Why did Japan attack Pearl Harbor?
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Ananda, I do believe the US would have definately gone to war. At the time of Pearl Harbor, the US had created the AVG to fight the Japanese. The US military was letting pilots fly for the RAF and we were already sending vast amounts of material to the allies. It's easy to overlook the fact that the president was convinced that war was inevitable hence the mass mobilization of US war industries pre-Pearl Harbor and was only waiting for what I would simply call a politically safe mechanism to go to war with full support from congress.
The USSR and Japan were weary to fight each other, and the USSR was not in a position to fight them other than possibly in mainland China. The commonwealth was in no position to effectively fight the Japanse either.
I think the British could have held out for many years, particularly with a bit of material support from the US. The Germans were never capable of invading Britain, they lacked the Naval forces to do so and the Luftwaffe had been smashed in 1940.
I also think too many equate the taking of Moscow as the end of the war for the USSR which is a rediculous conclussion. The Germans falsely believed they could bomb British fighter command into submission but the Brits simply moved their airfields a few miles north beyond German bomber range. The Russians could have and would have done the same thing. The Germans just didn't have the logistics go any further, and never would. Actually the Germans really didn't have a reallistic grasp on the logicistical aspects of war, Blitzkrieg doesn't allow for it which is a fatal flaw of course. The Afrika Corps suffered immeasurably because of this and as great as Rommel was, he was infamous for neglecting the importance of logistics.
I think taking on the US was a mistake, but the biggest mistake Hitler made was taking on the USSR. He had taken all of western europe, and had an alliance with the Soviets who showed no signs of considering serious aggression towards Germany. Hitler should have stopped with France, let the Brits keep the Med, consolidated and then after a few years of phoney peace attacked the Russians. The second biggest mistake Hitler made was taking the Italians in, who did nothing but sap crucial limited resources and opened another theater that allowed the British and Americans the opportunity to relearn the art of war, season their troops, and find bona fide leaders who would later bring the war to western europe.
The USSR and Japan were weary to fight each other, and the USSR was not in a position to fight them other than possibly in mainland China. The commonwealth was in no position to effectively fight the Japanse either.
I think the British could have held out for many years, particularly with a bit of material support from the US. The Germans were never capable of invading Britain, they lacked the Naval forces to do so and the Luftwaffe had been smashed in 1940.
I also think too many equate the taking of Moscow as the end of the war for the USSR which is a rediculous conclussion. The Germans falsely believed they could bomb British fighter command into submission but the Brits simply moved their airfields a few miles north beyond German bomber range. The Russians could have and would have done the same thing. The Germans just didn't have the logistics go any further, and never would. Actually the Germans really didn't have a reallistic grasp on the logicistical aspects of war, Blitzkrieg doesn't allow for it which is a fatal flaw of course. The Afrika Corps suffered immeasurably because of this and as great as Rommel was, he was infamous for neglecting the importance of logistics.
I think taking on the US was a mistake, but the biggest mistake Hitler made was taking on the USSR. He had taken all of western europe, and had an alliance with the Soviets who showed no signs of considering serious aggression towards Germany. Hitler should have stopped with France, let the Brits keep the Med, consolidated and then after a few years of phoney peace attacked the Russians. The second biggest mistake Hitler made was taking the Italians in, who did nothing but sap crucial limited resources and opened another theater that allowed the British and Americans the opportunity to relearn the art of war, season their troops, and find bona fide leaders who would later bring the war to western europe.
I mostly agree with you but there are some points which need further clarification.
a) While I agree that any invasion of GB would have been impossible, especially considering the vast amount of help flowing in from the US the Luftwaffe was far from smashed in 1940. As a matter of fact it dominated the skies in the eastern campaigns soon after and showed the RAF just how precious the advantages of the strategic defense were in air battles. Once again the defending air forces had by far the edge in terms of efficiency. The bombing campaings of the first two years were hugely costly for the RAF with little gain to show and more a sign of disperation fueled from the urge of revenge.
b) Nobody knows what could have happened after Moscow but I tend to agree with you that the war would likely not have been over. But it is utterly wrong to conclude that the Germans or "Blitzkrieg" didn't take logistics into account. Take for example the campaign against France which was could be a showcase how to support a massive amount of forces with fantastic planning.
