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You are probably right but perhaps using the current existing design of the Type 26 and modifying it for specific USN needs could speed things along and save a few dollars. The ships will still be built in the US with US weapons kit. The propulsion system, RR MT30 gas turbine and MTU diesels are already being used in US ships.

As for the Chinese trimaran clone, they have enough money to build a couple and see if they are suitable for whatever. I am not a fan of LCS but the Trimaran design does work for coastal areas and requires less power. More deck space for aviation is a plus as well.
 
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John Fedup said:
Bilden has withdrawn from the SecNav position claiming too much financial distress was necessary to meet ethics guidelines. The article mentions that Mattis preferred Bilden over Forbes, something I was not aware of.

https://news.usni.org/2017/02/26/philip-bilden-withdraws-secnav
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That article includes a brilliant summary of what will happen if new orders are not placed in a timely manner, I.e. exactly what happened in Australian shipbuilding between the last of the River Class DEs and the Australian built FFGs, between the ANZACs and the Hobarts, and what is happening again right now. As each phase of a project completes those workers are redundant to requirements and have to go elsewhere, even if they are reassigned instead of made redundant, they still are not practicing the skills needed for the next project. This, as always, no matter where it occurs, results in delays, cost over runs and quality issues when a new project eventually kicks off.

As counter intuitive as it may seem it is usually cheaper to build additional ships than to let the capability to build them wither. It has been shown to be the case in Australia, the UK and Canada, the US will be no different. They need to keep ordering LCS or minimum change FF variants of them until a new frigate design is ready or they will end up wasting more than the additional ships would have cost.
 
Integrating ESSM would go a long way toward making it a more effective escort in a scenario absent an AEGIS ship and would help mute protest to the new FG. Was the objection to incorporating a Mk 41 VLS purely a cost issue? The alternative Frigate solutions being discussed are mini-AEGIS designs.
 
colay1 said:
Integrating ESSM would go a long way toward making it a more effective escort in a scenario absent an AEGIS ship and would help mute protest to the new FG. Was the objection to incorporating a Mk 41 VLS purely a cost issue? The alternative Frigate solutions being discussed are mini-AEGIS designs.
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An eight cell Mk-41 or even a couple of Mk-56 are a no brainer as ESSM pretty much out performs SM-1 and is even evolving a terminal / last ditch ABM capability. The issue is probably more on the sensor and combat system side of the equation as these things require space, weight (especially top weight) and interfaces (power, cooling etc.) that the LCS designs may not have to spare.

I don't know but maybe a version of the AMDS developed for the ANZACs could fit?
 
Or perhaps the systems that willequip the MMSC being acquired by Saudi Arabia could serve as a starting point? Both LCS hull designs should accommodate some sort of AESA radar and the Mk 41 VLS.
 
colay1 said:
A couple of USN Lieutenants argue the case for the LCS. Basically they argue that there is more upside to continuing to build more LCS and address deficiencies than to terminate the program without an identified replacement in the pipeline.

http://cimsec.org/dont-give-littoral-combat-ship/30215

DON’T GIVE UP ON THE LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP
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yep, ex SecNav Mabus last farewell interviews are worth listening to...
 
The LCS is a 3000t plus fast surface combatant with a baseline self defence suite and the facility to embark mission modules dramatically enhancing their core capabilities and making those mission capabilities truly expeditionary. About the only thing I would consider adding to the baseline design is a CEAFAR type radar and if possible, even if it required a hull stretch, a strike length VLS, but not at the expense of the mission modules.

It is clear the 2009 Australian DWPs Offshore Patrol Combatant (OCV) was a poor mans LCS, and that the current OPV isn't even that, yet the commonsense of the concept is so bleedingly obvious. When you need extra patrol assets for a surge in border protection you have them, when you need extra heli decks and cargo space for HADR, you have it, as you do when you need hydrography post disaster to open up ports and trade routes. All stuff an LCS or OCV is designed to do that a 5000t plus frigate is eight unable to do, or wasted doing.

Stunning in these days of 3000t plus minor combatants, that the average punter thinks need to be bigger and more frigate like, there are also (often the same) people insisting frigates shouldn't be bigger than 6-7000t.
 
Re LCS, what was the idea behind making LCS so much faster than rest of the fleet?
I assume it is so they can operate alone close to shore in a contested environment with less risk, but not sure if my assumption is correct.
 
rjtjrt said:
Re LCS, what was the idea behind making LCS so much faster than rest of the fleet?
I assume it is so they can operate alone close to shore in a contested environment with less risk, but not sure if my assumption is correct.
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IIRC the intent was for the LCS to have fast transit times so that a vessel based outside of an area could be rapidly deployed where needed. Keep in mind the LCS was to replace two classes of MCM vessel, as well as a FFG class in USN service.

