never spoke of degrading the entire ROC armed forces within a few hours.

There is a difference between conducting airfield suppression activities and a sector of air defences compared to the entire island of Taiwan.

Amazing. Somehow this applies to Taiwan but not to China, going from the way people here bring out China's new toys and talk as if they are a mature part of China's fighting force. :unknown

Nope, it is an attitude borne out of the desire to avoid MacArthur's ill-fated dismissal of chinese capabilities when launching the Inchon landings. A realistic appraisal of chinese capabilities enable capable counter-strategies to be developed. It spots chinese weaknesses and will take advantage of such weaknesses to achieve specific objectives.

Good mission planners always take a conservative view.

Taking the very broad approach that once US intervene China get's destroyed tends to be not very useful. The difference is that China has a very good picture of what the US can do. The vice versa is less so.

 

[Transient]

No training? From a doctrinal point of view, the PLAAF already has one teacher, the same teacher accused of allegedly teaching techs to China---Israel. Many of the training methods the PLAAF uses, like bombing faithfully recreated mock bases and SAM sites in the desert for practice, is uncanningly similar to methods used by the Israelis.

Just because the PLA copies some of the methods used by the Israelis you infer that the Israelis have been teaching China operational procedures and tactics? That's some wild conclusion you arrive at there.

Zero experience base? Starting from 2001, the PLAAF had Su-30MKKs to practice with, to form their core experience in the use of PGMs. albeit using ARMs and TV guided weapons first, then LGBs with JH-7s and Q-5s. The PLAAF started dissimilar combat training since the time they first had Su-27s.

Zero experience base in terms of past experience with carrying out aerial campaigns. Practicing firing of weapons is a far cry from using them in action.

Even though they have little experience of exercising with other nations, there is no lack of DACT and Blue Flag-Red Flag training among different Military Region commands. Among the results of DACT was the creating of dedicated Aggressor units attached with Flight Test and Training Center, which also forms, experiments and educates new tactics, such as the use of PGMs and ARH missiles like the PL-12. The FTTC are among the first to acquire the latest jets like the Su-30MKK and the J-10, and train in the use of weapons like the PL-12 and the LS-6.

Without the ability to learn from those who have played the game, lessons will have to be learnt on what works wrong, and some lessons will even be learnt wrongly without the operational experience as a back up to tell what's simply not practical.

As for targeting with the KD-88, which KD-88 are you talking about? Targeting via optical means isn't a very hard technology to develop. The Chinese experience of using SLAM type weapons started with the Kh-59ME on the Su-30MKK, although the first TV type weapon they developed was the C-701 antiship missile which they sold to Iran but never deployed by the PLA. Subsequently, China was quick to develop various optical seeker heads which were shown in Zhuhai and other defense expos. It would only take two and two together to logically extrapolate that such heads are destined to be mated with the YJ-83 airframe to create a domestic Kh-59ME equivalent.

By no means even the KD-88 and the JH-7A weren't the first to achieve this in China. The much larger KD-63 beat the KD-88 to the finish line, mated to a new H-6 version, the H-6H. A video shows H-6H crewmen training using a TV "man in the loop" system, where the missile seeker provides a IIR image of the target area for the weapons officer to identify the target for the missile. The JH-7A should have TV channels in order to support not just the KD-88 but also the C-701 and TV guided munitions. Plus FLIR pods and others. Again, similar to the Su-30MKK. The FLIR/LT pod is to be used with LGBs.

On the passive KD-88, the JH-7A is captured using an associative pod, which can be a rangefinding radar receiver with an extended datalink. With ARMs and EO weapons, you don't need exact target coordinates. You need a way point to indicate a target zone. Once the missile gets there, its onboard seeker will do the rest.

All these mean little in relation to what Tphuang tried to assert, that they could be fired simply with on board targeting from the JH-7A. There is more than simply firing the missile , it travels there, it acquires the target with its EO seeker and the target is eliminated. There are many factors, like ensuring the missile will arrive at the target vicinity with the target in the EO seeker's limited FOV, ensuring the missile navigates multiple waypoints at differing altitude etc. Has there been evidence that the missile is capable of being targeted (includes mission planning for the missile) from on board the fighter? I have seen no evidence pointing out so.

through their other purchases, like for example, they purchased over 1000 R-77 and over 2000 R-27s in the recent years, despite the fact that they are only equipping them for the Russian made flankers. KD-88 right now is a far more important missile to China. China is purchasing whatever is needed for this conflict. And in any conflict, China has the advantage of being able to replenish its own missiles through domestic plants.

Again, how is that evidence that KD-88's are sufficient in the quantities that you assert they will be used for? They could very well have planned for a much smaller use for the weapon and set aside funding to only provide for a hundred or so of those missiles, which would negate their use the way you described.

Well, I didn't get into the sensor part, because I think with the recent satellites that they've been launching and since they've been observing the targets they need to hit (I'm sure Taiwan and USA has been doing the same), that they know the location they want to target. Look, why would they even bother developing SGBs if they can't use it in action?

I'm not saying those bombs cannot be used at all. I'm saying they may very well not be used to the same level of effectiveness as the USAF. Knowing the target and seeing it is different from generating the coordinates for that target, or even generating the correct coordinates for that target, as the incident with the bombing of the Chinese embassy so clearly illustrates.

A major unknown here is the quality and quantity of their anti-radiation drone. Now, even if we take that out of equation, the amount of anti-radiation missiles they have with the YJ-91 + KD-88 combination would pose an interesting challenge for Taiwanese air defense radars.

They pose a challenge. That doesn't mean they wipe out the ROC air defense system, as some here seem to think. Again, missions spent on degrading the ROC AD system takes away from missions spent supporting the extremely vulnerable landing force.

How many do you need?
And of course, just what I expect, more on the quality in training. Well, it's not going to matter much if their airbase get destroyed.

Destroyed, with what? Limited numbers of inaccurate SRBMs? Without timely BDA capability, the effectiveness of those SRBMs are decreased even further than you think.

 

[crobato]

Its not the SAR but the fact that Chinese fighter radars were quick to grasp the implication of having MTI/GMTI modes (Moving Target Indicator). Even the KLJ-1 that first appeared on the J-8II has MTI, and so should the more complex and powerful JL-10A on the JH-7. MTI modes started appearing in Western fighter radars. On the other hand, the Russians seemed to have ignored this feature. Not as if they're technically incapable of adding this feature, just that it seemed not in their list of priorities in favor of boasting rights to other more 'obvious' features.

So it shouldn't be the Su-30MKK's rather low SAR resolution, which can be compensated by IIR FLIRs or the MR400 recon pod, but the lack of MTI in its features list that probably most hinders this and other Russian aircraft in this matter until they finally get around to this.

More importantly is how GMTI is used in high loiter aircraft like the Y-8s to spot moving ground or surface targets, then network relay the coordinates to other aircraft. The abilities of aircraft like the Y-8 with the large side scanning phase arrays on its cheeks interests me far more than the SAR ranges and detection abilities of individual multirole aircraft like the JH-7A. These Y-8s can feature a possible combination of MTI with SAR mapping, providing battlespace surveillance.