The main problem of the Germany was the lack of fuel, which greatly influenced their choice to focus on the railways for longe range transport and to still rely on a lot of horse while using the fuel on most important assets (combat vehicles, airplanes, U-boats). The tiny amount of trucks is almost laughable compared to even the Soviets (with mostly US-trucks) alone. When we than see just how many troubles the allied powers had with far far larger ressources than it seems almost a wonder that the German forces could be kept at all in the field. Still better overall planning should have resulted in a better performance concerning the war effort. But if we consider that erratic decision making on the very top it was hard to achieve much more by the subordinates.
I'm painting in rather broad strokes for the sake of brevity. Regarding the Luftwaffe, they never gained air superiority over Britain and it is universally agreed, never made good on it's losses after. I totally agree strategic bombing was a bust for everyone including the US. The "success" of the US and British strategic bombing campaign is in my "opinion" one of the greatest coupes of misinformation during the war ie it simply didn't work. If it did, it would be hard to explain how the Germans were able to manufacture record numbers of tanks, airplanes etc in December 1944. Anyway with Germany lacking the necessary naval power Luftwaffe air superiority over Britain was mandatory to even consider an invastion however, it's a moot point because again, Germany didn't have the naval capabilities to invade anyway.
I agree the lack of fuel has a great deal to do with the difficulties Germany had during the war, that's what grounded the Luftwaffe when the armaments industry was cranking aircraft in record numbers. Going back to strategic bombing, all the allies needed to do to cripple Germany in 1943 was to take out the synthetic fuel plants, I think there were 2?
I'll try to keep this short as possible since your obviously a student of WW2 like me. My understanding of the Blitz is rapid breakthrough on a very small front, quick dash to the rear and cut off the front from communications, command and support. The logistics for sustained offense/defense are quite different than the logistics necessary for the shorter, successful Blitzkrieg. If you look at Afrika Corps, particularly the later half of 42-43 you will see what I'm trying to say.
I agree the lack of fuel has a great deal to do with the difficulties Germany had during the war, that's what grounded the Luftwaffe when the armaments industry was cranking aircraft in record numbers. Going back to strategic bombing, all the allies needed to do to cripple Germany in 1943 was to take out the synthetic fuel plants, I think there were 2?
The one flaw to your argument is the fact that the England is an island and the channel got in the way of being able to base their aircraft further forward. No such impediment exists in russia - just move your airfields forward in support of your forces.
Besides, the germans lost the battle of britain when Hitler moved the Luftwaffe's focus from the airfiels and radar sites to the civillian population.
Not so. The RAF never moved its fighters beyond German bomber range. Many fighter airfields were beyond German fighter range, meaning that escorted daylight bomber raids could not reach them. The fields could still be bombed by unescorted bombers, or night raids. But the first was too dangerous, & the second too inaccurate.
The RAF did not - could not - withdraw its fighters beyond range of German air raids, as that would have given Germany the control of the air over SE England & the sea that it sought - and the Luftwaffe would have won. Control of that airspace was what the battle was fought for.
Think about why the Luftwaffe wanted that control. It was to make an invasion possible! If the Luftwaffe had uncontested control over the Channel (& if British fighters were too far away for German air raids, they were too far away to intervene successfully against superior German forces operating from bases closer to the scene), it would have a chance of defeating any Royal Navy intervention against an invasion fleet, & would be able to attack British coastal defences with near impunity. That was what the RAF was fighting to prevent.
As already said, the RAF began getting the upper hand only when the Luftwaffe switched its focus to bombing cities & industrial targets*, thus giving the fighter bases a respite.
*Because of Goerings over-confidence, overestimation of RAF losses, & underestimation of British fighter output (it was much higher than the German level). The OKL thought the RAF was almost beaten & could be finished off with a reduced effort. Wrong!