A key part of the idea was that the mission modules would permit rapid changes between missions that an individual LCS could perform.

From my POV, it was another of the less than successful transformative efforts under SecDef Rumsfeld's 2nd watch.

In order to be ocean-going, fast, and able to operate in shallow water (to a degree), the designs had to be roughly the size of a frigate, though tending to have a broader beam. The designs also had to be of comparatively low displacement relative to their volume. One unfortunate impact of needing to keep the displacement so low, is that the base armament of an LCS is quite limited for a warship of it's size, and there is a limited displacement available for mission modules. I could be mistaken, but IIRC the 'extra' displacement available for mission modules is in the realm of 100 dwt.

A further issue with the LCS is that the development of the mission modules has been problematic, which has also been complicated by the need to keep the mission module displacement so low. This has limited the range of modules available. It has also been found that the time to change between roles, while faster than to change the role of a more conventional vessel during a dockyard refit, can still take several weeks.

While I support keeping the shipyards occupied with orders to maintain the pool of skilled labour, I would very much like to see a more servicable replacement for the LCS classes selected and ordered. Failing that, if the shipyards could be tasked with building more DDG's.
 
Todjaeger said:
IIRC the intent was for the LCS to have fast transit times so that a vessel based outside of an area could be rapidly deployed where needed. Keep in mind the LCS was to replace two classes of MCM vessel, as well as a FFG class in USN service.

A key part of the idea was that the mission modules would permit rapid changes between missions that an individual LCS could perform.

From my POV, it was another of the less than successful transformative efforts under SecDef Rumsfeld's 2nd watch.

In order to be ocean-going, fast, and able to operate in shallow water (to a degree), the designs had to be roughly the size of a frigate, though tending to have a broader beam. The designs also had to be of comparatively low displacement relative to their volume. One unfortunate impact of needing to keep the displacement so low, is that the base armament of an LCS is quite limited for a warship of it's size, and there is a limited displacement available for mission modules. I could be mistaken, but IIRC the 'extra' displacement available for mission modules is in the realm of 100 dwt.

A further issue with the LCS is that the development of the mission modules has been problematic, which has also been complicated by the need to keep the mission module displacement so low. This has limited the range of modules available. It has also been found that the time to change between roles, while faster than to change the role of a more conventional vessel during a dockyard refit, can still take several weeks.

While I support keeping the shipyards occupied with orders to maintain the pool of skilled labour, I would very much like to see a more servicable replacement for the LCS classes selected and ordered. Failing that, if the shipyards could be tasked with building more DDG's.
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Agreed, As far I as understand the plan is still to replace with a more lethal FFG with RFPs due this year and a decision NLT 2018. Also looking like some of the upgrades will be retrofitted to existing LCS hulls, especially the ASM (deck boxes tested with NSM and Harpoon)

Navy Wants LCS ‘Frigate’ Upgrade A Year Earlier: 2018, Not 2019 « Breaking Defense - Defense industry news, analysis and commentary
 
I have a different perspective on LCS to most and while not overly impressed with it's execution I am in favour of the concept.

The US Navy is massive and more able to absorb the overheads of single role ships / platforms than pretty much any other navy, throw in the fact they are supported in certain mission sets by organisations that conduct duties other nations usually assign to their navies, that is the Coast Guard especially but also Customs, even the US Army logistics / landing craft / ship capability and other organisations, they have less need to concern themselves with the low end of the equation.

However the USN still needs to cover off mine warfare, inshore / littoral patrol / SF support / ASW / anti surface, in an expeditionary setting. These missions are currently conducted by a range of specialised ships and craft that are not really suited for anything but their designed role. These craft could be replaced by uuv/usv/uav based capabilities added to major combatants or deployed by large amphibious vessels, but due to their size, expense and versatility will never be available in the required numbers and would likely be deployed on higher priority tasks.

To increase the numbers of destroyers and amphibs, even just to add flexible capability to the existing fleet, the USN needs more funding or to reduce costs. Steel is cheap and air is free meaning most of the acquisition costs are related to the systems on the ships, not the platform it's self, i.e. a smaller less capable destroyer, LPD, or new generation frigate, will either not be that much smaller, or cheaper, unless it is significantly less capable and flexible. End result, you are paying 70-80% the acquisition and operating cost of your big ships, for less capability in key roles and far less flexibility for supplementary roles because the shop is smaller. This means you have fewer destroyers and high end amphibs, a class of less effective, single role frigates that can't do anything the destroyers can't and are less effective and capable in the shared roles than the destroyers are, and you still need your single role MCMVs, PBs etc.

