There has been recent discussion about the Chinese naval buildup on the RAN thread which has prompted me to refer to an essay in the June edition of proceedings. It’s written by Professor James Holmes the inaugural holder of the JC Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College.
The following is my amateur attempt to précis his essay and I aplolagise for not have access to a link.
His essay explores the context in which China is amassing sea power and this should help US military leaders comprehend their maritime strategy along with the forces and methods the PLA N and affiliated joint forces are deploying to fulfill their operational and strategic goals. Sea power is no longer a matter for fleets alone, air forces and strategic rocket forces can increasingly reach far out to sea and the guided missile and precision guidance age has hastened the onset of land based sea power.
The PLA has harvested all available elements of maritime might to mount forward defences of Chinese shores.
The PLA has drawn on Mao and four other maritime scholars to deliver their strategic goals.
MAO his well known tenet of “ active defence” has been rebranded as “offshore waters defence”
It makes little sense to place the homeland and adjoining waters in jeopardy for the sake of secondary enterprises in faraway seas but if the PLA could defend the homeland and Pacific interests with land based weapons, diesel submarines and fast attack craft they could spare a sizeable fleet to venture beyond Chinas geographical environs and they could enforce open seas protection without risk at home.
Therefor if the US and her allies can compete effectively in the Western Pacific they can draw Chinese forces homeward to guard China proper and relieve Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean and other areas of importance.
The US should subsequently focus on the East Asia area and apply all seaborne energies and resources there.
THE OFFSHORE CRUMPLE ZONE
Chinese anti access logic operates like a car crumple zone, some areas are sacrifices in sequence to protect the passengers.
Security for the near seas and mainland is what they treasure most further, they know they can’t erect a defensive perimeter that blocks out the US fleet altogether. What they can do is impose a high if not unbearable cost on the US fleet and their reinforcements surging westward to supplement the forward deployed forces.
In this they take inspiration from Carl Von Clausewitz who teaches that there are three ways to prevail in war, simply, one can smash, one can overawe and one can bankrupt a foe.
Therefore if China can dishearten her adversaries or drive the price so high that the US is unwilling to pay China can win without committing to a major fleet engagement.
Again Mao’s “active defence”. Forces will not try to protect a fixed outer perimeter, they will stage a fighting retreat while launching piecemeal attacks to cut the US fleet down to size in preparation somewhere in the crumple zone.
If Chinese anti access defences grow powerful enough to impose unacceptable costs on the US fleet they ,AU be even able to hold their battle fleet in reserve - why risk your fleet when you can fulfill your goals by sending expendable platforms out to the near seas to dispense punishment. This is a strategy that both Mao and Clausewitz would endorse.
MAHAN AND THE FORTRESS
The next faces of Chinese sea power are those of MAHAN and AUBE
These two foresaw maritime tactics that are only now coming into their own with the advent of long range precision guided weapons.
Mahan wrote decrying the Russian tactics of keeping the fleet in harbour under the protection of the fort guns during the Russo Japanese war of 1904-5. The protection of land based guns was erroneous as it limited fighting ships radius of action and bred timidity in commanders.
But what if the Port Arthur guns boasted both the range and accuracy of today, the Russian tactics would have been justified, they were facing a far superior Japanese fleet, the result would have been far different.
No longer is the ‘Fortress Fleet’ strategy wrong, it’s an obvious choice for China.
AUBE
The French Admiral promoted the “Jeune ecole” or young school 19th Century Naval strategy. It sought to counter the RNks ocean going hegemony, it sought to keep the RN away from French shores by harnessing asymmetric technology such as torpedoes, seagoing mines, patrol forces and submarines.
Aube’s strategies resonate today, technology has super empowered submarines and patrol craft reinforcing his “jeune ecole” strategies.
By merging jeune ecole and Fortress Fleet concepts you have a perfect solution for China’s defence.
FOOTLOOSE FLEET
Speaking at the 1908 Battleship Conference Pres. Teddy Roosevelt promoted coastal gunners and light forces as a means of guarding seaports.
This concept would free the battle fleet to roam the seas to search out and destroy a foe thus rendering the fleet “footloose”.
In this strategy both Moa and TR agree, a mass of PLA defences in the West Pacific would render the PLA fleet “footloose” and that is the goal of offshore waters defence.
If the home land is defended by “fortress fleet” and “jeune ecole” platforms the bulk of the fleet is freed to mount a regular if not permanent presence in remote waters.
CHINA’S STRATEGIC IDEAS
All these concepts add up to a strategy that the US and her allies dare not take lightly. Chinese sea power is here to stay so what should the US do about it?
first understand the concepts impelling Chines maritime strategy, sound ideas from the past make sense in a modern world, Clausewitz, Mao, Mahan, AUBE and Roosevelt would instantly understand the strategies.
Second, fashion forces and counter strategies to punch through China’s crumple zone.
Third, study Chinese operating patterns. If they have faith in homeland defence and their crumple zone they will increasingly deploy further afield in greater numbers.
Hardware and methods need developing to pierce that zone.