I think you guys are forgetting that aircraft of the day flew from unimproved sites ie not concrete runways. The fighters were moved north beyond German fighter range, Lutfwaffe single engine fighters only had enough fuel for 20 minutes over London. With Britains radar network, SIGNIT and so forth the German were incapable of launching surprise attacks, I don't believe German bombers ever caught British fighters on the ground once the battle was in full swing but I could be wrong. In any event British fighters typically loitered out of range of fighter escort and then moved in to pick off the bombers while they were over London or egressing. As swerve pointed out, the whole intention was to gain air superiority as promised by Goering and as a precondition to invasion, the Luftwaffe simply didn't deliver, certainly never gained air superiority and switched to bombing civilian targets at night because of the mauling their bombers were received.
The Germans didn't lose the war for lack of quality soldiers or equipment, it was logistics logistics logistics, that did them in. If your troops make a successful breakthrough but are unable to exploit said breakthrough for lack of fuel, ammunition etc I would say logistics (the means to get these things to the troops) were the failure. Stalingrad, 6th Army held out forever and only gave up because guess what, they couldn't get supplied...logistics! Just about every German reversal following intial success during the war was due to shortages of expendables like fuel and ammo.
Yet the Germans never made it to Moscow, they reached the end of their logistical chain which is what I was speaking about earlier in the post. Also as mentioned earlier Rommel experienced the same problem in Afrika, in late 1942/43 (can't remember the month, doh!) the Afrika Corps launched an offensive to disrupt the impending Allied offensive. Initially the breakthrough was successful but logistics were ignored, the breakthrough wasn't exploited and Rommel was forced to withdraw for fear of running out of everything.
The Germans didn't lose the war for lack of quality soldiers or equipment, it was logistics logistics logistics, that did them in. If your troops make a successful breakthrough but are unable to exploit said breakthrough for lack of fuel, ammunition etc I would say logistics (the means to get these things to the troops) were the failure. Stalingrad, 6th Army held out forever and only gave up because guess what, they couldn't get supplied...logistics! Just about every German reversal following intial success during the war was due to shortages of expendables like fuel and ammo.
I'm afraid this is wrong. Fighters were often caught on the ground by bombers while refuelling & re-arming. Warning of a raid is no use if you have no fuel left. Also the RAF never withdrew its fighters. It was considered, but not done. The fact that it was actively considered shows how desperate the situation was. But 11 group remained in action, in the far SE, throughout.
Look up the locations of Hawkinge & Manston airfields. They remained in use throughout the battle. Withdrawal?
BTW, the Germans could & did launch surprise attacks, but only in limited circumstances. They temporarily knocked holes in the radar network, for example, & also launched low-level fighter-bomber raids on the airfields closest to the coast.
You appear to be confusing minor aspects of the battle, & things happening at particular times, with the general pattern. Yes, bomber raids were attacked while withdrawing, & sometimes not attacked until after they had bombed, but there was no deliberate choice to let them bomb & then intercept them. Sometimes, raids were left alone because there were no uncommitted fighters. Every fighter in 11 group was in action on 15th September, for example. When 12 group was sending big wings to intercept raids on London, they took time to organise, & sometimes arrived late.
Ananda
The Bunker Group
Gremlin, wasn'it at the hight of German invasion, the Russian also facing severe logistical problem. They have to left many of their hardware and supplies during the retreat.
Afterall eventhough many put Nazi invasions on similarity with Napoleon invasions, but I think it's rather different since Russian already expect invasion from Napolean, while Stalin still think that Hitler would not move against him (at least not soon enough).
Russia able to fastly resupply due to US supply lines and also bacause many of their war industries managed to be shipped on to Ural region, outside the reach of Luftwaffe.
Again if the US involvement had been delay one year or if the German more prepared with long range bombing in to Ural, could that put different fate to Russia ??
In here I'm assumed that logistics by German although not very sufficient still with the access to eastern Poland and Ploesty oil in Rumania, the German could provide enough logistics for her war machines while the Russian has problem on replacing theirs due to constant long range bombing in Ural.
Off course again this with assumption on Germany indeed build and have long range/strategic bombing (which we know was very lacking on Luftwaffe inventories), and late involvement from US in the war.
Swerve I'll concede that my conclussions may be out of context, perhaps I'm not seeing the forest for the trees? 