This is where the LCS concept comes in. It is baseline patrol vessel with corvette / patrol frigate level offensive and defensive capabilities that can affordably replace the single role vessels, without cutting into destroyer numbers the way a traditional guided missile frigate would. The mission modules, or more to the point, their capabilities are set, those capabilities are needed whatever ends up carrying them, the issue is do you cut into destroyer numbers building three frigate instead of two destroyers, or worse five frigates instead of four destroyers and still need the small vessels with no combat power of presence at all, or do you replace the single role craft and old frigates with a ship that cost one third what a destroyer does and leave the destroyer numbers alone?
 
Todjaeger said:
IIRC the intent was for the LCS to have fast transit times so that a vessel based outside of an area could be rapidly deployed where needed. Keep in mind the LCS was to replace two classes of MCM vessel, as well as a FFG class in USN service.

A key part of the idea was that the mission modules would permit rapid changes between missions that an individual LCS could perform.

From my POV, it was another of the less than successful transformative efforts under SecDef Rumsfeld's 2nd watch.

In order to be ocean-going, fast, and able to operate in shallow water (to a degree), the designs had to be roughly the size of a frigate, though tending to have a broader beam. The designs also had to be of comparatively low displacement relative to their volume. One unfortunate impact of needing to keep the displacement so low, is that the base armament of an LCS is quite limited for a warship of it's size, and there is a limited displacement available for mission modules. I could be mistaken, but IIRC the 'extra' displacement available for mission modules is in the realm of 100 dwt.

A further issue with the LCS is that the development of the mission modules has been problematic, which has also been complicated by the need to keep the mission module displacement so low. This has limited the range of modules available. It has also been found that the time to change between roles, while faster than to change the role of a more conventional vessel during a dockyard refit, can still take several weeks.

While I support keeping the shipyards occupied with orders to maintain the pool of skilled labour, I would very much like to see a more servicable replacement for the LCS classes selected and ordered. Failing that, if the shipyards could be tasked with building more DDG's.
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Thanks.
The speed requirement for rapid deployment without support that can keep up means LCS would presumably need robust self defence options.
Did the proposed Saudi version had more self as well as offensive systems?
 
gf0012-aust said:
swarm test conducted from LCS

https://news.usni.org/2017/03/07/vi...230426561&mc_cid=e5f7607a03&mc_eid=d7b25005c6
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Release from Naval Sea Systems Command:
Navy conducts successful missile test firing
WASHINGTON – The U.S. Navy conducted a successful structural test firing of the Surface to Surface Missile Module (SSMM) from Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) USS Detroit (LCS 7) Feb. 28 off the coast of Norfolk, Virginia.

The test marked the first launch of a missile from the SSMM from an LCS as well as the first vertical missile launched from an LCS, as part of the developmental test program for the Surface Warfare (SUW) Mission Package (MP)....
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It's great to see this program moving along. And, it's always nice to see existing systems successfully integrated onto a new platform. I still remain concerned about the AGM-114L's range in this configuration.

The vertical launch has to use a significant amount of the rocket motor's energy, and likely degrade the missiles overall range. The Hellfire "L" is already limited in its maritime surface-to-surface role with a 5 mile(8 km) range when fired in a standard horizontal/shallow ballistic mode.

I had hoped that some sort of booster motor would be attached. Though, I guess that the missile module's designed space might limit that. Since the module configuration was already designed to the dimensions of the NLOS-LS system, and the PAM/LAM missile was dimensionally similar to the Hellfire, finding space to add a booster motor might require redesigning the space.
 
rjtjrt said:
Re LCS, what was the idea behind making LCS so much faster than rest of the fleet?
I assume it is so they can operate alone close to shore in a contested environment with less risk, but not sure if my assumption is correct.
Click to expand...

I'd understood it was a requirement from the operators for close in shore insertion, stop and check, and other ops - in order to be able to move rapidly from one area to another to both do the job and avoid the counter force effort that might be deployed against it.

I doubt it was considered as an advantage for deployment because the speed requirement was drawn up when the ship was intended to be deployed in the same way as mine counter measure ships etc. The requirement to self deploy came along a little later and when that landed, I suspect the speed requirement should have been looked at again as it's had a large impact on the engineering requirement for the ship - it has about as much machinery as a Burke...
 
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