The Pacific is larger than the Atlantic Ocean, and 16 times the size of the US. Operational and strategic mobility throughout this vast expanse can only be accomplished by naval forces. Land mobility is of little value in a theater where all manoeuvre is subject to the US Navy’s ability to control SLOCs, and where land maneuver space is always at a premium.
To understand Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO), the concept of manoeuvre has to encompass the entire joint force over the enormous expanses of the Indo-Pacific theater.
If the US Marine Corps is able to establish and defend key maritime terrain on which are emplaced fires-complexes capable of engaging ships and aircraft miles away, such efforts would relieve the US Navy of the responsibility of controlling a circle of the ocean. By placing A2D2 systems within the island chains, EABO gives US options.
Explain the basis of your conclusion, as I am not convinced you are on the right track in your reasoning process. Let me raise 3 points for your consideration:
One, I have serious doubt whether the C2 work in a Contested Environment. And after the US Marines land, what if they encounter enemy armour?
Two, the coming proliferation of anti-tank weapons and its evil cousin, loitering munitions, means no ship-to-shore connector, AAV, Amphibious Combat Vehicle or landing craft can conduct an opposed landing without tremendous losses against a non-state actor. The tactics adopted by non-state actors would pose a growing challenge to any military, even one as experienced in asymmetric operations as the IDF.
- Hizbollah‘s style of fighting is based on three principles: Absorption, deterrence, and attrition.
- Absorption refers to the organization’s ability to withstand attack or retaliation. Hizbollah has sought to maximize its absorption capacities by building intricate systems of underground tunnels and bunkers across southern Lebanon, which it uses to store and transfer weapons and fighters from one combat zone to another, and as shelter from IDF retaliation.
- In regard to deterrence and attrition, both refer to Hizbollah’s ability to keep up its fight against Israel without suffering total destruction, thus drawing out the conflict to such an extent that it becomes difficult to bear the cost of sustaining it. Hizbollah’s massive arsenal ensures that Israeli towns and civilians will suffer a constant barrage of rockets and missiles. In order to destroy this arsenal and the infrastructure used to deploy it, Israel needs a combined air, ground, and sea attack.
- To be successful, however, Israel will need to overcome Hezbollah’s advanced anti-air and anti-ship weapons, countless booby traps and ambushes, abduction attempts, advanced anti-tank missiles, and many other challenges.
Three, the
Force Design 2030 document identifies the importance of war games, and many of these were classified. Without access to these classified documents on the threat matrix — how can you have such confidence in raising a valid critique?
Let me throw in some disconnected thoughts — as the changes confuse me.
The US Army has more tanks than the US Marines but even with the support of US Navy vessels or US Marines assets, they are not relevant to the littoral fight. And they are investing to certain capabilities, like active protection systems, Future Vertical Lift, the Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft and the Extended Range Cannon Artillery to stay relevant to the multi-domain battle.
The US Air Force after seeing the war plans and equipment purchases of Sweden and Singapore, in our preparation to fight in the littorals, has an epiphany and started to invest in the Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile – Extended Range, the LRSM anti-ship missile and the AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon to stay relevant to the multi-domain battle.
Why is that?
In 2004, the Swedish Government received a request from the US Navy to lease HSwMS Gotland, a Swedish-flagged, commanded and manned, for a duration of one year for use in anti-submarine exercises. HSwMS Gotland is a small Swedish submarine displacing 1,600 tons. Yet despite making multiple attacks runs on the USS Reagan, in all 2005 exercises, the HSwMS Gotland was never detected. And Sweden is in the process of developing the even more capable Blekinge-class submarine.
Why did the US Navy’s carrier task force of numerous anti-submarine escorts consistently fail against HSwMS Gotland?
Conceptually, if an aggressor invests enough time and effort, they can defeat the armies of countries like Sweden. The Russians (by extension the US Navy and Marines) are the notional enemy that the Swedish Army trains against. They have a plan to make the aggressor pay a high price in blood and treasure to achieve any of its goals.
But even the Swedish model has its problems. The fact that the Swedish Army shrank from 32 army brigades to 2 during the last 30 years suggests that either the mission or the doctrine should be changed, or both. Since the Army does not choose its mission (to defend Sweden), and there is no sign of significantly increased resources for the Swedish Armed Forces, the only alternative is to adapt the doctrine to the current mission and available resources.
As one study demonstrates, if the doctrine does not change, the Swedish Army may not even be able to meet the Supreme Commander’s statement that the Swedish Armed Forces only can defend Sweden in one defined area for one week once the changes are in place.
Agreed.
www.australiandefence.com.au
. And so far I don't see enough solutions coming out of the USMC for landing Marines against an opposing force.
www.thedrive.com
csbaonline.org
govtribe.com