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Anyway I don't think I said or infered the RAF withdrew from the fight, if I did I didn't intend to as that is plainly wrong. Regardless of the means and methods, the RAF won the Battle of Britain and because of this Sea Lion was canceled indefinately.
As for a strategic campaign into the Urals, I have developed in the past 10 years, an understanding that strategic bombing never really worked, for anybody during the war.
. Anyway I don't think I said or infered the RAF withdrew from the fight, if I did I didn't intend to as that is plainly wrong. Regardless of the means and methods, the RAF won the Battle of Britain and because of this Sea Lion was canceled indefinately.
I know the US supplied the Soviets with over 80,000 trucks, among other things however I don't have the information at my finger tips as to when deliveries were made. US aid certainly helped, but wouldn't go so far as to say it was "the thing" that helped the Soviets stop the Germans.
As for a strategic campaign into the Urals, I have developed in the past 10 years, an understanding that strategic bombing never really worked, for anybody during the war.
@Gremlin29: Point taken, it is understandable to paint broadly given that the topic is about the built-up to the conflict in the Pacific.
@Ananda: I'm perhaps more guilty than most here in derailing the thread. Anyway a new topic based on earnest study would be needed to reach even a very tentative conclusion on such questions.
@Ananda: I'm perhaps more guilty than most here in derailing the thread. Anyway a new topic based on earnest study would be needed to reach even a very tentative conclusion on such questions.
Ozzy Blizzard
New Member
Don't put too much weight in contemporary public opinion. The threat posed by a Japan with secure resource flows, increased industrial capability and no European naval forces to act as a counterweight in Asia would have become obvious to Joe blow on the street and congressman alike. The competition in Asia was primarily between the US and Japan, a massive escalation of the Chinese conflict to include attacks on US partners would have been impossible to ignore militarily, even if a few in congress would have scored isolationist political points. Remember the Bush administration escalated the Iraq war in the face of massive public disapproval.Not Trying to resurect a rather old thread (few months old not an ancient anyway yet
Anyway the articles put some issues on difficulties by Rossevelt to commit US in WW 2, due to reluctance on some part of US populations on commiting US troops on what they see as european issues. Infact that relluctancies also included the unwillingness to involved in Asia in case that Japanese attacking European collonies in Asia.
These conflicts are driven by forces that transcend partisan politics.
First let me address your scenario and why i think it is not a realistic possibility.
1) An operation against Singapore, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies would not have been feasible with the US Pacific Battle Fleet intact and based out of Manila. Amphibious operations are precarious things, and at any time during the operation even a partial commitment of US naval forces would have spelled disaster for the Japanese. Their lines of communication ran straight past US territory in the Philippines. Unless they could be 100% sure the Americans would not intervene, or allow Commonwealth forces to utilize US territory the operation was simply not feasible. Considering the antagonistic position the Americans had taken with the Japanese and their close relationship with the UK, neutrality was extremely unlikely. The destruction of the US battle fleet and the fall of Manila were pre-requisites for the successful occupation of Singapore and the Dutch East Indies.
2) Japanese possession of Malaya, Singapore and the Dutch East Indies and the defeat of friendly naval powers would have significantly shifted the pacific balance of power in Japans favor, giving her the resources to become the dominant naval power in the Pacific. That outcome was and is totally unacceptable to Washington, simply because its fundamental security position would be significantly eroded. It would be like the French standing by and doing nothing while the various German states to coalesce into a single German entity more powerful than France (see Franco-Prussian war).
Frankly large scale operations in South East Asia designed to free Japan from foreign resource dependence would have been impossible with the US Pacific forces stationed in the Pacific in 1941 and US possession of the Philippines. Assuming SE Asian resources were critical to Japanese ambitions, the US fleet in Pearl Harbor had to be dealt with one way or the other and Manila had to be taken. Considering that pretext Pearl Harbor was the most sensible option.
Now, would the US have entered the war without Pearl Harbor? Absolutely, the only major difference would have been the timing and the available US forces at its beginning.
If Japan decided not to act for another 9 to 12 months (which is extremely unlikely considering the US had already placed Tokyo in an untenable economic position in 1941) would there have been a major effect on the outcome of the war? Well the large scale supply of Russia through Iran over and above what the British had sent would have been delay by 12 months, but that probably wouldn't have affected Stalingrad much. The mobility of Russian attacks in 1943 may have been limited somewhat (American trucks were handy) but i don't think it would have tipped the balance in Germany's favor. In any case there was nothing to stop the US from increasing its aid throughout 1942 without directly entering the war.
The British would have hung on to North Africa (El Alamein was won without direct US involvement and US weapons still would have been used). Without torch though the Germans would not have fallen back to Tunisia and "Tunisgrad" would not have happened. In December 1942 the 8th army would have been facing the Africa Korps somewhere west of Tobruk.
The battle of the Atlantic was already turning in the Allies favor in early 1942, and in any case the USN was escorting Atlantic convoys half the way. For all intents and purposes the US was already in a shooting war with Germany prior to December 7th 1941.
The trigger would have come somewhere, it was only the sinking of the Lusitania in 1915 that put the US steadily on a path to war, from a place of steadfast neutrality and on the side of her old enemy, the British. As soon as fundamental US interests were at stake (German overtures to Mexico) it entered the war. Imagine what small incident would have been enough to justify American intervention when US sailors were already dying defending convoys to Europe and direct US interests were under grave threat in the pacific? The only major difference would have been the time and an intact pacific fleet ready to confront the Japanese.
Ozzy Blizzard
New Member
Sorry Palnatoke, not ducking you just been unable to contribute for the last week or so.
Ananda
The Bunker Group
Thanks Ozzy, this what i really pondering. If the Pearl Harbour kind of attack was the trigger that needed by US for entering the war.
By your remark's that's not the case since the trigger actually will not be as big as pearl harbour. For your oppinion above (if I read correctly), then the US actually ready for entering the war by end of 1941 or early 1942 anyway.
The scenario's that I put simply pondering whether Japan and the Axis can delay US Invovement in the war. By seems it's unlikely.
I realise that is not what you meant, & I'm sorry if I've given the impression that I thought you did mean it.Swerve I'll concede that my conclussions may be out of context, perhaps I'm not seeing the forest for the trees?
Anyway I don't think I said or infered the RAF withdrew from the fight, if I did I didn't intend to as that is plainly wrong.
What I've been trying to convey is that a withdrawal of RAF fighters to bases out of range of escorted German bomber raids (not completely out of the fight) would have conceded air superiority over the English Channel & the invasion beaches, because it would have given them too little flying time over the Channel to contest Luftwaffe control effectively. I don't think you realised that.
Because a withdrawal would have had such grave implications, it would have been done only if the alternative was destruction of the RAF fighter force, & it never quite got that bad (though pretty close, for a while). Even Hawkinge, the furthest forward RAF fighter base (just outside Folkestone, 3 miles from the coast) was kept in use throughout the BoB, despite being bombed heavily several times. Even after its buildings had been pretty well wrecked, it was still usable as a forward refuelling & rearming point, heavily protected by AA.
Fighters were withdrawn from Manston, the other fighter base near the Kent coast, only when it had been bombed to destruction - but two weeks later, it was back in limited use.
RAF fighters continued operating from every other fighter base within range of escorted Luftwaffe bomber raids, except when the runways were temporarily rendered unusable by bombing. And they were always repaired.
Absolutely.
I think this might have gotten a little off topic...
In any event, if I understood the original post correctly, the question wasn't why did the Japanese bomb pearl harbor, but what would have happened if the Japanese hadn't bombed it?
I actually kind of wrote a paper on this a whiles back, but I don't think I have it anymore. I'm pretty sure my thesis was that the US and the Axis were basically set on a collision course from day one, and that by the time pearl harbor rolled around, the US had already had several military encounters with the Germans. Look up the Greer incident of 1941. Tensions were already pretty high, and I think given enough time, the Americans would have had to jump in.
In any event, if I understood the original post correctly, the question wasn't why did the Japanese bomb pearl harbor, but what would have happened if the Japanese hadn't bombed it?
I actually kind of wrote a paper on this a whiles back, but I don't think I have it anymore. I'm pretty sure my thesis was that the US and the Axis were basically set on a collision course from day one, and that by the time pearl harbor rolled around, the US had already had several military encounters with the Germans. Look up the Greer incident of 1941. Tensions were already pretty high, and I think given enough time, the Americans would have had to jump in.
Japan's hunger for natural resources put her on a collision course with America. She chose the 'hard power' option, which based on her military culture was acceptable at the time. China today is basically doing the same thing, accept using 'soft power' (particularly in Africa and the ME) to achieve the same results. If Japan had waited until the US strike carriers were present at Pearl then they may have been able to sue for peace in exchange for increased access to raw materials across the Far East.
Interestingly Japan could have chosen a separate path. If Hitler had shared details of operation Barbarossa with the Japanese and encouraged them to move North West from China (instead of attacking Pearl) then it would have forced Russia to fight a two front war, not Germany. Siberian divisions would have been forced to confront Japan, plus Japan's track record against Russia was pretty damned good (1902). Once Russia was defeated in a giant pincer movement the German / Japan Axis could have carved up the British Empire at will. Anti-Communist propaganda would have played into the hands of the right in the US, which may have kept her out of the war for much longer. Influential families such as the Kennedy clan were pro-German, and anti-British and were keen to see the British Empire dissolved.
Hitler admired Britain (particularly the way they administered India) and was willing to allow her to keep the Raj intact (recorded in his written directives 1940-41) and he always believed the Soviets to be his true enemy, not his fellow Anglo-Saxon's. Plus he never took the maritime invasion of the UK seriously once the Battle of Britian was lost, instead he put his faith in the U-Boat. Result being - Russia here I come! He also estimated Russia had 200 divisions against Germany's better equiped and trained 180, what he failed to appreciate is the speed at which Russia churned out new divisions (estimated 600 by the end of the war). A full-on combined Japan / German invasion in 1941 would have changed the course of the war. Japans Navy could have focused its attention on the life saving Arctic convoys (via the Bering Straits), thus draining Mother Russia's vital lifeline and her 51 Divisions (1941) added to the 180 German Divisions attacking on two fronts would have driven Uncle Joe over the edge.
Why Hitler decided not to inform the Japanese of his Russian adventure and solicit their help in the East is a mystery to me?
Halder and other influential German Army officers interviewed after the war believed Hitler studied too much 'Schlieflen' and not enough 'Clausewitz'. Clausewitz watched Napoleon's defeat in 1812 from the Russian side and wrote at length about the enormity of the Russian steppes, severe winters and logisitical problems. If Japan had attacked from the East in force, Stalin would have finally imploded (He came pretty damn close once alerted of German movements east) and Russia would have folded in a two front onslaught. Japan could then have shared Russias vast resources.
Interestingly Japan could have chosen a separate path. If Hitler had shared details of operation Barbarossa with the Japanese and encouraged them to move North West from China (instead of attacking Pearl) then it would have forced Russia to fight a two front war, not Germany. Siberian divisions would have been forced to confront Japan, plus Japan's track record against Russia was pretty damned good (1902). Once Russia was defeated in a giant pincer movement the German / Japan Axis could have carved up the British Empire at will. Anti-Communist propaganda would have played into the hands of the right in the US, which may have kept her out of the war for much longer. Influential families such as the Kennedy clan were pro-German, and anti-British and were keen to see the British Empire dissolved.
Hitler admired Britain (particularly the way they administered India) and was willing to allow her to keep the Raj intact (recorded in his written directives 1940-41) and he always believed the Soviets to be his true enemy, not his fellow Anglo-Saxon's. Plus he never took the maritime invasion of the UK seriously once the Battle of Britian was lost, instead he put his faith in the U-Boat. Result being - Russia here I come! He also estimated Russia had 200 divisions against Germany's better equiped and trained 180, what he failed to appreciate is the speed at which Russia churned out new divisions (estimated 600 by the end of the war). A full-on combined Japan / German invasion in 1941 would have changed the course of the war. Japans Navy could have focused its attention on the life saving Arctic convoys (via the Bering Straits), thus draining Mother Russia's vital lifeline and her 51 Divisions (1941) added to the 180 German Divisions attacking on two fronts would have driven Uncle Joe over the edge.
Why Hitler decided not to inform the Japanese of his Russian adventure and solicit their help in the East is a mystery to me?
Halder and other influential German Army officers interviewed after the war believed Hitler studied too much 'Schlieflen' and not enough 'Clausewitz'. Clausewitz watched Napoleon's defeat in 1812 from the Russian side and wrote at length about the enormity of the Russian steppes, severe winters and logisitical problems. If Japan had attacked from the East in force, Stalin would have finally imploded (He came pretty damn close once alerted of German movements east) and Russia would have folded in a two front onslaught. Japan could then have shared Russias vast resources.
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The Japanese record against the Russians in 1904-5 was pretty good, but it was a lot worse in 1938. The Japanese army had no reason to expect an easy victory against the Red Army. It could have occupied the Soviet Far East, but advances further west would have been handicapped by logistical difficulties. Exactly one railway line, which the Russians would doubtless have done everything in their power to destroy as they withdrew, & no roads. Not one.
And the really big problem - what would attacking the USSR have done for Japans need for oil, iron, rubber, etc? There was none of that Siberia, as far as anyone knew. They'd still have needed to go south, & that meant fighting the USA, or hoping that despite its military co-operation with the UK & Netherlands, & joint embargo, the USA would do nothing. If the Japanese government had thought the USA would stand aside while the IJN took the Netherlands East Indies, North Borneo, Malaya & Singapore, it would never have attacked Pearl Harbor or the Philippines. Nothing has changed, except for the worse. Japan still has to give in or fight the USA, but now it has to fight from a weakened position, with its oil reserves used up, aircraft & men lost in Siberia, etc.
Japan can't 'roll up the British Empire', because the USA still stands in the way in East Asia, just as it did in reality. That's why Japan attacked Pearl Harbor.
BTW, what Bering Straits convoys? There was traffic via the North-East passage, but it was relatively minor, & AFAIK entirely Soviet. The main routes were through Iran & north of Norway. The eastern route needed icebreakers year round.
Yes, but it would have kept Marshall Zukov's 51 Siberian Divisions in the East. They were critical after Germany's failure to take Moscow before the first winter (as a result of Hitler's decision to focus on economic targets rather than deal a death blow to the Russian military machine defending Moscow - another Clausewitz lesson failure) . Germany could have done a deal with Japan - strike North West and support our advance and we will provide oil, synthetic technology and finally logistics / equipment support to help you defeat the Brit's in the East once the Russian bear is crippled (pushed to point where they could no longer have access to critical war-fighting raw materials and also forced to suffer the demoralising loss of their capital)
Reference Bering Straits, this is the route the Japs would have to have taken to expose them to Russian Convoys. A long journey I admit, but not beyond realms of possibility.
How could Germany provide oil to Japan? What use is German synthetic oil technology to Japan? Japan didn't have anywhere enough coal to provide feedstock for oil making. How would Germany help Japan defeat the USA* in East Asia? Remember, all this has to be done before the Japanese economy collapses, & its navy is immobilised from lack of fuel.
Look at the geography. Consider the naval strengths. It was physically impossible for Germany to ship any bulk cargo to Japan. Even exchanging envoys was difficult & dangerous.
What's in it for Japan? You are arguing for Japanese national sacrifice, to help Germany, on the strength of a promise that Germany would then, if it could, rescue Japan by fighting its way across Asia, securing sources of raw materials it was, itself, desperately short of, clearing routes for shipping them, & all in double-quick time. It's all very nice for Germany, but it would destroy Japan.
*Japan couldn't fight Britain in East Asia without fighting the USA. I've already covered that.
Look at the geography. Consider the naval strengths. It was physically impossible for Germany to ship any bulk cargo to Japan. Even exchanging envoys was difficult & dangerous.
What's in it for Japan? You are arguing for Japanese national sacrifice, to help Germany, on the strength of a promise that Germany would then, if it could, rescue Japan by fighting its way across Asia, securing sources of raw materials it was, itself, desperately short of, clearing routes for shipping them, & all in double-quick time. It's all very nice for Germany, but it would destroy Japan.
*Japan couldn't fight Britain in East Asia without fighting the USA. I've already covered that.